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ABSTRACT
THE SMUGGLERS’ LANDSCAPE:
GEOGRAPHY, ROUTE SELECTION AND THE GLOBAL HEROIN TRADE
James Dallis Medler 
Old Dominion University, 2004 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
This study focuses on transnational smuggling, and puts forth an analytical 
framework from the smugglers’ perspective with respect to route selection, focusing 
primarily on aspects of economic, political, and human geography. It is predicated on 
three interconnected decision-making domains that constitute the smuggler’s operational 
landscape, namely access, risk and connectivity, which interact to drive the smugglers’ 
perceptions of route attractiveness. The first two domains operate reciprocally, primarily 
at the national level of analysis, and together both shape and are shaped by the third at the 
transnational level to form a feedback loop. With respect to connectivity, the convention 
of the smuggling vector is also introduced.
As a benchmark commodity, heroin is used to demonstrate the utility of this 
approach with the primary aim of applying and validating the generic geographic 
smuggling model, meant to be extensible in terms of space, time and commodity. A 
review of the literature, focusing on the range of smuggled commodities, the nature and 
evolution of smuggling actors, the complex relationship between smuggling networks 
and nation-states, and potential modes of transportation by land, water and air. A 
discussion of the spatial parameters of the global heroin trade itself, with specific 
reference to the geography of supply and demand, is also undertaken.
For case studies, Afghanistan has been chosen as one of the two largest opium
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cultivators worldwide, as well as by virtue of its recent and dramatic history. In addition 
to established cocaine smuggling routes and methods, Colombia has also become a 
primary heroin source country with respect to the U.S. market. Finally, Nigeria is a 
known transit hub without being a center of production, demonstrating that factors other 
than mere proximity can be decisive.
Each case study first examines those geographic and historical factors that shape 
heroin smuggling at the national level, focusing on the themes of terrain, tradition and 
domestic turmoil, before considering the various sets of smuggling vectors that proceed 
outward via various modes and points of transit to their final destinations. This 
methodology not only highlights data gaps inherent in analyzing black markets, but also 
optimizes extant sources of information.
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The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) cast the need for the global 
community to effectively deal with organized criminal activity that transcends national 
borders into sharp relief. Given the ongoing reaction to this event, with regard to both the 
nation-state itself and the wider international system, the post-Cold War era may now be 
truly seen as a time when concern over transnational security threats has reached parity 
with the more traditional state-versus-state calculus of power. In this context, the term 
“transnational” is used to refer to the movement of information, money, physical objects, 
people, or other tangible or intangible items across national boundaries, when at least one 
of the actors involved in this movement is non-governmental.1
While terrorism has become most prominent aspect of such transnational criminal 
activity, it is intertwined with a number of related phenomena and enabling factors. 
Similarly, though perhaps prosaic by comparison, the ability of various types of groups to 
successfully engage in smuggling, namely the illegal movement of goods across 
international borders or jurisdictions, nonetheless lies at the heart of many of these non­
state actors’ capabilities. For instance, in addition to providing logistical support for 
terrorist and other armed groups, the movement of various proscribed commodities across 
international borders for profit is both globally endemic and highly lucrative.
This paper follows the format requirements o f Kate L. Turabian, A Manual fo r Writers o f  Term Papers, 
Theses, and Dissertations, 6th ed., rev. John Grossman and Alice Bennett (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1996).
1 This definition comes from Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona, “The United Nations and Transnational 
Organized Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), 4-5.
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Moreover, smuggling forms an essential component of numerous other 
transnational criminal enterprises, ranging from intellectual property and copyright 
violations to illegal immigration, and from the fencing of stolen property to the potential 
placement of weapons of mass destruction.2 According to Robert Mandel, among the 
most pressing transnational concerns within this issue area are the smuggling of drugs, 
arms, migrants and hazardous materials. These also parallel what Moise Naim refers to 
as the “five wars of globalization,” namely the challenges of controlling the illegal trade 
in drugs, arms, intellectual property, migrants and money at the global level.4 Finally, a 
host of other illegal activities often support smuggling in turn, including bribery, forgery, 
money laundering, and both the threat and use of violence.
Much of this activity takes place at the direction, or at least under the auspices, of 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the nature and evolution of which are 
discussed at greater length in the next chapter.5 Incidentally, alternative labels
2 The various manifestations o f  this activity are discussed at greater length in Appendix A, “Typology of 
Smuggled Goods.”
3 Robert Mandel, “Deadly transfers, national hypocrisy, and global chaos,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 
2 (Winter 1999), 307-31.
4 Moises Naim, “The five wars of globalization,” Foreign Policy, January-February 2003, 28-37. For a 
more extensive overview o f this phenomenon, see also Edgardo Rotman, “The globalization o f criminal 
violence,” Cornell Journal o f  Law and Public Policy 10, no. 1 (Fall 2000), 1-42.
5 The concept o f TCOs will be referred to prominently throughout this study. As such, it is useful to put 
forth a working definition o f  the term from the outset. To begin with, the U.S. law enforcement community 
considers any “continuing and self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy, having an organized structure, fed by 
fear and corruption, and motivated by greed” as a criminal organization. This definition comes from U.S. 
Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: GPO, December 
2000), Ch. I, 4, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/Dub45270index.html. accessed 15 July 2004. 
Furthermore, the same source notes the following as common characteristics o f  most TCOs: seeking 
financial gain; requiring member loyalty through ethnicity and family considerations; pursuing the 
corruption of government officials; a hierarchical structure; diversity in terms o f types o f  crimes; an 
organizational maturity that transcends individual personalities; and multi-jurisdictional activities.
However, one o f the most succinct definitions o f TCOs as “organized crime groups that have a home base 
in one state but operate in one or more host states where there are favorable market opportunities,” comes 
from Williams and Savona, 6. This definition will be taken as a point of departure, with aspects o f its 
underlying concepts discussed at length within the context o f this analysis. For more on this issue, see also
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encompassing this issue include international, global or multinational organized crime, as 
well as the more disconcertingly nonjudgmental “gray-area phenomenon.”6 However, at 
this juncture it is sufficient to note, as does Peter Andreas, that while such groups engage 
in numerous types of illegal activity, “the cross-border dimension of their business 
largely involves smuggling in one form or another.”
While most studies of illegal activity tend to approach issues from the law 
enforcement point of view, in this instance the analysis is consciously skewed toward 
assessing the most logical course of action in specific operational environments from the 
smugglers’ perspective. This dissertation examines how, in an age of increasing 
globalization and logistical sophistication, the actual routes and methods by which black 
market commodities make their way from supply to demand areas shift in accordance 
with the smugglers’ perceptions of how, and where, such business can be most 
expeditiously and profitably transacted. As such, this activity may be seen as following 
the paths of least resistance, or those routes that are the most attractive to the relevant 
smuggling actor in terms of offering the highest profits with the least risk of compromise.
Phil Williams, “Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” Transnational 
Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 60-6.
6 Peter A. Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation-State,” Transnational Organized 
Crime 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 21-48. Broadly speaking, this issue can become very taxonomically 
confusing if  one chooses. As an example, by one definition, transnational criminals are those based in one 
country who cross international borders to commit crimes before returning home. Alternately, international 
criminals are characterized as tending to establish ongoing illegal enterprises in two or more countries. 
David L Carter, “International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Crime,” in 
Understanding O rganized Crime in G lobal Perspective , ed. Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 139. To avoid this, throughout this study the term “TCO” will be 
used generically to delineate a relatively wide range o f  actors, with the specific context set forth as 
necessary. For instance, it is the author’s contention that many terrorist groups in fact can fit the definition 
o f a TCO, provided they extend their operations across national borders to undertake various types o f  
illegal activities, particularly with respect to funding.
7 Peter Andreas, “Smuggling Wars: Law Enforcement and Law Evasion in a Changing World,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 76.
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The focus of this study is on the parameters of this geographic attractiveness as it 
influences smuggling route selection, both at the national and transnational levels of 
analysis. As such, in some ways the responsive behavior of smuggling actors resembles 
the type of two-level game described by Robert Putnam.8 Similarly, in framing this issue 
with respect to legitimate commerce, Toby B. Gooley notes the four main factors 
determining route selection are physical infrastructure, proximity to suppliers and 
consumers, political and tax considerations, and international trade conditions.9 
However, as smuggling actors engage in their operations, additional dimensions must be 
taken into account in assessing the path of least resistance.
For instance, in his excellent book on the global drug trade, Paul B. Stares cites 
the need for an understanding not only of illegal economic activity itself, but also the 
forces that shape it. These factors include, but are not limited to, economic liberalization, 
globalization, political developments in key countries, and geographic advantages and 
constraints.10 An added dimension is the sheer growth of world trade as a complicating 
factor. In response to higher volumes of import and exports in which contraband can be 
concealed, national governments are also under pressure to lower trade barriers and 
streamline customs procedures. This in turn helps to multiply the number of unmonitored 
international transactions that can be exploited.
In general, there are three overriding themes that emerge from the analysis of the 
smugglers’ landscape. The first is that, while smuggling can be found across the globe,
8 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic o f two-level games,” International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), 427-60.
9 Toby B. Gooley, “The Geography o f Logistics,” Logistics Management & Distribution Report 37, no.l 
(January 1998), 63-5.
10 Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1996), passim. Incidentally, numerous others have also noted the impact o f  these factors, all o f  
which will be examined at further length in the next chapter.
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the terrain, traditions and domestic turmoil of certain nations can make them particularly 
attractive to smugglers. This notion of attractiveness becomes more readily apparent in 
the context of the case studies, and forms the crux of the national level of analysis. A 
second and related observation is that despite their often greater resources, in geographic 
terms national actors are more highly circumscribed in their actions than transnational 
ones, while at the same time the level of cooperation between states necessary to 
effectively counter smuggling at the transnational level is generally lacking. Finally, the 
degree to which various black markets are interrelated at all levels, often in fact directly 
linked by various forms of illegal transactions, must be recognized and taken into 
account.
As Shona Morrison points out, among other rationales for a strategic approach to 
the analysis of smuggling is to more effectively allocate limited national resources, as 
such decisions are often made more in response to immediate threats than in 
consideration of less tangible future activity. The natural result of this tendency is that 
most models tend to focus strictly on the routes that are being used at any given point in 
time, rather than the dynamics that either shape these routes or their potential successors. 
As such, a deeper understanding smuggling route attractiveness, or the reasons why 
smugglers exhibit a preference for one route over another, as well as how these 
perceptions change over time, is necessary.11
More broadly, in addition to calling for more sophisticated methodologies that are 
not necessarily predicated on a rigid preoccupation with numbers, Phil Williams observes 
that an important endeavor of data collection and analysis relating to transnational
11 Shona Morrison, “The Dynamics of Illicit Drug Transshipment and Potential Transit Points for 
Australia,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 1-2.
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organized crime should be anticipating developments and even, potentially, detecting 
anomalies in predicted outcomes. Echoing Morrison, he also stresses the need to put 
particular emphasis on the dynamics of illegal activity. In particular, this includes, but is 
not limited to, the possible redistribution of criminal activity from one region to another; 
the efforts of TCOs to co-opt legitimate political and economic actors; their expansion 
into new market niches; and the formation of cooperative relationships.12
The various manifestations of transnational smuggling phenomena are determined 
to a high degree by an exceedingly complex set of physical, political, economic and 
human factors that shape the parameters of smugglers’ decision-making, particularly at 
the national level of analysis.13 Given the spatial component inherent to each of these 
dimensions, the common interface among these discrete sets of variables can be seen as 
geographic in nature. Collectively, this template of the smugglers’ operational 
environment is referred to throughout this analysis as the smugglers’ landscape. To 
illustrate the dynamics that shape this landscape, the specific benchmark commodity 
under scrutiny throughout this study is heroin, though trade interactions with other illegal 
goods are also addressed as they arise.
As David G. Hansen notes in discussing the strategic utility of geographic 
analysis, “The ageographical quality of our world causes many of us to overlook the 
geographical motives for behavior.”14 As such, an important aim of this study is to
12 Williams, “Organizing Transnational Crime,” 82-5.
13 The concept o f complexity, or how discrete elements organize themselves into complicated structures 
that emerge with apparent spontaneity and adapt over time, has itself evolved into a subject o f study. In the 
context o f the philosophy o f science, for instance, parallels among complex systems ranging from 
ecosystems and economies to physics and meteorology are drawn in M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity:
The Emerging Science at the Edge o f  Order and Chaos (New York: Touchstone / Simon & Schuster,
1992).
14 David G. Hansen, “The Immutable Importance o f Geography,” Parameters XXVII (Spring 1997), 59.
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demonstrate the utility of spatial analysis or explaining observable patterns of black 
market activity, in this case the transportation of illicit goods. Rather than a categorical 
distribution, such as those seen in statistical analyses, spatial analysis centers on 
variations spread out along a surface. The inherent challenge is to meaningfully elaborate 
upon those factors that constitute the dominant selection criteria used by international 
criminal organizations, either deliberately or by default, to determine the attractiveness of 
a particular transnational smuggling route.
An important precedent for a geographical approach to the analysis of black 
market logistics can be found in various reports issued previously by the now-defunct 
Paris-based Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues (OGD), specifically with reference to 
the issue area of drug trafficking.15 However, there are two distinct differences between 
those efforts and this one. First, an attempt has been made to develop a more systematic 
framework for the analysis of smuggling trends and patterns than those found previously. 
Second, this framework is not, in theory, limited to the smuggling of drugs, but rather 
consciously designed as an open architecture able to accommodate a wide range of 
contraband.
This study is predicated upon the idea that transnational smuggling route selection 
is a function of smugglers’ spatial perceptions regarding the relative attractiveness of 
available routes, filtered through the decision-making domains of access, risk and 
connectivity. While the various aspects and interactions of these decision-making 
domains are discussed below, the overriding goal is to develop a means of sorting diverse
15 As o f this writing, the final report put out by this organization was Observatoire Geopolitique de Drogues 
(OGD), The World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 1998 /1 9 9 9  (Paris: OGD, April 2000). Since then, its work has 
been superseded by that o f the Association d’Etudes Geopolitique des Drogues (AEGD, or Centre for 
Geopolitical Drug Studies).
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data points, observations, trends and events that shed light on the phenomenon of 
transnational smuggling. As such, this smuggling template is developed first in its 
generic form without reference to a specific commodity, and then applied to the global 
trade in heroin.
The Smugglers ’ Perspective: Initial Assumptions
Before expanding upon the conceptual framework that underpins this study, it is 
first necessary to place transnational smuggling phenomena in context to circumscribe 
and more meaningfully address the issue. To facilitate this task, a number of assumptions 
must be made in advance. Despite being initially put forth in this section, however, many 
of these themes are expanded upon in greater length in the context of subsequent 
chapters.
As noted above, within this conceptualization the cornerstone of the smugglers’ 
landscape is geography. From this perspective, the unifying principle among those 
physical, economic, political and human factors that have a direct impact upon the 
smuggling landscape is their spatial elements. Thus, in order to navigate through their 
complex landscape, smugglers must rely either consciously or subconsciously on an 
underlying framework of geographic logic in order to select among possible routes to 
determine which is the most attractive.
This assertion itself rests upon two main assumptions. The first and most basic of 
these is that there in fact exists a fundamental link between these various aspects of 
geography and transnational smuggling activity that is analogous in many ways to that 
between geography and more legitimate commercial activity. The second is that, ceteris
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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paribus, smuggling route selection tends tend to follow the path of least resistance, as 
noted above, with respect to the overall smuggling landscape as contraband moves from 
point of origin to final destination.
As such, it is taken as a given that black market economic activity, as well as licit 
commerce, is inextricably connected to physical geography.16 As evidence of this, in 
many respects transnational smuggling patterns seem to correspond geographically to 
those of legitimate trade. Similarly, globalization in its many manifestations has greatly 
increased opportunities for both licit and illicit trade. As a result, policies of economic 
liberalization, such as the removal of trade barriers, can be seen as facilitating the 
movement of smuggled goods as well. With respect to economic geography, smuggling 
can certainly be seen to follow those spatial conduits that ensure the highest relative rate 
of return, even if that route is not the most direct one available. Thus, the trade-offs 
between profitability and risk in determining the attractiveness of a given route become 
readily apparent.
Moreover, the geography of transnational smuggling is obviously shaped by the 
international political landscape as well. The interaction between economics and politics 
within this issue area are readily apparent, given nation-states’ desires to control their 
borders. In particular, the variable porosity exhibited by the world’s many borders 
testifies to the wide range of capabilities among nation-states in this respect.17 Finally,
16 With respect to the interaction between economics and geography, Paul Krugman notes that “the subject 
o f economic geography is important in itself; it sheds light on international economics, and it is a valuable 
laboratory o f understanding economics in general.” Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, Gaston Eyskens 
Lecture Series (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Leuven, Belgium: Leuven Universtiy Press, 1991), xi.
17 This issue will be discussed at much greater length in the next chapter. However, for a more traditional 
analysis o f logistics within the realm o f legitimate commerce, see Gooley, 63-6; and, more 
comprehensively, Donald F. Wood and James C. Johnson, Contemporary Transportation, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Macmillen Publishing Company, 1989).
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human factors such as demographic and migration patterns also have a definite and 
discernible impact on transnational smuggling activity.
As this proposed geographic smuggling framework has been consciously 
designed as an open architecture that is both functional and extensible in nature, it can in 
theory accommodate any illicit commodity. Thus, a corollary assumption is that, in the 
illegal movement of disparate goods, certain analogous dynamics exist that transcend the 
specific attributes of the commodities themselves. The smugglers’ decision-making 
process can thus be analyzed regardless of the commodity in question, given the 
appropriate parameters. In its broadest application, such a generic analytical framework 
can serve as the basis for the generation of various permutations depicting the movement 
of a wide range of illegal goods, given the geospatial and other data inputs of supply and 
demand as dictated by the relevant black markets.
The final assumption to be made is that the transnational smuggling activity is 
question be primarily motivated by profit, which is incidentally almost always 
commensurate with risk. While it is by no means accurate to say that such enterprises are 
never undertaken for other than economic purposes, there are a number of reasons for 
circumscribing the discussion in this manner. To begin with, in both conceptual and 
practical terms, this allows the actions of smugglers to be characterized more 
homogeneously as those of relatively rational economic actors, as opposed to those 
underpinned by potentially idiosyncratic and diverse political agendas.
For instance, as mentioned at the outset, smuggling is often linked both explicitly 
and implicitly to terrorism, in many respects a valid association that is assessed further in 
the next chapter. Despite obvious commonalties, however, by its nature smuggling is
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qualitatively different from terrorism. For instance, terrorist acts tend to be singular and 
dramatic occurrences, generally devastating in intent and, when successful, in execution, 
and usually involving perpetrators, victims and some sort of message or demand directed 
toward a larger target and a wider audience.
By contrast, smuggling activity can be functionally represented most accurately as 
an ongoing activity represented by a series of discrete iterations. As such, it is best 
conceptualized as more of a process than as an event, and in this respect has more in 
common with other economically motivated crimes such as for-profit extortion, hostage- 
taking or piracy. In turn, the goal of the nation-state in countering terrorism is geared 
toward total threat elimination, while smuggling countermeasures generally serve to raise 
the risk threshold of doing business in a given venue above acceptable limits and to thus 
increase the probability of an unsuccessful transaction. While smuggling can certainly 
form an adjunct to crimes motivated primarily by politics rather than economics, in 
nearly every instance and particularly where middlemen are involved, there is almost 
always some form of profit incentive at work as well.18
However, an excellent example of politically motivated smuggling can be found 
in the various scenarios of terrorist groups moving weapons of mass destruction into a
18 This issue will be dealt with at greater length in next chapter. However, the following passage, though 
somewhat lengthy, illustrates the convergence o f these different types of organizations: “With the 
substantial decrease in state-sponsored support, many insurgencies and extremist groups reach out to 
criminal networks to acquire arms and supplies that cannot be obtained through more traditional or 
legitimate channels. Unlike insurgent groups, criminal groups are well connected to outside gray market 
arms merchants, transportation coordinators, money launderers, and other specialists who can provide the 
weapons and other logistics support once given by state sponsors. Organized crime groups are also more 
likely than armed illegal political, ideological, or religious movements to have stables o f corrupt contacts in 
customs, immigration, and other law enforcement authorities to facilitate the smuggling o f weapons and 
other contraband to extremist and insurgent groups. Armed groups are also turning to criminals to acquire 
high-technology items, like encryption software or global positioning equipment, that are otherwise 
unobtainable.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 6-7.
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target country via established commercial channels.19 Though for the most part such 
cases fall beyond the bounds of this discussion, an assessment of the ulterior motives 
involved in transnational criminal activity that encompasses smuggling as a constituent 
element can serve to sharpen the analytical approach set forth herein. While both the 
confluence and divergence between economic and political agendas definitely exists, the 
focus here remains on the former, though the latter is addressed as it arises in context.
Under this set of assumptions, the smuggler is thus best seen as an opportunist 
responding to the conditions inherent to a specific operational landscape, working under a 
framework of bounded rationality, and filling a niche left vacant by more conventional 
economic entities. Most often, the smuggling of particular commodities is presented in 
terms of a security threat, a purely economic activity or a development issue, as is 
discussed in the next chapter. However, an analytical framework based on geography 
can encompass the most pertinent elements of each approach onto a common template in 
order to model the landscape that smuggled commodities must move through.
The Smugglers ’ Landscape: Access, Risk and Connectivity 
To begin developing a generic geographic smuggling model, there are several 
issues that need to be addressed from the outset. The first is to set the initial context of 
the discussion with respect to the broader dimensions of geographic analysis. The second 
is to conceptualize access, risk and connectivity as they apply to the smugglers’ decision­
making processes with respect to route selection and the resultant accrual of expected
19 As o f  this writing, this issue has become increasingly more prominent. See, for instance, Michael 
Richardson, “Countries join with the U.S. to screen cargo for terrorist shipments,” International Herald 
Tribune, 23 September 2002,3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
profits. Finally, the analytical framework representing the parameters of the smugglers’ 
landscape must be fully rendered, taking into account both decision-making domains that 
shape the smugglers’ perceptions of the relative attractiveness for a given route.
As a point of departure, the diagram below highlights the three primary 
conceptual axes of geographic analysis, namely those relating to space, time and 
perspective. In terms of the spatial axis, although the smuggling route selection criteria 
can be applied across various levels of analysis, the explicit focus is on smuggling routes 
originating in one nation and then crossing international borders. The temporal axis 
highlights changes to the smuggling landscape over time. Finally, the perspectives of 
various geographic disciplines form the fundamental parameters of black market 







20 This diagram is adapted from Bruce Mittchell, Geography and Resources Analysis, 2nd ed. (New York: 
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Building upon these three axes, the generic spatial model put forth to assess the 
decision-making process governing smuggling route selection falls into three distinct, 
though interrelated, domains. As mentioned previously, these are access, risk and 
connectivity. Each of these three decision-making domains can be seen to have a distinct 
spatial dimension with respect to physical, economic, political and human geography. 
However, having returned to the framework implied by these discrete decision-making 
domains, a clarification of terms becomes necessary.
To begin with, in this context access is most simply defined as the smugglers’ 
degree of confidence in and control of a smuggled commodity throughout the logistical 
process, determined primarily at the national level. This has been modified slightly from 
traditional logistical usage, that of a nodal attribute that measures the effort necessary to 
reach all other nodes or certain nodes from a given node within a network. Rather than a 
more common, static formulation, such as the various methods that topographically 
examines the number of links between point A and point B, in this representation a more 
dynamic process serves to illustrate this basic attribute of the smugglers’ decision-making 
criteria.21 However, as Eugene Van Cleef notes, “Access should not be confused with 
mere distance. It does not necessarily imply nearness.”22
In this conceptualization, access encompasses all the potential efforts that a 
smuggling actor can take to maximize operational efficiency in moving contraband
an analytical framework in three dimensions for the analysis o f  natural resources in terms o f  factors such as 
dispersal, allocation, demand and distribution. In that context, it may be seen as an ancillary tool for 
resource management and development.
21 Examples o f standard accessibility measures with respect to a given network include the beta index, 
which compares the number o f links in a network with the number o f available nodes; the gamma index, 
which compares the actual number o f links with the maximum number; and the Shimbel index, which 
measures the minimum number o f links necessary to connect one node with all nodes in the network.
22 Eugene Van Cleef, Trade Centers and Trade Routes (New York: D. Appleton -  Century Co., 1937), 13.
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through a logistical network linking points of origin to final destinations, by extension 
increasing the probability of a successful transaction and the its resultant profits. As 
such, it represents a highly divergent set of factors that the transnational smuggling can at 
least attempt to control, and that in turn can actively cause a given route to be perceived 
as more or less attractive.
By contrast, those factors that serve to impede access, often referred to as friction 
of distance, fall under the heading of risk. As such, with respect to smuggling, risk may 
be defined as the probability that the use of a given smuggling route will result in a 
successful transaction, with the implication that there are forces at work that may either 
intentionally or unintentionally be working to reduce that probability. In terms of the 
path of least resistance, risk is resistance. Moreover, the inverse correlation between risk 
and profit in practical terms is also worth reiterating at this juncture.
In his extensive study of the evolution of risk as a concept, Peter L. Bernstein 
writes, “The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have 
some control over the outcome while minimizing the areas where we have no control 
over the outcome and the linkage between cause and effect is hidden from us.”23 Risk 
may be thought of as the consequences of an undesirable event, multiplied by the 
probability of its occurrence. In even simpler terms, risk may be thought of as the set of 
factors that tend to “push” smuggling activity toward different routes by making a given 
route relatively less attractive, as opposed to those that serve to “pull” such activity to the
23 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story o f  Risk (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1996), 197.
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given route by enabling smugglers’ access and thus increasing that route’s 
attractiveness.24
Risk management for smuggling actors, as well as other entities, is the process of 
avoiding controllable risks and planning for uncontrollable risks. Though not the sole 
extant factor, interference emanating from the nation-state can be seen as the primary 
source of smugglers’ risk, as noted above, though an unsuccessful smuggling transaction 
could also be the result of accident, natural disaster or the actions of other non-state 
actors. However, it is interesting to note that risks that can be surmounted may serve to 
make the resultant reward that much greater in terms of profit margin. After all, the 
Chinese character for risk is composed of two distinct components, one denoting 
“danger” and the other “opportunity.”
Finally, connectivity may be defined with respect to the decision-making process 
related to the actual modes of transportation and methods of concealment used to 
transport smuggled commodities across international borders. The traditional usage of 
the term refers to the attribute of a network that measures the number of links necessary 
to reach all nodes from all other nodes. It is always an aggregate characteristic that refers 
to the network as a whole rather than a single node. In other words, connectivity is the 
level of effort needed to reach across a given network.
In practical terms, and as a dynamic concept, connectivity can only be assessed 
via observation of the various routes taken during smuggling transactions across multiple 
iterations. Intuitively speaking, the adage of one’s reach exceeding their grasp is
24 A concise introduction to risk concepts can be found in U.S. Coast Guard, “Risk 101” (Washington, DC: 
USCG, December 1999), available at http://www.uscg.mil/ha/gm/risk/old%5Fsite/about/risk%5F101.htm. 
accessed 15 July 2004. For a more extensive discussion, see also Bernstein, passim.
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germane, if one thinks of access as representing a given smuggling actor’s grasp, while 
access minus risk stands for their reach. In this context, connectivity is the geographic 
manifestation of this balance and empirically represents the path of least resistance. The 








Fig. 2. Generic smuggling model: domains of decision-making
The underlying rationale for this generic smuggling model is that, for a given 
smuggling event, smuggling route selection is primarily dependent on the smugglers’ 
attempt to maximize access and minimize risk, in an effort reach optimal connectivity, 
which as noted above is analogous to the path of least resistance. Furthermore, decisions 
regarding connectivity will in turn effect future perceptions of both access and risk,
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depending on the success of the route selected, in a form of feedback that serves to close 
the loop and pave the way for subsequent decision-making. To continue this train of 
thought, the following diagram serves to delineated the most relevant levels of analysis, 
as well as some of the key factors that allow smuggling to flourish, a set of issues 


















Fig. 3. The smugglers’ landscape: a functional schematic
From the smuggler’s point of view, the balance between maximization of access 
and minimization of risk are the key determinants of specific geographic routes and 
modes of transportation at the national level. Simultaneously, connectivity reflects the 
transnational business climate facing a given smuggling actor, as reflected in the dynamic
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interaction between access and risk across all national territories situated along the route 
from point of origin to destination.
Furthermore, as the relevant smuggling event occurs the attempt is made to 
optimize connectivity at the transnational level, as assessed in terms of such factors as 
success, speed and volume delivered. This assessment, in turn, serves as feedback into 
the smuggler’s perceptions of access and risk. Application of this set of decision-making 
processes underpins the evolution of the smugglers’ perceptions of a given route’s 
attractiveness over time, with the resulting decision being to continue using the same 
route, or either modifying or replacing that route with another more viable alternative.
Outline o f Study and Chapter Overview 
Thus far, this chapter has introduced the topic of transnational smuggling as an 
issue with global relevance, outlined a number of initial assumptions that further the 
development of an analytical framework for smugglers’ decision-making with respect to 
route selection, and put forth such a model in conceptual terms. Moving forward, 
Chapter II expands upon many of the themes noted thus far by way of a review of the 
relevant literature relating to smuggling as a security issue. As such, it examines in 
greater detail the range of smuggled commodities, the nature and evolution of smuggling 
actors, the complex relationship between smuggling networks and nation-states, and the 
potential modes of transportation offered by land, water and air.
As noted previously, to narrow the scope of study to manageable proportions, a 
single commodity is used to demonstrate the utility of geographical analysis in this 
context. Due to the global prominence of the international trade in illicit drugs as well as
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other factors, heroin has been selected as the benchmark commodity. In some ways 
serving as a second review of the literature with specific respect to drug trafficking, 
Chapter III addresses the geography of the international heroin trade in detail. Due to the 
interconnected nature of both money laundering and the black market in the chemical 
precursors used to process heroin, these issues are also addressed in this context.
Chapter IV serves to outline the methodology that is employed in the case studies, 
as well as to highlight the various data gaps inherent to the analysis of black markets. 
With respect to access and risk, the definitions put forth in the previous section are 
operationalized at the national level, most saliently with reference to aspects of physical, 
economic, political and human geography. Similarly, at the transnational level the issue 
of how to meaningfully address connectivity is also discussed at length.
In particular, to more empirically measure connectivity the convention of the 
smuggling vector is introduced in order to illustrate the dynamic nature of transnational 
smuggling activity. Briefly, for each transaction involving contraband, a vector exists, 
consisting of the specific route, which can be separated into path segments or legs and 
transitional nodes, as well as the associated human element. By analyzing sets of both 
observed and expected smuggling vectors, certain trends emerge whereby the utility of 
the model itself may be assessed in terms of its capacity to identify the divergences 
between theory and reality. In turn, these divergences may be used to gain deeper insight 
into the behavior of black market logistics in response to various changes in the 
smuggling landscape.
Chapters V through VII comprise three case studies related to the global heroin 
trade, respectively focusing on Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria. Not only is each a
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major hub of heroin smuggling activity, but also illustrative of the truly worldwide nature 
of this activity by virtue of their locations in separate regions. Furthermore, despite a 
high degree of divergence at first glance, all three countries share a number of common 
traits. For instance, a number of themes relating to terrain, tradition and domestic turmoil 
emerge as key factors allowing smuggling activity to flourish at the national level.
Afghanistan has been chosen by virtue of the fact that, together with Burma, the 
two countries account for roughly 90% of world opium production. Furthermore, in 
recent years, Colombia has become a major supplier of heroin to the U.S. market, though 
as yet production is not as proportionally significant in global terms. Flowever, the 
smuggling routes and methods established to move large quantities of Latin American 
cocaine have been adapted to smuggle heroin, a phenomenon that represents the ways in 
which different smuggled commodities can be handled in similar ways. Finally, Nigeria 
represents an interesting case in that it has become a well-documented transit hub without 
being a major drug producing area, demonstrating that factors other than mere proximity 
can play a determining role in smuggling route selection.
Each case study involves an examination of the country in question at the national 
and transnational levels of analysis. In as systematic a manner as possible, given the gaps 
in available data, the format is to first establish the physical, political, economic and 
human geographic factors that have played in shaping the relevant domestic smuggling 
landscape at the national level. Then, the movement of heroin outward from the country 
in question and the corresponding smuggling vectors and proceeding outward via various 
modes and points of transit to their respective final destinations are examined. Finally, an
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assessment of this empirical data using the models, conventions and parameters that have 
been previously introduced is conducted.
At each level of analysis, the aim is to meaningfully apply the generic smuggling 
model to the country in question and its relevant smuggling vectors. Taken together, 
these represent an attempt to validate the analytical framework of the smugglers’ 
landscape though empirical observation by assessing how closely the two types of 
smuggling vector sets, observed and expected, overlap for each case study. The final 
chapter, Chapter VIII, serves not only to summarize the results of this analysis, but also 
to point the way toward further applications of this theoretical approach and 
methodology.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW: SMUGGLING, STATES AND SECURITY
Ever since the human animal first engaged in economic activity recognizable as 
such, political entities have sought to regulate this behavior, to various degrees and with 
mixed success. As Andreas points out, “Smuggling is an extraordinarily diverse form of 
trade that is as old as trade itself.”1 In some respects, smuggling is the concrete 
manifestation of the ongoing and often fundamental tension between economics and 
politics at any given point in space and time.
Furthermore, it appears abundantly clear that if demand is not met through licit 
market activity, black markets will emerge and be serviced in relation to their profit 
potential.2 Not only is this an age-old phenomenon, but a truly international one as well. 
Wherever and whenever opportunity exists, such opportunism naturally arises. As these 
profit incentives collide with the interests of nation-states, the resultant friction serves to 
shape the smugglers’ decision-making processes and operational landscape.
On its own merits, the relevance of illicit economic activity in global terms seems 
self-evident. For instance, one projection puts forth a range of between $500 billion and 
$1.5 trillion, or 5% of the gross world product, which is laundered every year as a profit
1 Andreas, 76.
2 Put another way, “The iron law o f capitalism is that where there is a demand there will be a supplier if  the 
profit is high enough.” Alan Block and William J. Chambliss, Organizing Crime (New York: Elsevier, 
1982), 32. While the authors are writing with specific reference to the growth in demand for narcotics and 
the subsequent rise in organized criminal activity in the United States between the 1930s and 1950s, this 
appears to be a truism across a wide range o f regions and eras. For more analysis o f the interaction 
between supply and demand in the context o f  the illicit drug market, see also Fernando Garcia Arganaras, 
“The drug war at the supply end: the case o f Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives 24, no. 5 (September 
1997), 59-80; and, with specific reference to the Canadian market, “Heroin seizures do not limit drug 
supply,” United Press International, 21 January 2003, 1008020w9101.
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on illegal activities.3 It may be further assumed that aggregate black market revenues, 
which would include a certain portion that is not laundered and yet another portion that is 
carried out under a barter system, represent an even larger share of the world economy.4
As noted previously, this chapter focuses on the most salient category of 
smuggling actors, TCOs. The first section deals with the nature and evolution of these 
groups, as well as the observable range of smuggled commodities. The second addresses 
the complex relationship between smuggling actors and nation-states, the latter being the 
primary source of risk with regard to the operations of the former.5 Finally, the various 
aspects of land, water and air modes of international transportation that shape the 
manifestations of connectivity are examined with respect to transnational smuggling 
activity.
However, before moving into a discussion of smuggling actors per se, a 
preliminary overview of transnational issues with the field of international security is in 
order. As of this writing, the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks has yet to resound fully
3 “Crime without punishment,” The Economist, 28 August 1999, 17. The U.S. Office o f National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP) puts forth the slightly lower but still impressive figure o f $300 billion per year as 
the proceeds o f international organized crime. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, “The Department o f  Defense’s Role in U.S. Drug 
Control Policy, ” Testimony o f Barry McCaffrey, Director, ONDCP, 27 April 1999, 7. As a third and final 
representative estimate, Jessica T. Matthews notes the estimate o f $750 billion per year globally, “o f which 
$450-500 billion is in narcotics.” Jessica T. Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” New 
Perspectives Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Spring 1997), 11.
4 For instance, with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa, OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 
19-20, notes that, “drug money buys other goods with a high value-added that serve the purpose o f a hard 
currency. These goods -  gold, diamonds, non-ferrous metals, as well as cash crops like coffee and cocoa -  
have long been part and parcel of the informal exchanges that generate large profits, and their well-oiled 
networks are often under the protection o f states, highly place individuals, and even geopolitical interests 
outside o f Africa.” In particular, this source offers specifics relating to black market diamonds, a subject 
also addressed in Appendix A.
5 Other potential sources o f smugglers’ risk, such as those posed by competing criminal elements or from 
internal elements within a particular TCO, must be mentioned at this juncture. From the smugglers’ point 
of view, as was said o f  the British Empire in the nineteenth century, there are no friends but only interests. 
However, for the most part this aspect o f  risk will not be addressed directly due to the various obstacles 
inherent to systematic data collection within this area. The exception will be where such competition 
comes to prominence via relatively reliable sources.
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through the field. However, there can be little doubt that a wide range of security issues 
relating to non-state actors that were formerly seen as peripheral has finally, and by broad 
consensus, come into the mainstream. Similarly, various pressures stemming from 
globalization and related worldwide trends can be seen as having a distinct impact upon 
once unassailable assumptions regarding the primacy of the nation-state within the 
international system.
While in hindsight the point may seem almost moot, it is worth revisiting the 
debate that existed within the realm of international security regarding what should be 
rightfully included under its purview. In the past, specialists in the field have tended to 
focus on the security threat inherent in the dealings among nation-states, understandably 
so given the field’s roots in classical realism and focus on the nation-state as its primary 
unit of analysis.6 Such analytical frameworks reflect the intellectual dominance of the 
realist school of thought that has held sway since the end of the Second World War.7
However, even prior to 9/11, within the field a number of key questions were 
being asked, primarily revolving around the issue of security from what, and for whom. 
While this first set of issues is involved with expanding the scope of inquiry, the second 
is more directly concerned with levels of analysis. One particularly notable example of
6 The essential elements o f  classical realism can be found in Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, 6th ed., rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1985). These include the aforementioned focus on the nation-state as the primary unit o f  analysis, as well 
as assumptions relating to the structural anarchy o f the international system and the relative capabilities of 
actors within this system.
7 Comprehensive discussion o f realism and both related and competing schools o f  thought can be found in 
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal 
Challenge, (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate (NY: Colombia University Press, 1993); and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism 
and its Critics (NY: Colombia University Press, 1986).
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an effort to meaningfully engage both of these sets of issues can be found in the work of 
Barry Buzan.8
With respect to expanding the scope of inquiry within the field of international 
security even further, others have also previously attempted to steer this debate in new 
directions. For instance, Simon Dalby discusses the range of issues generally considered 
as “non-traditional” and even irrelevant during the Cold War period.9 Other proposed 
additions to the international security agenda include ecological issues, feminist analyses, 
and a renewed focus on the security of previously marginalized groups.10 Even the study 
of terrorism, despite the issue’s recent rise in prominence, tends to be framed in terms of
8 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991). Vertically, Buzan’s analysis moves along the axis from 
individual to national to regional to international, while horizontally he addresses the spectrum o f military 
to economic to political threats. In particular, he also notes the often-overlooked aspect o f the nation-state 
as a source of threat, most significantly with respect to the security o f the individual. This view, 
contrasting state and individual sovereignty, is also echoed in Kofi Annan, “Two concepts o f sovereignty,” 
The Economist, 18 September 1999,49-50.
9 Simon Dalby, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” 
Alternatives 17 (1992), 95-134.
10 Within respect to the environment, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental 
Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991), 76-116; Norman 
Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis o f  Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1993); and Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape o f  Global Conflict (New York: Henry 
Holt & Co., 2001). As a counterpoint that highlights the debate in question, an opposing viewpoint is put 
forth in Marc A. Levy “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” International Security 20, no. 2 
(Fall 1995), 35-62. In particular, while conceding that environmental issues can pose a direct physical 
threat to state interests, the author argues that the parallel and more indirect political threat, “is at once both 
the weakest substantive threat. . .  and the strongest intellectual challenge in the field o f security studies.” 
For more on feminist interpretations o f international relations, see Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and 
Bases: Making Feminist Sense o f  International Politics (London: Pandora Press, 1989); V. Spike Petersen, 
Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions o f  International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1992); J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global 
Security (New York: Colombia University Press, 1992); and Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and 
International Relations in the Post-Modern Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Finally, 
examples o f  work focusing on marginalized ethnic groups include Eric Wolfe, Europe and the People 
Without History (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1982); Marc S. Miller, ed., State o f  the Peoples: 
A Global Human Rights Report on Societies in Danger (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); and Michael Renner, 
Fighting fo r Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age o f  Insecurity (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1996), which directly links these challenges with the aforementioned issues involving the 
environment.
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the impact on and threat to the nation-state rather than as a legitimate subject in its own 
right.11
With respect to the latter, and with relevance to the focus of this study, is the
apparent trend toward the increasing convergence between TCOs and terrorist groups.
For instance, as one U.S. government report notes:
One of the most significant developments since the end of the Cold War has been 
the growing involvement of insurgent, paramilitary, and extremist groups -  whose 
crimes are primarily against the state -  in criminal activities more associated with 
traditional organized crime groups and drug trafficking syndicates. Although 
various insurgent and extremist groups have been involved in traditional criminal 
activities before, particularly the drug trade, their role typically was more a 
subsidiary one of extorting or offering protection to drug trafficking and crime 
groups operating in the areas they controlled. Partnerships that some of these 
insurgent or extremist groups had with drug traffickers and other criminal 
organizations were often fleeting, but sometimes longer-standing symbiotic 
arrangements based on a coincidence of interests. In either case, the relationship 
was often marked by mutual suspicion and wariness.12
As state sponsorship of terrorism began to wane along with the bipolar Cold War
paradigm, logically enough alternate means of funding were found, with drug trafficking
being arguably the most visible such manifestation of this phenomenon at the global
level. However, while this theme is expanded upon as it arises, particularly with respect
to the case studies, the focus will remain on economically motivated smuggling actors
11 For instance, explicitly making this connection as a major assumption for her study, Annamarie Oliverio 
notes that, “terrorism and the state are assumed to be symbiotically related. Thus, the discourse of  
terrorism is inextricably related to the art o f statecraft.” Annamarie Oliverio, The State o f  Tenor, SUNY 
Series in Deviance and Social Control, ed. Ronald A. Farrell (Albany: State University o f New York Press,
1998), 19-20. See also “What is terrorism?” The Economist, 2 March 1996, 23-5; and Martha Crenshaw, 
“Thoughts Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw 
(University Park, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 3-24.
12 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 6. This linkage is also 
made by, among others, Stephen Blank, “Narcoterrorism as a threat to international security,” World and I 
16, no. 12 (December 2001), 265-79; Alex P. Schmid, “The Links Between Transnational Organized Crime 
and Terrorist Crimes,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 4 (Winter 1996), 40-82; and Richard 
Clutterback, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies (London: Routledge, 1990), 89.
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rather than organizations with a political agenda that turn to criminal activity as means to 
an end.
Similarly, in geographic terms the operational areas between TCOs and terrorists 
often coincide, logically enough given the fact that, at the national level, the same types 
of factors relating to terrain, tradition and domestic turmoil allow both to flourish. As 
one U.S. official puts it, “Terrorists tend to live, operate, and derive support from the 
lawless comers of the world . . .  Narcotraffickers and drug producers, like international 
criminals, also seek out those comers of the world where their behavior will not be 
subject to government control or punishment. So it is not surprising that there is often an 
overlap between those that engage in terrorism and those engaged in other internationally 
unacceptable behavior.”13
Despite a long-standing and direct relevance, however, the place of TCOs within 
the international security literature has been relatively ambiguous in the past, as have 
issues related to organized crime in general. Emblematic of this debate, Louise Shelley is 
able to ask whether or not transnational organized crime presents an imminent threat to 
the nation-state itself.14 At roughly the same time, official U.S. interest in TCO activity 
had risen to the point that it was being put forth as a potential replacement for the Cold
13 U.S. Congress, House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Statement o f  Michael A. Sheehan, 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department o f  State, 13 December 2000. Incidentally, not only 
does this testimony predate the events o f 9/11, it also holds up both Afghanistan and Colombia as prime 
examples o f  this phenomenon. For more recent analyses, see also U.S. Department o f  Justice (DOJ), Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Africa Strtaegic Unit, “Drugs and 
Terrorism: A New Perspective,” Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA-02039 (Washington, DC: DEA, September 
2002), available at http.7/www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02039/02039.html. accessed 15 July 2004; and 
U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information, “International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism,” Testimony o f Asa Hutchinson, DEA 
Administrator, 13 March 2002. Incidentally, both also discuss Afghanistan and Colombia to illustrate their 
points, while the former also includes Turkey and the latter Peru. Aspects o f all o f these examples will be 
addressed as they arise in context.
14 Louise I. Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?” Journal o f  
International Affairs 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), 463-89.
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War as a focus for international security concerns.15 However, even earlier the issue of 
TCOs had become significant enough to be addressed directly by Boutros Boutros Ghali 
during his tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations.16
At present, it suffices to say that non-state actors capable of sustaining and even 
escalating transnational activities detrimental to the interests of nation-states have 
demonstrable relevance to the field of international security, even beyond the context of 
terrorism. Specifically, Williams and Savona cite the various types of threat presented by 
TCOs to sovereignty, to societies, to national stability and state control of territory, to 
democratic values and public institutions, to economies and financial institutions, to 
democratization and privatization, to development efforts, and to global regimes and
17codes of conduct.
Moving more directly to the issue of levels of analysis, the concept of the nation­
state as the key building block of the international system traditionally dates from the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. With the waning of bipolarity as the prevailing Cold War- 
era paradigm, there has been a major effort to articulate the parameters of potential 
successors. As such, a major issue within the field of international relations is whether or 
not the nation-state will even continue to hold sway, or in turn be unseated by its various
15 See R. T. Naylor, “From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New ‘National Security’ Threat,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 37-56. As a tangible example o f this school o f  
thought, in February 1996, the Clinton administration for the first time publicly recognized international 
organized crime as a national security issue facing the United States in its National Security Strategy 
presented to Congress. See U.S. President, Office o f the White House, A National Strategy o f  Engagement 
and Enlargement (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1996), 25, available at 
http://www.fas.org/spp/militarv/docops/national/1996stra.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
16 Boutros Boutros Ghali, “Transnational Crime: The Market and the Rule o f  Law,” Vital Speeches 61, no. 
5 (15 December 1994), 130-2.
17 Williams and Savona, 32-9. For more on the security implications of organized criminal activity for 
various types o f  military operations, see also Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “The Organized Crime Dimension 
o f Regional Conflict and Operations Other Than War,” in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: 
Implications fo r  U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. 
Schultz, Jr. (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 125-46.
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challengers, including international organizations, multinational corporations and a range 
of other sub- and supra-national actors. As a potential threat to the global status quo, the 
growing relevance of smuggling actors falls squarely within the realm of the much wider
1 o
ongoing debate regarding the so-called “end of the nation-state.”
Though the actual death-knell is decidedly premature, the nation-state as the basic 
unit of the international system is in the process of becoming less dominant, less 
independent and less separate, due to a range of economic, military and technological 
developments. As such, various transnational, extra-national and sub-national entities are 
becoming more prominent vis-a-vis the nation-state, though they by no means set to 
replace it.19 While the entire breadth of this debate extends well beyond the purview of 
this study, there are several aspects that are directly germane.
To begin with, the accelerating pace of globalization and economic liberalization 
is rightly held up as one of the most salient factor shaping international change in the 
post-Cold War era.20 The conceptualization of a “borderless world” that some see on the 
horizon, if not already at hand, almost by definition will lead to the relative diminution of
18 While by no means encompassing the issue in its entirety, the parameters o f  this debate are concisely laid 
out in “The nation-state is dead. Long live the nation-state,” The Economist, 23 December 1995, 15-8. For 
an analysis o f these issues based more on political than economic grounds, see also Grant T. Hammond and 
Bryant P. Shaw, “Conflict, the Rise o f States, and the Decay o f Nations,” Journal o f  Conflict Studies 15, 
no. 1 (Spring 1995), 5-29, and, with specific reference to the European context, Gurutz Jauregua 
Bereciartu, Decline o f  the Nation-State, trans. William A. Douglas (Reno: University o f Nevada Press,
1994).
19 This more moderate view is supported by Peter Marden, among others, who astutely notes that, “rather 
than championing the demise o f the statist project as signifying a historical shift in the position and power 
o f the state, emphasis should be put on the ‘reconstituted state’ and the contradictory tensions implicit in 
such a transformation.” Peter Marden, “Geographies o f  Dissent: Globalization, Identify and the Nation,” 
Political Geography 16, no. 1 (1997), 58.
20 For an overarching view o f the globalization process and its ramifications that is both comprehensive and 
accessible, see Thomas Freidman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000). 
Friedman also provides a useful definition o f globalization as well, “the inexorable integration o f markets, 
nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before -  in a way that is enabling individuals, 
corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever 
before, and in a way that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states 
farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.” Freidman, 9.
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the nation-state. For instance, coming from a relatively extreme perspective with respect 
to this phenomenon, Kenichi Ohmae points to the speed and volume of international 
transactions, the global flow of information and the nation-state’s shifting role from 
creating wealth to destroying it. Of these, it is the last of these observations that is the 
most telling in this context.
In general, Ohmae contends that nation-states lack the will, incentive, credibility, 
tools and political base to play and effective role in the evolving global economy. Quite 
pointedly, he notes that, “By heritage and by experience, nation-states are comfortable
9 1with the market’s invisible hand only when they can control or regulate it.” As such,
some types of smuggling activity can be seen in certain respects as being illegal merely
because certain states or groups of states consider them so.
One criticism that can be made of this view is that it does not fully take into
account the continuing roles for types of power other than economic and the underlying 
•  22  •need for strategic stability. This point has been both well made and reiterated in various 
works by Joseph Nye, who posits three levels within the international system. These are 
the military, the economic, and the transnational, with the latter being largely beyond the 
control of any single government. Incidentally, under this conceptualization transnational 
smuggling activity as an issue area falls squarely within the latter category, where 
hegemonic policies are least effective. However, Ohmae is correct to note that one effect
21 Kenichi Ohmae, “Putting Global Logic First,” Harvard Business Review 73, no. 1 (January-February 
1995), 120. Specifically, the author sees regions, at both the inter-state and sub-state levels, as the primary 
building blocks o f the new borderless economy, an earlier exposition of which can be found in Ohmae,
“The Rise o f  the Region State,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993), 78-87. For a relatively more 
balanced view o f the globalization process, see also “Unfinished battle,” The Economist (web edition), 10 
April 1999.
22 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f  American Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 1990); and, more recently, The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower 
Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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of globalization is to empower increasingly nimble competitors, rather than just large 
ones. Such organizations are increasingly enabled to challenge the nation-state, which in 
turn may be seen as adapting as well.
With respect to this issue, David C. Jordan notes that drug trafficking and other 
transnational issues highlight the divergence of opinion with respect to the globalization 
of the market economy. In particular, while some see this phenomenon as too large for 
the nation-state, and thus requiring supranational institutions and mechanisms, others 
hold that it is too small for the nation-state, and is thus best addressed via sub-state or 
non-state actors.24 In fact, Jessica T. Matthews cuts to the heart of the matter by asking 
whether, in the post-Cold War era of globalization, networks are in fact more efficient 
than nation-states.25
The germaneness of this dichotomy is addressed at greater length below, as 
transnational networks serve as the basic structure for most TCOs. However, at this 
juncture it is sufficient to note that it is this asymmetry between the organization of 
national and non-state actors that has posed a major conceptual challenge in the past to 
the inclusion of a number of transnational security issues under the aegis of international 
security. The next section examines in greater detail both the nature and evolution of the 
actors behind much of the observed transnational activity at the global level, as well as 
the range of goods moved in this manner.
23 For instance, with respect to the evolution o f  the nation-state in response to these pressures, see Richard 
Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986).
24 David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies (Norman, OK: University o f Oklahoma,
1999), 3. However, the author continues by citing the indispensable role o f nation-states ruled by 
democratically accountable governments resistant to various types o f related corruption in curbing the 
expansion o f TCOs.
25 Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 10-13.
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Smuggling Actors and Smuggled Commodities 
To begin to examine the issue of smuggling actors and smuggled commodities, it 
is useful to return to the initial assumptions of the overarching motives for such activity. 
As noted at the outset, despite their linkages in general a distinction can be made between 
economically motivated actors on the one hand, and politically or ideologically motivated
9 ( \actors on the other. For instance, weighing in from its own organizational perspective, 
the U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan for 1997 goes so far as to note that “financial 
gain remains the motivating factor behind most smuggling activity.”27 As such, rather 
than a social psychological or other explanation of smuggling activity, this analysis 
remains predicated upon profit as the primary stimulus, to include both monetary and
98non-monetary or barter transactions.
26 While the relationships between transnational organized crime and terrorism are well documented and 
have already been touched upon, for the purposes o f study consideration o f profit motives will remain the 
primary focus o f analysis. However, as such linkages become germane within a specific context or case 
study, they will be dealt with at that point. The motivational distinctions between these two types o f groups 
is highlighted by Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances,” The 
Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), 59-60, as is the potential skewing o f threat assessment by 
failing to differentiate in this respect. Interestingly, from a security point of view, it is worth reiterating the 
trend toward convergence o f  international organized crime and international terrorism. Paradoxically, this 
may actually serve to make at least some potential terrorist targets within the transportation sector less 
viable, since the relevant branches of such criminal enterprises may opt for targets that will not have a 
direct negative impact on their own bottom line.
27 U.S. Department o f the Treasury (DOT), Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan 
(Washington, DC: USCS, 1997), 20. The relevant passage continues by noting that, “while there are no 
reliable estimates o f the size o f  the problem, various analysts have estimated that criminal activity 
generates proceeds o f $100-200 billion annually,” reiterating both the scope o f and uncertainty surrounding 
this issue.
28 The literature supporting this point o f  view is outlined in Block and Chambliss, 3-10. Alternative 
analyses range from Marxist to Freudian, and generally characterize criminal activity as either a political 
statement or a psychological disorder. While other approaches may be more fitting for the examination of  
certain types o f  illegal acts, the thrust o f this study lends itself most readily to the use o f profit as the key 
motive. However, as smuggling activity analyzed in the case studies that does not appear to readily 
conform to this model, these exceptions will be noted.
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However, even among profit-seeking criminal actors, despite commonalties of 
motivation a great diversity exists among smuggling actors in terms of organization.29 
While not all smuggling is particularly organized, smuggling is a distinct function of 
nearly all developed transnational criminal enterprises, and the level of this development 
with respect to operational capabilities constitutes one possible analytical delineation of 
smuggling activity. As such, this variation can be most easily conceptualized as a
30spectrum.
At the lower end there are, understandably enough, the petty forms of smuggling 
that tend to utilize more mundane methods to move less exotic commodities, and operate 
with a greater reliance on opportunity than planning. However, at the upper end, there 
exists a level of sophistication that rivals that of any successful, legitimate multinational 
corporation (MNC), a parallel that is discussed at greater length below.31 The following 
diagram illustrates this conceptualization:
29 Highlighting this diversity, Louise Shelly offers four different methods o f categorizing TCOs, namely by 
their relationship the legitimate economy; by structure, product and membership; by political and terrorist 
links; and by assets, revenues and cost o f their activities. Louise Shelly, “Identifying, Counting and 
Categorizing Transnational Criminal Organizations,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring
1999), 18.
30 Andreas, 80-1, underlines this point with the following: “Smuggling organizations come in all forms and 
sizes. While smugglers are often lumped together under the banner o f ‘organized crime,’ this is highly 
misleading because o f the extreme variation in the levels o f organization and degree o f criminality. 
Smuggling is an illegal transnational enterprise, but how organized and how criminal depends on what is 
being smuggled and the intensity and form o f state control efforts.”
31 Though a rather common comparison, it is handled particularly well by Williams, “Transnational 
Criminal Organizations,” 57-72, who takes it as his main theme.













Fig. 4. Spectrum of transnational smuggling activity
While petty smuggling may logically account for a greater number of smuggling 
events, in terms of both potential volume and range of smuggled goods it is the better 
organized groups that are poised to service black markets on a more meaningful scale.32 
Petty smuggling certainly has a distinct and measurable impact, and may in fact comprise 
a far greater share of international smuggling activity than most would realize. However, 
at present it does not appear that any authoritative study exists examining the full range 
of transnational smuggling activity to include the lower end of this spectrum.
Conversely, at the upper end of this spectrum are transnational criminal actors 
with varying degrees of efficiency and areas of specialization. In general, common 
characteristics of such organizations include: a lack of ideology; an organized hierarchy; 
continuity over time; a willingness to threaten or use force; relatively restrictive
32 For example, in theory anyone who passes through U.S. Customs with the odd box o f Cuban cigars or an 
extra bottle o f  liquor is technically a smuggler, albeit on a petty scale. Similarly, the combination o f loose 
border control and high import duties has led to situations o f endemic low-level smuggling throughout 
various parts o f the world. Certain aspects o f this issue are discussed further in the context o f Appendix A.
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membership; profits gained through criminal activity; the provision of illegal goods and 
services to segments of the general population; neutralization of some public officials and 
politicians by corruption or intimidation; seeking monopolies of specific goods or 
services; assigning specialized activities to gang members; a code of secrecy; and careful 
planning to meet long-term goals.33
Though certainly not synonymous with smuggling actors per se, TCOs appear to 
account for a large portion of observable smuggling activity and as such have come to 
represent the archetypal smuggling actor as this activity approaches the upper bound of 
the spectrum. Thus, the focus of this study remains on TCOs, as by their nature they tend 
to engage in transactions involving illegal commodities that require extensive economies 
of scale, special handling, higher risk or an enhanced degree of operational planning and 
coordination in order to make them profitable.34
As such, inherent to this conceptualization of transnational smuggling activity is 
the issue of what is being smuggled. The expansion of smuggling activity at the global 
level may be clearly seen by the very diversity of commodities involved. Ranging from 
the mundane to the exotic, smuggling actors deal in everything and anything that will
33 Brian Sullivan, “International Organized Crime: A Growing National Security Threat,” Strategic Forum, 
no.74 (March 1996), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF 74/forum74.html. accessed 15 July 
2004. Moreover, with respect to the focus o f this study, the author continues by noting that, “The most 
important factor in the growth o f organized crime has been the development o f a global network for illegal 
drug trafficking that produces multi-billion dollar profits.” However, while drugs remain the most 
important smuggled commodity worldwide, for many countries the importance o f smuggling extends well 
beyond this issue area. For instance, although Madagascar is a very marginal actor in terms o f legitimate 
global trade, with respect to the transnational trade in endangered species it is a major player. See Andreas, 
79.
34 Categorizations o f smuggled commodities are discussed at further length below, and outlined more fully 
in Appendix A. However, looking forward to the next chapter, at this juncture it is worth noting the 
following: “Large-scale international movements o f  cocaine and heroin are almost entirely controlled by 
transnational organized crime groups, for whom drugs are consequently a primary source o f revenue. Thus 
the illicit drug economy and organized crime are more or less interdependent.” United Nations Drug 
Control Programme (UNDCP), World Drug Report {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 133.
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turn a profit. However, in general illicitly traded commodities may be divided into three 
categories, despite a certain degree of overlap. First, there are goods that are de facto 
illegal or at a minimum strictly controlled, merely by their nature. Most often, some form 
of broad international consensus underlies this designation. Among the more salient 
examples within this category are narcotics, endangered animal parts and fissile 
materials.
Second, there are de jure illegal commodities, the possession of which may or 
may not actually be illegal, depending on the circumstances. These may include 
instances where import or export is dependent on such factors as authorization of 
recipient or consignee, or official notification to the relevant authorities regarding point 
of origin and intended destination. This category can potentially encompass a wide range 
of goods, including gemstones, artifacts, gasoline, cigarettes, and, in the context of illegal 
immigration, even human beings.
Often these first two categories are subject not only to national controls but also to 
multinational agreements with varying degrees of scope and effectiveness. Moreover, 
while the lack of broad agreement can undermine efforts to address transnational 
smuggling, even in cases where consensus exists the variation in law enforcement at the 
national level remains significant.35 However, there are two principal inducements to the 
formation and promotion of such multilateral prohibition regimes.
35 For instance, “As the trend toward market liberalization and an increasingly open global trading system 
continues, prohibitions rather than tariffs and quotas increasingly drive the business o f smuggling. For, at 
the same time as there has been a general liberalization o f trade, there has also been an increase in the 
selective criminalization o f trade through prohibitions.” Andreas, 77-8. The author continues to by 
pointing out that, while some prohibitions, such as those against heroin and cocaine, are virtually universal, 
others are more nation-specific.
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The first is the inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement measures in 
the face of criminal activities that transcend national borders. The second is the role of 
moral and emotional factors related to neither political nor economic advantage but 
instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, fears, prejudices, 
paternalism, faith in universalism, the individual conscience, and the compulsion to 
proselytize. Ultimately, the success or failure of an international prohibition regime in 
effectively suppressing a particular activity depends, however, not only on the degree of 
commitment to its norms or the extent or resources devoted to carrying out its goals but 
also on the vulnerability of the activity to enforcement measures.36
As the third and final category of smuggled goods, there are otherwise legitimate 
commodities that are smuggled predominantly in an effort to avoid duties or related 
taxation, which may in fact overlap with the category of de jure smuggled commodities 
noted above. In such cases, often there exists some form of state or functionally 
analogous monopoly control that serves to artificially restrict supply, and as such 
diversion to meet pent-up demand is common in these instances. Generally speaking, 
wherever a situation of differential pricing exists and the resultant profit potential offers 
incentives beyond the threshold of the associated risk, some form of arbitrage naturally 
arises, generally facilitated by smuggling activity in cases where the trade in question has 
been deemed illegal.37
However, it is important to note that the legality or illegality of trade in a given 
commodity not only depends on where such transactions are conducted, but when and by
36 Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution o f norms in international society,” 
International Organization 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990), 479-526.
37 For a more extensive examination o f these categories, see Appendix A.
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whom. Two historically salient examples can be found in the slave trade and the opium 
trade, the latter directly germane to the focus of this study and discussed at greater length
-5 0
in the next and subsequent chapters. Moreover, globalization further complicates the 
nation-state’s task of distinguishing between legal and illegal trading activity. To return 
to Andreas, “Depending on the political winds and dominant social norms of the day, 
what is illegitimate trade in one era may be legitimate trade in another.”39
As the result of the globalization process, the parameters of which have been 
already described, the trend toward both the convergence and integration of black 
markets also appears to be growing more prominent. Furthermore, the two-way nature of 
illegal trade is all too easily overlooked, particularly in analyses predicated solely upon 
threat. This phenomenon can be seen most readily in the convergence of such 
overlapping black market activities as small arms traded for illicit diamonds, stolen 
artwork traded for contraband cigarettes and even cocaine traded for heroin. Similarly, 
law enforcement pressure with respect to one commodity may lead smuggling actors use 
established routes to expand into new market segments and areas of specialization.40
As Patrick Clawson and Renssalaer W. Lee III note, “transnational criminal 
alliances are essentially fungible -  they can be used to transport virtually any
38 For more on the slave trade, see Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade, 
1440-1870 (New York: Touchstone, 1999); and, for more on this issue’s historical manifestations in the 
Islamic context, Ronald Segal, Islam ’s Black Slaves: The Other Black Diaspora (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2001). Modem manifestations of this phenomenon, particularly as it relates to sexual slavery 
and prostitution, are also discussed in Appendix A in the context o f illegal immigration.
39 Andreas, 78.
40For instance, some analysts trace the explosive growth o f  human smuggling to the international 
crackdown on drugs over the last twenty years, using established drug smuggling networks. As further 
evidence o f this phenomenon, the United Nations estimates that this trade generated between $1.5 and $2 
million annually at the beginning o f the 1990s. A more recent estimate for human trafficking at the global 
level ranges from eight to nine billion dollars, with much o f this activity associated with the sex industry. 
See “World faces deluge o f  human trafficking,” CNN.com, 31 August 2000. This subject is also examined 
at greater length in Appendix A. Similarly, the next chapter will discuss linkages between various black 
markets as they relate to the global heroin trade.
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commodity.”41 Moreover, for any given smuggling route and method, the ability of 
transnational smuggling networks to simultaneously move various types of illegal goods 
can be seen as a testament its overall effectiveness. Given the assumption that smuggling 
activity is predicated upon turning a profit, the market forces of supply and demand may 
be seen as paramount, particularly in terms of their spatial dimensions as characterized 
within the context of the smugglers’ landscape. However, as these parameters change 
over space and time, the corresponding routes may be seen to shift as well.
As such, the smugglers’ operational landscape itself continues to evolve over 
time, largely in conjunction with the numerous trends relating to issues of globalization 
and law enforcement. In response, the dramatic growth of TCOs is also demonstrably 
apparent.42 As Peter A. Lupshka points out, “Transnational organized crime is not a new 
phenomenon. Cross-national organized crime and contraband have existed since time 
immemorial along adjacent borders. What is new is the scale of the activity and the fact 
that organized crime now possesses tools once reserved for nation-states.”43
Such criminal actors serve to facilitate a widening range and volume of smuggled 
goods throughout an increasingly interconnected world economy, as discussed at length
41 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998), 89. The authors also point out that the resultant smuggling routes created “by agreement” 
between TCOs can be harnessed to facilitate the movement o f items not generally considered as market- 
related, such as weapons o f mass destruction. See also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 12, 
which notes that “all illicit commodities are intimately linked. Once it has proven its profitability, no 
network, no trafficking connection restricts itself to an individual territory or product.”
42 An excellent table o f  global and regional trends encouraging the growth and diversification of 
transnational organized crime can be found in John McFarlane, “Transnational Crime, Corruption, and 
Crony Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century: An Asian-Pacific Perspective,” Transnational O rganized  
Crime, 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 2-3. See also Jordan, 71-98.
43 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 23. For a concise overview o f the historical growth of 
TCOs in this context, see also Williams and Savona, 7-10. Moreover, the projected future o f such 
organizations is discussed in Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: Potentials and 
Consequences,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 55-74. In particular, the authors 
assess the evolution o f drug cartels from hierarchical organizations to networked criminal actors capable o f  
challenging the legitimacy and solvency o f nation-states.
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above. Furthermore, paralleling this rise of TCO activity, the study of organized crime 
itself has also evolved from assumptions that all such activity was monolithic in nature, 
to a growing realization that criminals can be observed in conflict as often as in 
cooperation.44 As a result, in recent years there has been something of a return to this 
view, albeit often in a more sophisticated form.45
44 See Block and Chambliss, 10-13. In the United States, for instance, for years the dominant assumptions 
were that organized crime was not only centrally directed but also primarily o f Italian-American lineage. 
Despite the facile surface appeal o f this proposition, much explanatory value was lost in applying this 
relatively simplistic model. Similarly, a primary feature o f early studies on organized crime is a focus on 
domestic rather than transnational manifestations. An example o f both these tendencies, dating from the 
late 1960s, can be found in Donald R. Cressey, “The Functions and Structures o f  Criminal Syndicates,” in 
Ryan and Rush, 3-15. However, this latter work does exhibit a fairly advanced analysis o f the functional 
division o f criminal labor. P. Williams and C. Florez, “Transnational criminal organizations and drug 
trafficking,” U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, 2-003 (1994), also notes the need to meaningfully address the 
issue o f  transnational criminal linkages without falling into the trap o f seeing a monolithic conspiracies at 
every turn. For instance, examples o f criminal groups preying upon one another abound. One recent 
example o f this can found within the immigrant smuggling market, in which reports have surfaced o f  
groups kidnapping each other’s “clients” in order to both maximize profits and stifle competition. 
“Smugglers of illegal immigrants face threat from other smugglers,” CNN.com, 8 September 2000. Alan 
Block, Space, Time and Organized Crime, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), 33-4, also 
discusses not only outright violence between groups but also the strategic utility o f  informing to law 
enforcement authorities on competitors’ activities. For more on the broadening scope o f criminological 
perspectives with respect to levels o f analysis, see also William F. McDonald, “The Globalization of 
Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 1- 
22 .
45 Examples utilizing variations on this thesis include: Claire Sterling, Octopus: How the Long Reach o f  the 
Sicilian Mafia Controls the Global Narcotics Trade (New York: Touchstone / Simon & Schuster, 1990), 
positing the continuing primacy o f the Sicilian Mafia in the international narcotics trade; Claire Sterling, 
Thieves ’ World: The Threat o f  the New Global Network o f  Organized Crime (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1994), expanding on a putative strategic alliance between the Sicilian Mafia and Russian 
organized crime; taking a slightly different focus, Martin Booth, The Triads: the Growing Global Threat 
From the Chinese Criminal Societies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and Jeffery Robinson, The 
Merger: The Conglomeration o f  International Organized Crime (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press,
2000). By contrast, Naylor, “From Cold War to Crime War,” 37-56, is particularly critical o f Sterling’s 
work as a vast oversimplification o f the types o f complex interaction taking place among various TCOs. A 
more moderate stance, involving a “criminal mosaic” evolving in the United States as an alternate model, 
can be found in William Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs: The Changing Face o f  Organized Crime in 
America (New York: The Free Press, 1996). This view is also underlined in U.S. Intergency Working 
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 5, which notes that, “Much more than in the past, 
criminal organizations are networking and cooperating with one another, enabling them to merge expertise 
and to broaden the scope o f their activities.” For an overview o f the competing schools o f thought 
regarding models o f organized criminal activity, see also Boronia Halstead, “The Use o f  Models in the 
Analysis o f  Organized Crime and Development o f Policy,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 1 
(Spring 1998), 1-24.
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For instance, Phil Williams warns that treating TCOs as “part of a single global 
challenge is not only misleading conceptually, but could encourage policy response that 
is as ineffective as it is undifferentiated.” Echoing the aforementioned network 
metaphor, he further notes that while large, fixed, hierarchical organization may present 
an easier target, the more prevalent “looser, less formal network structures” actually 
present a greater challenge.46 This in turn corresponds with Lupshka’s observation that 
“loose cross-group alliances and ‘marriages of convenience’ are increasingly occurring 
between different nationally rooted organized crime groups.”47
However, even without resorting to the debatable proposition of monolithically 
conceptualizing transnational organized crime, the sophistication of and cooperation 
among TCOs does appear to be growing. For instance, Michael Lane writes that, “In the 
global economy, domestic criminal organizations seize on new opportunities to link with 
international criminal organizations, often resulting in international money laundering, 
narcotics trafficking and other international cartels.” Similarly, as John Kerry 
succinctly puts it, “Crime was a natural for globalization.”49 Robert J. Bunker and John
46 Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations,” 60-1. Furthermore, the author continues by noting 
that, “The notion that there is a relatively small number of global conglomerates linked in a vast criminal 
conspiracy also underestimates the threat. . .  The reality is not only more messy but also more unsettling -  
and less susceptible to easy solutions.” This view is echoed in Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 
488-9. Moreover, in the context o f the transnational drug trade, there also appears to be a trend toward 
putting profits and mutual gain at the forefront. For instance, as noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6, “Traffickers from many countries increasingly are 
eschewing traditional preferences for criminal partnerships within single ethnic groups and collaborating in 
the purchase, transportation and distribution of illegal drugs. Nontraditional trafficking groups -  including 
rebel armies and extremist organizations have also turned to the drug trade as a means o f  raising 
revenue.”
47 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 23.
48 Michael H. Lane, Customs Modernization and the International Trade Superhighway (Westport, CT: 
Quorum Books, 1998), 19.
49 John Kerry, The New War: The Web o f  Crime That Threatens America’s Security (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1997), 20. At the global level, the author continues by noting the “Big Five” international 
criminal organizations at present as the Italian Mafia, the Russian mobs, the Japanese yakuza, the Chinese
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P. Sullivan also note that, being essentially borderless, networks established by TCOs 
“display a remarkable capacity to flow around legal or geographic boundaries.”50 The 
next section examines the ramifications of globalization in this context, particularly with 
respect to the nation-state.
In the spatial context, the ability to control or, at a minimum, observe the 
movement of contraband at each step in the transnational logistical process is an essential 
capability for the smuggling actor. From this perspective, among other positive attributes 
the network structure serves to maximize access and thus optimize connectivity along the 
length of a given smuggling route. As such, in terms of their organization TCOs are 
prominent among the various types of non-state actors that have embraced the 
transnational network model.
As Matthews notes, the growing efficacy of networked organizations in the 
international arena, as opposed to the more traditional hierarchies found within nation­
states, is demonstrable with respect to non-state actors. To use her definition, “In a 
network, individuals or groups link together for joint action without building a physical, 
formal institutional presence.”51 In general, criminal activity, constrained by the threat of 
legal action and other operational grounds to a relatively high degree of secrecy, naturally 
tends toward this type of structure.
triads and the Colombian cartels, as well as a number o f smaller, more specialized groups centered on such 
countries as Nigeria, Poland, Jamaica and Panama. While by no means authoritative, and o f course subject 
to change over time, this characterization appears essentially valid. On the subject o f  structural changes in 
the organization o f criminal activity over time, see also Block, 53.
S0Bunker and Sullivan, 56.
51Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 11. Furthermore, as noted in U.S. Interagency Working 
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 3, “The dynamics o f globalization . . .  particularly 
the reduction o f barriers to movement o f  people, goods, and financial transactions across borders, have 
enabled international organized crime groups to expand both their global reach and criminal business 
interests.” See also Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 74-8.
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The case can certainly be made that traditional and often domestically-based 
organized crime hierarchies are giving way to more fluid and task-specific decision­
making entities which allow for greater flexibility in such matters as asset allocation and 
risk management. In embracing this updated operational model, TCOs can be seen as 
becoming even more tenacious in their own right and serving as umbrellas for various 
affiliated criminal activities.52 In fact, the term TCO itself implies at least a minimal 
degree of horizontal and vertical integration. As such, smuggling actors must be 
considered at the forefront of Ohmae’s “nimbler competitors” vis-a-vis the nation-state.
Regarding terminology, it is interesting to note the distinction between “illegal 
networks” and “illegal practices.” As Josiah McC. Heyman and Alan Smart write, 
“Illegal networks specifically indicates a ordered web of people centered on an illegal 
activity, and implies [though it does not necessarily require] an alternative social world to 
the formal, legal state.” While opting for the looser “illegal practices” in order to 
encompass the intentional or unintentional involvement of nation-states in various types 
of criminal activity, the authors do highlight the additional insight gained by a focus on 
the network concept: “Networks rest on the human capacity for mutuality, trust and 
exchange in relationships.”53
A formulation that serves to underline this aspect of TCO structure is put forth by 
Peter Marden, who characterizes non-state actors of this type as networks of economic, 
social and cultural relations occupied by conscious association in separate locations that
52 The decentralization o f decision-making within smuggling organizations is exceedingly difficult to 
assess. However, for a perceptive overview o f the phenomenon in this context, as well as a comparison 
between international criminal organizations and multinational corporations, see Williams and Florez, 1-11.
53 Josiah McC. Heyman and Alan Smart, “States and Illegal Practices: An Overview,” in States and Illegal 
Practices, ed. Josiah McC. Heyman (New York: Oxford Press, 1999), 17.
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link themselves for specific political and social ends.54 With reference to this definition, 
ethnic ties or some analogue appear to be the most common organizing principle and 
substantially serve to at least somewhat mitigate these issues of trust, without which the 
resort to violence would be that much more common. This is, of course, not an 
especially modem phenomenon; for instance, in the 14th century, the Islamic historian Ibn 
Khaldun wrote, “Group feeling results only from blood relationship or something 
corresponding to it.” [emphasis added]55
In short, there usually exists some sort of feeling which underlies the 
commonality of group purpose, often based on such actual or assumed bonds as kinship, 
culture, religion or language, that underpins trust among members of a transnational 
network.56 It should also be mentioned that, historically, examples of ethnically-based 
transnational trading activities organized along these lines have been quite common.57 In
54 Incidentally, the basis o f Marden’s analysis is geographical, with an emphasis on issues o f  identity and 
the control o f territory within the evolving international system. While the author makes this 
characterization primarily with reference to a range o f non-governmental organizations and ethno-cultural 
groups, it is also particularly apt in describing international criminal organizations. Marden, 41.
55 Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. 
N. J. Dawood (Princeton: Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press, 1989), 98. The range o f theories 
involving ethnicity and ethnic identity is extensive, and includes primordial, contextual and functional 
approaches. Similarly, models o f  inter-ethnic relations primarily aim at addressing issues o f conflict, 
cooperation and coexistence. While somewhat beyond the direct scope o f this study, some key general 
works dealing with these subjects include Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., Ethnicity: Theory 
and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1985); Urs Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989); and Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacekeeping in Multiethnic 
Societies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991).
56 This conceptualization forms the basis o f Harold R. Isaacs’s classic treatment o f the subject, Idols o f  the 
Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
57 Extended studies o f this phenomenon include Joel Kotkin, Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity 
Determine Success in the New G lobal Economy (New York: Random House, 1992), and Philip D. Curtin, 
Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Edward R. 
Kleemans and Henk G. van de Bunt, “The Social Embeddedness o f Organized Crime,” Transnational 
Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 19-36, also examines this phenomenon in its criminal 
manifestations using data from the Netherlands. For more on issue in the African context, see also Janet 
MacGaffey and Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on the Margin o f  the Law 
(Oxford, UK: International African Institute, in association with James Currey and Indiana University 
Press, 2000), 12-16. The next chapter also addresses this topic with particular respect to money laundering.
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the context of TCOs, Lupshka notes, “At present most transnational organized crime 
groups have a single ethic character or national identity root, with cells inserted into 
nation-states where aspects of their criminal enterprises take place.”58 In particular, from 
a geographic point of view, organized crime often develops where states are weak, such 
as in border areas, less accessible regions and economically depressed territories.59
As will be seen in the various case studies, group cohesion among members of 
TCOs is crucial to maintaining organizational control and achieving common goals. In 
the context of this study, the primary spatial application of organizing principles 
predicated on solidarity ties fall within the realm of human geography. As such, a 
number of ongoing trends serve to facilitate the spread of this phenomenon. For 
example, as with the globalization of trade, international travel and tourism have also 
become increasingly easy.60
Moreover, the sheer volume of people crossing international borders both 
voluntarily and involuntarily as either political or economic refugees is also 
accelerating.61 Patterns of migration and demography are thus extremely relevant as they 
allow these smuggling actors to increase their scope both geographically and 
operationally. While the vast majority of immigrants are law-abiding, increasing 
international migration has enormous value for TCOs that have an ethnic basis by 
facilitating the spread of network structures and providing enclaves that serve as
58 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 22.
59 This issue is examined at length in Frank Bovenkerk, “Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There 
a Link?” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 3 /  4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 109-26. Furthermore, the 
author also notes that ethnic specialization is often to be found among criminal organizations.
60 For a concise overview o f this phenomenon’s historical context, see “Humanity on the move,” The 
Economist (web edition), 31 December 1999.
61 A broad-ranging survey o f recent migration trends can be found in “The longest journey: A survey o f  
migration,” The Economist, 2 November 2002, 3-16.
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recruiting grounds.62 These transnational ties also provide access to supplies of 
contraband goods, potential clients, new and existing markets, and other sources of 
operational support.63
Finally, to return to a theme introduced earlier, TCOs may also be seen as 
functionally analogous to MNCs, though with certain specific features that obviously 
distinguish their activities from licit trade. Most significantly, there is the common 
driving motivation between legitimate corporations and ongoing smuggling enterprises, 
namely the pursuit of profit maximization. In particular, operations that do not generate 
sufficient marginal revenue will be the least likely to continue. The exception to this rule 
would be where ideology or some other non-commercial interest underlies such activity.
As noted above, another parallel with legitimate multinational corporations can be 
seen in TCOs’ response to wider trends of globalization. For instance, as Matthews 
notes, “Precisely the same forces that are shaping the legitimate global economy are 
nourishing another new non-state actor, globally-integrated crime,” transforming local 
operations into global enterprises.64 Extending this observation further, Andreas points
62 Williams and Savona, 9-10. See also “A world o f exiles,” The Economist, 4 January 2003, 41-3; “There 
is another country . . The Economist, 19 August 2000, 26-7, dealing with migrant communities in the 
U.S; and, for more on the security dimensions o f the issue, Khachig Tololyan, “The Impact o f Diasporas on 
US Foreign Policy,” in Pfaltzgraff and Schultz, 147-60. However, with respect to the U.S., perhaps the 
most salient historical example linking immigration to organized crime is that of the southern Italy, and 
specifically Sicily, following a period o f mass emigration to not only the United States, but also Canada, 
South America and Australia. The opportunity for transnational linkages among the branches o f organized 
crime affiliated with this ethnic group came in 1943, when the U.S. government released a number o f jailed 
Mafia figures, notably Salvatore “Lucky” Luciano, in order to facilitate the Allied invasion o f Sicily. The 
impact o f  this wartime expediency is addressed in Alison Jamieson, “The Transnational Dimension o f  
Italian Organized Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 152-6.
63 Kleemans and van de Bunt, 25. However, the authors do rightly note that ethnic homogeneity is not the 
sole determinant o f criminal associations. In particular, their research from the Netherlands also appears to 
indicate that more ethnic diversity can be found toward the final end of the smuggling distribution chain.
64 Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 11-2. Among the specific aspects o f globalization 
noted by the author are dramatic increases in the volume o f goods and people crossing borders, competitive 
pressures to keep trade flowing, deregulation and privatization o f government owned businesses, growing
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out that, “The economic importance of smuggling suggests that there is not just a formal, 
above-ground dimension of regional and global interdependence, but an informal, 
underground dimension as well. For some countries, it is the smuggling-based part of the 
economy that is most responsive to (and integrated into) US and global markets.”65
However, the most salient differences between MNCs and TCOs lie in the latter’s 
relative lack of constraints. This distinction can be seen as part of a wider comparison 
made by James Rosenau between sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors.66 
While the legitimate multinational corporation’s activities are sanctioned by the nation­
state, despite occasional invective from the dispossessed, the disgruntled and the 
politically motivated, smuggling actors are those that engage in illegal transactions, as 
defined by consensus among nation-states. As such, it is in the very use of the term 
“legitimate” that a key difference lies. In simplest terms, one type of organization 
adheres to the rules laid out by the powers that be within the international system, while 
the other does not.
Specifically, despite certain parallels with MNCs, illegality has compelled TCOs 
to be much more fluid in structure and functionally cooperative as situations arise.67 
Specifically, Lupshka notes a number of factors that constitute the “competitive edge” 
enjoyed by TCOs vis-a-vis MNCs. These include access to vast amounts of capital, a 
lack of jurisdictional and other boundaries, the ability to use corruption as a means of
ease of communication, rapidly shifting commercial alliances and the emergence o f global financial 
systems. This view is also echoed in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat 
Assessment, Ch. I, 1, which notes that, “International criminal networks have been quick to take advantage 
o f the opportunities resulting from the revolutionary changes in world politics, business, technology and 
communications that have strengthened democracy and free markets.”
65 Andreas, 79.
66 See James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 
passim.
67 William and Savona, 29-30.
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leverage, recourse to the threat and use of violence, organizational flexibility, a wide 
latitude to eliminate unproductive components, organizational secrecy and an emerging
/TO
global network. However, as Pino Arlacchi points out, “The cost of doing business 
within the illegal economy is much higher than in the legal economy -  which is reflected 
in the market price of most illegal goods. This largely is due to additional costs incurred 
in the attempt to minimize the risks of being caught.”69
Organizational aspects relating to group affinities among members of TCOs have 
already been addressed. However, barring the sanction of the nation-state, issues of trust 
that are taken for granted in the course of legitimate commercial activities occur in the 
absence of formalized legal structures, such as those enforcing contracts via torts and 
associated regulation of business relationships. As a result, both the threat and use of 
violence serve to fill the void and underlie the activities of organized crime in their
• 1C\ •operational context. This in turn further threatens the long-standing Westphalian 
monopoly on organized violence that nation-states have formally reserved for themselves 
dating back to 1648, as is discussed at length in the next section.
In spite of these many differences, Morrison makes a strong case for potential 
qualitative changes among TCOs in response to various pressures that may impel them 
toward evolutionary paths more closely paralleling the MNC model than their 
predecessors. Specifically, she notes that:
68 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 34-8.
69 Pino Arlacchi, “The Dynamics o f  Illegal Markets,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 3/4 (Autumn / 
Winter 1998), 8.
70 For a wealth o f  recent anecdotal evidence in support o f this assertion, see Roy Godson and William J. 
Olsen, “International Organized Crime,” Society 32, no. 2 (January-February 1995), 18-30. The authors 
discuss examples ranging from Colombia to Italy to Burma in context, as well as the trends behind the 
growth o f such activity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
. . .  a cloak of legitimacy rather than a cloak of secrecy will be required to take 
full advantage of the trafficking opportunities afforded by free trade agreements 
and investment in privatized services -  whereas in the past, political weakness 
and social disruption were the foundations of trafficking. This is not to deny that 
social and political disruption will continue to play a role in drug transshipment 
but simply to argue that subtler methods of operation will be required in order to 
avoid the attention that violence and intimidation attracts from the international 
business community, foreign governments and local law enforcement.71
Functionally speaking, she further points out that, as traffickers become more
sophisticated and establish a veneer of legitimacy, they are better able to diversify their
business interests and become multi-commodity providers. In particular, they may
become less focused on maintaining direct links to various supply areas, and instead
specialize in providing support services, transportation expertise and protection for
shipments of a wider variety of contraband.72
To summarize, the following passage serves to succinctly illustrate the nature and
evolution of TCOs into actors capable of effectively challenging nation-states within the
bounds of certain issue areas:
International criminal networks . . .  have taken advantage of the dramatic changes 
in technology, world politics, and the global economy to become sophisticated 
and flexible in their operations. They have extensive worldwide networks and 
infrastructure to support their criminal operations; they are inherently flexible in 
their operations, adapting quickly to challenges to rivals and from law 
enforcement; they have tremendous financial resources to draw upon; and they 
are completely ruthless.73
As such, although the topic has been tangentially addressed already, at this juncture the




73 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 5. See also Andreas, 
81-2.
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Smuggling Networks and Nation-States 
This chapter began with an overview of the debate surrounding the nation-state’s 
primacy vis-a-vis non-state actors as the pace of globalization continues to increase. As 
noted at the outset, an understanding of the transnational network structure found among 
most smuggling actors is essential to assessing the various states of conflict and 
coexistence that exist between TCOs and nation-states. Most saliently in this context, a 
key advantage of the former is the fact that international logistical systems are also 
arranged as networks, a topic that is addressed in the next section. However, in general 
nation-states are not organized in this manner, and are furthermore constrained 
geographically by their international borders. Finally, levels of cooperation among these 
discrete actors do vary widely across issue areas.
As such, two inextricably connected aspects, the structural and the spatial, 
delineate the primary arena for interaction between these disparate types of actors. While 
TCOs are capable by definition of operating beyond the jurisdiction of any individual 
nation, the actions of nation-states are circumscribed in terms of jurisdiction while at the 
same time being called upon to implement international law.74 Thus, nation-states are in 
some ways at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis smuggling actors, despite their numerous 
other advantages.
74 See UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 157. Further underlining this inherent asymmetry between 
nations and criminal networks, U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, 
Ch. 1 ,9 observes that, “while globalization has allowed international criminals to operate virtually without 
regard to borders, government and law enforcement agencies remain limited by national boundaries.” This 
report continues by noting, “National sovereignty concerns and jurisdictional restrictions are impediments 
to targeting criminal activities that cross international boundaries. Unlike criminals, governments and law 
enforcement agencies must respect other nations’ sovereignty and legal statutes in law enforcement 
operations.”
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In terms of both issue area and geographic area, smuggling may be seen as 
presenting a distinctly asymmetrical challenge to the nation-state. With respect to this 
prevailing asymmetry between nation-states and TCOs, Bunker and Sullivan point out 
that as longstanding assumptions of struggles between nation-states or their coalitions 
over the preservation and extension of national sovereignty are challenged and in danger 
of becoming irrelevant, “At national levels the adversary will not necessarily be an 
emerging peer competitor.”75
In consideration of the structural differences between TCOs and nation-states, 
from the smuggler’s perspective the nation-state’s primary function is ostensibly that of 
imposing risk and deterring access. However, the relationship between smuggling actors 
on the one hand and the nation-state on the other is much more complex that may appear 
at first glance. As such, it defies a simplistic “us-versus-them,” “good-guys-against-bad 
guys” analysis.
Along these lines, Heyman and Smart rightly observe that, “State law inevitably 
creates its counterparts, zones of ambiguity and outright illegality . ..  Having grown in 
necessary connection, state law and evasion of state law must be studied together.”76 
There is a need to take such symbiosis into account when analyzing topics falling within
75Bunker and Sullivan, 57. However, the authors continue by noting that, with respect to activity below the 
nation-state threshold, “At sub-national levels, organized criminals and gangs will not necessarily be the 
usual suspects.”
76Heyman and Smart, 1. The question o f who defines various types o f activity as illegal, and the 
underlying legitimacy for so doing, has been a theme in the study o f organized crime over the past several 
decades. For a synopsis o f this literature, see Block and Chambliss, 4-15. For a concrete example o f  this 
type of interaction between nation-state and TCO, note the tacit agreement between the government and the 
yakuza in Japan, by which criminal activity is unofficially tolerated as long as it takes place within certain 
parameters. Calvin Sims, “Gangster Shoot-Out in Tokyo Violates an Unspoken Pact,” New York Times 
(web edition), 9 August 2000.
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this issue area, rather than taking all nation-state pronouncements to the contrary at face 
value.
Paradoxically, in a borderless world smuggling would not exist. As Andreas 
notes, “The state-smuggler relationship is a paradoxical one, defined by irony and 
contradiction: the smuggler is pursued by the state, but at the same time kept in business 
by the state. The smuggler is dependent on the state in a multitude of ways.”
Specifically, nation-states tacitly or openly contribute to the creation of markets and de 
facto price supports, facilitate the emergence of more efficient smuggling groups by 
counter the less efficient, and tolerate or otherwise allow corruption to flourish. He 
continues by noting that smuggling activities “reveal both the power and limits of the 
state: even as the state fails to deter smuggling, there is no smuggling without the state. 
Laws, and the selective nature of their enforcement, are what make smuggling 
possible.”77
According to Lupshka, there are three distinct stages of TCO interaction with 
nation-states. These are the predatory, when the group is circumscribed within a 
particular geographic area, focused primarily on immediate rewards, subject to the 
prevailing political and economic sectors, and easily disciplined by law enforcement 
authorities; the parasitical, as the group develops a corruptive interaction with legitimate 
political entities, and melds control of a territorial base with the provision of illicit goods
77 Andreas, 82-7. Moreover, not only can smugglers’ assets be directly allocated to the state via various 
forms o f  forfeiture, those involved in such illegal activity constitute a major source o f  primary information 
used by law enforcement agencies to control smuggling. The author even goes a far as to note that, in some 
respects, smuggling keeps law enforcement in business by underlining its continued relevance in an era of 
constrained resources. In the context o f  drug trafficking, as will become more salient in the next section, 
Jordan also notes the ambiguous relationship between governments and TCOs: “The economic model alone 
does not include an awareness o f governmental support o f and protection for drug trafficking.
Furthermore, it impedes an enhanced understanding o f the embedded nature o f criminal activity within the 
political system.” Jordan, 55-6.
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and services to those holding power within the nation-state; and the symbiotic, when 
there becomes a separate but equal bond of mutuality between organized criminal actors 
and the political system of the nation-state.78
Similarly, manifestations of illegal activity, even in the face of at least nominal 
deterrence on the part of nation-states, may be seen in terms of the following typology: 
market persistence, predicated on continued demand for a good or service proscribed by 
the authorities; ambiguous persistence, where activity is de facto illegal but generally 
tolerated due to a significant degree of social legitimacy; managed persistence, where 
significant profits accrue to the state as the result of a given activity despite its illegality; 
rebellious persistence, where internal political actors, opposed to the government in 
question, have control over either the region or the activity itself; and subversive 
persistence, where an outside political actor supports an illegal economic activity.79
It has been previously noted that the behavior of TCOs is generally unpinned by 
both the threat and use of violence, which in turn challenges the nation-state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force.80 Interestingly, in the modem era this monopoly is the 
subject of widespread consensus throughout the international system in all but the most 
circumscribed of situations, and serves as a primary pillar of the current international 
system.
78 This typology is laid out in Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 30-2.
79 This terminology and taxonomy comes from Alan Smart, “Predatory Rule and Illegal Economic 
Practices,” in Heyman, 103-5.
80 As noted in UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 130, “Lack o f recourse to legal redress . . .  implies 
higher transaction costs, because new entrants are liable to be coerced by better established, more powerful 
organizations or individuals. In other words, entry into a market place and to market position have to be 
fought for in ways that lie outside legitimate business practice.” See also Lupshka, “Transnational 
Organized Crime,” 29-30.
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However, not only can extralegal actors employing the use or threat of violence 
be readily observed throughout history and often coexisting with a wide range of other
political structures, a strong case can be made for their essential role in the rise of the
• •  81nation-state itself in its present form. At an even more fundamental level, Joshua
Charap and Christian Harm even go so far as to posit that nations themselves may have 
developed as the hegemonic results of gang warfare.
As with a wide range of other illegal endeavors, in the smuggling context the use 
of the carrot complements that of the stick. The smuggling process thus may also be 
characterized as highly dependent on the facilitation of corruption, particularly with 
respect to the commercial transport of contraband. With reference to the generic 
smuggling model, the access decision-making domain is integrally tied to the smuggler’s 
ability to control the smuggling process, and represents a key component of risk 
mitigation and avoidance.
The ability to co-opt the agents of the nation-state, if not the nation-state in toto, 
serves as a key element in a TCO’s operational success. Functionally speaking, in the 
absence of corruption the movement of contraband via commercial methods would 
become virtually impossible. Most often, such corruption is manifest in various forms of
81 Examples o f  this range from the use o f mercenaries, both medieval and modem, to the various types of 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned private organizations such as the British and Dutch East India Companies. 
Although this theme runs through a number o f works, for a focused analysis see Janice E. Thomson, 
Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 21-41, 69-105; 
Thomas W. Gallant, “Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a 
Historical World-Systems Perspective,” in Heyman, 25-61; Block and Chambliss, 221-8; and Michael 
Howard, War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 20-53.
82 See Joshua Charap and Christian Harm, “Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State,” IMF 
Working Paper WP/99/91 (July 1999), 12. Incidentally, this hypothesis is underpinned by the assumption 
that the relevant geographic landscape favored either offensive or defensive military action, which then 
defined the limits o f  spatial control. As such, these proto-nations represented the optimal reach o f a given 
hegemonic hierarchy, while borders arose as the result o f an anarchical equilibrium o f cooperation as 
neighbors realized that mutual conquest was not an option.
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bribery, with intimidation used as necessary in a supporting role. As this section’s focus 
is on TCO interaction with the nation-state, the issue of public sector corruption is of the
O')
essence.
Like smuggling, corruption is a complex phenomenon that can be found in many 
forms throughout history and in every part of the world. In general, the question is not 
whether corruption exists at a given time and place, but rather to what degree. However, 
there does appear to be an important distinction to be made in terms of scale between 
systemic corruption and corruption on the part of individuals or small groups. While the 
task of meaningfully measuring corruption is admittedly difficult, there does appear to be 
a consensus regarding the root causes of public sector corruption.84 In particular, the
83 The majority o f the literature on corruption tends to be confined to consideration o f the public sector.
For instance, even while acknowledging the difficulty o f  defining the phenomenon, Vito Tanzi writes, “The 
most popular and simplest definition o f corruption is that is the abuse of public power for private benefit.” 
Vito Tanzi, “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures,” IMF Working 
Paper WP/98/63 (December 1998), 8. The impact o f corruption on international trade is discussed at 
length in Shang-Jin Wei, “Natural Openness and Good Government,” NBER Working Paper W7765 (June 
2000), available at www.nber.org/papers/w7765. accessed 15 July 2004. See also Nikos Passas, “A 
Structural Analysis o f Corruption: The Role o f Criminogenic Asymmetries,” Transnational Organized 
Crime 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 42-55, which does note the general failure o f regional and multinational 
efforts to meaningfully address corruption within the private sector. While the public sector serves as a 
solid point o f departure, this study will attempt whenever possible to incorporate a consideration o f the 
private sector into the analysis as well. While recognizing that the climate for endemic corruption is 
generally set by the public sector, the rationale for this decision rests on the importance o f  the private sector 
in carrying out smuggling transactions. Consideration o f potential corruption should not exclude anyone in 
a position to enable criminal activity. One precedent for this broader definition may be found in the U.S. 
RICO (Racketeering-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statutes, which are targeted almost exclusively 
toward the private sector. The following section will address private sector corruption more directly, with a 
focus on international logistical networks.
84 Within the literature, economic and political analyses o f  corruption are among the most common 
approaches. For instance, Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste use an “equilibrium” analogy by which 
the size o f a country’s illicit economy may be positively correlated to factors such as high levels o f  
government regulation, weak rule o f  law and large discretionary corporate and personal tax burdens. 
Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste, “Shadow Economies Around the World: Size, Causes and 
Consequences,” IMF Working Paper WP/00/26 (February 2000), 19-26. Similarly, Tanzi notes that the 
causes o f public sector corruption may be broken down into those that affect demand, such as regulations, 
tax systems, spending decisions and the provision o f goods and services at below-market prices, and those 
that affect supply, such as bureaucratic traditions, public sector wages, penalty systems, institutional 
controls, government transparency and leadership examples. Tanzi, 3. See also Paolo Mauro, “Why 
Worry About Corruption?” IMF Economic Issues no. 6 (1997), 1-19, specifically focusing on the
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same types of social solidarity networks that characterize TCOs find a parallel in
oe
motivating corruption.
Furthermore, as with other types of criminal activity, levels of corruption 
demonstrably higher than acceptable global norms may be seen as inimical to good 
governance, defined as the management of a nation’s economic and social resources in 
ways that maximize the public good.86 Generically speaking, in political systems with 
ineffective or unregulated systems of institutional checks and balances where corrupt 
elites are allowed to flourish, access to political office tends to be limited to a relatively 
small group and officeholders are able to avoid, undermine or otherwise circumvent
• 07measures entailing transparency or accountability.
opportunities for corruption stimulated by governmental economic intervention in terms o f rents and rent- 
seeking; and Steven N. S. Chung, “A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption,”
Contemporary Economic Policy 14, no. 3 (July 1996), 1-5, which puts forth the notion o f public officials as 
constrained self-maximizers, and as such hypothesizes that in much o f the developing world, regulations 
and controls are formulated in order to open and maintain opportunities for corruption; the danger in 
transitioning to a free market system without the benefit o f solid private property rights is that corruption 
becomes integrally entrenched. However, one o f the most comprehensive treatments o f the subject can be 
found in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
85 For instance, Tanzi, 8-9, notes that, “In several cases o f corruption, the abuse o f public power is not 
necessarily for one’s private benefit but it can be for the benefit o f one’s party, class, tribe, friends, family 
and so on.” As corruption is anything but a monocausal phenomenon, its socio-cultural aspects need to be 
fully addressed. While this may be seen as something o f a gap in the literature, many o f the available 
corruption indices do in fact take this dimension into account. These will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. Rose-Ackerman, 130-2, also notes the detrimental impact o f public sector corruption via 
patronage systems within ethnically divided societies.
86 The negative effects on a given nation-state include, but are not limited to, the erosion o f political 
legitimacy, the loss o f investor confidence, and the erosion o f international efforts across issue areas 
ranging from trade to public health to development. See G. Shabbir Choma, “Corruption -  And How It 
Affects the Legitimacy o f the State,” UN. Chronicle 35, No. 11 (Spring 1998), 88-90; Robert S. Leiken, 
“Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic,” Foreign Affairs 105 (Winter 1996), 55-73; Andrei Shleifer 
and Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 108, no. 3 (August 1998), 599-618. 
For discussion o f a practical set o f strategies aimed at explicitly linking anti-corruption efforts and good 
governance, see also McFarlane, 17-24. However, dissenting views specifically those holding that 
corruption may have some redeeming features, may be found. For example, see Gordon Tullock, 
“Corruption Theory and Practice,” Contemporary Economic Policy 14, no. 3 (July 1996), 6-14. While this 
sentiment may not resonate with the general international consensus, as an extant and divergent point o f  
view it is worth mentioning.
87 Jordan, 37-8.
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While not the sole entities engaging in or taking advantage of these behaviors, 
TCO activity is inextricably intertwined with the issue of corruption, the existence of
oo
which in a specific operational context constitutes a distinct force multiplier. Within 
the public sector, leverage gained either by corruption or intimidation allows these groups 
to gain high level protection for themselves and their activities, access insider 
information on potential and ongoing investigations, and influence legislation or 
regulations that could affect their interests.
For their part, corrupt officials may opt to participate to secure financial rewards, 
avoid pressure and reprisals, and gain either political or personal favors from criminal
OQ <
groups. As Susan Rose-Ackerman notes, “Corruption is often embedded in the 
hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy. Low-level officials collect bribes and pass a 
share to those at higher levels -  perhaps in the form of an up-front payment for the job 
itself. Conversely, higher-ups may organize and rationalize the corrupt system to avoid 
wasteful competition between low-level officials.”90 However, corruption not only in 
government, but also in business and throughout society, is necessary to fully enable 
transnational smuggling.
From the smugglers’ perspective, there appears to be an optimal level of political 
corruption and overall instability that will best facilitate their activities. For instance, as 
Morrison notes, rather than the outright chaos that is found in war zones, a lower level of
88 Illustrative o f this, Leiken notes that the range of nontraditional threats rising to prominence in the post- 
Cold War era, in particular terrorism and smuggling activity, have little in common analytically “except 
that all are aided at critical junctures by official corruption.” Leiken, 56. The author also notes the growth 
o f TCOs as prime movers in exploiting these opportunities.
89 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 7-8. In addition to 
echoing many o f the points noted above, this source also observes that, “Criminal groups are most 
successful in corrupting high-level politicians in countries that are their home bases.” This phenomenon 
will be discussed at greater length in the case studies.
90 Rose-Ackerman, 49.
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civil disorder may in fact be more desirable from the smugglers’ perspective in terms of 
their ability to control their operational environment by maximizing access and 
minimizing risk. Conversely, political systems that allow high levels of corruption to 
flourish are also magnets for smuggling.91
Moving on the consideration of the spatial, in terms of geography one defining, 
perhaps the defining, characteristic of the nation-state is the control of certain territorial 
borders. Nearly the entire surface of the earth is organized along such lines, and, under 
the international system, governments purport to hold political sway in the form of 
national sovereignty within their respective borders. However, as Matthews notes, a 
distinct divide exists between “the essence of statehood, which is a fixed and precisely 
defined territory, and the amorphous geography of the resources and threats.”93
As the edges of the nation-state, international borders and their relevant crossing 
points can be seen as focal points for both smuggler and the nation-state. The relative 
porosity of international borders can be seen largely as a function of the physical terrain 
in question, the nature of the relevant national actors’ border control policies, and the 
effectiveness of the specific law enforcement entities charged with implementing those 
policies.
91 Morrison, 2-4. Methods o f assessing the various types o f  relevant political risk factors at the national 
level will be discussed further in Chapter IV.
92 For instance, Buzan, 60-6, makes use o f  the terminology o f  “physical base” to differentiate this concept 
from both the idea o f the state and its institutional expression. In noting the common usages o f the concept 
of security, Dalby also highlights the spatial dimensions o f the nation-state’s duties, namely the social 
contract that calls for the state to “provide order within its boundaries.” In making the case for “anti­
geopolitics” and questioning the traditional approach to security and its various levels o f analysis, the 
author frames the issue o f transnational threats primarily in an ecological context. However, an analogous 
critical framework using smuggling as a test case may also be made. Dalby, 97-8, 107-10.
93 Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 10.
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In general, as noted at the outset of this study, national boundaries are 
increasingly subject to a wide range of political, economic and social pressures. For 
instance, regional integration of existing national territories, particularly with respect to 
trade, is occurring in tandem.94 The enhanced ease with which not only goods, but 
people as well, can cross international borders, while serving as the engine of 
globalization and associated economic growth, also offers immense opportunities for 
illicit activity.95
Similarly, there has been a marked increase of sovereign territorial entities, as 
well as an even greater number of aspirants to nationhood, which also serves to 
complicate the issue. While many factors have helped to facilitate this upward trend, 
overall it can be traced in turn back to the sheer number of nation-states that have come 
into being over the past fifty years.96 As a result, “There has probably never been a 
period where more governments on Earth have codified what is right and what is wrong,
94 The most salient example o f this may be found in the case o f the European Union, in both its widening 
and deepening efforts. Interestingly, it may be argued that regional economic integration does not negate 
national borders, but rather redefine them without lessening their significance. See “Good fences,” The 
Economist, 19 December 1998, 19-22.
95 The international transportation o f goods will be the focus o f the following section. However, continuing 
with the E.U. example, under the terms o f the Schengen Agreement, citizens o f those countries opting to 
join no longer require passports. In addition to concerns regarding illegal immigration, the proliferation of 
cross-border crime within the region implies the need for a higher degree of coordination among the 
relevant law enforcement, legislative and judicial entities. For a more in-depth analysis o f these challenges, 
see “European borders: melting,” The Economist, 24 August 1998, 40; “A single market in crime,” The 
Economist (web edition), 16 October 1999; and, focusing on a particularly active segment o f  the immigrant 
smuggling market, Carlotta Gall, “China’s Migrants Find Europe’s Open Back Door,” New York Times 
(web edition), 22 April 2000.
96 For instance, there have been three distinct waves o f nation-state creation during the twentieth century. 
These have come in the wake o f World War I, with the various post-war settlements; o f World War II, 
particularly with respect to decolonization in Africa and Asia; and o f  the Cold War, which not only gave 
rise to the Soviet successor states but in many respects reconfigured the international consensus regarding 
the nature o f sovereignty and the inviolability o f natural borders. Recent illustrations of this continuing 
trend can be seen in the Balkans with the former Yugoslavia, in sub-Saharan Africa with the case of 
Eritrea, and in the Indonesian archipelago with the case o f  East Timor. A holistic view o f this phenomenon 
is offered in Graham E. Fuller, “Redrawing the World’s Borders,” World Policy Journal 14, no. 1 (Spring
1997), 11-21. In the African context, see also Ali Mazrui, “The bondage o f boundaries,” The Economist,
11 September 1993,28-30.
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or when there were more organizations operating beyond these established norms and 
standards.”97
Moreover, as Williams and Savona note, uneven criminal justice and law 
enforcement capabilities among nation-states mean that degrees of risk vary considerably 
according to the location of the organization and its associated jurisdiction.
Consequently, transnational criminal organizations tend to have operational bases in 
areas where risks are low and to engage in providing illicit goods and services to markets 
where the profits are very high.98
Furthermore, smuggling actors have shown a marked willingness to exploit any 
areas of potential vulnerability, and, in keeping with the principle that such activity 
opportunistically follows the path of least resistance, will continue to do so in the future. 
Taking this idea further and underlining the symbiosis between smuggling actor and 
nation-state, Andreas posits that, “Just as some countries and regions have a special niche 
in legal trade, so too do different countries and regions have a niche in illegal trade. The 
industrialized countries dominate legal trade; illegal trade is an area of significant 
comparative advantage for many developing countries.”99
Thus, it is hardly surprising that one Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study 
found that, “Crime groups typically target regions experiencing economic or social
97 Leonard Sullivan Jr., Meeting the Challenges o f  Regional Security, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. War College, 1994), 1. In support o f this view on a regional scope, see “A goat, a rug, 
special price?” The Economist, 3 December 1999, 38-9. Interestingly, the latter article underlines not only 
the endemic movement o f  outright contraband throughout the Middle East but also, and even more 
commonly, “everyday household goods subject to high tariffs or stiff regulation” on the part o f various 
national governments.
98 Williams and Savona, 5.
99 Andreas, 78. While is demonstrable across a wide range o f issue areas, in the context o f drugs this study 
will elaborate further on the issue o f  heroin production. However, another excellent example o f a regional 
specialization can be found in the competitive advantage o f the Andean countries o f  South America with 
respect to cocaine, certain aspects o f which will be addressed in Chapter VI.
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turmoil to take advantage of burgeoning black markets for consumer and other goods.”100 
With respect to the economic turmoil, Morrison also notes the impact of insecure 
commodities markets or transitional economies, whereby disruptions or fluctuations of 
the market for a commodity on which a nation or region depends, or movement from 
centralized to market control of economies, can serve to stimulate smuggling activity.101
In its more extreme forms, such organized criminal activity can even undermine 
the very fabric of national institutions and control of territory, albeit most often when 
other pressures are already extant. With particular reference to the focus of this study, 
Stares notes that, “Not only does drug traffickers’ presence and behavior undermine the 
authority of government, but in some cases they prevent it from being properly
established. The vital process of nation building becomes stalled, if not derailed, in the
102process.” In this respect, states that have failed or are in the process of failing can be 
seen as particularly at risk.
Expanding on this dimension, Larry Goodsen makes the added distinction 
between developed and developing states, with the former influenced by the forces of 
integration and the latter by those of fragmentation. Under this conceptualization, the ex-
100 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), “International Organized 
Crime and Cargo Theft,” CNC 99-10007D (Washington, DC: CNC, December 1999), iii. See also “War 
and money: The business o f conflict,” The Economist (web edition), 4 March 2000, which notes the 
prevalence o f such profiteering, as well as the economic incentives paradoxically imparted by efforts at 
imposing international sanctions.
101 Morrison, 5-6
102 See Stares, 97. However, even among more developed nations, there is a growing awareness o f the 
seriousness o f  this issue. At a recent symposium on NATO and European security, the narcotics and 
organized crime issue figured prominently in the discussion o f  future threats. Winston Wiley, Associate 
Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “Transnational Threats to NATO in 2010,” 
presented at 1998 European Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 10-11 February 
1998. Moreover, the issue o f the increasing power and influence o f criminal organizations over the 
political and economic structure o f nation-sates is also worrisome, particularly in a scenario where such 
countries become safe havens where criminals can operate with virtual impunity, protected by the concept 
o f sovereignty under international law. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat 
Assessment, Ch. IV, 4-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
Communist and newly industrialized states are being pulled in both directions 
simultaneously. In this light, he notes that, “It is not just a question of whether 
governments hold onto their territory, but whether governments increasingly become 
meaningless or at least less meaningful actors within their society, and which factors 
constrain their sovereignty.”103 Along these lines, H. Richard Friman also posits a direct 
linkage between a state’s territorial integrity and potential involvement in smuggling.104
As such, various types of vulnerable areas, or “interspaces,” exist within the 
international system that are highly susceptible to smuggling, as well as other criminal 
activity, since monitoring and enforcement assets dedicated to these places are notably 
lacking. Major types of interspaces would include extended and unprotected national 
land and water borders, the territories of failed or failing states, and the high seas.105 
Within the context of the international system, the phenomenon of states that, for a
103 Larry Goodsen, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise o f  the Taliban 
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2001), 185. The author also includes a table o f variables, 
including the geostrategic position of the state in question, the economic well-being o f the society, the 
strength o f state institutions, and the stability o f the population, with respect to hypothesized impacts on 
state failure. Incidentally, these variables roughly parallel the aspects of physical, economic, political and 
human geography put forth in this study. Another depiction o f a world divided into three discrete groups 
can be found in Jeffrey Sachs, “A new map o f the world,” The Economist, 24 July 2000, 81-3. Here, the 
distinction is made between the technology innovators, the technology adapters and the technology 
excluded. In general, this framework appears much more optimistic in its underlying assumption that 
technology can be a panacea for development.
104 H. Richard Friman, “Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics o f Illicit Shipment,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 73.
105 The concept o f these “interspaces” is put forth admirably, though primarily with respect to the maritime 
context, by Kevin Burke, “Waterway and Port Security,” Proceedings o f  the Marine Safely Council 56, no. 
4 (October -December 1999), 61-2. While somewhat beyond the scope o f this study, a related discussion 
of the analogous case both on the high seas and along littoral areas where piracy flourishes can be found in 
“Those in peril on the sea,” The Economist (web edition), 9 August 1997. For a land-based example o f this 
phenomenon, see Ian Fisher, “Somali Business Stunted By Too-Free Enterprise,” New York Times (web 
edition), 10 August 2000. Moreover, Bunker and Sullivan, 56, also note the sub-national aspects o f this 
phenomenon, even down to the neighborhood level, where residents are place at risk by breakdowns in 
public safety, endemic violence and inter-gang warfare, with the resulting “failed community” being the 
local analogue o f the failed state.
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variety of reasons, are unable or unable to control their borders is crucial to the ability of 
the smuggling actor to flourish.106
In the post-Cold War era of global economic integration, a definite bifurcation 
exists between the imperatives of opening borders to commerce and limiting the direct 
economic roles of states on the one hand, and of controlling prohibited types cross-border 
transactions. As Andreas notes, “The regulation and monitoring of cross-border flows is
■I f\n
central to the modem state’s claims of territorial sovereignty.” While the industrially 
developed countries may be relatively better able to deal with the pressures inherent to 
this issue area, nation-states as a class may be seen as ceding a certain degree of 
sovereignty almost by default, as it is nearly impossible for even the most to even 
monitor all such activity.
In most cases, a wide range of law enforcement entities may be seen as having a 
role in enforcing national laws and international agreements with respect to border 
control. However, as a segue into the next section, a discussion of the singular role of 
customs administrations as the most salient concrete interface with respect to this issue 
area is in order. As the primary organizations charged with regulating legitimate cross- 
border commercial activity, customs administrations throughout the world are at the 
forefront of the nation-states efforts to counter smuggling activity.
Unlike other government organizations, customs administrations are neither 
wholly domestically nor internationally focused, but rather charged looking both inward
106 In a holistic sense, this is a major component o f the thesis put forth by Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming 
Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, 273, no. 2 (February 1994), 44-6, 48, and expanded further in To the Ends 
o f  the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers o f  Anarchy (New York: Vintage, 1996), and The Coming Anarchy: 
Shattering the Dreams o f  the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).
107 Andreas, 75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
and outward simultaneously. As Lane notes, “Customs organizations throughout the 
world hold a unique position within a country’s government and within the international 
community. Protection of a nation’s borders, collection of duties and taxes, and the 
operation of a customs administration are uniquely sovereign responsibilities”108
The challenges faced by customs administrations are abundantly clear, and 
growing more complex. For instance, as Lane continues by pointing out, “Transnational 
criminal trafficking in weapons, munitions, and drugs is familiar to all customs 
organizations. Today, transnational criminal organizations are adding money laundering, 
fraud, child pornography, environmental crimes, and terrorism to the list of traditional 
customs violations.”109 In the wake of 9/11, the last of these in particular has taken on a 
particularly heightened urgency.
The range of responses to smuggling on the part of customs organizations 
includes the monitoring of shipments, country of origin certification and various other 
forms of administrative controls.110 Flowever, worldwide these entities are subject to a 
fundamental paradox, specifically that of balancing the demand for speedier, cheaper and 
less intrusive clearance of goods and people with the need for more effective law 
enforcement, regulation and compliance assurance. Furthermore, these conflicting 
imperatives must be addressed as the volume of trade continues to increase across the 
global economy,
108 Lane, 4, 16. For more on this topic with respect to the E.U, see also “Anything to declare?” The 
Economist, 21 September 2002, 52-3.
109 Lane, 101.
110 These responses on the part o f the nation-state are addressed more extensively in Friman, “Just Passing 
Through,” 66-8.
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Despite the mixed success of customs organizations in meeting these challenges, 
risk mitigation measures taken by smuggling measures are increasingly prevalent. For 
instance, as Morrison notes, “transit points may increasingly be chosen, not for the 
protection that internal chaos or corruption provides, but because they have no known 
involvement in the illicit trade in drugs and therefore less likely to arouse the suspicion of 
Customs Services.”111 Furthermore, while customs operations are greatly enhanced by 
new technology and the application of data analysis techniques, as discussed in the 
previous section smugglers are also growing more sophisticated, employing much of the 
same, and sometimes better, technology in more innovative ways.112 Such criminal 
groups are also able to leverage a wide range of talent in support of their operations.113
The resultant pressures of sustaining legitimate economic activity while at the 
same time controlling black market transactions is the key challenge facing nation-states 
and their agents. From just a cursory survey, it is obvious that even the most effective of 
organizations cannot cover every point of entry, particularly when unofficial means of
111 Morrison, 9. Furthermore, adding to the inherent obstacles to effective control o f  borders, the author 
also points out that in many cases the only information that custom’s services will have available relates to 
a given shipment’s last port o f  call.
112 Lane, 117. A recent CIA report also notes that international organized crime groups appear quite able to 
tap into information-sharing networks related to transportation as necessary to carry out their activities.
U.S. CIA, CNC, “International Organized Crime and Cargo Theft,” iii.
113 According to U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 5, 
“Globalization has bred a more professional criminal element. International criminals make use o f the 
latest commercial and technological developments to expand and improve the efficiency o f their 
operations, and they have the financial resources to obtain whatever access, know-how, and technology 
they may need or desire. Many criminal groups employ individuals with specific access to facilitate their 
operations. As a result, they are able to quickly identify and adapt to market conditions.” In particular, 
“Major drug smuggling and other international criminal groups use transportation specialists and legal 
experts to research commercial flows and learn about tariff laws and administrative procedures in the 
world’s major commercial ports. With such information, they are able to exploit international air, sea, and 
land shipping to move drugs, arms, other contraband, illegal aliens, and even money past law enforcement 
and customs.”
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access are added to official ones.114 Consequently, the gap between custom’s resources 
and missions will continue to widen for all nation-states.
Even within these constraints, at any given border crossing security measures 
represent the effort to balance expedience and efficiency with respect to both economic 
and security considerations. However, “perfect” security would virtually eliminate or at 
least irrevocably delay most legitimate transnational commercial activity as well.115 
While the nation-state is not becoming irrelevant by any means, it has rather been given 
the choice of participating in and shaping the process of globalization, or fighting what 
appears to be a losing battle against market forces.
In many ways, smuggling graphically illustrates the divergence between the 
interests of state and those of non-state actors. With respect to international borders, 
smuggling route selection follows the path of least resistance by capitalizing on various 
political factors such as corruption, internal stability, external conflict and economic 
policies, which serve to increase the vulnerability of a given country to such activity. 
Conversely, from the smuggler’s point of view, a primary source of operational risk 
comes from the efforts of nation-states to stem the flow of contraband. It is the
114 This issue is not only outlined well but also constructively engaged by Colin Vassarotti, National 
Director, Office o f Business Systems, Australian Customs Service, “Customs 2000: Risk Analysis in the 
New Millennium,” presented at Risk Management in the New Millennium Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, 
1-3 December 1999. Interestingly, a reverse engineering o f the proposed customs risk management process 
may serve to highlight areas o f potential criminal exploitation. This topic will be addressed further in 
Chapter IV.
115 At present, most customs organizations’ levels o f  scrutiny seldom make this an issue. For instance, in 
the United States, which may be expected to have one of the highest inspection rates given the scope o f its 
resources, less than 2% o f import and 1% of export cargo using the maritime mode o f transportation is 
physically inspected. U.S. Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (ICCSS), 
Report o f  the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, Fall 2000, 87, available at 
http://www.securitvmanagement.com/librarv/seaport 1200.pdf. accessed 15 July 2004. However, in the 
wake o f 9/11 this issue has taken on an even more pressing aspect and it is reasonable to expect inspection 
rates to rise.
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mechanics of this flow, and its supporting logistical networks, that constitute the focus of 
the next section.
Potential Modes o f Transnational Smuggling 
The transnational movement of both goods and people is obviously an integral 
function of the world economy. In particular, the transshipment of both licit and illicit 
commodities continues to become increasingly cheaper and easier. The growth of 
international trade, as noted above, has also resulted in a correspondingly enhanced 
window of opportunity for transnational smuggling. In this context, criminal elements 
vie for operational access to various forms of transnational logistical networks, while 
nation-states attempt to impose risk upon such activities. The resultant equilibrium 
between access and risk is manifest in the potential modes of transportation, which in the 
generic smuggling model is captured as connectivity via the path of least resistance.
Up to this point, the approach to these issues has been largely theoretical in 
nature, focusing on the concept of smuggling rather than its more concrete physical 
manifestations. While the case studies further illustrate how theory becomes practice, 
this section serves to delineate the various modes of transportation available to smuggling 
actors, namely by land, by water, and by air, as well as the interaction between licit and 
illicit uses of these commercial channels.116 Moreover, an additional dimension of
116 Paralleling his taxonomy with respect to the development o f trade centers, Van Cleef, 6-15, also 
delineates modes o f transportation in a similar manner. However, given the date o f publication (1937), the 
analysis o f  air routes is understandably the least developed among the three modes.
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modem logistics is the intermodal connectivity that serves to link these networks into a 
seamless whole.117
Before moving on to a direct consideration of these transnational logistical 
linkages, however, it is necessary to introduce a third major set of actors into the calculus 
of smuggling, along with smuggling actors and nation-states, namely those within the 
private sector. In particular, the cross-border activities of commercial entities are often 
the subject of the nation-state’s scrutiny, generally via customs administrations as noted 
in the previous section and largely with respect to the subversion of legitimate transport 
networks for criminal ends. As an example, Petrus C. Van Duyne and Michael Levi 
point out that the transport business is frequently targeted by TCOs and often bears the 
stigma of being highly vulnerable to such infiltration.118
As Andreas notes, “while the methods of smuggling are as diverse as the 
commodity being smuggled, most smuggling parallels the methods and routes of legal 
commerce.”119 In general, commercial transportation appears to lend itself more readily 
to the movement of large amounts of contraband. By contrast, the smuggling of smaller
117 For an overview of trade globalization from the logistical perspective, to include discussion of 
intermodality, see “Delivering the goods,” The Economist (web edition), 15 November 1997. As noted in 
U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 2, “The advent o f  
intermodal commercial shipping -  including standardized cargo containers, computerized cargo tracking, 
and automated cargo-transfer equipment -  enables shippers to securely and efficiently transfer containers 
delivered by sea to other ships for onward shipment or to commercial railroads and trucks for overland 
transportation. Criminals are able to exploit the complexity o f the intermodal system to hide drugs or other 
contraband or to conceal the true origin and ownership o f  [the] cargo within which the contraband is 
hidden.” These trends and their impact on the various modes o f transportation will be discussed at greater 
length below.
118 See Petrus C. Van Duyne and Michael Levi, “Criminal Financial Investigation: A Strategic and Tactical 
Approach at a European Level,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 50-2.
Furthermore, with specific reference to the maritime context but applicable across all transportation sectors, 
U.S. DOT, Office o f Intelligence and Security, Port Security: A National Planning Guide (Washington,
DC: DOT, 1997), 11, available at http://www.uscg.mil/hQ/g-m/nmc/securitv/portDlan.htm. accessed 15 July 
2004, notes that “Smugglers are utilizing front companies or exploiting legitimate shippers in the process.”
119 Andreas, 80.
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amounts of contraband becomes more attractive as the value of the contraband increases
in relation to its volume.
Legitimate trading activity also tends to be concentrated through official border
crossings such as road and rail checkpoints, seaports and airports, while non-commercial
border crossings tends to be more dispersed and may not necessarily utilize the same
points of access. However, such movement of both people and goods certainly constitute
viable and parallel windows of opportunity to smugglers, and will be discussed as they
arise in relation to the potential methods of smuggling by land, water and air, and in the
context of the case studies. If relatively less attention is paid at this point to such private
activity, it is not because it is less important as a phenomenon, but rather because it is
more difficult to meaningfully assess than analogous commercial activity.
With regard to the flow of international trade, the following passage outlines the
tensions between the private sector and national governments that naturally arise from
their divergent interests:
The . . .  private sector typically considers maintaining the unimpeded flow of 
cargo to be paramount and expects government law enforcement agencies to 
assert the principle [sic] role in countering criminal exploitation of the 
transportation system. Governments, on the other hand, increasingly expect the 
commercial industry to assume more responsibility for preventing crimes against 
their transportation and logistic systems, particularly in such crimes as cargo theft. 
Governments also expect companies to cooperate with law enforcement agencies 
to prevent such crimes as drug smuggling in commercial cargo, which serves the 
public interest, and to comply with governmental efforts to collect revenues from 
international trade and protect the integrity of its borders from transnational
120 U.S. DOT, Maritime Administration (MARAD), “OAS Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Port 
Security: A Multilateral Initiative to Develop a Common Strategy to Devise Basic Guidelines and 
Minimum Standards to Improve Port Security in the Western Hemisphere,” Maritime Security Report (May 
2000), 7. Similarly, “A government-only approach [to transportation security] depends on regulatory and 
law enforcement capabilities and mechanisms . . .  However, criminal exploitation of commercial industries 
manifests in illicit enterprises which victimize or mimic legitimate business activities. In the absence of 
industry involvement, these circumstances tend to place government in an adversarial position with the
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Despite their differing agendas vis-a-vis nation-states, the private sector has a 
considerable ability to influence the transnational flow of contraband. Moreover, it 
appears self-evident that smuggling issues cannot be meaningfully addressed without the 
cooperation of commercial actors.
For the nation-state, the challenge lies in convincing firms involved in 
transportation and logistics that their interests lie in embracing measures to counter 
smuggling. These include, but are not limited to, enhanced safety considerations, a 
concern for public image, and the desire to mitigate operational losses arising from 
criminal activities. Furthermore, knowing that they can be threatened with substantial 
fines or prison terms, and that their assets can be seized as well, provides addition 
incentives for owners and operators involved in shipping to maintain vigilance and avoid 
any directly involvement in illegal activity.121
For instance, various efforts on the part of U.S. Customs to work more closely 
with shippers are predicated on the latter’s agreement to enhance security measures and
private sector, which may [work to the] advantage o f organized crime.” U.S. DOT, MARAD, “The U.S. 
International Crime Control Strategy -  A Foundation for Substantially Improving the Security of  
International Maritime Trade Corridors and Reducing Cargo Crime,” Maritime Security Report (October
1998), 7. More concisely, Lane notes that, “As a result o f  its history as a protectionist organization and a 
barrier to trade, customs’ relationship with the international trade community has often been acrimonious 
and adversarial.” Lane, 96.
121 Within this context, the issue o f bribery as a business practice is particularly salient. Despite being 
common worldwide, U.S.-based firms and any foreign companies either registered in the U.S. or quoted on 
one of its stock exchanges are legally constrained by the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which bans 
the bribery o f foreign government officials. For an overview o f this legislation’s genesis, see John T. 
Noonan, Jr., Bribes (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 676-80. Another important multilateral initiative within 
this issue area, adopted in November 1997, is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), “Convention o f Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/gov/2001/eng/091801 .htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
Furthermore, as o f  early 2001, British legislation paralleling that o f the U.S. was also under discussion. For 
discussion o f the competitive advantage offered by a lack o f such controls on bribery, see also John J. 
Fialka, War By Other Means (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 94-5; Julie B. Nesbit, “Transnational 
bribery o f foreign officials: a new threat to democracy,” Vanderbilt Journal o f  Transnational Law 31, no. 5 
(November 1998), 1273-91; and “The short arm o f the law,” The Economist, 2 March 2002, 63-5.
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the exchange of information, while in return the government will in most cases reduce or 
dismiss fines for involvement in smuggling that can range into the millions of dollars. 
However, more can be done to encourage these “best practices” among such commercial 
actors.122 Furthermore, other private sector entities such as insurance companies also 
have a concrete economic interest in exerting their available leverage to meaningfully 
address the nexus of smuggling activity.
At this juncture it is necessary to turn to a more direct discussion of the relevant 
logistical networks. Overall, decision-making processes related to connectivity represent 
a key component in the movement of both legitimate goods and contraband. As such, a 
number of principles can be applied to the analysis of the supporting logistical networks. 
Within the field of geography, there is “friction of distance” concept. Similarly, from the 
business perspective, “least-cost routing” comes into play, as well as the avoidance of 
“detour costs.” However, none of these concepts fully take into account the nature of the 
risk imposed by the nation-state on black market logistics, which may be considered as 
resistance if the analogy of electricity is used.
122 Illustrative o f  the range o f these efforts to facilitate government-private sector cooperation in the U.S., 
programs such as the Carrier Initiative Program (CIP), the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), the 
Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), and, most recently, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Container Security Initiative (CSI) have been instituted, all operating under the 
auspices o f  the USCS. See also Stephen E. Flynn, “Globalization and the Future o f Border Control,” 
Council on Foreign Relations Online Study Group, 11 January 2000, which makes the case for expanding 
these types of programs. Shipping industry best practices are also outlined at length in U.S. DOT, National 
Science and Technology Council, Office o f Science and Technology Policy, Intermodal Cargo 
Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices, (Washington, DC: John A. Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center, 1999); and Lou Tyska, ed., Guidelines fo r Cargo Security and Loss 
Control (Annapolis, MD: National Cargo Security Council, n.d.). See also Michael Fabey, “Drug Transit 
Zone: Carriers, shippers beef up security as GAO reports U.S. falling short in war on drug traffic,” Traffic 
World, 16 March 1998, 44. Moreover, various proposals to merge the U.S. Customs Service, once part of 
the Department o f the Treasury, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, previously a component 
o f the Department o f  Justice, and perhaps elements o f  other agencies, all under the auspices o f the newly- 
formed Department o f Homeland Defense, recently culminated in a reorganization along these lines.
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To begin with, in the case of transnational smuggling there will always be at a 
minimum both a source country and an arrival country, with a transit zone that 
encompasses at least one international border. The diagram below represents the notional 
movement of smuggled commodities from the contraband’s source into a given arrival 
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Fig. 5. Potential modes of transnational smuggling
As discussed in the previous section, in spatial terms smuggling actors are able to 
exploit areas where nation-states are unable or unwilling to exercise authority and to 
subvert the agents of the nation-state either directly or indirectly. Thus, in deciding
123 The arrows representing these notional smuggling routes are further conceptualized as smuggling 
vectors in Chapter IV.
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where, when and how such shipments will be made, the smuggler is able to exploit gaps 
in national border controls and to largely determine the character of illicit trade. This is 
in sharp contrast to the various and largely reactive efforts of nation-states to thwart such 
transactions. Whereas the nation-state must be strong everywhere at all times, or at a 
minimum extremely well informed and coordinated, the smuggler must only succeed in 
the instance of the given smuggling event.
TCOs are demonstrably able to reach into the various mechanisms of the 
legitimate global trading system in ways that nation-states find difficult to counter. The 
readily available range of contraband that can be found the world over is a measure the 
latter’s overall operational success. In the smuggling context it is not the most direct 
route that prevails, but rather the path of least resistance between areas of supply and 
demand. As Clawson and Lee note, the improvement and diversification of routes and 
methods is an important way for smugglers to increase their profits, which leads directly 
to the key issue of transshipment.124
Transshipment refers specifically to the shipment of goods via a third party en 
route to a final destination. Although this practice can be either licit or illicit, in moving 
contraband shippers often seek to evade various types of trade restrictions by indirectly 
shipping contraband in order to either hide the activity entirely or otherwise disguise its 
point of origin. Efforts at outright concealment of such activity in toto most commonly 
take place in the context of prohibition regimes, while the evasion of sanctions,
124 Clawson and Lee, 11. The authors continue by pointing out that, using cocaine as an example, “the 
sheer diversity o f vehicles that modem smugglers use to move bulk cocaine -  cargo jets, merchant 
shipping, tractor trailers, camouflaged small boats, and even (as in the case o f Colombia) specially 
produced submersible vessels -  represents a daunting challenge to law enforcement officials.”
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embargoes, or quantitative restrictions more often motivate smuggling of otherwise licitly 
traded products.
As Friman notes, “Despite this longstanding dynamic, the challenge of the transit 
trade remains severely understudied by the prominent literature on the political economy 
of trade. Moreover, although the practice of transit trade is often noted in the literature 
on transnational crime under the broad category of ‘smuggling,’ the nature and dynamics 
of ‘intermediate countries’ remains largely unexplored.”126 As trends relating to 
globalization accelerate, determining the origins of international cargoes will continue to 
become more difficult, particularly when smuggling actors have a definite interest in
177camouflaging the country of origin for a particular shipment.
When only two nation-states are involved, the literature on interdependence 
suggests that economic linkages between them would tend to increase the opportunities 
for smuggling by offering a broader flow of goods within which illicit commodities can
• 10Salso be shipped. Lupshka also observes that, “Organized crime has always prospered 
where international boundaries meet, but any nation whose standard of living is higher 
than its neighbors must recognize this threat. In any border or port situation where 
economic inequities at the point of entry or the adjacent countries are extreme . . .  one has 
a natural incubator in which transnational organized crime can grow and prosper.”129 
This tendency is also accelerated when border restrictions are minimized or eliminated.
125 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 66.
126 Ibid., 65.
127 See Morrison, 5, 10-4.
128 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 70.
129 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 27.
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Observing that traditional geopolitical arguments stress the impact of land and sea 
access, Friman continues by pointing out that, “Extending this focus to the analysis of 
transshipment suggests the importance of location dynamics. Those countries that border 
the target -  especially those that serve as coastal access points for a landlocked target -  or 
those countries located in the target’s access region would appear to be prime candidates 
for transit points due primarily to the relatively low cost of transporting goods from 
transit to target state.” However, as the number of transshipment countries increases,
“All things being equal, exporters are likely to seek transit points close to the target.” As 
such, the extent of restrictions on such countries as well as other factors facilitating 
access are likely to decrease the importance of location dynamics.130
In the case of routing through multiple countries, a high level of international 
coordination on the part of nation-states must be achieved to successfully interdict
1 T1contraband. At present, however, such cooperation is the exception rather than the 
rule. From the smugglers’ perspective, the task is relatively more straightforward: “To 
smuggle . . .  via a third country requires the smuggling organization to establish reliable 
transfer points within the in-transit countries, as well as the source country. This involves 
subverting the law enforcement establishment and corrupting other parts of the 
government and citizenry.”132 As noted above, such opportunities for corruption are 
never entirely absent.
130 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 69. Furthermore, the nature o f the good being shipped can also have 
an impact, with the bulkier the good and the lower its price by volume, the greater the importance o f  
geographic proximity in this respect.
131 As noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 18, 
“Routing contraband through a transit country helps to conceal the true country o f origin on merchandise 
that is controlled or restricted by the importing country.”
132 U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 18.
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For any given country, Friman posits that its potential as a transit state is a dual 
function of openness to transit and access to target, with the former focusing on the 
source country and the latter on the final destination. In this conceptualization, openness 
to transit can be defined as the extent to which exporters are able to obtain passage 
through the potential transit state, while access to target refers to the extent to which the 
potential transit state can gain entry to the intended final market sought by the exporter. 
The benefits to the transit state from choosing to engage in illicit transshipment include 
accelerated revenue and employment gains as well as access to distribution networks and, 
in come cases, technology. However, there can also be significant economic, political 
and social costs associated with allowing illicit transshipment to flourish.133
Overall, concealment of smuggled goods in commercial cargo is quite common, 
particularly with respect to the movement of contraband in large volumes. Most often, 
such activity is facilitated either by physical concealment of the illicit goods or by a 
fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts.134 In terms of the actual methods of physical 
concealment involved in transnational smuggling, the variation is literally bounded only 
by the imagination, an issue that is discussed further in the context of drugs in the next 
chapter.135 However, a similar function is served by altering shipping documents at
133 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 68-74.
134 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 18. While the concept 
o f  physical concealment is relatively straightforward, the mechanics o f  fraud are more opaque. The 
primary methods involved are false invoicing, and the over or under valuation o f smuggled goods. While 
the under valuation o f goods allows smugglers to avoid tariffs or excise taxes, overvaluation is used either 
to disguise the true identity o f the item or to launder illicitly derived proceeds.
135 For instance, as Andreas points out, “Literally anything that crosses a national border can be used for 
smuggling, ranging from the most common and conventional (such as car trunks and luggage) to the most 
desperate and dangerous (human ingestion) to the most ingenious (stuffing cocaine into jalapeno peppers) 
to the most unstoppable (the airwaves).” Andreas, 80.
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intermediate transshipment points and using counterfeit customs seals to avoid inspection
1 ̂and thus facilitate the passage of illicit shipments through any inspection process.
Moreover, by their nature nearly all smuggling events involve both a specific 
buyer and seller, with any transfers of control along the way made by some sort of 
intermediary agents except in the case of a direct exchange. In general, illegal 
transactions utilizing commercial logistical channels can be categorized as either 
consignee shipments, in which contraband is actually delivered to the nominal recipient 
or some other intended agent, or internal conspiracies, in which contraband is removed at 
some intermediary point in the transportation process.
To clarify further, a consignee shipment of contraband travels though the 
logistical system to its intended destination precisely as if it were licit cargo. Consignee 
shipments may also fall under the heading of “deep concealment,” with the emphasis 
being on avoidance of detection all along the route via camouflaging the smuggling 
activity as legitimate. Those involved in such transactions may be either witting or 
unwitting of the criminal activity in question, and involvement could include anyone with 
the ability to control the transaction in question, from crew to cargo handler to freight 
forwarder to shipping agent.
136 The range o f recent documented drug smuggling methods is discussed in U.S. DOJ, DEA, National 
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report 1997: The Supply o f  Illicit Drugs to the United States 
(November 1998), 6, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agencv/doi/dea/product/nnicc97.htm. accessed 15 
July 2004. Incidentally, this report is also commonly referred to as the NNICC. Furthermore, as noted in 
U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 18, “Most contraband 
smuggling is facilitated by physical concealment o f  the illicit goods or by a fraudulent misrepresentation of 
the facts.” While the concept o f physical concealment is relatively straightforward, the mechanics o f fraud 
are more opaque. The primary methods involved are false invoicing, and the over or under valuation of 
smuggled goods. While the under valuation o f goods allows smugglers to avoid tariffs or excise taxes, 
overvaluation is used either to disguise the true identity o f  the item or to launder illicitly derived proceeds.
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Though more specifically dependent on physical access to the shipment in transit, 
internal conspiracies in particular raise the issue of corruption and its variants, both 
directly in the case of the commercial entities and more indirectly within the public sector 
as noted previously. In particular, the insertion and extraction of contraband into 
otherwise legitimate cargo or otherwise concealed in the conveyance itself can take place 
at any point along the cargo handling process.
Involvement in this type of smuggling activity would not necessarily be limited to 
cargo handling personnel but could encompass the involvement of the transiting vessel’s 
crewmembers as well. Unsupervised access to the cargo is crucial for the success of this 
type of activity, also known as “rip-and-run,” with the alternate label basically outlining 
the most common modus operandi. An interesting composite case occurs when there is a 
passenger-crew conspiracy in the passenger transportation setting.
The nature of the shipment itself also serves to determine the parameters for 
smuggling activity. Within the cargo sector, the most prominent types of operations 
include bulk, break bulk and containerized shipping activities. Bulk cargo refers to the 
movement of material that is generally without form or shape that tends to be moved in 
large quantities and handled by scooping or pumping. By contrast, break bulk usually 
refers to mixed types of cargoes that may be divided up into smaller parcels at some point 
in the logistical process, as with a load of boxed goods where certain numbers of boxes 
will be sent to different destinations. However, in terms of the international movement of 
cargo containerization has increasingly become the standard method of shipment.
The standard cargo container is the TEU, or twenty-ton equivalent unit. First 
used by the military, their commercial usage expanded in the mid-1960s due to greater
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1 T7operating efficiency. Not only can the space within the container be overtly used to 
move contraband, but either the structure of the container itself or otherwise legitimate 
cargo within can serve as concealment. The ability of nation-states to effectively screen 
containers in a timely manner is one of the major challenges facing customs services 
worldwide.138
However, this is not to say that other types of cargo do not offer significant 
smuggling potential. For instance, with respect to break bulk cargoes which may or may 
not be containerized, contraband can be concealed both within the diversity of goods or 
even inside modified pallets. However, liquid and solid bulk cargoes appear to offer a 
relatively narrower scope for direct smuggling activity. Finally, other types of cargo, 
such as perishable cargo that must move through customs rapidly in order to remain 
commercially viable, or hazardous material that may not be scrutinized as heavily as 
other cargoes due to safely considerations, may also serve to reduce the odds that any 
contraband concealed within will be detected.
Furthermore, in all types of conveyances, land, water and air, smuggled goods 
may be secreted within the structure of the vehicle, vessel or plane itself.139 As noted
137 Henry I. DeGeneste and John P. Sullivan, Policing Transportation Facilities (Springfield, IL: Charles 
Thomas, 1994.), 40-1. For more on the efficiencies offered by containerized cargo, see also “Bobbing 
bytes,” The Economist (web edition), 23 May 1998.
138 Although this issue will be address further below, it has become increasingly more salient in the wake o f  
9/11 and subsequent threats involving the smuggling o f weapons o f mass destruction. See “When trade and 
security clash,” The Economist, 6 April 2002, 59-62
139 The multinational character o f certain forms o f conveyance further increases the difficulty o f even 
tracking potential contraband. Registration o f  oceangoing vessels in particular tends to flow to flags o f  
convenience. At present, for instance, Panama and Liberia have the biggest fleets in the world, accounting 
for about a quarter o f total global tonnage. It is not at all out o f the ordinary to have a vessel owned by 
nationals o f one country, registered in a second, served by a crew o f diverse citizenship and carrying cargo 
with its own complicated provenance. See “Shipping: Follow the flag of convenience,” The Economist 
(web edition), 22 February 1997; and, for more on international pressure to reform this often chaotic 
system in the current climate o f  heightened security concerns, see also “Brassed off,” The Economist, 18 
May 2002, 65.
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above, economic imperatives require that loading and unloading be done as quickly as 
possible, a goal that can interfere with contraband detection countermeasures. As the 
spatial nature of these conveyances is essentially transitory, this dimension is easily 
underestimated. Considering the complex structure of and the resultant number of 
potential hiding places within an international airliner or an oceangoing vessel, 
enforcement efforts may be even further hampered.
The various private and public sector personnel involved in the transportation 
process similarly have a potential involvement in smuggling, in various capacities to 
differing degrees. The key here, as noted with respect to the various forms of 
concealment, lies in access to the place of concealment. With respect to a given 
conveyance, most opportunities for smuggling are predicted upon access to the place of 
concealment, as with the crew or some non-crew conspirator with a legitimate reason for 
boarding.
In cases where contraband is secreted within cargo, workers directly involved in 
cargo handling such as drivers or loading operators have considerable latitude to 
potentially either remove, reroute or otherwise facilitate its movement. Furthermore, 
customs personnel or other on-site law enforcement authorities may at a minimum also 
be subverted to the extent of overlooking certain shipments, if not actually involved in 
such activity directly.
Moreover, in conveyances relating to tourism or other forms of mass 
transportation across borders, often passengers as well as crew serve to actually move the 
contraband in question. This would include such phenomena as transfer via body 
carrying, to include the physical swallowing of high value items such as drugs or
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gemstones, as well as illegal goods secreted in clothes or luggage, a subject that is 
discussed at further length in the next chapter with respect to drugs. Finally, the various 
types of body carrying of contraband, as well as its concealment within both cargoes and 
conveyances, find parallels in the non-commercial sector, with luggage often serving as 
the functional analogue for cargo.
Of the three primary sets of logistical modes, land modes may be considered the 
most static. Land-based logistical networks tend to involve the most capital investment, 
generally on the part of the nation-state or some other public entity. As such, these actors 
are generally responsible for the supporting infrastructure, such as highways, bridges and 
rail lines, and hold key decision-making for both improvement and new projects, which 
may in turn have an enormous impact on both legitimate and illicit trade flows.
In general, land border crossings occur via primary road and rail lines, along 
secondary routes that may or may not be monitored, or overland.140 The levels of 
scrutiny involved at these border crossings understandably vary by the volume and type 
of traffic, the amount of resources allocated to border control by the nation-state at any
140 Though not common, underground transportation does exist in both overt and covert forms. The most 
salient international underground conduit is the Channel Tunnel linking the United Kingdom to the 
European continent. As noted in Martin Booth, Opium: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 
322, shortly after its opening British authorities were making almost daily heroin seizures along this 
conduit. However, more informal efforts also exist, particularly across the southwest border o f the United 
States. As noted in U.S. DOJ, Bureau o f Justice Statistics, Office o f Justice Programs, Drugs, Crime, and 
the Justice System: A National Report, NCJ-133652 (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1992), 44, more than a 
ton of drugs was moved through a concrete-reinforced tunnel linking a house in Agua Prieta, Mexico, to a 
warehouse in Douglas, Arizona. While the tunnel itself was five feet high, four feet wide and thirty feet 
under ground, the house itself had a system o f  hydraulic jacks to actually raise and lower the floor at the 
entrance to the tunnel. Another makeshift tunnel was found linking the border towns o f Nogales, Mexico 
and Nogales, Arizona, used by drug smugglers to move both cocaine and marijuana have also been 
detected. See Michael Janofsky, “Drug Runners’ Tunnels Test the Agents in a Border Town,” New York 
Times (web edition), 1 March 2001. Even more recently, a tunnel found in Tierra Del Sol, California, 
across the U.S.-Mexican border, served for several years as a conduit for a significant amount o f  
contraband. Kevin Sullivan, ‘“Billions’ Worth o f Drugs Entered U.S. by Tunnel,” Washington Post, I 
March 2002, A -1,22.
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given access point, and by the efficiency of the relevant customs institutions and 
mechanisms.
However, it should be kept in mind that, in addition to rail cars and various types 
of motor carriers, in many parts of the world the movement of contraband involves 
transportation by either human or animal means. While some of this latter type of 
activity may be undertaken commercially, much of it is private, particularly in parts of 
the world where borders are particularly porous, extended or otherwise unprotected.
The various dynamics discussed previously are captured in the following diagram, which 
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Fig. 6. Potential smuggling methods by land
By contrast, water modes of smuggling offer a high degree of flexibility in terms 
of cross-border movement, provided the natural features of the country in question are
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suitable. Moreover, as Andreas points out, “Historically, waterways have provided the 
primary channel for smuggling.”141 The various types of waterborne modes of transit 
may be generally divided into those that utilize oceanic or deep water on the one hand, 
and those that utilize both natural and man-made inland waterways.
Generally speaking, oceanic movement may be though of as including both the 
open sea and directly adjacent areas, as in the case of cabotage.142 By contrast, 
movement via inland waterways may include riverine, interlacustrine and canal modes of 
transit. Moreover, while surface methods of delivery are understandably the most 
common, the added though relatively uncommon issue of sub-surface smuggling activity 
must also be considered.143 Finally, opportunities for smuggling offered by the diversity 
among the various types of commercial and private vessels that may be using a given 
body of water at any point in time is an issue that nation-states need to take into account. 
The following diagram delineates these aspects in further detail:
141 Andreas, 80. Supporting this view, Mandy Bentham notes that during the 1970s and the first half o f the 
1980s the vast majority o f marijuana and cocaine, as well as a sizable portion o f heroin, was transported 
globally by sea. “Since the transportation o f the illicit drugs occurred along the same routes as legitimate 
trade and recreational vessels, efforts at interdiction have had a profound effect on the evolution o f the law 
o f the sea, in negotiation during the same period.” Mandy Bentham, The Politics o f  Drug Control (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 13. An overview o f common maritime smuggling characteristics can be 
found in U.S. Department o f Defense (DoD), Joint Counterdrug Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.4 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 17 February 1998), 11-12.
142 This term, though generally referring to domestic coastal trade, has been expanded to include the 
movement o f cargo and passengers across international borders where free trade agreements exist or 
maritime border controls are minimal. It may also be used in the context of domestic air transportation.
143 Not all that long ago, given the technical and economic barriers involved, inclusion o f the undersea 
mode o f transportation might have been regarded as somewhat tongue-in-cheek. However, in 1997, 
Miami-based Russian organized crime elements tried unsuccessfully to broker the sale o f  a surplus Soviet 
Piranha-class sub to transport cocaine from Latin America to the United States. Owen Matthews, “Sex, 
Drugs and a Soviet Submarine in the Ports o f Miami,” St. Petersburg (Florida) Times (web edition), 24-30 
March 1997. More recently, a partially built submarine o f a relatively high degree o f  technological 
sophistication was found in the remote Colombian hinterland. Its carrying capacity was estimated at 200 
tons. “Submarine found in the Colombian Andes,” CNN.com, 7 September 2000. This article also notes 
two previously detected instances of the use o f “mini-subs,” as well as the refitting o f both used 
commercial airliners and oceangoing freighters to smuggle drugs.
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Fig. 7. Potential methods of smuggling by water
To begin with, the interaction between waterborne trade and the supporting
landside seaport infrastructure is readily identifiable in geospatial terms. Seaport
facilities also provide an important interface between separate modes of transportation.
As the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) notes:
International maritime trade corridors consist of three main logistical components 
-  ports, ocean vessels, and the landside modes of transport. Functioning as 
pivotal nodes in a system of trade routes, the seaports provide intermodal 
interface to the international maritime shipping cycle . . .  Consequently, seaports 
and the freight movements through their landside accesses are viewed by cargo 
crime groups as marine intermodal choke points of commerce.144
144 U.S. DOT, MARAD, “The U.S. International Crime Control Strategy,” 5. Further testifying to the 
complexity o f  the seaport environment, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) concluded 
in an internal assessment that its proposals to more effectively manage their efforts to counter illegal 
immigration using maritime modes o f  transit were not being optimized at present. The reasons for this 
include insufficient collection, analysis and sharing o f data; incomplete or inaccurate inspection 
information; record keeping that does not lend itself to such analysis; and regulations that do not allow 
seaports to share or exchange data easily. See U.S. DOJ, Office o f  the Inspector General, “Identifying 
Current Challenges To INS’s Plans For Using Risk Management in the Seaport Environment,” 1-2000-015
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Moreover, in addition to cargo operations, seaports also encompass various types of 
service vessel activity, such as tugboats, pilots and other working boats, and may 
sometimes provide the infrastructure for cruise and other passenger activity, such as 
ferries.
As Douglas Keh and Graham Farrell note, “Trends in shipping are significant 
because of the impracticality of stopping and investigating all incoming shipments at a 
given port.”145 In particular, as volumes of maritime container traffic increase, random 
inspections become statistically less likely to detect concealed narcotics shipments. The 
review of shipping documentation by customs investigators, though somewhat limited by 
high volumes of trade, continue to become an increasingly effective tool. Moreover, such 
predictive operational intelligence can provide explicit information usable at the tactical 
level.”146
As discussed previously, in addition to any goods it may be carrying, a ship’s 
structure itself may conceal a wide range of contraband. This is greatly facilitated by 
such factors as the intricate layout of most vessels, which offer numerous concealment 
possibilities including not only the various storage spaces on board. Furthermore, 
structural modifications to the vessel such as additions to or construction of hidden
(Washington, DC: DOJ, March 2000), available at http ://www.usdoi .go v/oig/insnection/IN S/0015/. 
accessed 15 July 2004.
145 Douglas Keh and Graham Farrell, “Trafficking Drugs in the Global Village,” Transnational Organized 
Crime 3, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 62.
146 See U.S DOT, MARAD, “Cocaine Smuggling From Bolivia To Atlantic Ports May Exploit Commercial 
Trade On Mercosur Hidrovia, Lacking A Waterways Management Strategy,” Maritime Security Report 
(October 1997), 3. Similarly, as the DEA observes, “Traffickers continued to use intermodal means of  
transport, frequently concealing larger shipments in commercial maritime containerized or bulk cargo.” 
U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 3.
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compartments, most notably within fuel or ballast tanks, have also been detected and are 
likely to see continued usage.147
In short, methods of concealment both within cargo and aboard ships are limited 
only by the smugglers’ imagination. Making the task of detecting contraband even more 
difficult for law enforcement entities comes from the various temporal parameters 
imposed by commercial logistics. For instance, less official scrutiny may be taken in 
cases when relatively short times are allotted to offload and take on cargo while in port, 
such as with urgent or perishable shipments or when volumes of traffic at the facility are 
particularly heavy.
Yet another potential area of smuggling related to seaports lies in tourism. In 
particular, as a trend cruise ships are growing increasingly prominent for the smuggling 
of contraband. For instance, an industry journal article, quoting an unnamed USCS 
official, notes that, “it is clear that both passengers and crew members are smuggling
i 4o
more drugs via passenger ships.” Given the exponential growth of the cruise industry 
and the subsequently more numerous windows of opportunity, this is hardly surprising. 
A similar observation could most likely be made regarding commercial land and air 
modes of travel where large passenger volumes are involved.
147 B. R. Aune, “Maritime drug trafficking: an underrated problem,” UN. Bulletin on Narcotics 1990 -  1, 
no. 7 (1990), 5. Concrete examples o f more recently used methods o f concealment can be found in U.S. 
DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 6-7. In a particularly salient example of structural concealment, it is worth 
noting that during the recent seizure o f  $23 million in cocaine aboard four Haitian barges on the Miami 
River, the drugs were found within in both the keels and the hulls o f  the ships. Arnold Markowitz, “Ships 
yield cocaine haul,” Miami Herald (web edition), 8 February 2000. A parallel within the airport context 
can be found in the recent arrests o f airline employees smuggling drugs from Bogota, Colombia to Miami 
inside the walls o f  airplane galleys. The drugs were generally offloaded only after a follow-on domestic 
flight to avoid countermeasures. Richard Willing, “Airline drug smugglers getting ever more 
sophisticated,” USA Today, 1 August 1997, A-4.
148 Teresa Anderson, “Cruise Control,” Security Management 44, no. 3 (March 2000), 39.
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On the other hand, cruise operations appear to have the potential to more easily 
facilitate the movement of smaller amounts of contraband, carried either on passengers 
themselves or in their luggage in a situation more akin to that encountered by airport 
security personnel.149 However, as cruise lines specialize almost solely in the movement 
of people and their luggage rather than large-scale cargo operations, relatively less 
scrutiny vis-a-vis airport security may serve to foster this trend.
Adding yet another dimension to an already complex environment, depending on 
the level of security various types of private vessels may also have access to a seaport’s 
operational areas as well. As an alternative, however, both private and commercial 
vessels may call at either private facilities or along nearly any point on an unmonitored 
coastline. Various types of “drops” of contraband may also be utilized, in which the 
goods in question are put overboard from a generally larger ship to be picked up at a later 
time, often by a smaller, faster vessel, in an effort to avoid official scrutiny. As will be 
discussed below, with respect to air modes of transit, similar arrangements can be made 
in which an airdrop functions in the place of the larger ship.
Finally, trends related to the growth of international air travel increasingly have 
served to functionally link geographically non-contiguous parts of the world. However, 
these modes of transportation, while offering a high degree of potential flexibility in 
theory, are circumscribed by a number of factors. First, commercial air transportation, 
paralleling the situation with seaports, is generally funneled through specialized facilities.
149 While little direct evidence appears forthcoming, the potential is highlighted by a 1994 Border Patrol 
investigation (Operation Seacruise), which found that one-day excursions from Florida to the Bahamas 
were being used to smuggle both drugs and illegal immigrants into the U.S. Joel Brinkley, “For Aliens, a 
Bahamas Cruise is an Easy Way Into the U.S.,” New York Times, 29 November 1994, A l. In general, cruise 
activity’s association with smaller volumes o f contraband may be contrasted with larger parcels more 
commonly found in cargo operations.
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Perhaps even more significantly, due primarily to safety concerns both private and 
commercial airline activity is among the most regulated of activities, particularly at the 
international level.150 The following diagram highlights the various potential 
manifestations of smuggling via air modes of transit:
Most common 




As with seaports in the maritime context, airports represent the hubs of this 
commercial activity. As with land and water transportation, the air mode is used to carry 
cargo as well as passengers, though the latter tends to be more prominent in the mind of 
the public. Heavy passenger volumes provide enormous opportunities for smuggling 
using body carry methods, as noted above. Generally speaking, air cargo operations tend
150 See Keh and Farrell, 62-3. For a pre-9/11 overview o f international airlines as a business sector, see 
“Flying visits,” The Economist (web edition), 10 January 1998, focusing on the issues o f deregulation, 
industry consolidation and the future o f  nationally-based carriers operating in a global economy. However, 
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Fig. 8. Potential smuggling methods by air
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toward break bulk and the transport of parcels and related freight, rather than bulk or 
containerized loads. Interestingly, it should be noted that, in the Untied States, airlines 
themselves fund a large portion of counter-smuggling programs.151
Nonetheless, as with an unprotected coastline, unofficial landing strips may be 
improvised, despite the fact that they may be subject to discovery. The practice of 
merely passing over a prearranged area and dropping contraband may also be employed, 
thereby obviating the need for even rudimentary ground preparations. With specific 
respect to counter-drug operations, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) considers any 
airdrop of contraband, as well as the movement of a suspect aircraft, as an air smuggling 
event. Finally, the relatively higher overall costs associated with air operations can make
t  C A
regular service more dependent on demand.
As mentioned at the opening of this section, the dimension of intermodality in the 
context of transnational logistical networks is becoming increasingly more salient. The 
increasing use of intermodal transportation, combining land, maritime and air 
conveyances for a single shipment, represents a long-term trend toward greater cost 
efficiency. For instance, a cargo container may travel by rail to a seaport, loaded on an 
ocean-going vessel and then transshipped via barge to a secondary destination, and then 
finally set on a truck chassis for the final leg of its journey. The growth in volumes of
151 Specifically, passenger user fees levied by airlines, and determined by use o f  specific airport facilities, 
are a primary funding source for individual programs. U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service 
Strategic Plan (1997), 19. By contrast, recent intelligence sources estimate that criminal groups control 
ground cargo handling at airports in Russian and the former Soviet states, to the extent that 34% of 
shipments passing through these facilities were either stolen or not delivered. U.S. CIA, CNC, 
“International Organized Crime and Cargo Theft,” 3.
152 As Krugman notes, ‘a railway or a highway represents indivisible investments, while the frequency o f  
air service and the ability to use large, efficient planes depends on the volume o f demand.’ Krugman, 
Geography and Trade, 24-5. For an overview o f common air smuggling characteristics, see also DoD, 
Joint Counterdrug Operations, II-11.
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containerized cargo can be taken as the most concrete example of this trend, and may be 
readily correlated to globalization and its associated competitive pressures.
The efficiency of this intermodal connectivity also represents a key characteristic 
of a given transportation network, and can enhance its potential volume of trade 
immensely. However, this aspect can similarly serve to facilitate the influx of contraband 
via the same conduits as legitimate trade unless proper security measures are employed, 
both at transportation nodes proper and along the connected infrastructure. This 
consideration is reiterated in Henry I. DeGeneste and John P. Sullivan’s concept of 
“softer targets,” by which criminal activity exploits the weakest link in a given logistical 
chain.153
While this chapter has focused on the nature and evolution of smuggling actors, 
their complex relationships with nation-states, and the potential modes of transnational 
smuggling, the next continues by discussing the utility of heroin as the selected 
benchmark commodity for this study. In particular, an understanding of the geographic 
parameters of supply and demand as they relate to the global trade in heroin are essential 
to setting the stage for further analysis via the relevant case studies. As such, the 
following serves as something of a secondary review of the relevant literature, illustrating 
a number of the dynamics put forth to this point.
153 DeGeneste and Sullivan, 41. This idea and the assumptions regarding the path o f  least resistance are 
quite compatible. The authors also make the important point that enhanced physical security and access 
control measures designed to reduce cargo theft at transportation facilities, particularly those aimed at 
securing warehouses and staging areas, will have a similar deterrent effect on the movement o f contraband. 
Ibid., 37-8. In the maritime context, the introduction to the ICCSS report notes that, “criminal activity 
associated with the cargo that comes into the seaport does not always occur on the seaport grounds or is not 
detected until after the cargo leaves the port.” U.S. ICCSS, Report, “Commission Structure -  
Introduction.”
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CHAPTER III 
NETWORKS, NODES AND NARCOTICS:
THE TRANSNATIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF HEROIN
Up to this point, discussion has centered primarily on the development of a 
geographic smuggling framework that transcends commodity specificity. However, this 
generic approach can only be taken so far. The remainder of this study focuses on heroin 
as a benchmark commodity, with this chapter addressing the parameters of heroin 
movement at the global level. In particular, it examines the geographic organization of 
this trade, the impetus behind its growth and development, and the primary factors 
relating to supply and demand that serve to shape this phenomenon, both in geospatial 
and temporal terms. As such, the historical context of this trade, and the various efforts 
to control it, are addressed, as are more recent trends with respect to both supply and 
demand, as drawn from the relevant literature and most current data available.
It seems indisputable at present that the transnational drug trade and its associated 
political, economic and social consequences will continue to pose a major challenge to 
the interests of nation-states.1 At the most fundamental level, the cultivation, processing, 
transport, and distribution of narcotics constitute the greatest single generator of political 
violence and crime in the world. Its profits are used to finance and arm rural guerrillas, 
urban terrorists, and criminal gangs; to facilitate and expand the trade itself by
1 For example, as noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 8, “it cannot be denied that illegal 
drugs play a leading role in economic matters (Italy, Spain, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Burma), local 
conflicts (Afghanistan, Central Asia, India, Turkey, Kosovo, Colombia, Congo), and the “criminalization” 
of state institutions (Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Argentina).”
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intimidation and corruption; and to avoid or subvert the nation-state’s military and police 
forces.2 In fact, the OGD has calculated that drugs play a role at various levels in some 
thirty conflicts worldwide.
To establish the order of magnitude for this issue in global terms, the United 
Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) estimated in 1998 that the international drug 
trade as being approximately $400 billion per year. If reliable, this figure would be 
equivalent to 8% of total international trade, and approximately the same size as the 
international market for oil and gas, as well as those for both textiles and tourism. It 
would also be significantly larger than the international trade in iron and steel, as well as 
in motor vehicles, and nearly double the global turnover of legitimate pharmaceutical 
companies.4 Accounting for roughly half of this market, and with its wide geographic 
dispersion, the worldwide trade in heroin forms an integral part of this activity.5
2 As discussed in the previous chapter, numerous sources have made this linkage. However, this trend is 
well encapsulated by the following quote from Robert Charles, a former U.S. House o f Representatives 
staff member well versed in drug issues: “Today, international drug traffickers and international terrorists 
are in a hedonistic marriage o f design. Drug funds are financing terrorists whose aim is to overthrow 
governments; in the meantime, those terrorists are providing wide-ranging protection for drug operations. 
These groups are now linked at the hip, and extremely wealthy.” Quoted in John G. Roos, “The Enemy 
Next Door,” Armed Forces Journal International, March 2000, 40.
3 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 11. Moreover, it is further noted that over half o f these 
conflicts can be found in Africa. Moreover, in the context o f  issues discussed in the previous chapter 
regarding the future o f the nation-state, as pointed out in “The global menace o f local strife,” The 
Economist, 24 May 2003,23-5, at present almost all ongoing wars are civil wars.
4 See UNDCP, “Economic and Social Consequences o f Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking,” UNDCP 
Technical Series, no. 6 (New York: UNDCP, 1998), 3, available at
http://www.undcD.org/technical series 1998-01-01 l.html. accessed 15 July 2004. This figure is also 
close to Interpol’s independent estimate. While the process o f estimation is hampered by a number of 
factors, not least o f  which is the clandestine nature o f drug trafficking, most estimates fall within the $300 
to $500 billion range. An earlier estimate puts the value o f  the international trade in illicit drugs as 
exceeding even that in oil, and only itself being surpassed only by the global arms trade. LaMond Tullis, 
Handbook o f  Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences (New York: 
Greenwood Press / United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1991), xvii.
5 Ron Chepesiuk, Hard Target: The United States War Against International Drug Trafficking, 1982-1997 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1999), 39. Specifically, the author breaks down the global illicit drug 
market as heroin accounting for roughly half o f all profits, cocaine one quarter, and marijuana, hashish and 
various psychotropic drugs together constituting the remaining quarter.
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As discussed in Chapter II, access to these levels of funding have allowed TCOs
to become increasingly empowered vis-a-vis the nation-state by factors such as the
globalization of financial systems, the rapid growth of cross-border trade, the increasing
dependence of certain states on drug profits to service debts, and the expanding
population of drug users worldwide.6 In this context, Jordan posits that:
A dynamic structural model stressing the merging of government and organized 
crime suggests that the political systems of certain countries are in partial civil 
war. While elements within the government seek to control drug trafficking, 
other elements of the government form an alliance with the traffickers. The 
complex relation between elites and traffickers may corrupt both the democratic 
and authoritarian state. Narcostatization does not respect political systems.7
However, with particular respect to both democratic countries and those transitioning to
democracy, he also notes that, “In order to eliminate false claims of democracy, the
understanding of the democratic regime needs to be extended beyond the procedural
definition. It should take into account the potential symbiotic relationship between ruling
elites, organized crime, and the globalized financial system.”
Moreover, by transcending national borders, the drug trade not only challenges
assumptions separating domestic and foreign policy considerations, it also necessitates
6 These conditions have not only transformed the illicit drug trade but also undermined the viability of 
international drug control regimes. Keh and Farrell, 50-2. Moreover, the authors continue by noting that, 
“Documented increases in the geographical scope o f  drug trafficking are testimony to a robust, worldwide 
industry that shows no sign o f bucking under the would-be pressures of official intervention.”
Furthermore, both heroin and cocaine demonstrated rapid and consistent spatial distribution, more than 
doubling their geographic reach during the 1980s and 1990s.
7 Jordan, 6-7.
8 Ibid, 19. The author also notes that if  a state cannot meet the definitional requirements o f democracy, it is 
also removed from inclusion in the democratic peace thesis. This concept holds that democracies by and 
large do not fight other democracies, and is an important rationale for encouraging this form of 
government. For more on the interaction between ideology and alliance formation, see Stephen M. Walt, 
The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 33-40.
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multilateral cooperation between governments.9 As the UNDCP noted its 1997 World
Drug Report, however:
Political tensions, incompatibilities between legal systems concerning extradition 
or the transfer of evidence, delays in processing requests for judicial assistance, 
agency rivalries and language problems all work in favour of the criminal and 
against the slower bureaucratic mechanisms of international cooperation. The 
geographical terrain covered by drug distribution networks cannot be kept under 
constant surveillance, while the wealth of the drug trafficking organizations is 
such that all around the world, corruption and intimidation permit shipments to 
escape customs and police controls.10
While borders are not necessarily obstacles to smuggling actors, and in fact can serve
both to enable some activities and shield others from scrutiny, in most cases discrete
nation-states cannot effectively project their will across competing sovereignties. As
such, the present level of international cooperation within this issue area cannot be seen
as a sufficient deterrent to smuggling activity.
Taken with the more straightforward imperatives of supply and demand, these
factors highlight the challenges posed to nation-states by the complex landscape of the
drug trade. In particular, this analysis leads into subsequent case studies by focusing on
particular drug nexus regions, or those areas with a high concentration of potential or
observed smuggling vectors involving the transnational movement of drugs. It should be
noted, however, that as these case studies develop there is an inherent difficulty in
isolating the various aspects of physical, economic, political and human geography the
constitute the smugglers’ landscape, given the often high degree of interaction among
9 For instance, as noted in Bentham, 5, “As with environmental concerns such as air and marine pollution, 
drug trafficking does not conform to political boundaries and cannot be controlled by a single state acting 
in isolation.”
10 UNDCP, World Drug Report ( 1997), 231.
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these factors. However, wherever possible the relationships both between and among 
these spatial dimensions are also highlighted.
Heroin as a Benchmark Commodity 
Heroin is particularly suited to function as a benchmark commodity for a number 
of reasons. To begin with, it moves thought a truly worldwide market, allowing for 
meaningful interregional comparison. In this respect, both by its ubiquity and its 
geographic scope, heroin trafficking is perhaps most akin to the international black 
market in small arms. However, unlike the small arms trade, where production is highly 
decentralized, the vast bulk of heroin production tends to originate in specific regions.
As Bentham points out, “Drugs are the archetypal free-market commodity . .. 
they are easy to produce, easy to transport, easy to conceal and, due to their illegality, 
have a high added value at each stage of the trading chain.”11 Even relative to other 
drugs, by weight heroin is an extremely lucrative commodity in comparison to other
black market goods. As such, it is economically feasible to transport even in small
12amounts. Furthermore, as a widely traded commodity, heroin can be seen responding to 
trends in globalization in a manner similar to that of other legitimate natural resources.13
Heroin can even be seen as having its own transnational commodity chain as it 
moves from raw material to final product, an arrangement that “tends to encourage the
11 Bentham, 48.
12 As a form o f portable wealth, relatively few other high value commodities surpass heroin. However, one 
example o f  a similarly lucrative smuggled commodity by weight would be diamonds. See Appendix A for 
more on this issue, while heroin profit margins will be discussed at greater length below.
13 For instance, see “Commodities get big,” The Economist (web edition), 28 August 1999. Parallels 
include falling prices for raw materials, the consolidation o f producers where the market was once 
fragmented, and a transnational alliance system to facilitate distribution. In the criminal context, see also 
Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 465-7; and Booth, Opium, 339-43.
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development of a series of supplier relationships as well as the emergence of links with
companies providing ancillary services.”14 As Stephen Flynn notes:
In essence, drug trafficking is a form of commodities trade conducted by 
transnational consortiums. Acquiring chemicals to produce drugs, transporting 
the drugs to wholesale distributors, and laundering the profits require interacting 
with and blending into legitimate markets. The size and complexity of these 
operations mandate that the drug industry pattern itself after the modem 
multinational corporation. Yet unlike traders in oil, automobiles, or microchips, 
traders in illicit drugs must outwit a dynamic enforcement environment designed 
to defeat them. Consequently, over the past two decades the dmg trade has 
undergone something of a Darwinian evolution, the survivors of which have 
developed into sophisticated and highly flexible organizations.15
As such, developments that foster international commerce, and in particular the removal
of trade barriers, have served to markedly aid the smugglers’ ease of transport.16 In
practical terms, this translates directly into an enhanced flexibility in terms of smuggling
route selection.
In keeping with the trends outlined in Chapter II, TCOs are very active in the 
global movement of heroin, particularly in instances where such groups are capable of 
mobilizing vast resources and moving large quantities of dmgs, allowing them to 
dominate both key production areas and markets. As Booth notes, “The heroin trade is 
superbly organized: if such acumen was applied to some legitimate produce, it could 
increase profits severalfold.”17
14 Williams, “Strategic Alliances,” 62. In the business context, this term and its usage are discussed in Gary 
Gereffi and Miguel Koreniewicz, ed., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (London: Praeger, 1994).
15 Stephen Flynn, “Worldwide Drugs: The Expanding Trade,” Current, no. 352 (May 1993), 30-1.
16 In particular, as noted in the previous chapter, “Multinational economic agreements reducing trade 
barriers in North America, Europe, Asia, and other regions o f the world have substantially increased the 
volume o f international trade . . .  Criminal groups have taken advantage o f the high volume o f legitimate 
trade to smuggle drugs, arms and other contraband across national borders.” U.S. Interagency Working 
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 2. For more on recent trends in logistics, see also “A 
moving story,” The Economist, 1 December 2002, 65-6.
17 Booth, Opium, 329-30.
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As a business model, an article in Fortune characterizes the international trade in 
illicit narcotics in unequivocal terms: “Think of it as a huge, multinational commodity 
business with a fast-moving top management, a widespread distribution network, and 
price insensitive customers.”18 Though the generic comparison with MNCs has already 
been made in the preceding chapter, in the context of the drug trade Sidney Jay Zabludoff 
points out that, “The key difference, of course, is that narcotics traffickers sell an illicit 
product. This distinction is important in entrepreneurial terms because sizable risks arise 
in the form of potential loss of product, confiscation of assets, incarceration and death. 
These risks drive up prices and create the huge profits which constantly attract new 
individuals who are willing to take the risk.”19
Moreover, with respect to this latter aspect, there remains a widespread and 
continuing involvement of large numbers of individuals drawn to the drug trade by the 
lure of its immense profits. As UNDCP notes, “A seemingly endless stream of willing 
recruits for the most menial tasks provides the industry with a key input for its near 
constant growth -  inexpensive labour. In addition, the industry requires a wide range of 
specialized personnel including chemists, chemical engineers, pilots, communications 
specialists, money launderers, accountants, lawyers, security guards and ‘hit men.’”20
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, it is the very complexity of the international 
heroin trade, intertwined as it is with a number of other illicit market activities, which
18 Louis Kraar, “The Drug Trade,” Fortune 117, no. 113 (20 June 19S8), 26-35. Other sound business 
practices that the author notes in this context include: awareness o f and responsiveness to changing market 
conditions; constant evolution o f operating methods; investment o f earnings in other businesses; creation o f  
new demand through creative marketing and price-point management; and both vertical and horizontal 
business integration.
19 Sidney Jay Zabludoff, “Colombian Narcotics Organizations as Business Enterprises,” Transnational 
Organized Crime 2, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 20.
20 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 123.
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21makes it a particularly fitting test case for a geographic approach. From a policy point 
of view, the linkages between drug trafficking and wider issues relating to transnational
O')organized crime are also relevant. As Bentham points out, “the ‘drug problem’ can be 
seen as not a single issue at all, but an amalgamation of a variety of separate issues 
involving various actors and various stakes in distinct issue systems, within a similar
» * OQcontext of what can be described as drug-related activity.”
Before moving too far into other issues, however, it is necessary to outline the 
nature and characteristics of heroin itself.24 Heroin is an opiate, one of the three main 
classes of natural drugs and their derivatives grown commercially and traded on a global 
scale.25 The drug, more formally known as either diacytlmorphine or simply 
diamorphine, is a semi-synthetic product derived from the complete acetylation of
21 For instance, even compared to the analogous challenges o f cocaine control, note the following: “Widely 
dispersed growing areas, multiple trafficking organizations and diversified routes and concealment methods 
make heroin supply reduction particularly difficult.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on International 
Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Anti-Narcotics Efforts in the Western Hemisphere 
and Implementation on the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act,” Statement by Thomas J. Umberg, 
Director o f Supply Reduction, Office o f National Drug Control Policy, 3 March 1999, 6.
22 In addition to earlier discussions relating to drugs as a source o f funding for terrorist and other criminal 
organizations, see also Raphael F. Perl, “United States Foreign Narcopolicy: Shifting Focus to International 
Crime?” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 33-46.
23 Bentham, 25.
24 This section draws from information found in National Institute on Drug Abuse, Heroin Abuse and 
Addiction (Washington, DC: NIDA Research Report Series, 2000), 1-2; James A Inciardi, The War on 
Drugs II: The Continuing Epic o f  Heroin, Cocaine, Crack, Crime, AIDS, and Public Policy (Mountain 
View, CA: Mayfield Publishing, 1992), 63-81; Mary H.Cooper, The Business o f  Drugs (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1990), 47-71; and Customs Co-operation Council / International Association 
o f Ports and Harbors (CCC / IAHP), CCC / 1APH Guidelines on Co-operation Between Customs 
Administrations and Port Aimed at the Prevention o f Drug Smuggling (Tokyo, Japan: CCC / IAHP, 1987), 
15-8.
25 The other two primary categories o f natural drugs cultivated on a large scale for profit are the 
cannaboids, such as marijuana and hashish, and the coca derivatives, though other types o f  natural drugs 
also have their own niches. Furthermore, though outside the realm of this discussion, it should be kept in 
mind that such generally accepted drugs as alcohol, nicotine and caffeine also fall under this heading. By 
contrast, synthetic drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), barbiturates and MDMA (Ecstasy), 
as well as a wide range o f  prescription medicines, form the other major class o f controlled substance. For 
more on the range of available drugs, see Appendix A. Though not directly germane in this context, it is 
interesting to note that, taxonomically, the UNDCP lists prescription drug used illicitly as a separate 
category.
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morphine, which is in turn chemically processed from the opium poppy, papaver 
somniferum. 26 While the stages of this process are outlined in more detail in Appendix 
C, it is worth noting that it takes approximately ten kilograms of opium to make one
'yn
kilogram of morphine, which in turn yields slightly more than that quantity of heroin.
The opium poppy itself can be grown in a wide variety of locations, though for 
the most part its cultivation on a commercial scale is relatively circumscribed in 
geographic terms at present, as is discussed below. In addition to its relative profitability, 
as an agricultural commodity opium stores easily for extended periods of time, does not 
spoil, can be grown in high terrain without fertilizer or extensive irrigation, and can be 
harvested without machinery. Raw opium, generally harvested from the milky sap of 
the poppy bulb, starts as thick, brown, viscous substance that hardens over time into a 
dark brown, slightly sticky mass known as opium gum. However, the stalk of the poppy
26 The opium trade itself has a long and turbulent history, even before the advent o f its various chemical 
distillations. For a concise survey o f this commercial activity from its emergence, thought to be under the 
auspices o f  Turkish traders in the eighth and ninth centuries, up to the nineteenth century and the heyday o f  
European colonialism, see Block and Chambliss, 19-29. The Portuguese appear to have been the first 
Europeans to realize that opium could serve as a viable and valuable trading commodity. It served not only 
to conserve their relatively scarce precious metals, the standard measure o f national wealth at the time, but 
also to turn a very respectable profit in exchange for Asian spices, tea, silk, pottery and many other 
products then in demand throughout Europe. The British opium trade in the Far East eventually led to the 
First Opium War (1839-42), precipitated by Chinese efforts to stem the outflow o f silver for opium, in 
which the Chinese military was thoroughly defeated. The Second Opium War (1856) ended much the same 
way. The authors also note a parallel incident in 1852, when King Rama II o f Thailand, still nominally 
independent, was forced to accede to British military pressure and grant an opium monopoly. With respect 
to the British official involvement in the opium trade during this period, Jordan, 55-62, who specifically 
notes that, “This pattern o f government-granted monopoly or direct government management has become a 
model for organized crime.” For an even more extensive overview o f  this trade and its ramifications, see 
Booth, Opium, 106-37; and John Newsinger, “Britain’s opium wars,” Monthly Review 49, no. 5 (1997), 35- 
43.
27 By definition, any medicinal compound containing more than 0.1% opium by weight or volume may be 
considered an opiate. For more on the processing o f opium into heroin, see U.S. DOJ, Bureau o f Justice 
Statistics, Office o f Justice Programs, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, 43, as well as Appendix C, 
“Heroin Activity Model.”
28 Bentham, 45.
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plant, known as poppy straw, can also be processed to produce opium, though generally 
for licit medical uses.
As opium gum is exposed to air, it becomes “cured,” and can be smoked or 
otherwise consumed if desired. As it will lose considerable potency, and hence value, if it 
dries out, it is usually wrapped in some sort of waterproof material for storage and 
transport. In addition to heroin, various other alkaloids, notably codeine and morphine, 
can also be obtained from opium. In particular, raw opium can be converted to morphine, 
heroin’s immediate chemical precursor, in a relatively simple process that usually takes 
place in makeshift laboratories near the poppy fields.
Morphine itself was discovered in 1805 and subsequently named for Morpheus, 
the Greek god of sleep. However, German chemist Heinrich Dreser, working under the 
auspices of the Bayer drug company, first produced heroin in 1898 as further distillation 
of morphine. Heroin was originally intended as more powerful pain reliever that would 
have fewer side effects than its predecessors. Its trade name, stemming from the German 
adjective heroisch, or “heroic,” indicates the high hopes pinned to its anticipated 
therapeutic potential. Prior to the realization of its own deleterious effects, for a time 
heroin was even used as a treatment for morphine addiction.30
Heroin has since become the common name for preparations containing diacetyl 
morphine base or its salts. It has a quicker, more intense effect on users than morphine,
29 For its part, morphine in pure form consists o f  white crystals, and is most often adulterated, or “cut,” with 
substances ranging from sugar, starch and powdered milk to chalk, baby powder and strychnine. Most 
often it is found in to form o f a powder, pill or ampoule. Another common derivative o f opium is codeine, 
often found in various prescription cough syrups. Finally, entirely synthetic opiates such as methadone, 
pethidine and dipipanone have also been developed.
30 See Ian Scott, “A hundred year habit,” History Today 48, no. 6 (June 1998), 6-9. Incidentally, in 1899 
Bayer also introduced a second acetyl derivative from a plant-based painkiller. This was salicylic acid, 
better known under the now-generic trade name “Aspirin.”
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and is characterized by strong psychological and physical addiction, as well as an 
increasing physical tolerance among users. Known under a variety of slang names, it is 
generally found on the street as an odorless powder, or, less commonly, in either pill,
o  1
capsule or ampoule forms.
As the true addictive nature of the drug became more apparent, the international 
backlash against its medical usage gained momentum, with the Hague Opium Convention 
of 1912 being the first of a series of agreements setting the framework for the relevant 
prohibition regime.32 During this period, a notable exception among nation-states was 
the case of Japan in the 1930s, which continued to produce heroin for the Chinese market 
up the end of the Second World War.33 In institutional terms, most efforts at
31 While the number o f street terms to denote heroin even in the United States are too numerous to fully 
delineate, some o f the more common ones include “horse,” “H,” “junk,” “smack,” and “white lady.” For a 
more complete list o f slang words, including those to various types o f heroin, combinations o f heroin with 
other drugs and related phenomena, see Marla Schalaffer, “Street Terms: Drugs and the Drug Trade, Part 
2,” The Narc Officer, July-August 1997, 89-90. While intravenous administration o f the drug is the most 
common, in recent years higher purity levels have led to an increase in both the smoking and sniffing o f  
heroin. For more on drug abuse patterns in general, to include heroin, see also U.S. DOJ, Bureau o f Justice 
Statistics, Office o f Justice Programs, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, 20-8.
32 Other international conventions brokered under the League o f Nations auspices were to follow in 1925, 
1931 and 1936. For more detail on international drug control efforts under the League’s auspices, see 
Block, 95-105. Following the Second World War and continuing up the late 1980s, the difficulties of 
implementing international controls brokered through the United Nations became increasingly apparent, as 
was seen in both 1953 and 1961. Greater detail o f these proceedings can be found in Catherine Lamour 
and Michel R. Lamberti, The International Connection: Opium from Growers to Pushers, trans. Betty and 
Peter Ross (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 238-47. For a fiirther overview o f the trade during this period, see 
also Alvin Moscow, Merchants o f  Heroin: An In-depth Portrayal o f  Business in the Underworld (New 
York: Dial Press, 1968).
33 A comprehensive analysis on the economic role o f  opiates within the East Asian region during this 
period can be found in John M. Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking 
in Asia, 1895-1945 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). The author dates official Japanese involvement in the 
opium trade to the annexation o f Taiwan following the Sino-Japanese War o f 1895, and the subsequent 
need to formulate policy in order to deal with that island’s existing addict population. This trend continued 
under military oversight with imperial expansion into Korea and Manchuria, and later into Southeast Asia. 
The continuing involvement o f  Europeans in the Far Eastern opium trade during this period is also 
discussed in Block, 113-7.
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international drug control begun under the auspices of the League of Nations have 
continued under those of its successor, the United Nations.34
Since that time, by global consensus the production, distribution and consumption 
of heroin has been largely relegated to the criminal sphere of activity.35 As such, the 
challenge of regime building on the part of nation-states within the drug control issue 
area continues to reflect a wide range of international pressures and concerns. In recent 
years, there has been a proliferation in both the number and scope of international 
agreements, not only on drug trafficking per se but on related issues as well. To date, the 
most prominent and comprehensive such agreement to date is the 1988 U.N. Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.36
Offering a less traditional view of consensus building within this the issue area, 
Bentham posits that while the literature on regimes implies a specific issue that is being 
regulated, the complexity of drug control and its related political, economic, social and 
health dimensions mitigates against simplistic analysis and necessitates further 
conceptual clarification. Furthermore, noting the primacy of the traditional Realist 
school of thought since the end of the Second World War, she further points out that,
34 Bentham, 89-118. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the author also sees the U.N.’s focus on 
trafficking as significantly impeding the development of an effective and holistic global drug control 
regime. For a fuller chronological outline o f  these international drug control efforts, see Appendix B, 
“Heroin -  A Timeline.”
35 See Kathryn Meyer and Terry Parssinen, Webs o f Smoke: Smuggler, Warlords, Spies, and the History o f  
the International Drug Trade (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), which puts many o f these 
developments in context while focusing on East Asia throughout the first half o f the twentieth century. For 
a contemporary overview o f the trade during the early stages o f  its global expansion, see also Moscow, 
passim.
36 The issue o f an international “war on drugs” was also the topic o f a special session o f the U.N. General 
Assembly in June 1998, which included thirty heads o f state and representatives from 150 countries. 
Unfortunately, as reported at the time, “The predictable result was ponderous speeches on ‘our common 
global challenge,’ multilingual chaos in the corridors . . .  a few unrealistic pledges, the distant but 
unmistakable sound o f the buck being passed from one government to another, and the looming question of 
who is going to pay for it all.” See “Tremble, Medellin, tremble,” The Economist, 13 June 1998, 45-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
“The rigidity of the Cold War gave the discipline of International Relations an excuse for 
not taking into account the advances, concepts and methods from alternative disciplines, 
such as sociology, philosophy, anthropology, and history, with their concepts of identity, 
values and community.”
However, despite such conceptual impediments, multilateral cooperation on this 
issue continues to develop, more often than not with the United States taking what has 
become a traditional lead in this respect. Specifically, the annual U.S. drug certification 
process represents the most salient ongoing unilateral evaluation process, as embodied in 
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) put out under Department 
of State auspices.38 In general, U.S. efforts at international drug control continue to put it 
at the forefront within this issue area, as in many others, and thus will form a touchstone 
for the discussion that follows.
37 Bentham, 2. As an alternative to realism, the author puts forth an approach to the drug issue based on the 
paradigm variously known as global politics, pluralism, multi-centrism or issue-politics, which attempts to 
synthesize literature within the field on interdependence, international regimes, foreign policy analysis and 
transnationalism. Ibid, 15.
38 Specifically, the INCSR is compiled by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau o f International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), with one o f the more recently published iterations being INL, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001 (Washington, DC: Department o f  State, March 
2002), available at http://www.state.gOv/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/. accessed 15 July 2004. Generally 
speaking, it is used to provide a factual basis for the drug certification process’ impact on foreign assistance 
to specific drug producing and transit countries. Its intent is to exert leverage within the issue area o f  
international drug control by identifying the so-called “majors,” or those countries considered prone to 
either significant production or trafficking activities within their territory. The criteria for certification is 
whether or not the countries in this category are seen to be both cooperating fully with the U.S. in this issue 
area and complying with the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. As to the genesis o f this particular initiative, the process was mandated by 
legislative action in 1986 via an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act o f  1961, during the height o f  
fears regarding the crack-cocaine epidemic. At present, the threshold criteria for being considered a major 
drug producing nation is having at least 1,000 hectares o f  illicit opium or cocaine, or 5,000 hectares o f  
cannabis, under cultivation. This process links U.S. bilateral aid, as well as support within such 
international bodies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to cooperation with the U.S. 
on this issue. Countries listed among the majors can be certified either by demonstrable cooperation or in 
the name o f vital U.S. national interests. However, this is not to say that the process is not influenced by 
political considerations or overridden by the imperatives of issue areas perceived as having a greater 
precedence, as will be seen below. While the United Nations does carry out its own parallel evaluation 
process, this does not carry any analogous tangible sanctions.
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The loss of trading legitimacy, coupled with an enduring demand, has cemented 
heroin’s role as a key component of global black markets. While all economic 
transactions, licit or illicit, imply reciprocity, heroin’s capacity as a readily bartered 
commodity has been well documented. Moreover, given the unregulated nature of 
transnational black markets, drugs often serve as collateral in deals involving a wide 
range of actors and contraband, and thus may be seen as playing an often-pivotal role in
' i Q
that respect. The various types of interaction between the global trade in heroin and 
various other black markets are explored more fully in the context of the case studies.
However, there are two black markets in particular that have a direct role in 
supporting the transnational heroin trade, and as such must be highlighted in order to 
fully understand this phenomenon. The first is the illegal trade in the precursor chemicals 
necessary to process opium into heroin, while the second involves the various money 
laundering mechanisms that recycle, reinvest and otherwise conceal the profits accrued 
by the drug trade. As in the case of international drug control, both of these issue areas 
have emerged as focal points of broad-based efforts in their own right.
To begin with, the control of the chemical precursors necessary to process opium 
first into morphine, and then into heroin, is increasingly the subject of international 
agreements. Incidentally, those chemicals commonly used to produce synthetic drugs 
such as amphetamines are also generally covered under such agreements.40 In the case of
39 Some specific examples include explicit links with illegal arms trafficking, as noted in T. M. 
Oppenheimer, “Projections for the future development o f international drug control policies,” UN. Bulletin 
on Narcotics, no. 1-001 (1990), 8. See also Appendix A, in which nearly every type o f contraband listed is 
known to have some sort o f market relationship with illegal drugs.
40 To establish the scope of this issue at the global level, between 1990 and 1994 the U.N. estimated that 
four billion “potential dose units” o f precursor chemicals were seized annually. UNDCP, World Drug 
Report (1997), 29. Interestingly enough, progress on precursor chemical controls is less likely to have an
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heroin, the most prominent such precursor is acetic anhydride. However, both the 
number of producers in the global marketplace and the essential fungibility of these 
products exponentially increase the difficulty of achieving this goal.
Furthermore, while the chemicals in question certainly have legitimate purposes 
as well, in response to economic incentives their diversion to illicit uses continues in any 
number of forms. These include the siphoning off of supplies from domestic chemical 
production; the legal importation and subsequent misappropriation of chemicals for 
illegal transshipment; the legal importation of chemicals into a neighboring country for 
transshipment to the drug-producing country; and the use of shipping routes via countries 
that do not have any form of precursor chemical control. Furthermore, drug traffickers 
involved in the processing phase are very resourceful, even going so far as developing 
techniques to extend the functional usage of such chemicals or replace them with more 
easily available alternatives.41
Unsurprisingly, consensus on this issue, as on so many others, is often under 
intense pressure from narrower national interests. However, in 1991 the G-7 established 
the Chemical Action Task Force (CATF), establishing an important milestone in 
international understanding among the major allies. By December 1992, the European 
Community had introduced new legislation covering extra-European trade in precursor 
chemicals.42
effect on refining coca into cocaine, which can be done with materials as common as kerosene. For a 
detailed table o f these chemicals and both their licit and illicit uses, see Keh and Farrell, 56-7.
41 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Chemical Control.” This issue is also discussed in the 
maritime context in U.S. DOT, Office of Intelligence and Security, Port Security, 11. However, these 
observations remain valid across other modes o f transportation as well.
42 As an example, early U.S. adherence to the control o f such chemicals, many o f which had legitimate 
uses, put definite constraints on the U.S. chemical industry. For a time, German exports appeared to be 
filling the gap, leading to U.S. accusations that the German government was either unwilling or unable to
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That would be nearly the end of the problem if large-scale production of precursor 
chemicals were confined to Europe and the United States, which it is not. In a more 
wide-ranging effort to stem the flow of these chemicals, there have been significant 
recent efforts through the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB).43 However, the most comprehensive initiative to date is the U.S.-sponsored 
Multilateral Chemical Reporting Initiative (MCRI), first put forth in 1997.44
As with precursor chemicals on the front end of the transnational drug trade, 
money laundering plays an integral role by recycling and reinvesting the profits resulting 
from such transactions using various methods to make them appear to be the proceeds of 
legitimate business activity.45 As John J. Fialka notes, “New financial instruments, the
stand up to its own chemical industry. Under continuing U.S. pressure, in July 1992 Germany amended its 
system o f voluntary export controls, while stressing the need for a uniform standard across Europe. These 
restrictions brought the issue to a resolution that the U.S. found satisfactory, resulting in a marked 
improvement in relations within this issue area. See H. Richard Friman, NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the 
U.S. War on Drugs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 110-1. More recently, in May 1998 the U.S. 
and the European Union signed a chemical control agreement laying down the formal basis for increased 
cooperation. More details on the CATF effort can be found in U.S. Department o f State, “Fact Sheet: 
Controlling Chemicals Used in Drug Trafficking,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 9 (2 March 
1992), 164-5.
43 The relevant international statute on chemical control under U.N. auspices is Article 12 o f the 1988 U.N. 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. A subsequent annex 
currently lists 22 chemicals as those most necessary to drug manufacture and thus the primary targets for 
international control. For more on this issue, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 227-30.
44 For an overview o f MCRI, see U.S. DOJ, DEA, Diversion Control Program, Program Report, “The 
Diversion o f Drugs and Chemicals” (Washington, DC: DEA, December 1999), available at 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoi.gov/pubs/program/activities/index.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
45 For instance, as Douglas I. Keh notes, “Anecdotal evidence suggests that illicit drug revenues represent a 
substantial proportion o f the financial reserves available to criminal organizations.” Douglas I Keh, “Drug 
Money in a Changing World: Economic Reform and Criminal Finance,” U.N. Drug Control Programme 
Technical Series no. 4 (1996), available at http://www.undcp.org/technical series 1996-01-01 2.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. In analytical terms, there are several methods of dissecting this phenomenon. A 
prominent example can be in U.S. Department o f  State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy  
Report 1999 (Washington, DC: Department o f State, March 2000), “Money Laundering and Financial 
Crimes,” available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics law/1999 narc report/index.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. This document puts forth three distinct steps to the laundering o f illegal profits, 
namely “placement,” “layering,” and “integration.” In the first, the currency is introduced into a financial 
services institution. In the second, these funds are moved from institution to institution in order to hide 
their source and ownership. Finally, the cycle is concluded when the funds are reinvested in an ostensibly 
legitimate business.
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globalization of money markets, and the removal of trade barriers to cross-border 
transactions have changed the geography of money.” Moreover, the speed and fluidity of 
money laundering mechanisms, underpinned by the wider criminalization of the 
international financial system, are exceedingly difficult for nation-states to curtail.46 
Most significantly, the cross-border nature of most such investigations, as well as related 
interpretations of the relevant local laws, also makes enforcement within this issue area 
especially problematic.
Broadly speaking, money laundering control regimes place an emphasis on both 
the identification of money laundering centers and on international efforts to isolate and 
confiscate ill-gotten assets. For instance, in parallel with, the various initiatives on 
chemical controls, the G-7 established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989, 
since expanded to include twenty-six members.47 On an even wider level, in December 
1999, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 54/109, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, specifically mentioning 
drug trafficking in its preamble.
Flowever, in the U.S., the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) leads 
bilateral dialogue within this issue area.48 As far as the U.S. is concerned, tracking the 
money involved in drug trafficking cannot be separated from wider related issues 49 This
46 Fialka, 139. For more on this issue with specific respect to drugs, see also Bentham, 140-66; and Jordan, 
99-116. Furthermore, a list o f the criteria to be used in assessing the vulnerability o f  a given financial 
system or institution to money laundering can be found in U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, 
“Money Laundering.”
47 See U.S. Department o f  State, “Fact Sheet: Combating Drug Money-Laundering,” U.S. Department o f  
State Dispatch 3, no. 9 (2 March 1992), 163-4; and “Shell games,” The Economist, 26 October 2002, 69.
48 An overview o f this organization’s activity and scope can be found in U.S Department o f State, INL, 
INCSR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
49 A comprehensive treatment o f the evolution o f American policy on this issue area, domestic as well as 
foreign, can be found in Robert E. Powis, The Money Launderers (Chicago: Probus, 1992). Current U.S.
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is actually quite a logical stance, given the absolute necessity of such assets to initiate and 
sustain nearly every type of illicit activity. Following the events of 9/11, the issue has 
also taken on an even greater significance in light of the imperatives to track the funding 
of international terrorism. In particular, nation-states that allow very strict banking 
privacy have become targets for U.S.-led international pressure advocating a greater 
transparency for transactions.50
More often than not, the focus of these efforts to curb transnational money 
laundering is on the monitoring the electronic transfer of funds.51 As mentioned
policy requires that deposits o f more than $10,000 be reported to federal banking authorities, resulting in a 
subsequent proliferation of deposits of $9,999. This in turn has given rise to the practice of breaking large 
sums o f illicit money into chunks small enough to evade federal detection, known colloquially as 
“smurfing.” During the late 1980’s, the U.S. strove to negotiate similar reporting mechanisms with the 
banking regulators o f other countries. At the time other governments generally interpreted these endeavors 
to mean that cash deposits o f U.S. $10,000 would have to be reported to the U.S. government, which were 
seen as highly intrusive to national sovereignty. For instance, at the time the U.S. relied on a variety of 
unilateral pressures to force even allies to prohibit their banking institutions from doing business with 
international drug trafficking organizations. These types of leverage have included revoking visa rights in 
the U.S., targeting o f suspect bank’s North American operations and threatening to publicly expose 
particularly unsavory clients. As written, foreign banks would not have been expected to notify the U.S. of 
such transactions but merely to record them. In practice, unfortunately, the most daunting task was found 
to be the backlog involved in recording this class o f transaction due to their sheer volume. It was not until 
other nations came to appreciate the linkage between this complex o f  issues that international progress 
became feasible. See also “That infernal washing machine,” The Economist, 26 July 1997, 19-20; David A. 
Andelman, “The Drug Money Maze,” Foreign Affairs, 73, no. 4 (July-August 1994), 15; and “Through the 
wringer,” The Economist, 14 April 2001, 64-6. Furthermore, the issuing o f Executive Order 12978 in 
October 1995, allowed the U.S. federal authorities to either freeze or block all assets held in the U.S. by 
known foreign nationals engaged in international narcotics trafficking. U.S. President, Office o f  the White 
House, “Executive Order 12978 - Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics 
Traffickers,” Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 31, no. 43 (30 October 1995) 1907.
50 For more recent developments within this issue area in the wake o f 9/11, see “Follow the money,” The 
Economist, 1 June 2002, 67-8; “The needle in the haystack,” The Economist, 14 December 2002, 69; and, 
for a broader assessment, Kimberley L. Thachuksee, “Terrorism's Financial Lifeline: Can It be Severed?” 
Strategic Forum, no. 191 (May 2002), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF 191 /sfl 91 .htm. 
accessed 15 July 2004. For the time being the most effective mechanism appears to be the FATF, 
especially in terms o f the mutual evaluation provisions among members. However, holding countries that 
harbor known or suspected money laundering operations accountable for their actions or inactions remains 
an area o f contention. For instance, even prior to 9/11, U.S. Senator John Kerry even went so far as to 
advocate economic war against countries that refused to take action on this issue. Kerry, 150-68.
51 Generally speaking, the ability to effectively engage in computerized money laundering is part o f a wider 
trend toward the greater use o f high-tech skills on the part o f criminal organizations. Among other 
advantages, the ability to conduct business remotely allows for a higher degree o f insulation from law 
enforcement agencies, particularly in the transnational context where multiple jurisdictions are involved.
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previously, despite being an important issue in its own right, the transnational movement 
of illegal non-tangible assets such as those constituted by money laundering via wire 
transfer falls somewhat beyond the scope of this study. However, other options used by 
money launderers include sending the money abroad or using an underground banking 
network, and may involve the cross-border physical movement of legal tender in various 
amounts.52
In particular, bulk transport of currency is becoming increasingly more prevalent, 
particularly in cases where money is physically shipped to locations from which it can 
enter the international banking system more easily, in itself another manifestation of 
illegal activity following the paths of least resistance. For instance, the USCS notes that, 
“One by-product of tightening up . . .  U.S. financial institutions has been an increased 
reliance by criminal organizations on the physical transportation of currency.” This 
issue is be discussed further in the context of Colombian TCOs in Chapter VI.
See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 28-9, for a more 
complete discussion o f growing criminal capabilities in this respect, as well as efforts to address these 
challenges.
52 The most singular commonalties among all o f  these transnational mechanisms involve trust-based 
networks. For instance, throughout the Middle East hawala banking systems play a vital function in the 
absence o f other economic channels, particularly with respect to remittances from overseas workers. As for 
the nature o f these networks, “no money moves physically between locations; it is transferred by means o f  
a telephone call or fax between dealers in different countries. No legal contracts are involved, and 
recipients are given only a code number or simple token, such as a low-value bank note tom in half, to 
prove the money is due. Over time, transactions in opposite directions cancel each other out, so physical 
movement o f funds is minimized. If an imbalance builds up, cash or jewelry is carried across the borders, 
trade invoices are adjusted, or conventional banks are uses. Trust is the only capital that the dealers have.” 
[emphasis added] See also “Still flush,” The Economist, 1 September 2002, 66; and “Cheap and trusted,” 
The Economist, 24 November 2001, 71, which notes the historical role o f  hawala networks in smuggling 
gold from Europe to India, primarily through Dubai. Incidentally, the long distance movement o f  funds 
significantly predates the modem era. This is demonstrated by the fe i qian or flying money system 
developed in the latter half o f the Tang dynasty in China, medieval Jewish trading networks, the Knights 
Templar with respect to the funding o f Crusaders, and the Hanseatic League in facilitating commerce 
among its members. For a historical overview o f this phenomenon, see Curtain, 1-14, while more recent 
manifestations are discussed in Kotkin, 3-35.
53 U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 20. See also U.S. DOT, Office 
of Intelligence and Security, Port Security, 12. The latter document in particular notes the following
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On a number of levels, money laundering constitutes a serious challenge to 
national interests. This can be seen not only in the context of drug trafficking, but also 
with respect to the sales of illicit arms, the financing of terrorism, the evasion of 
sanctions, the movement of weapons of mass destruction and the smuggling of a wide 
range of contraband.54 As with access to precursor chemicals, the ability of TCOs to 
engage in money laundering is crucial to facilitating the transnational heroin trade, as 
well as numerous other illegal market activities. These themes will be found throughout 
the remainder of this analysis, particularly with respect to the case studies.
For the nation-state, the common thread of all these issues is the need for 
international cooperation to meet transnational challenges. The following two sections 
shift the focus to recent trends relating to global heroin supply and demand, respectively, 
in an effort to establish the geographical parameters involved. Moreover, intertwined 
with these market imperatives is a consideration of the various types of efforts that 
nation-states can take to address the spatial aspects of this illegal activity.
As a point of departure, any consideration of the transnational heroin trade, and 
by extension the smugglers’ landscape with respect to this commodity, must be 
predicated upon the exigencies of supply and demand. Furthermore, the various
potential for currency smuggling via containerized freight: “$18 million of U.S. currency in $20- 
denominations consists o f 9,000,000 bills, weighting 2,000 pounds and amounting to approximately 40 
cubic feet in volume (one measurement ton). The interior space o f a standard twenty-foot freight container 
measures 1,100 cubic feet, which can accommodate 27.5 measurement tons.” Furthermore, in some parts 
of the world the majority o f all legal tender in circulation can be infused with detectable amounts o f  drugs. 
In South Florida, this has even resulted in court cases where drug-sniffing police dogs have pointed to 
money rather than actual drugs being dismissed for lack o f evidence. See Carolyn J. Keough, “Drug- 
stained cash widespread in South Florida,” Miami Herald (web site), 9 September 2000.
54 The prospects for cooperation on the issue o f  money laundering control remain good so long as the 
United States continues to not only push forward unilaterally but to encourage the building o f international 
consensus as well. For a comprehensive overview o f global efforts to control money laundering, see U.S. 
Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
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strategies employed by nation-states to curb such activity is salient in this context, as 
these represent the primary forms of leverage by which risk can be imposed upon the 
smuggler. In fact, the major differentiation among counter-drug policies is between those 
that seek to disrupt supply and those that attempt to lessen demand.
Parameters o f Global Heroin Supply 
While demand reduction is discussed in the following section, supply-side 
strategies can be characterized as either “top-down,” those that focus on the upper 
echelons of TCOs, and “bottom-up,” which aim to disrupt the relationship between 
distributors and consumers.55 In general, while supply-side issues tend to be framed in 
international terms, those involving demand most often fall under the aegis of domestic 
policy. It should also be noted that, though addressed here as a separate topic, in general 
the transit stage is treated as a component of the supply side, as are the processing and 
cultivation stages.
In spatial terms, Paul Krugman puts forth a generic geographical trade model 
positing that economic concentration relies on increasing returns, transportation costs and 
demand.56 As with legitimate commodities, this framework can also be applied the 
heroin trade. However, with respect to the illicit drug trade in general, Francisco Thoumi 
notes that:
From a purely economic perspective the narrow geographical distribution of 
illegal drugs is quite puzzling, since the industry’s extremely high profits p rov id e  
very strong incentives to produce wherever possible and lead to expectations of a 
more disperse production pattern that that of legal goods. It must also be noted
55 See UNDCP, World Drug Report {1997), 230-1.
56 Krugman, Geography and Trade, 14-5.
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that although production and trafficking patterns of illicit drugs are significantly 
more concentrated than those of licit goods, they are spreading across the globe.57
To begin with, as they relate to supply these dynamics can be vividly seen in the complex
issue of opium cultivation.
It is worth noting that potential world heroin production has increased by
approximately 60% over the past decade, while opium poppy cultivation itself has
doubled.58 For decades, the main opium producing areas were limited to two regions,
which remain the most important in global terms. These are the Golden Crescent,
centered on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and the Golden Triangle, centered on Burma,
Thailand and Laos.59 In recent years, Afghanistan and Burma alone have accounted for
the vast majority of world cultivation and production, and as such consideration of
Southwest Asian and Southeast Asian heroin have dominated the analysis of supply at the
global level.60
37 Francisco Thoumi, “The Role o f the State, Social Institutions and Social Capital in Determining 
Competitive Advantage in Illegal Drugs in the Andes,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring 
1999), 72.
58 The first figure comes from U.S. DOJ, DEA, National Heroin Conference Report, Reston, VA: DEA, 3-6 
February 1997, while the second comes from U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives -  Central and 
Southwest Asia” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, 25 January 2000). It should also be noted that when 
discussing estimates o f drug cultivation and production, large discrepancies often exist, particularly 
between U.S. and U.N. figures. Though much o f this may be attributed to differences in methodology, this 
issue will become more apparent as this study progresses and relates directly to the data gaps discussed in 
the next chapter.
59 UNDCP, “Supply o f and Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs,” 6-8. The primacy o f these two regions in world 
opium production dates back at least the early 1970s, as evidenced in Lamour and Lamberti, 154. In 
particular, Shelley characterized both Afghanistan and Burma (Myanmar) as “one crop illicit economies,” 
defined as countries where organized crime is based on one area o f criminal activity, in this case the 
cultivation o f opium poppies and the processing o f heroin. Shelley, “Identifying, Counting and 
Categorizing,” 5-6.
60 However, it should also be noted that while Burmese poppy cultivation may outstrip that o f Afghanistan 
in acreage, the corresponding yield o f Southeast Asian opium per acre is only about one-fourth that of 
Southwest Asia due to substantial differences in potency. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International 
Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 25. This issue is also discussed at length in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  
Drugs (2000), 27-30. In addition to the methodological hurdles already discussed, this report also notes 
that, “in mountainous countries like Afghanistan and Burma the rugged terrain makes it hard to interpret 
accurately the color spectrum o f the panchromatic photographs taken by satellite because it is affected by
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Compared to the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle, other regions have 
had a more circumscribed overall impact. For instance, Latin American opium 
production, centered in Colombia and Mexico, has never achieved the same economies of 
scale despite expansion in recent years.61 Overall, that region is responsible for only 4% 
of the total global opium supply, according to 1997 U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) statistics, though in 2000 the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) put the figure for Colombia and Mexico together at 11%.
However, the same DEA report also notes that 75% of the heroin seized in the 
U.S. was of South American origin, while a further 14% came from Mexico.
Furthermore, the ONDCP source points out that Latin America’s heroin production 
capacity of 11 tons now exceeds the estimated U.S. demand of 10 tons per year.62 
Prominence within this key market has understandably tended to magnify perceptions of 
regional production from absolute to relative terms, particularly within the realm of U.S. 
drug policy-making.
Other areas continue to have a vast potential for poppy production, though as yet 
these remain largely remained untapped. Within the former Soviet Union, for instance, in 
addition to large tracts of land dedicated to poppy cultivation in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine and southern Russia, there is also a pool of
slopes, shades, etc.” As such, a series o f ground checks are in order, which may or may not be feasible at 
any given point in time. While Afghan opium production will be discussed at greater length in the context 
o f  Chapter V, for more on the impact o f  Burmese drug cultivation, see American University, Trade 
Environmental Database, “Opium Trade and Environment,” Case 435, available at 
http://www.american.edu/TED/opium.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
61 It should be noted that the U.S. Department o f Defense sometimes refers to the Latin American drug 
nexus region, comprised primarily o f Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, as the “Silver Triangle.” Though this 
term’s derivation most likely comes from the region’s association with cocaine, its usage does not appear to 
have entered popular parlance. See U.S. DoD, Joint Counterdrug Operations, GL-18.
62 See U.S DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 9,40; and U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives.”
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talented chemists able to turn out a wide range of natural and synthetic opium 
derivatives.63 Moreover, the impact of other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, as 
cultivation centers remains negligible.64
Writing three decades ago, Catherine Lamour and Michel R. Lamberti note that, 
“It should not be forgotten, however, that in the poppy growing countries national 
interests are also involved. Here the drug problem is by no means confined to its medical 
or criminal aspects, since opium represents a means, if not the sole means, of subsistence 
for large sections of the peasant population and is in addition a source of foreign currency 
for the State.”65 Where poppy cultivation is deeply entrenched, attempts at eradication or 
crop substitution run into hurdles involving not only economic, but also social and 
developmental issues as well.66
A number of observers have also noted the predominance of marginalized ethnic 
groups or other social classes in relatively underdeveloped areas with respect to opium
63 Chepesiuk, 178-9. See also Rensselaer W. Lee III, “Drugs in Communist and Former Communist 
States,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 199-203; Booth, Opium, 317-9; and 
OGD, Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 37-41.
64 For an historic overview o f world heroin production trends, see Jara Krivanek, Heroin: Myths and 
Reality (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 105-13; and Booth, Opium, 295-338.
65 Lamour and Lamberti, vii-viii. An excellent analysis o f the interaction between these factors can be 
found in UNDCP, “Drugs and Development,” ONDCP Technical Series no. 1, UNDCP/TS.l (New York: 
UNDCP, May 1996), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/technical series 1994-06-01 l.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. For a less optimistic view o f the related international efforts along these lines, see 
also Graham Farrell, “A Global Empirical Review o f Drug Crop Eradication and United Nations’ Crop 
Substitution and Alternative Development Strategies,” Journal o f Drug Issues 28, no. 2 (1998), 395-436. 
Incidentally, in 1993 an ironic manifestation o f alternatives to drug cultivation came about in Colombia, 
where coca farmers from the town o f Argelia interested in participating in UNDCP extension programs 
requested opium poppy seeds as a substitute crop. Clawson and Lee, 143-4.
66 In a few  cases, drug eradication measures can actually be damaging to the environment. For instance, as 
noted in Bentham, 45, “In the Chu valley in Kazakhstan, cannabis is the only plant which grows in the 
sand. Its immediate eradication would result in an ecological disaster, transforming the valley into a 
desert.” However, it would be incorrect to imply that drug crop eradication never succeeds. As an 
example, the Bekaa Valley o f Lebanon has traditionally been a major source for both opium and cannabis. 
As o f 1998, eradication effort had largely reached fruition due to cooperation between the Lebanese and 
Syrian security forces. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” International Criminal Police Review, 
no. 472-473 (1998), 1.
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cultivation. Moreover, involvement in such activities can be further linked to the 
subsequent smuggling of opiates as well. The reasons for this often extend back to a 
more fundamental lack of other viable socio-economic opportunities, while the ethnic 
dynamics involved may serve to facilitate various smuggling venues as discussed in the 
previous chapter. For instance, as Andreas points out, “smuggling provides an alternative 
avenue for upward mobility for entrepreneurial but marginalized social groups that have
/TO
little access to legitimate business opportunities.” Similarly, as Bovekerk notes, 
“Wherever national borders traverse settlement regions of this kind, the conditions are 
perfect for smuggling.”69
As a result, international supply reduction efforts, or the attempt to present 
ongoing and systematic obstacles to the heroin trade at its various production and 
logistical stages, remain exceedingly problematic. With respect to the issue of national 
interests alluded to above by Lamour and Lamberti, this dimension ties directly into the 
complex interaction between smuggling actors and nation-states discussed in the previous 
chapter. By virtue of this relationship, the latter or its agents may have vested interests in 
allowing drug cultivation or trafficking to flourish under its auspices.
Specifically, Jordan delineates four main reasons for governments to support drug 
trafficking and consumption, particularly in other countries. These are to receive a 
portion of the enormous profits involved, to bolster their relevant national agricultural 
and commercial sectors, to support intelligence operations by gaining access to sources of
67 For instance, see Lamour and Lamberti, 253-4; and Andrew Ball, “Indigenous peoples and substance 
abuse,” World Health 48, no. 4 (July-August 1995), 8. In the context of the Golden Triangle, see also John 
Bray, “Ethnic groups and the future o f Burma,” The World Today 48, no. 8-9 (August-September 1992), 
144-7. This theme will be examined in greater detail in the context o f the case studies.
68 Andreas, 79.
69Bovenkerk, 117.
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information and alternative funding, and for strategic reasons such as the destabilization 
of enemies.70 All of these motivations are at least touched upon in the context of this 
analysis.
As noted above, the role of the United States in international drug control remains 
pivotal, and is particularly salient in light of its early and concerted involvement in what 
would later become seen as problem of global dimensions. In this respect, the case of 
Turkey illustrates a number of the hurdles involved in stemming global drug supplies. 
Once a major producer of opium, and still a major conduit for heroin flowing from the 
Golden Crescent into Western Europe, Turkey’s move away from illicit opium 
cultivation, and U.S. involvement in that evolution, represents in some ways the opening 
shots in an escalating transnational struggle.
The sweep of U.S. counter-drug strategy first expanded on a massive scale under 
the Nixon administration. In fact, the Nixon-era approach to this issue is sometimes 
referred to as the “first war on drugs.” Despite its status as a vital Cold War ally and 
fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey soon became the 
primary target of these early attempts to control the supply of opium and its derivatives. 
Such was the growing perception of the threat posed by rising addiction levels that an 
unnamed U.S. senator is cited as publicly threatening that the U.S. would bomb Istanbul 
if Turkish opium growers continued to supply heroin via the well-known French 
Connection.71
70 Jordan, 69-70.
71 Matheo Falco, “Passing Grades: Branding Nations Won’t Resolve the U.S. Drug Problem,” Foreign 
Affairs 1A, no. 5 (September-October 1995), 16. The French Connection, subject o f  numerous books and 
movies, was a French-Corsican venture that ran from Turkey through the French port o f Marseilles, and 
then beyond to New York, Montreal and other destinations. Following an international law enforcement
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In policy terms, the Nixon administration made an abortive attempt in 1971 to 
allocate $35 million in “aid” to Turkey for the purpose of wiping out all but a tiny portion 
of its opium harvest, the remainder being reserved for legitimate medical uses.72 
However, while the U.S. initially conceived of this sum as a one-time payment, for its 
part Turkey saw the potential for a recurring annual payment. As other opium producing 
countries expressed interest in similar arrangements, the U.S. quietly dropped the plan 
and returned to more traditional crop eradication and substitution efforts.73 However, 
within a few years Turkey had largely eradicated illicit opium cultivation on its own via 
strict law enforcement measures, while cultivation and smuggling patterns merely shifted 
accordingly.
Support for such programs has remained a mainstay of U.S. counter-narcotics 
strategy ever since.74 Moreover, with the end of the Cold War the U.S. was freed from 
the compelling national security constraints of the past half-century via the dissolution of 
its primary threat, the Soviet Union. The most singular immediate effect of this 
development was the flexibility to more actively enlist Department of Defense assets in 
the so-called “war on drugs” proper.
effort, this conduit was largely eliminated in the mid-1970s. It should be noted, however, that successful 
routes and methods often exhibit eventual resurgence once the nation-state’s attention has shifted 
elsewhere. For more detail, see also Lamour and Lamberti, 17-35.
72 However, as in the case o f  India discussed below, Turkey’s licit opium production has also been 
allegedly diverted to illegal uses. See OGD, World G eopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 30-2.
73 Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics o f  Failure (New York: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1996), 61. For more on Nixon-era drug policies in general, and the case o f Turkey in particular, 
see also Chepesiuk, 59-62; and Booth, Opium, 206-9.
74 For instance, from 1981 to 1991, the period o f the Reagan and Bush administrations, spending on 
interdiction efforts rose from $350 million to $2 billion, while support for programs to curtail drug 
production and trafficking from source countries increased from less than $67 million to more than $660 
million. Falco, 17.
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Interestingly, the final decade of the Cold War coincided with the rise of cocaine 
use, especially in American cities. Due to the geography of the transnational cocaine 
trade, centering on Latin America and bounded for the most part by the greater Caribbean 
basin, there came to be a growing reliance on the interdiction of drugs on their way into
n e
the U.S., often through military means. This development is addressed further in 
Chapter VI, with particular reference to Colombian TCOs.
According to Jordan, the U.S. war on drugs is predicated on five assumptions, all 
of which have been the grounds for debate. First, there is a relatively straightforward 
conceptualization of the issue in economic terms of supply and demand, with an 
emphasis on the former. Second, TCOs based on various ethnic or national groups are 
identified as the major culprits. Third, the financial system is generally depicted as being 
either unwitting or actually victimized by the influx of drug money. Fourth, despite the 
certification process, other government’s drug control efforts are viewed optimistically 
despite being undermined by corruption and intimidation. Finally, there is the 
assumption that strong societal forces both within the United States and throughout the 
world are fundamentally opposed to the production, distribution and consumption of 
illegal drugs.76
Furthermore, at this juncture it is worth pointing out that, while the United States 
is by far the most prominent smuggling destination in the world, in general nation-states 
tend to be more concerned with illegal goods entering their territory than leaving it.
Thus, for instance, Mexican concerns over weapons coming into its territory from the
75 For an overview o f U.S. supply-side counter-drug policies during the 1980s, see Cooper, 107-25. The 
seaborne aspects o f this regional interdiction activity are also addressed in Charles M. Fuss, Jr., Sea o f  
Grass: The Maritime Drug War, 1970-1990 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).
76 Jordan, 15-8.
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United States generally receive less attention in Washington than issues considered more 
relevant, namely drugs and immigration moving northward across the common border.77
Even within the arena of supply-side strategies, in recent years the trend in U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy has been to focus more attention on cultivation areas relative to 
interdiction efforts at the national borders. As the INCSR 1997 unequivocally states, “We 
cannot reduce the flow of drugs to the United States unless we strike as close as possible 
to the source.” Thus, the U.S. government’s “international drug control programs target 
the first three links of the chain: cultivation, processing and transit.”78 As mentioned 
above, for the U.S., the cornerstone of targeting the global supply of drugs remains the 
annual process of certification.
As a snapshot of this process, the 1997 iteration is illustrative of the gulf between 
theory and practice. In the case of Nigeria, which was consistently decertified over a 
period of several years throughout the 1990s for its failure to stem not only drug 
trafficking but money laundering as well, the Clinton administration proved slightly more 
rigorous in its application of standards. However, many of the countries listed in 
previous years were taken off the decertification list, under the logic that they were 
making good faith efforts and that a failure to certify them would produce more harm 
than good.79
77 See Andreas, 76-7. Other major illegal U.S. exports include cigarettes and stolen automobiles. In fact, 
the author goes as far with this train o f thought as to note that, given the magnitude o f  contraband leaving 
the country, were the U.S. to rigorously apply the certification criteria to itself a rather poor grade would 
result, particularly if  the evaluation focused on smuggling in general. For a ground-level perspective on the 
issue o f illegal Mexican immigration to the U.S., see also Ted Conover, Coyotes: A Journey Through the 
Secret World o f  America’s Illegal Aliens (New York: Vintage Departures, 1987).
78 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1997, “Executive Summary,” 3. See also Falco, 17.
79 For instance, during the administration o f Bush senior, sanctions related to narcotics production and 
trafficking were for the most part limited to countries with which the U.S. had limited or at least 
problematic relations, such as Iran, Burma, Laos, Afghanistan, and Syria, as well as Panama under Noriega
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Furthermore, Colombia, Paraguay, Pakistan and Cambodia were waived despite 
failing to meet the stated standards and received certification only due to their standing 
with respect to unrelated issue areas, justified in terms of their importance to vital U.S. 
national interests. As U.S. aid was previously restricted on other grounds in the case of 
Afghanistan, Burma and Iran, only Nigeria was both eligible to otherwise receive aid and 
subsequently denied due to its government’s chronic failure in this specific issue area.80 
This type of behavior underlines the OGD’s observation that, “The contradictions 
between the promises of states and international institutions to fight the ‘drug scourge’ 
and the concessions made to narco-states when they are clients or allies are as clear as 
ever.”81
Overall, criticism of the certification process tends to center on finding fault with 
its allegedly vague and subjective criteria, inconsistent mechanisms, hollow punishments
in 1988 and 1989. All other countries were annually certified, including the Andean countries accounting 
for all o f the world’s cocaine supply. As such, during this period the process could be characterized as both 
“predictable and largely unnoticed.” Falco, 18.
80 For 1997, fourteen o f the thirty countries identified as “majors” were listed pertaining primarily to 
heroin, and located outside the Western Hemisphere: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, 
Laos, India, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. The remaining 16 nations on 
the list were Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. U.S. President, Office o f the White House, “Memorandum 
for the Secretary o f  State, Subject: Certification o f Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug Transit 
Countries,” Presidential Determination No. 98-15 (Washington, DC: Office o f the Press Secretary, 26 
February 1998). Incidentally, for 2000, Nigeria received full certification, as did Pakistan and Paraguay, 
while Cambodia and Haiti were certified via national interest waivers. Afghanistan and Burma were the 
only countries not granted certification. Iran was no longer on the list. See U.S. Department o f State,
“2000 Narcotics Certification Determinations,” Remarks at Special Briefing Randy Beers, Assistant 
Secretary for Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department o f State, and Robert Brown, Deputy 
Director, ONDCP (Washington, D.C.: Department o f  State, 1 March 2001), available at 
http://www.state.gOv/g/inErls/rm/2001/ian apr/101 l.htm. accessed 15 July 2004. For a complete listing of  
the relevant countries, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Introduction.”
81 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 14. Paralleling a number of the themes put forth in Chapter II, 
at a more fundamental level Jordan, 9, notes that, “Three interrelated phenomena work synergistically to 
produce the narcostate: organized crime, governmental policy, and transnational capitalism.” In particular, 
states transitioning economically from statism to capitalism, or from authoritarianism to democracy, can 
also be seen as especially vulnerable.
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and blunt application. More pointedly, in an Economist editorial, the somewhat tongue- 
in-cheek notion is put forth that the various countries regularly decertified may be within 
their rights to decertify the U.S., given that “the iron law of the market is that demand 
breeds supply.”83
Perhaps in response to these types of arguments, the 2000 iteration of the 
certification process in fact listed the United States as both a major precursor chemical 
source country and a major money laundering country.84 This lends a certain degree of 
balance to the ofiten-paternalistic pragmatism the U.S. may show in dealing with 
supposed partners in the global struggle against transnational drug trafficking, and as 
such must be taken as a positive sign.
In general, too much adherence to the unilateral approach, as exemplified by the 
“big stick” of the certification process, not only serves to undermine multilateral efforts 
but also to negatively skew important bilateral relations as well.85 While the U.S. 
certainly remains “bound to lead” in this issue area, as many others, in the future the 
balance between unilateral and multilateral approaches becomes even more crucial.86
82 See Council on Foreign Relations, Rethinking International Drug Control (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1997), 5-6.
83 “Motes, beams and drugs,” The Economist, 9 March 1996, 18. However, until recently these were not 
points that the United States is inclined to acknowledge. However, consider the comments o f U.S. 
Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright, inclining in some ways toward a new approach to the process: “We 
make our certification decisions not to stand above other countries in judgment, but to hold them up to the 
same public scrutiny to which we hold ourselves.” U.S. Department of State, Department o f the Office o f  
the Spokesman, “Remarks on the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 1997,” (Washington, 
DC: Department o f State, 26 February 1998).
84 See U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Introduction.”
85 As even the text o f one INCSR notes, “Though many countries understandably resent the process, most 
governments try to ensure that they receive full certification the following year.” U.S. Department o f State, 
INL, INCSR 1999, “Executive Summary,” 5.
86 See Nye, both Bound to Lead and The Paradox o f  American Power, passim. For an overarching analysis 
of the United States’ role in underpinning the international system as necessary but in and o f itself not 
sufficient, see also Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative o f  American Leadership: A Challenge fo r Neo- 
Isolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996). However, as o f this writing the
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Moreover, as supply only represents half of the equation, a parallel emphasis on 
controlling domestic demand for drugs is also a public policy imperative. As such, the 
next section examines this reciprocal issue in terms of the primary global markets and the 
efforts of various governments to meet these challenges.
Parameters o f Global Heroin Demand 
In many ways, the demand for drugs can be seen as providing the necessary 
incentives that drive the engine of supply, particularly in terms of profit motive. As 
noted above, demand-side counter-drug policies tend to fall within the arena of domestic 
policy and may be characterized as relating primarily to either the treatment of drug 
addicts or law enforcement measures taken against those participating in the distribution 
end of the trade.
With respect to the stances of individual nation-states and their relevant legal 
statutes, exceedingly harsh penalties for drug offences can be found in a number of
• 87  •countries. This may be contrasted with a relatively high degree of tolerance and even, 
in a limited number of cases, legalization, in others, particularly in Europe. For its part, 
the U.S. seems generally loath to proceed conspicuously down this path, preferring for
option o f the U.S. failing to engage with the rest o f the world appears largely moot, with the current debate 
centering more on the nature o f  such engagement.
87 For instance, OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 16, notes that drug possession can be a capital 
crime in a number o f countries, including China, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Russia. 
Furthermore, merely possessing drug paraphernalia is in itself an offense in many places. This report also 
discusses the selective use o f the drug control policies by repressive regimes to quell political opposition 
and otherwise infringe on human rights.
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the most part to criminalize the problem. However, despite the various strategies that 
have been implemented, demand for illegal drugs persists.88
From a policy point of view, focusing on supply-side counter-drug strategies, 
particularly with respect to external sources, is often a much easier course of action for
Q Q
national governments in that it obviates the need to make difficult internal decisions. 
While this is less problematic in countries with repressive political systems, in the case of 
democracies the impact of such efforts not only directly affects a certain segment of the 
voting populace, but also opens up a fundamental debate on a wide range of issues.
While the tendency to blame one’s problems on others is hardly atypical to human nature, 
it does serve to skew the assumptions underlying the formulation of policy by only 
encompassing half of the problem.
Moreover, this emphasis on foreign blame is certainly not a new phenomenon.
For instance, by international agreement the 1912 Hague Opium Convention committed 
signatory nations to restrict production rather than consumption, an early instance of 
putting a supply-side strategy over its demand-side counterpart in order to facilitate 
consensus building. However, it is worth noting a 1994 RAND study determining that 
$34 million invested in treatment programs in the U.S. would reduce drug use by the
88 Competing explanations for this persistence abound, though a distinction can be made between the 
experimental use o f drugs and actual addiction to these substances, whereby rational decision-making is 
largely superseded. With specific reference to heroin addiction, see Inciardi, 69-79. Not only does the 
author note the various schools o f thought on this issue, he also quotes several actual users commenting on 
their personal experiences with heroin. See also UNDCP, World Drug Report { 1997), 45-69, for more on 
theories and interpretations o f  illegal drug abuse; and “Just say maybe,” The Economist, 5 April 2003, 72-3, 
for a discussion o f the parameters o f the legalization debate.
89 For instance, see Falco, 15-16. Characteristic o f this attitude, quite prevalent in U.S. policy-making 
regarding this issue area, is the following statement: “From a domestic perspective, in is increasingly clear 
that we cannot sustain a reduction in drug use without attacking foreign supplies.” U.S. Department of 
State, “Narcotics Control in Asia,” Statement o f Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary o f State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department o f  State Dispatch 6, no. 27 (3 July 1995), 
540.
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same amount as $336 million invested in interdiction efforts or $783 million in source 
country programs.90
Generally speaking, the most significant end-user markets have been, and will 
most likely remain for the foreseeable future, Western Europe and North America. From 
the perspective of the mid-1970s, Lamour and Lamberti observe that, “For many years 
America was the only consumer of heroin, and today she remains the chief market.”91 
However, while the United States continues to exert its leadership on international drug 
control efforts, according to the ONDCP, as of 1999 the U.S. itself consumed only 11% 
of the world’s drugs, and an even less significant 3% of opium products.92 While the 
U.S. still contains a large number of heroin users, by one estimate Europe as a whole has 
over ten times as many.
90 This study cited in Falco, 20.
91 Lamour and Lamberti, 50. Writing from the European point o f view, the authors furthermore note the 
“veritable psychosis” o f Americans on the subject o f illegal drugs. In the U.S., heroin use can be seen to 
have reached a plateau following the First World War, leveling o ff following the Second World War, and 
then resuming its rise again in the 1960s. From the vantage point o f the mid-1970s, the authors continue by 
saying, “Obviously the United States are more affected than any other country by the new wave of drug 
addiction, since they hold the world record where addicts are concerned. But in 1972 their position was no 
longer as lonely as it had been three years earlier. The demand for narcotics is steadily increasing, with a 
corresponding expansion o f the market available to international characters.” Lamour and Lamberti, 7-9. 
For the most part, demand trends have continued to be extrapolated along these lines. See also Chepesiuk, 
44-50; and Block and Chambliss, 31-9.
92 Used to support a policy focus on Latin American cocaine, these statistics are cited in U.S. Congress, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony o f Barry R. McCaffrey (27 April 1999). For a more recent 
overview o f the domestic U.S. heroin market, as well as various other trends, see U.S. DOJ, National Drug 
Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment 2002 (Johnstown, PA: December 2001), 
available at http://www.usdoi.gov/ndic/pubs07/716/index.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
93 As elsewhere within this issue area, statistics vary widely. However, Chepesiuk, 39-40, cites estimates 
of 40,000 heroin users in the U.S., and between 500,000 and a million users in Europe. However, ONDCP 
estimates that the U.S. has around 600,000 heroin users, as opposed to 1.5 million in Europe, only two and 
a half times as many. U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives.” Regardless o f  the exact number o f  
addicts, the fact remains that heroin constitutes a major public health issue throughout Europe. For 
instance, U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 4, reports that 
heroin is the drug most cited in European studies o f drug-related crime, deaths, demand for treatment and 
HIV infection. For more on drugs in Europe, see also Bentham, 36-9; and E.U, European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), “2002 Annual Report on the State o f  the Drugs 
Problem in the E.U. and Norway” (Brussels, Belgium: EMCDDA, 3 October 2003), available at 
http://ar2002.emcdda.eu.int/en/home-en.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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From the policy point of view, among European nations there exists a 
traditionally broad cooperation on drug control, especially in the related areas of 
chemical control and money laundering. As the union grew closer, however, there was 
the perception early on of the need for European Union countries to harmonize their 
counter-drug policies, not only in the context of law enforcement but in terms of 
treatment and other forms of demand reduction.94
Overall, the lobby in favor of legalization appears to have more support in Europe 
than in the United States.95 In particular, it appears that lenient policy stances on soft 
drugs, or those considered less addictive such as cannabis, serves to attract criminal 
dealers in both soft and hard drugs. The position of the Netherlands in this regard is 
particularly germane.96 As such, even as early as the 1970s, the country had been 
considered a major heroin trafficking hub.97
94 Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990), 
191-3. As an aside, illustrating how much the international situation has changed since this work’s 
publication, Clutterbuck advocates not only the use o f both NATO and Warsaw Pact assets for interdiction 
efforts but also a joint U.S.-Soviet combined command for a “world war on drugs,” under U.N. auspices.
95 However, this attitude may be changing. For instance, “Although Europeans historically have tended to 
take a liberal view toward drug use, viewing drug abuse as a medical and social problem, E.U. governments 
have become increasingly concerned about abuse trends and have taken a more aggressive stand toward 
narcotics trafficking.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 4. 
For more on the international debate among the options o f the legalization, regulation or prohibition of  
drugs, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 184-99. Interestingly, this source also points out that, 
in addition to shifting criminal operations to other venues, there would almost certainly be a residual 
market for illegal drugs if  certain categories where excluded or if  only some countries exercised this option. 
See also Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, “The Unwinnable War on the Drug Trade,” ORBIS 41, no. 4 (Fall 1997), 
653-8.
96 By the mid-1990s, French President Jacque Chirac was reported as being particularly annoyed that the 
Netherlands had become something o f a drug haven within the E.U. See “Drug dealers? What drug 
dealers?” The Economist, 12 October 1996, 58.
97 Moreover, Block and Chambliss, 127, note that, “In addition, there is little effort by either law 
enforcement agencies or Government bureaucrats in stopping the traffic. The Dutch are, it seems, content 
to let it continue as long as it is perceived to be a foreign or nonwhite problem.” In particular, the authors 
list the role o f Chinese criminal organizations in the transshipment o f heroin via Amsterdam, and the 
involvement o f  local Chinese, Mollucan and Surinamese elements as both distributors and consumers. For 
more recent analysis o f the drug trade in the Netherlands, including the rise in the production o f ATS and 
other types o f  synthetic drugs, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central 
Asia -  Netherlands.”
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Thus, with the loosing of intra-E.U. border controls in the late 1990s, it was 
reported that nearly 90% of the LSD, amphetamines and Ecstasy seized in Germany 
during 1998 either originated in or transited via the Netherlands.98 As such, a 
standardization of drug policy must be high on the E.U. agenda for the new millennium. 
Furthermore, it is in the U.S. interest not only to do all it can to facilitate such efforts but 
to move beyond such regional regimes to more comprehensive multilateral efforts to 
address drug trafficking and related issues.99
While the European Union, and its constituent membership, remains the United 
States’ closest partner within this issue area, as on so many others, at times divergences 
of interest certainly occur. For instance, patterns of domestic drug use in Germany 
encouraged broad support for the U.S. drug control agenda up to the 1980s, when the 
U.S. focus shifted to cocaine while Germany remained more interested in controlling 
heroin trafficking.
By the early 1990s, German officials were becoming increasingly concerned with 
low-priced, high-purity heroin entering the country from the Middle and Far East, as 
reflected in greater volume of seizures and arrests, as well as the rise in drug-related 
deaths due primarily to heroin overdose. The continuation of unilateral German aid to 
opium-producing nations regardless of U.S. certification or even an analogous German or 
European process can be alternatively considered either practical and flexible or self-
98 Eduard Lintner, “Germany: A  strict approach,” World and 1 13, no. 10 (October 1998), 73. See also 
Saskia Sissons, “Liberal Drug Policy Angers EU Neighbors,” The European, July -  August 1996, 21.
99 For instance, note the establishment o f  the Trevi Group, comprised of various Western European nations, 
the U.S. and Canada, as an international coordination group against drug trafficking and terrorism. For 
more on the apparent hardening o f the European Union’s stance, see Rory Watson, “New Crackdown on 
Drug Menace,” European Voice, 30 November 1995, 1. Flowever, despite these efforts at policy 
coordination, definite differences o f opinion exist among E.U. members, as noted above. For more on 
regional and sub-regional drug control efforts, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 176-80.
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serving and short-sighted. However, it should be noted that, in the case of Germany, 
efforts are taken to separate international development programs from its internal law 
enforcement policies, which remain strict.100
Illustrative of the fact that demand-side issues are not necessarily region-specific, 
even before the end of the Cold War an important component of the Soviet illicit drug 
market were a variety of home-brewed opium derivatives. These appear to have 
accounted for a significant proportion of drug use, given the relative scarcity of refined 
narcotics vis-a-vis the West. Thus, upon the opening of the Russian economy, the market 
was actually quite developed and receptive to new products.101 According to Russian law 
enforcement officials, drug use in 1992 was fifteen times a high as in 1987.102 More 
recently, the OGD noted that the number of addicts in the county is over three million, 
with one Russian citizen in five having some sort of relationship with drugs.103
In terms of domestic drug control, in 1986 the Soviets launched a series of 
biannual mak (poppy) eradication programs in Central Asia, which continued to grow 
until 1991. Since then, successor programs have also been implemented, often at least
100 Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 88, 106-8.
101 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe (London: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), 
113-4. Incidentally, as o f 1991 a principal foreign drug supplier to Russia was North Korea, with opium 
brought in by forestry workers entering the country via intergovernmental contracts. Others involved in 
servicing the growing Russian drug market included Afghanistan, Vietnam, Iran, Hungary and Romania.
102 Chepesiuk, 178. By one estimate, there were one-and-a-half million narcotics users in the former Soviet 
Union in 1991. That number had risen to between five and seven million by 1993. Lesser, though still 
impressive, figures were reported by Russian officials in 1999, specifically o f 350,000 registered drug users 
and 175,000 registered drug addicts. However, both the Russian Ministry o f  Interior and Health Ministry 
estimate that the true numbers are ten times greater, approximately 3 million users and nearly 2 million 
addicts. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 12.
103 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 112-3. This report also notes that the structure o f the Russian 
drug market also underwent a drastic change in 1999, with pre-existing demand for poppy straw 
derivatives, hashish and marijuana being replaced by both refined heroin and synthetic drugs.
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partially funded by the UNDCP.104 While few would minimize the challenge that 
Russian economic reform poses for the allocation of increasingly scarce resources, the 
need for effective drug control measures seems self-evident. Moreover, the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia remain highly vulnerable to drug-related organized 
criminal activity, as discussed below and in the context of Chapter V.105
Globally, as the spatial demand patterns for heroin continue to evolve, other 
countries not previously pressured by the challenges of drug abuse also increasingly have 
to make similarly difficult decisions as their own levels of domestic drug use expand.
For instance, Australia recorded the most significant rise in volume of heroin seized in 
the world for 1998.106 In a further example of the blurring of lines between global 
supply and demand, countries which have been traditionally been strictly producers or 
transshipping conduits are increasingly encountering higher numbers of or drug addicts, 
along with all the other related social ills.107
104 Unfortunately, these operations have led to fears that such undertakings have become too similar to 
counter-insurgency operations. With the danger o f  the Peruvian and Colombian narco-terrorism models in 
mind, the search for sustainable goals and the offer o f alternative development plans will hopefully 
preclude an over-reliance on security forces. Mark Galeotti, “The Drugs War in Central Asia,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, October 1994,461-2. See also Peter Fuhrman, “Lethal Harvest,” Forbes 150, no. 1 (6 
July 1992), 45.
105 See, for instance, Rensselaer W. Lee III, “Russia’s New Drug Threat,” Eurasian Reports: A Report by 
the Center for American-Eurasian Studies and Relations, Winter 1994-1995, 33-50; and “Deadly traffic,” 
The Economist, 29 March 2003, 38-9. The latter source also notes that, since the late 1990s, the region has 
experienced the fastest growing rates o f heroin addiction in the world.
106 This was predominantly o f  Southeast Asian origin, which is understandable given the regional proximity 
and trading patterns. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1. See also Morrison, 9-14. For a more 
recent incident illustrative o f this trend, see Jamie Tarabay, “Australia Charges N. Korean Ship’s Crew in 
Drug Case,” Washington Post, 22 April 2003, A15.
107 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6, which notes 
that, “Countries that today are major narcotics producing or transit areas have significant drug addiction 
problems that grew with their involvement with the drug trade.” As an example o f  this trend, ONDCP cites 
an Interpol estimate that Pakistan has 3 million addicts, while Thailand has at least 600,000. U.S. ONDCP, 
“Drug Policy Perspectives.” This report also notes that while China, India and Iran also report growing 
heroin addict populations, hard statistics are lacking. Though only recently recognized in some policy­
making circles, this is not a particularly new phenomenon, as discussed in Lloyd Garrison, “Let them shoot 
smack: Heroin, once mostly an export, is now a scourge at home,” Time, 19 March 1984, 35.
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Similarly, as new routes appear this phenomenon can become even more
pronounced. It is not too much to consider the correlation between the geography of
trafficking routes and levels of drug use as almost axiomatic, especially in cases where
growers and couriers are paid not only in cash but also in kind. In such instances, the
drugs used for payment in kind tends to remain within the local area and in turn stimulate 
108local drug use. Moreover, various other tangential effects related to increased drug use 
may become manifest as well.109 The next section serves to further develop the concept 
of global heroin supply chains and their ramifications.
The Transnational Movement o f Heroin 
While the supply of and demand for heroin obviously serve to shape the 
transnational movement of this commodity, as discussed previously the trends relating to 
globalization and economic liberalization also have relevance in this respect. Putting this 
issue into context, as well as reiterating the challenges posed to the nation-state, the 
UNDCP notes that:
The growth of international trade -  while a welcome development that augers 
well for the livelihood of the global market -  have also made the interdiction of 
illicit drugs difficult. Free trade agreements in different parts of the world, 
designed to increase trade and reduce border regulation, are also likely to have 
inadvertently provided opportunities for illicit drug trafficking. As it is not 
desirable to turn back the tide of free trade, it will be increasingly important to 
increase efforts to reconcile two seemingly contradictory aims, namely trade 
liberalization and the effective control of the illicit drug trade.110
108 For instance, the health and social consequences o f drug abuse are discussed at length in UNDCP, 
World Drug Report { 1997), 70-109.
109 An excellent example o f  this can be found in the rise o f documented HIV infections in prolific drug 
trafficking areas. For instance, with respect to Southeast Asia see Charles W. Henderson, “Drug Routes In 
Asia See HIV Increase,” AIDS Weekly, 13 March 2000, page not available.
110 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 25.
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While the spatial parameters already discussed are certainly crucial to understanding the 
smugglers’ landscape, it is the logistical linkage between supply and demand that 
constitutes the crux of this study.
As one U.S. drug enforcement official notes, “From the perspective of drug law 
enforcement, DEA views drug trafficking as a seamless continuum. The domestic and 
international aspects of the trafficking organizations are inextricably woven together.”111 
While this indicates a certain logical and cohesive pattern of behavior on the part of 
smuggling actors, the task of discerning the underlying decision-making rationale 
remains quite complex in practice. A 1987 analysis even makes the following 
observation, less than edifying but all too true, with respect to discernible patterns of 
heroin smuggling: “None. Anywhere, anyway, any quantity.”112
However, despite this apparent empirical chaos, the point of departure for this 
discussion remains that transnational drug smuggling routes and methods will tend to 
follow the path of least resistance toward the most attractive and profitable markets. To 
begin with, as drugs are essentially a fungible commodity, for the most part the total 
global drug supply alone does not appear to have direct impact either on the availability 
of drugs within a given market, or on price as an indirect measure of that availability.
For instance, in spite of major efforts aimed at disrupting supply, heroin prices in the 
United States remained relatively unchanged throughout the 1990s.113
111 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, Testimony o f Donnie Marshall, Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency, 3 March 
1999, available at http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct990303.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
112 CCC/IAHP, C C C /IA P H  Guidelines, 18.
113 As noted in Chepesiuk, 258, in the U.S. heroin was actually cheaper in 1997 than in 1981, when the 
Reagan administration launched its “war on drugs.” Furthermore, in the past two decades not only has 
heroin use surged, but street supply has doubled as well. Further evidence o f this pricing trend can be seen
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Furthermore, by its very nature the pathology of drug abuse and dependency help 
to ensure that the overall demand for drugs remains relatively inelastic. This inelasticity 
of demand is particularly apparent in comparison to other agricultural commodities, 
whose global markets are generally marked by weakness and instability, a fact which 
serves to make drug cultivation all the more attractive by comparison.114 As the UNDCP 
noted in 1997, “only in the illicit drug industry can seizures of between 10 and 30 percent 
of production, the forfeiture of a (small) percentage of financial and other assets and the 
loss, through death or imprisonment, of a percentage of operatives, impose merely an 
imperceptible or short-term impact on retail price and still allow large net profits at every 
stage of the distribution chain.”115
It should also be noted that, much as other goods increase in price as they move 
though the hands of various middlemen, the bulk of the profit from heroin comes as it 
nears its final destination.116 In this particular case, it has been estimated that, altogether,
in the 30% drop in heroin prices in the U.K. between November 1990 and December 2001. See “It’s all in 
the price,” The Economist, 8 June 2002, 52-3
114 Williams and Florez, 3. See also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 125. In the corresponding 
logistical context, this aspect is referred to as the “distance elasticity of demand,” or the relative response to 
effective demand to changes in transport costs on the part o f the consumer. This dynamic is analyzed 
further using the international shipment o f petroleum, another commodity whose demand is relatively 
inelastic, in Zenon S. Zannetos, The Theory o f  Oil Tankship Charges (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).
115 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 9-10, 231. Specifically, estimated global interception rates for 
heroin in recent years is put at roughly 15 percent. This source also notes that the corresponding rate for 
cocaine is approximately 30 percent. See also Graham Farrell, “The Global Rate o f Interception o f Illicit 
Opiates and Cocaine, 1980-94,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), which notes the 
role that the risk o f interception and other law enforcement measures play in maintaining the prices o f  illicit 
drugs.
116 However, it should also be noted that the final distribution stage also carries the highest risk as well. In 
general, the lucrative profit margins involved have led a number o f TCOs to diversify from their more 
traditional core activities into drug transshipment. For instance, “Although they are not narcotics producers 
themselves, many organized crime groups -  including those from Russia, China, Italy, and Albania -  have 
cultivated and expanded ties to drug-trafficking organizations to obtain cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs 
for their own distribution markets and trafficking networks.” U.S Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6.
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growing, refining and transporting heroin account for only 13% of its retail price.117 
Furthermore, in terms of street-level distribution patterns, the illegal drug trade is 
“organized like any other importing-wholesaling-retailing business.” At the top level, 
those who can handle multiple-kilo lots, those who can handle single kilograms, down 
through quarter-kilo, single ounces and, finally, local pushers. The product is generally 
adulterated at each level, with a cost to the end user in excess of 300 times the cost of the 
original kilo.118
Given the vast complexity of issues and the number of actors involved, the most 
straightforward metaphor for the transnational heroin trade is that of a pipeline, traveling 
from cultivation and processing through some form of transit to distribution at the final 
destination.119 In terms of supply and demand, cultivation regions provide the source of 
raw materials, which are, in turn, refined, marketed and then transshipped in response to 
international demand. The diagram below offers a generic depiction of such a notional 
pipeline, along with the various factors that may serve to diminish the available supply as 
it moves to a given market:
117 Falco, 18. To further highlight this disparity, the UNDCP noted in 2000 that, while Afghan farmers 
could expect to earn about $14 per pound o f opium, at the consuming end the cost o f a pound o f uncut 
heroin in European or North American markets can exceed $40,000. Even keeping in mind the roughly 
ten-to-one ratio o f raw opium to heroin, this is an incredibly lucrative profit margin. See Christopher S. 
Wren, “U.N. Forsakes Effort to Curb Poppy Growth By Afghans,” New York Times (web edition), 17 
September 2000, 2. Offering evidence o f an even higher profit margin, Booth, Opium, 331-2, notes that a 
kilogram o f Southeast Asian heroin sells for between $66 and $75, while the same kilogram, obviously 
diluted several times over, retails for between $940,000 and $1.4 million.
118 Cressey, 10-1. While the data referenced in this article dates from the late 1960s, there is little reason to 
believe that the relative price differentials or other underlying functionalities have changed significantly 
since that time. A more recent analysis o f  this issue, including an attempt to compensate for the inherent 
difficulties in measuring the price o f  illicit drugs, can be found in William Rhodes, Raymond Hyatt and 
Paul Scheiman, “The Price o f Cocaine, Heroin and Marijuana, 1981-1993,” Journal o f  Drug Issues 24, no.
3 (1994), 383-402. However, the focus here is on the street-level prices in the United States, rather than the 
differential markup on imports.
119 As a point o f clarification, the distinction made between cultivation o f opium and the actual production 
of heroin is due to varying crop yield factors. UNDCP, “Supply o f and Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1996,” UNDCP Technical Series, no. 7 (New York: UNDCP, 1998), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical series 1998-03-01 l.pdf. accessed 15 July 2004.
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Heroin Global Accounting DESTINATION
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Opium /  Heroin 
Taken Out 
of System
Fig. 9. Heroin global accounting (“cornstalk”) diagram120
As the contraband moves from the source area to its final destination, the 
processing steps from raw opium to heroin are implicit, and may theoretically take place 
at any point along the route. In general, processing that takes place closer to the source is 
considered “upstream,” while cases where these steps occur in closer proximity to the 
target market may be considered more “downstream.” Incidentally, a recent trend is for a 
higher percentage of heroin processing to take place further upstream than before.
120 This figure is adapted from a diagram developed for cocaine, “Global Accounting Chart,” in U.S. DOJ, 
DEA, Semiannual Interagency Assessment o f  Cocaine Movement -  Seventeenth Edition, Year End Review, 
(March 1999). While the document itself is classified, the chart is not. Due to its distinctive outline, it is 
know colloquially as the “cornstalk” diagram. In the original conceptualization, this global accounting 
applies to the amount o f cocaine that is notionally available strictly for domestic U.S. consumption, rather 
than the more generic “destination” used here.
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However, the dilution or “cutting” of pure heroin with various types of adulterating 
agents, as mentioned previously, may take place at any time following processing. In 
general, this activity becomes more prominent as the product moves toward the street- 
level of distribution and the final end-user.121
The arrows above the transit pipeline illustrate the efforts of the nation-state to 
disrupt the supply of heroin available in a given target market via confiscation. Similarly, 
the set of arrows on the lower side represent various other types of operational losses that 
smugglers might expect to sustain. However, certain factors that effect potential 
production a priori, such as crop eradication or drought, are not included in this 
schematic, nor are the impact of counter-drug strategies and other variables that serve to 
directly reduce demand. Another important dynamic to keep in mind is that, as the 
product moves through the supply pipeline, it gains tremendously in value.122
Moreover, the range of physical concealment methods involved is truly 
staggering, and as noted previously is limited only by the imaginations of smuggling
123 •actors. The lucrative profit margins also account for practices such as body carrying in 
its various forms, which including the physical swallowing of drugs as well as contraband
121 For more on this issue, see also Ross Coomber, “The Cutting o f Heroin in the United States in the 
\99Qs,” Journal o f  Drug Issues 29, no. 1 (1999), 17-36.
122 As an example, Cooper, 50-1, notes that an Afghan farmer can receive as little as $1 for his opium crop 
for every $42,000 it will earn on the retail market. However, this is in fact more profit than can be accrued 
for nearly any other crops available. This issue will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.
123 Numerous documented methods are discussed in Booth, Opium, 232-8, with a common theme being the 
use of any type o f item that can potentially be hollowed out for the internal concealment o f  drugs.
However, among the more bizarre are drugs hidden in the false horns on animals, peanut shells, dead 
kittens, live camels’ stomachs, and, during the Vietnam War, inside body bags containing dead U.S. 
soldiers. However, the author also notes that, “Most modem heroin transshipment is done by containerized 
freight aboard ships, air freight cargo, vehicles, international mail parcels, concealment on commercial 
airline flights and light aircraft.”
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secreted in clothes or luggage.124 Such methods are particularly common in heroin 
smuggling due to its high price in relation to volume.125
However, despite this profit margin, when compared to multi-ton shipments of 
marijuana or cocaine, heroin smuggling that relies on relatively small parcels is 
sometimes characterized as “inefficient.” Nonetheless, the expendable nature of a certain 
class of courier, known collectively as “mules,” within the wider context of organized 
criminal activity appears to more than offset the associated risks in comparison to the 
anticipated profits.126
While not addressed directly, the intent of this conceptualization is to ignore 
neither the temporal aspects of this phenomenon that evolve over time, nor the interaction 
with other black markets as most saliently illustrated by the two-way exchange inherent 
to all business transactions. Moreover, though at this level of analysis the issue of heroin 
in transit seems distinctly linear, there is a multitude of specific paths by which drugs can 
proceed toward their final destination. These may be broken down by the three primary 
modes of transportation, namely land, sea and air, or by some combination thereof, as 
outlined in the previous chapter.127
124 The ingestion o f contraband is known colloquially as “swallowing,” while methods utilizing the other 
end o f the alimentary canal are known as “stuffing.” Moreover, both phenomena are generally covered 
under the umbrella term o f “body packing.” The empirical aspects o f this phenomenon are addressed 
further in Chapter VII. More generically and in the context o f internal medicine, the risks involved, 
detection techniques and treatment should the packages rupture are discussed in L. S. Nelson, “The Clinical 
Syndrome o f ‘Body Packing,’” Journal o f  Toxicology: Clinical Toxicology 38, no. 5 (March 2000), 175.
125 For instance, with respect to the end market, see “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995,
44, which notes that, “Heroin is more profitable than cocaine: $65,000 -  75,000 a kilo (2.2 pound) in 
Miami, against $14,000-18,000 for cocaine.”
126 See Peter Reuter, “The organization and measurement o f the international drug trade,” Conference 
Report, Economics o f  the Narcotics Industry, sponsored by the Bureau o f Intelligence and Research, U.S. 
Department o f State, 21-22 November 1994.
127 In particular, trends such as the containerization o f international cargo have had a major impact on 
smuggling patterns, as discussed in the previous chapter. As the volume o f containers has risen, so has the 
risk to nation-states, not only with respect to smuggling but to terrorism as well. Paralleling earlier
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Fig. 10. Worldwide heroin seizures by conveyance (1998)128
With respect to this issue, the diagram above delineates the global aggregate of 
heroin seizures by mode of conveyance for a single sample year, in this case 1998. 
However, a number of caveats should be noted in interpreting this data. To begin with, 
given the prominence of intermodal shipping trends in modem logistics, categorizing a 
given seizure that has traveled via more than one mode of transit can be problematic.
observations that the same channels that move one commodity can move others, an executive from CSX 
Lines, a major shipping company, notes that, “If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to 
smuggle a nuclear bomb.” Quoted in Graham Allison, “Could worse be yet to come?” (Special report -  
fighting terrorism), The Economist (web edition), 3 November 2001. Furthermore, there also exists a 
definite relationship between drug smuggling and cargo theft, as both phenomena encompass the same 
logistical infrastructure. Speaking in the context o f the U.S., Edward V. Badolato notes that, “The use o f  a 
drug gang’s organization, contacts, transportation systems and underground marketing systems for illegal 
goods provides a ready made entree for drug traffickers to participate in the cargo theft business.” Profits 
from cargo theft may then be used to fund other illegal activities or, conversely, the stolen goods may be 
used as collateral in drug transactions. Another factor making cargo theft relatively more attractive is the 
significantly more lenient punishment vis-a-vis drug offenses. Edward V. Badolato, Chairman, National 
Cargo Security Council, “Cargo Security: Avoiding Theft Loss in the New Millennium,” presented at 
Supply Chain Solutions ’99, Baltimore, MD, 21 September 1999. See also Julie Salazano and Stephen W. 
Hartman, “Cargo Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no.l (Spring 1997), 39-49.
128 This chart comes from U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide,” n.d., available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/products/cncweb/home.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
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Furthermore, there is no way of directly measuring how much heroin was successful 
shipped to its destination, only how much was not.
As such, it is exceedingly difficult to assess the effectiveness of law enforcement 
efforts in this respect, as a high seizure rate may indicate that the relevant mode is either 
relatively well regulated or that other modes are not. For instance, the use of mail to ship 
drugs may stem from the method either not being statistically significant in terms of 
volume or merely seldom detected, and perhaps even both. Similarly, the relatively small 
amount of seizures made at laboratories, by definition a mandatory stage of heroin 
processing, points more specifically to the ineffective policing or outright corruption 
often found upstream, as well as the difficulties in even locating such activity. These 
issues, as well as others relating to the difficulties in measuring black market and other 
illegal activity, is addressed further in the next chapter.
However, there are certain factors relating to the transnational heroin trade that 
can be extrapolated in a more general way. For instance, the volume of seizures from 
shipments by land dominates this particular data set. As opium is an agricultural product, 
at least the initial portion of any given heroin shipment’s commodity chain must begin 
with a land-based component. Much of this can be linked to heavy traffic areas at border 
crossings on the part of both vehicles and individuals as discussed previously. With 
respect to the latter in particular, the amounts of heroin involved tend to be smaller, as 
discussed previously in the context of body carrying.
With respect to maritime drug trafficking, in a historical sense this has been the 
dominant mode for the movement of drugs, particularly in terms of volume. This trend
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was even more significant prior to the advent of regular international air travel.129 
Moreover, a number of factors serve to facilitate this seaborne trade, with geography at 
the top of the list. For instance, Morrison notes among her primary criteria for
1T1
potential drug transit nations whether or not a country has coastal access. Furthermore, 
seaports can easily be utilized to insert various forms of transiting contraband into the 
wider legitimate transportation infrastructure via access to various types of intermodal 
connectivity nodes, such as road and rail networks, inland waterway systems and airports.
Finally, the significance of air transportation of heroin is likely to be curtailed for 
the foreseeable future, in light of the relatively stricter controls on air transportation since 
9/11 and the resultant wider efforts to protect critical logistical nodes and related 
infrastructure. However, there is little reason to believe that such activity will wither 
away entirely due to enhanced security measures at airports, particularly where airdrops 
and other less traditional delivery mechanisms are concerned. As discussed previously, 
the use of air modes of smuggling can vary in terms of being either commercial or 
private, with the former primarily involving smaller amounts of contraband secreted in
129 The importance o f this issue at the international level is reflected in the passage o f U.N. Resolution 
A.872 (20), “Guideline for the Prevention and Suppression o f the Smuggling o f Drugs, Psychotropic 
Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International Maritime Traffic,” adopted on 27 
November 1997.
130 As Aune, 1-2, notes, “Geography is the main component o f the maritime drug trade: the physical 
position or form and accessibility by sea countries or regions influence how and to what degree certain 
modes o f transport are used for drug trafficking into or through them.” Transportation by water also easily 
lends itself to methods o f  multiple routing, by which several ports o f  call are made in an effort to disguise 
the actual transit o f drugs or other contraband. For instance, “Drug smugglers obfuscate the origins and 
destinations o f their shipments by permeating the legitimate flows o f international commerce. By varying 
their distribution patterns and using multiple transit points, drug smugglers increase their prospects for 
evading contraband enforcement and avoiding priority-country customs inspections.” U.S. DOT, 
MARAD, “Emergence of Vietnam as a Transit Country for Heroin Traffic is Exploiting the Containerized 
Export Trade,” Maritime Security Report, no. 2 (April 1996), 12.
131 Morrison, 10-2.
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the luggage or on the person of individual mules, or concealed within the structure of the 
plane itself.
In general, the rise of the transnational market for illegal drugs that began in a 
rudimentary and localized manner at the turn of the century had become a truly global 
phenomenon even by the early 1970’s. Since that turning point, subsequent 
developments may largely be characterized as comprising more than anything else a 
search for and consolidation of markets. Thus, in addition to the various types of risk 
imposed by nation-states, in competing for these markets smuggling actors in turn also 
impose additional levels of risk upon one another.
In response to these market imperatives, drug trafficking networks may be seen as 
constantly evolving, particularly with respect to their intra- and inter-ethnic transnational 
dimensions. As discussed previously, while obviously not a new phenomenon, 
ethnically-based organized crime groups are taking on an increasingly transnational 
character. In practice, this means that smuggling actors are becoming more mobile, 
willing to collaborate when necessary, and conversant with high technology, but also 
more prone to violence in order to protect perceived interests.132 Moreover, members of 
certain ethnic groups seem particularly suited for a role in the international heroin trade 
by virtue of various geographic advantages, such as an established presence in major drug 
production areas or in key markets.
Examples of these types of spatial leverage would include a high demographic 
concentration in a region where opium both grows well and is difficult to eradicate, a 
favorable position either within or in opposition to an appropriately situated central
132 Chepesiuk, 105.
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• • •  ♦ 1 1 'lgovernment, or a traditional involvement in such illicit trading activities. Such 
networks may also exhibit traditional patterns of both vertical and horizontal integration. 
Moreover, heroin trafficking has provided an effective way for a variety of ethno- 
nationalist guerrilla and terrorist groups to obtain funding.134 In general, however, there 
is an extremely fine line between groups that seek to justify criminal activity by way of a 
political rationalization, and more blatantly profit-seeking TCOs.
At the national level, however, individual nation-states can also be characterized 
as either “vulnerable” or “sensitive” to drug transit. Under this conceptualization, the key 
relationship is between the country in question and the final transshipment point, as
opposed to that with the source country since the potential for multiple routing variations
1become too complex. As Morrison notes, “Any country in the world could become a 
drug transit point, even those not on direct routes between producing and consuming 
regions. However, this is not to suggest that transshipment routes are chosen randomly.
133 Lamour and Lamberti write that, “It is a noteworthy fact that, generally speaking, the traffickers always 
belong to peripheral or closed ethnic groups.” Using observations dating to the mid-1970s and finding the 
phenomenon “perfectly explicable” by virtue o f their relative marginalization, the authors continue by 
citing the Italian-American, and later Cuban, Puerto Rican and African-American influences in the United 
States; Corsicans in France; Sicilians in Italy; Turks in Germany; and the non-resident “overseas” Chinese 
throughout Asia. Lamour and Lamberti, 22. For more on Jewish-American drug racketeering through the 
1930s, and the subsequent transition to Italian-American organized crime activity, see Block, 40-1, 105-11. 
In particular, the author also notes the primary overseas suppliers for these Italian-American groups as 
French, Greek, Lebanese and Syrian traders. For more on the trading roles o f transnational “middleman” 
minorities, see also Horowitz, 107-24.
134 In the past, links between drug traffickers and armed anti-government groups have been for the most 
part localized activities, as in the case o f Sendero Luminoso (SL, or Shining Path) in Peru. However, other 
groups with a wider transnational reach that have been linked to drug trafficking include the Liberation 
Tigers o f  Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Basque Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and the 
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey. See Roos, 40; Schmid, 70-2; 
and OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 54-5, on the Tigers and 95-7 on ETA. For a wider 
analytical overview o f this phenomenon, see also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, “Narco-Terror: The Worldwide 
Connection Between Drugs and Terror,” Testimony o f Randy Beers and Francis X. Taylor, 13 March 2002, 
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02031300.htm. accessed 15 July 2004; and Frank 
Viviano, “Drug Trade Feeds World’s Rebellions: Profits From Smuggling Keeps Causes Alive,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, 18 December 1992, A l.
135 This typology comes from Morrison, 7-14, which in turn builds in part upon Friman, 65-83.
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As opportunists, drug traffickers weigh up the costs and benefits of potential routes in 
order to choose those which are most hospitable to drug transit or provide the lowest risk 
of detection.”136
Among the factors that Morrison discusses as affecting the establishment of drug 
transit nodes is a given country’s strategic position, in particular those relating to physical 
geography and encompassing both the range of transportation options available and the 
porosity of the relevant borders. Similarly, under the conceptualization outlined above, 
involvement in the drug trade can occur either directly via alignment between traffickers 
and legitimate governments, or indirectly as the result of a weak central governmental 
control or inadequate law enforcement.137
No matter what the mode or method of smuggling, however, transnational 
smuggling actors remain very quick to adapt to their changing operational landscape, 
particularly in response to risks imposed on their operations by the nation-state. As 
ONDCP Director of Strategy James R. McDonough noted in 1998 with respect to entry 
into the U.S., “Over the past five years, they [drug traffickers] have reduced their transit- 
zone vulnerabilities by shifting from non-commercial aircraft to maritime methods, 
quickly shifting routes in response to effective law enforcement operations.”138 In some 
ways this observation restates the generic smuggling model, namely that illicit trade will
136 Morrison, 7-9.
137 Ibid., 2.
138 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee for Coast Guard 
and Marine Transportation, Statement by James R. McDonough, Director o f Strategy, Office o f National 
Drug Control Strategy, 10 June 1998, 4. In an even more general acknowledgement of this capability, one 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report notes the following: “A key reason for U.S. countemarcotics 
programs’ lack o f success if  that international drug-trafficking organizations have become sophisticated, 
multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control efforts.” U.S. Government 
Accounting Office, “Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts,”
GAO/NSAID-97-75 (Washington, DC: GPO, 27 February 1997), 5.
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move toward those routes that serve to maximize access and minimize risk at any given 
point in time and space, optimizing connectivity via the path of least resistance.
As discussed in previous chapters, economic incentives have led smugglers to be 
nothing if not resourceful. The clearest illustrations of this can be found within the range 
of transit zone activities. To return to McDonough, “In contrast to source zone 
conditions, traffickers have the initiative in the transit zone and can choose when, where 
and how to challenge interdiction forces . . .  To date, traffickers have absorbed the transit 
zone interdiction as a cost of doing business.”139 The next section offers an overview of 
the issue of heroin transshipment by region, with a focus on specific nations that have a 
demonstrable involvement with these logistical mechanisms.
Heroin Trafficking: Regional Trends
In geographic terms, an examination of the various regional singularities of the 
global heroin trade serves to further illustrate the dynamics that shape the smugglers’ 
landscape. For instance, as one U.S. government report notes, “each heroin producing 
region has separate and distinct distribution methods that are highly dependent on ethnic 
groups, transportation nodes, and surrounding transit countries.”140 As noted previously, 
by the mid-1970s the market for illegal drugs was well on its way to achieving a 
worldwide scope. However, as of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, a number of political 
developments had irrevocably altered this landscape.
139 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Statement o f James R. 
McDonough (10 June 1998), 4. Though this observation was made in specific reference to the U.S., it 
nonetheless holds true with respect to most other major markets and their transit zones. The parameters of 
the U.S. transit zone itself will be discussed at greater length in the context o f Chapter VI.
140 GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia,” GAO/T-NSIAD-96-240, 
Statement by Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, to the House o f Representatives, Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 May 1996), 5.
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Among these, European integration served to facilitate the intra-regional 
movement of contraband within the E.U., as well as along its extensive periphery.141 The 
break-up of the former Soviet Union led to an expansion of both opium cultivation and 
processing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moves toward economic liberalization by 
China resulted in a greater volume of Golden Triangle production being moved through 
Chinese territory.
Similarly, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the dismantling of 
its pervasive security apparatus brought a rising prominence to the Southern African 
region in the transshipment of heroin.142 Finally, previously marginal players such as 
Nigeria and Sri Lanka became increasingly involved in the drug trade across the Indian 
and Atlantic basins, while various transnational Asian organized crime groups developed 
transpacific routes to the West Coast of North America.
However, as noted above, for the near-term the primary global markets for illicit 
drugs are Western Europe and North America, largely by virtue of the wealth of these 
regions coupled with persistent demand. Similarly, the Golden Crescent and Golden 
Triangle remain the main production areas for opiates at the global level. In terms of 
access, much of the European market is reached via the Balkans, Eastern Europe and 
North Africa, while heroin destined for North American markets often enters through 
established trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and Latin American trade corridors.
141 As noted in International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 2, “The well-to-do Western European 
population rivals the United States as the most desirable market for drugs, as well as other contraband.” 
The growth o f this market has also led to a related expansion o f money laundering activity, as discussed at 
length in Ernesto Savona, “European Money Trails,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 4 (Winter
1996), 1-20.
142 See Simon Bayham, “Drugs set to become Africa’s new invaders,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
September 1996, 426-9.
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Both individually and as an aggregate, all of these trends have served to either 
modify or reinforce the relevant paths of least resistance. While some of the resultant 
routes remain fixtures of the smugglers’ landscape, others appear to have already fallen 
by the wayside. Though the case studies focus on specific drug nexus regions, by way of 
an overview it is necessary to introduce certain key areas of geographic interest to 
transnational smuggling actors. Although the same caveats noted previously with respect 
to this type of data still apply, the diagram below serves to illustrate the spatial 









Fig. 11. Worldwide heroin seizures by region (1998)143
To begin with, as noted previously Turkey has played a longstanding role as the 
major conduit for Golden Crescent heroin moving into European markets and beyond, an 
issue that is also addressed in greater length in Chapter V. In terms of domestic 
cultivation, all in all the follow-up to the initially U.S.-sponsored eradication effort has
143 This chart comes from U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
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been quite successful as Turkish authorities continue their vigilance with respect to illicit 
opium, though processing of licit opiates persist.144 Nonetheless, as with most fungible 
globally traded commodities, Turkey’s former market share was quickly taken up by 
production from other regions of the world.
However, at this juncture it is worth returning to the case of Turkey with respect 
to the specific context of transit. In a confluence of interests, the eradication of the illicit 
Turkish opium crop not coincidentally also eliminated a potentially lucrative source of 
income for Kurdish guerrilla groups such as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK, or 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a major incentive for the Turkish military to support the 
policy. According to Turkish police, major heroin processing in the mainly Kurdish 
southeast continue to fund the PKK, a major incentive for continued vigilance on their 
part.145 As such, trafficking through these areas is often dependent on at least minimal 
and tacit arrangements with corrupt officials, the military or non-Kurdish criminal 
groups.
As elsewhere, Turkey has also seen a rise in the number of domestic drug users. 
Moreover, and somewhat disconcertingly, many Turks seem ambivalent about drug 
trafficking. This may be more understandable in light of the inflow of foreign currency 
from Europe due to the illegal drug trade estimated at $50 billion annually. Despite 
corruption at various levels, there appears little real chance that Turkey will fully
144 In the wake o f the Nixon-era pressures, by most accounts Turkey’s opium eradication efforts were 
largely successful. However, for a dissenting view, incidentally used to illustrate the shortcomings o f crop 
substitution, see Bruce Bullington, “All About Eve: The Many Faces of United States Drug Policy,” in 
Global Crime Connections: Dynamics and Control, ed. Frank Pearce and Michael Woodiwiss (Toronto: 
University o f  Toronto Press, 1993), 38.
145 Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall o f the PKK,” ORBIS 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 47-63.
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abandon cooperation on counter-drug efforts.146 However, for the foreseeable future the 
country remains an important transit route, given both its proximity and access to Europe. 
The fact that the U.S. does not consider Turkey to be among the majors speaks volumes 
about the priorities and objectivity of the certification process.147
Along with Turkey, Russia constitutes another area of concern, especially with 
respect to the access of Russian TCOs to European markets. As Williams noted prior to 
9/11, the broad spectrum of criminal activities that transnational Russian mafias engage 
in make them a near-perfect case for non-state actors as a security threat.148 With respect 
to Russia’s geography, as Nicola J. Lowther notes, “Its 58,000 kilometers long border are 
hard to police. Some parts of the border follow no logical lines, nor do they reflect 
geographic or ethnic realities. Poor coordination between regional and national police 
forces is another major factor. Finally, huge local imbalances of supply and demand 
along many of the border offer criminals considerable opportunities for smuggling and 
black-marketeering.”149
Furthermore, non-Russian ethnic groups within the former Soviet Union also play 
pivotal roles. For instance, while the prominence of Chechens within Russian narcotics
146 See John Doxey, “Losing the battle and the war against drugs,” The Middle East, no. 271 (October
1997), 20-2; and Mark Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime: Where State, Crime and Rebellion Conspire,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 25-41. In the latter case, the author in particular 
notes that a key strength o f Turkish organized crime is the considerable protection it enjoys within Turkey, 
especially with its vital money-laundering haven in northern Cyprus.
147 Incidentally, this attitude sharply contrasts with a similar understanding o f the parallel challenges facing 
Iran, as discussed in the context o f Chapter V. While the tensions between the U.S. and Iran are long­
standing and beyond the scope o f  this discussion, the latter’s efforts to halt the drug trade on its territory 
have been extensively documented. This dichotomy is noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 
9-10.
148 See Phil Williams, “How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?” Transnational Organized 
Crime 2, no. 2/3 (Summer / Autumn 1996), 19-20. In the wake o f 9/11, other groups have obviously also 
risen to prominence in this respect.
149 Nicola J. Lowther, “Organized Crime and Extortion in Russia: Implications for Foreign Companies,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 27.
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trafficking is well documented, Azeris also play a key, though secondary role, generally 
being forced to pay tribute to Chechen organizations.150 To make the situation even more 
volatile, the drug trade in the former Soviet Union is also highly intertwined with various 
forms of arms smuggling, as is examined more fully in Chapter V.
For its part, India plays an interesting though somewhat ambiguous role in the 
global trade in opiates. It is the world’s largest producer of licit opium products, and the 
only country that still exports opium gum, valued by pharmaceutical companies for its 
high alkaloid content and purity.151 While some diversion to the black market certainly 
exists, this is exceedingly difficult to measure. However, despite the persistence of 
allegations regarding corruption in this respect, there have been few prosecutions.152 
Furthermore, India’s domestic consumption of opiates also appears to be on the rise.153
150 Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafiya (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), 193. See also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 39, which discusses the presence of 
Chechen criminal organizations throughout Kazakhstan. Similarly, Booth, Opium, 317, also notes the role 
of Armenians in brokering and transporting from the Golden Crescent through Turkey into Europe. DEA, 
NNICC (1998), further highlights the involvement not only o f Chechens, Azeris and Armenians, but also 
Georgians.
151 For more on the licit opium trade, see Booth, Opium, 293-5. Other important producers o f  licit opiates 
include France, Spain and Tasmania, Australia. With respect to the U.S. market for licit opiates, the 
prevailing ratio is that India and Turkey together share 80 percent, while the remaining 20 percent is 
allocated to new or non-traditional producers. However, globally the Indian and Turkish combined market 
share is closer to half. See U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Africa Strategic Unit, 
“India Country Brief,” DEA-02022 (Washington, DC: DEA, May 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02022/02022.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
152 See U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia and the Former Soviet 
Union,” GAO Briefing Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-148BR (Washington, DC: GPO, 9 May 1997), 1-16. In 
particular, concerns over the Indian government’s system o f oversight for opium cultivation licenses is 
questioned, with Indian officials holding that very little o f the opium crop is diverted to the black market 
despite U.S. estimates as high as 20%. However, this does not appear to be a major concern to U.S. 
officials as “most o f  the diverted opium is consumed by addicts in India and the surrounding region and 
does not constitute a direct threat to the U.S.” On a related topic, this report also notes India’s role as a 
major manufacturer, at 40,000 metric tons (MT) annually, o f the acetic anhydride necessary to convert 
opium into heroin. Despite Indian chemical control measures, the DEA holds that a “substantial 
proportion” o f worldwide supply o f  this chemical is diverted from Indian production.
153 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 52, which notes a range o f  between 7 and 9 million drug 
users in India out o f  a population o f nearly a billion.
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Moreover, due to its strategic location between the Golden Triangle and the 
Golden Crescent, India often functions as a hub of narcotics trafficking, particularly to 
non-U.S. destinations.154 Moreover, the geographic proximity of Sri Lanka to India has 
resulted in a fair share of trafficking from the mainland by both sea and air. As the island 
nation has no coast guard, and its navy has often been focused on operations against the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the scope for such activity is quite large.155 
Similarly, heroin smuggling activity across the common land borders with both Burma 
and Bangladesh has also been prevalent in the past.156
Further east, it is necessary at this point to examine the Golden Triangle in 
relatively greater detail, as it will not be addressed as directly as other major heroin- 
production regions in the context of the case studies. Southeast Asia’s rise to prominence 
with respect to opium cultivation and subsequent trafficking can be traced back at least as 
far as the era of European colonialism, with a dramatic impact at the global level being 
seen during the Vietnam War.157 However, at present most of the opium later processed 
into heroin originates in Burma and, to a much lesser extent, Laos.158
154 As such, U.S.-Indian dialogue on these issues appears to be relatively cordial. See, for instance, U.S. 
Department o f State, “U.S.-India joint working group in narcotics,” U.S. Department o f  State Dispatch 6, 
no. 38 (18 September 1995), 700. Items on the agenda included discussions o f Indian controls over licit 
opium supplies, as well as precursor chemicals, o f which the latter is also a major producer. For its part, 
India was able to put forth its concerns over the international demand that drives the drug trade. 
Furthermore, in the same year Indian drug control officials also met with their counterparts from both 
Pakistan and Burma to discuss these issues.
155 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, 1NCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia -  Sri Lanka.”
156 Though less heroin appears to cross India’s common border with Burma than between the latter and 
China, the issue is discussed in Hamish McDonald, “Hooked on smuggling,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review 157, no. 23 (9 June 1994), 34. For more on smuggling across the porous border between India and 
Bangladesh, see also Willem Van Schendel, “Easy come, easy go: Smugglers on the Ganges,” Journal o f  
Contemporary Asia 23, no. 2 (May 1993), 189-233.
157 See Cooper, 60-7; and Booth, Opium, 255-82.
158 A comprehensive regional overview o f the drug trade in Southeast Asia can be found in OGD, World 
Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 56-72. However, for a representative portrait illustrating many o f the regional 
dynamics within the Golden Triangle, see Alfred W. McCoy, “Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and
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Commodity in the Career o f Khun Sa,” in Heyman, 129-67. However, while noting that Khun Sa had a 
immense impact on both local politics and the global drug trade, McCoy also points out that, “Just as the 
state retains the ultimate capacity to crush any outlaw, no matter how powerful, so the global drug traffic is 
a vast commodity trade that interpenetrates every aspect o f the modem state, compromising those same 
capacities.” McCoy, 156. Furthermore, a discussion o f U.S. regional dmg control efforts focusing on 
Burma can be found in U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia,” 1-11.
159 Map source: U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
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The map above illustrates some of the more observable spatial manifestations of
this activity. With respect to drug trafficking throughout the region, much of this activity
is facilitated by transnational ethnic ties that often extend far beyond their Southeast
Asian epicenter. As one U.S. government assessment notes that:
Ethnic Chinese and Thai criminal networks in Thailand and Burma play major 
roles as brokers, financial backers, and transporters in the Southeast Asian heroin 
trade. Operating in major regional commercial centers like Bangkok, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan and using a wide array of interchangeable front companies 
and legitimate businesses. Chinese and Thai criminal networks also arrange 
financing and transportation of drugs, routing drugs through many different ports 
-  largely by commercial shipping -  to their final destination.160
In general, the export-based economies of the region, combined with the high volume of
land and maritime trade via containerized shipping, provide ample opportunity and cover
for a wide range of smuggling activity.161
Interestingly, although Thailand has traditionally served as a staging area for
opiate smuggling, the domestic drug of choice as of this writing is methamphetamine.162
Moreover, with the economic opening of Vietnam, that country is also being increasingly
used in the maritime transshipment of heroin.163 Since 1995, however, seizure data
points to a downward trend in the trafficking of opiates through Southeast Asia.164
160 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. III, 24.
161 With respect to maritime modes o f smuggling, see also U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Southeast Asian Heroin 
Smuggling Techniques: Containerized Cargo,” Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA-01022 (Washington, DC: 
DEA, September 2001), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/01022/. accessed 15 July 2004; 
U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Ethnic Chinese Crime Syndicates Prefer Port Cities and Containerized Heroin 
Exports,” Maritime Security Report, no. 1 (August 1995), 15-6; and Ko-Lin Chin, “Triad Societies in Hong 
Kong,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 47-64.
162 See “A new order: A survey o f  Thailand,” The Economist, 2 March 2002, 13. Moreover, there also 
appears to be a wider confluence throughout the region between heroin smuggling activity and the 
production o f methamphetamines, as noted in Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1.
163 See U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Emergence O f Vietnam As A Transit Country For Heroin Traffic Is 
Exploiting the Containerized Export Trade,” Maritime Security Report, no. 2 (April 1996), 11-4. This 
source also notes that much o f this activity is still controlled by ethnic Chinese TCOs.
164 For a broad overview o f recent developments throughout the region, see U.S. Department o f State, INL, 
INCSR 2001, “Southeast Asia and the Pacific.”
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Specifically, much of this activity appears to have shifted to transit routes through China, 
due primarily to the upgrading of the relevant logistical infrastructure, as well as inroads 
made by ethnic Chinese TCOs operating along the common border with Burma.165 
Consequently, this activity has also led to a tremendous rise in domestic drug use within 
China.166
With respect to ethnic Chinese TCOs, the reach of these organizations is both 
broad and well documented, not only within China and throughout Southeast Asia, but 
also in a number of other countries as well. This phenomenon is especially prevalent 
where sizable ethnic Chinese enclaves exist, as these TCOs tend to maintain strong ties 
with such expatriate and immigrant communities overseas. Furthermore, their illegal 
activities often parallel or even intertwine with other legitimate commercial transactions.
Generally speaking, a distinction can be made between Triad societies, 
transnational networks based primarily out of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, and 
mainland Chinese groups, often either Fukienese or Cantonese in origin, which are 
generally more autonomous. Though membership is relatively closed to outsiders, a 
significant feature of ethnic Chinese TCOs is that they tend to have few qualms about
165 Lee, “Drugs in Communist and Former Communist States,” 194-9. The evolution o f these regional 
trafficking patterns from the early to mid-1990s can also be found in the following series o f  articles: Bertil 
Lintner, “Roads from Mandalay: Heroin traffickers exploit new land, sea routes,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review 148, no. 26 (28 June 1990), 27; Bertil Lintnter, “Chasing the dragon: Drug traffickers develop new 
routes,” Far Eastern Economic Review 155, no. 155 (20 February 1992), 24; and Bertil Lintner, “A piece 
o f the action: Burma-China drug trade thrives with official complicity,” Far Eastern Economic Review 157, 
no. 51 (22 December 1994), 27. For a more recent assessment, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 
(2000), 60-2 .
166 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 24-7. This 
source also notes that, in keeping with some o f the demand trends discussed earlier, “Heroin addiction has 
become an enormous problem since China became an increasingly important transshipment route for heroin 
produced in Burma. Before 1990, when most o f Southeast Asian heroin transited Thailand, China had few 
problems with drug trafficking or addiction. Between 1990 and 1998, however, the number o f registered 
drug abusers in China increased by a factor o f 10 from some 70,000 to nearly 700,000, according to official 
Chinese statistics; unofficial estimates o f drug addiction in China range from 1 to 12 million.”
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cooperating with other types of criminal organizations in profitable joint ventures. For 
example, in the past they have worked closely with both Italian and Dominican groups in
1 f »7the United States, Canada and Europe.
Turning to Africa, it is worth noting that by 1990, one-third of the heroin moving 
into Europe was entering through that continent.168 In particular, by virtue of geography, 
history and demography, North Africa has always posed a more pressing concern to 
European policy makers than to their U.S. counterparts.169 The wider issues driving 
African involvement in the transnational drug trade are discussed at greater length in the 
context of Chapter VII. Specifically, the focus there is on Nigeria and the rest of West 
Africa, though other regions are also examined in this context.
However, in particular the potential of Southern Africa as a drug nexus region, 
with South Africa as its center, is relatively high for the near future. With its 
sophisticated and relatively unmonitored land, sea and air infrastructure to move illegal 
cargo, South Africa at present is primarily a transshipment hub for cocaine, heroin and 
Mandrax. The latter compound is a synthetic sedative derived from methaqualone and
167 See also U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 31-3; Ko- 
Lin Chin, Sheldon Zhang and Robert J. Kelly, “Transnational Chinese Organized Crime Activities: Patterns 
and Emerging Trends,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 131-8; and 
Willard H. Myers, III, “Orb Weavers -  The Global Webs: The Structure and Activities o f  Transnational 
Ethnic Chinese Criminal Groups,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 1-36. More 
generically, the wider commercial aspects o f this phenomenon are analyzed in “Inheriting the bamboo 
network,” The Economist, 23 December 1995, 79-80; Sterling Seagrave, Lords o f  the Rim: The Invisible 
Empire o f  the Overseas Chinese (New York: Bantam Press, 1995); and Murray Wiedenbaum and Samuel 
Hughes, The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Entrepreneurs Are Creating a New Economic Superpower 
in Asia (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996), which in particular focuses on the prevalence o f this 
phenomenon throughout Southeast Asia.
168 Baynham, 426.
169 This differential prioritization may best be seen the case o f Morocco. In 1991, over 27% of the hashish 
seized in Europe was Moroccan in origin. As a result, by 1993, the European Community had agreed to 
fund a five-year, $2 billion program to develop infrastructure, irrigation projects and crop substitution in 
the northern Rif region, the primary cannabis growing area. See “Morocco: fighting the drugs war,” The 
Middle East, no. 222 (April 1993), 20. This is precisely the sort o f initiative that the U.S. will need to 
support in the future if  it expects to receive reciprocal support within this issue area.
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antihisamines, originally developed for veterinary purposes but increasingly popular 
regionally as a recreational drug. Southern Africa also appears to have the capacity to 
develop into a provider of drug trafficking support services as well, such as money
|  nr\
laundering and chemical processing.
While the parameters of the European market for heroin have been addressed
above, it is worth reiterating a number of key factors that serve to directly facilitate the
smuggling of drugs into the region. These include the E.U.’s single market reforms
permitting the unrestricted movement of goods, services, labor and capital among its
signatory states; a sophisticated logistical infrastructure; the tremendous volume of
people and goods passing across its land borders and through its seaports and airports;
and well-developed trading ties with every other part of the world. Moreover, as
discussed previously, the persistence of certain member nations, such as the Netherlands,
in treating drugs strictly as a health issue rather than a matter of law enforcement
continues to draw criticism from certain quarters.171
With respect to the U.S. market for heroin, by the late 1970’s and extending into
the early 1980’s the Sicilian Mafia had developed a major presence, particularly along the 
111East Coast. For instance, at one point this group supplied up to 80% of the New York
170 See Robert S. Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” in War and Peace in Southern Africa: 
Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Greg Mills (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institute Press / World Peace Foundation, 1998), 175. For a broader historical view o f the issue, see also 
Peter Gastrow, “Organized Crime and the State’s Response in South Africa,” Transnational Organized 
Crime A, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 56-80.
171 While this is extensively documented, as an example see “Model makers: A survey o f  the Netherlands,” 
The Economist, 4 May 2002, 13.
172 See Booth, Opium, 243-50, for more on the rise to prominence o f the Italian Mafia within the U.S. 
heroin market. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 7, also 
notes that in the 1960s and 1970s, Italian criminal groups were responsible for as much as 85 percent o f the 
U.S. heroin trade. It is also reported that several such groups remain active, particularly those using 
connections in Venezuela and Canada.
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market. However, a treaty signed between the United States and Italy in 1982 allowed 
for closer police collaboration and the exchange of information, prisoners and witnesses. 
As a result of this cooperation, the Mafia’s share of the steadily shrinking American 
market is currently under five percent.173
Succinctly summarizing this transition of primacy, Chepesiuk writes, “Before the 
mid 1980s, Italian organized crime generally dominated the heroin trade in the United 
States and Europe, using the famous French Connection to smuggle large quantities of 
heroin from Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle into Europe and the United States. 
By 1986, however, Chinese criminals had begun to play a bigger role in heroin 
trafficking.”174
Similarly, as noted in a recent U.S. government report, “Fueled by high-purity, 
low-cost heroin introduced into the US market by Southeast Asian and Colombian 
traffickers, heroin use in the United States increased significantly in the early-to-mid 
1990s and has leveled off in recent years. The purity of heroin available in the US is 
higher than ever.”175 While the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle remain the 
largest suppliers of heroin on a global scale, Colombia and Mexico are the first and 
second largest suppliers to the U.S. market, respectively.176 In particular, the role of
173 “A state within the state,” The Economist, 24 April 1997,21. An earlier analysis, predicated upon a 
projected growth o f Sicilian involvement with the global heroin trade rather than its observed relative 
diminution, can be found in Sterling, Octopus, passim.
174 Chepesiuk, 93. Interestingly, elsewhere the author notes that, “Historically, the Italian American Mafia 
never adapted well to the emergence o f the international drug trade.” Making the distinction between the 
American branch and its Sicilian counterpart, the author further cites various sources stating the policy o f  
the five major New York crime families to eschew any involvement in drug trafficking, even to the point of 
threatening members who choose to become involved with death. Chepesiuk, 117. For more on Chinese 
heroin smuggling into the U.S., see also Chin, et al., 130-2.
175 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 5.
176 For a excellent historical overview o f the U.S. domestic market for illegal drugs spanning the past 
twenty years, see U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Affica Strategic Unit, “The 
Evolution o f the Drug Threat, the 1980’s Through 2002,” Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA-02046
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Colombian organizations in meeting North American demand for drugs is discussed at 
length in Chapter VI, as are more specific dimensions of the U.S. market for illicit drugs.
As noted above, many of the aspects addressed in this chapter are examined in the 
context of the selected case studies. However, the next chapter focuses more directly on 
the supporting methodologies to further conceptualize access, risk and connectivity as 
they relate to transnational smuggling, as well as on a number of obstacles inherent to the 
study of this topic. With respect to connectivity in particular, the convention of the 
smuggling vector, previously mentioned only in passing, is also presented in greater 
detail.
(Washington, DC: DEA, June 2002), available at httD://www.usdoi.gov/dea/nubs/intel/02046/02046.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. See also U.S. DOJ, NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2002.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY: ASSESSING PATHS OF LEAST RESISTANCE
As noted at the outset, due to its complex dynamics transnational smuggling is 
precisely the type of phenomenon that lends itself to an interdisciplinary analytical 
methodology. In keeping with the domains of smugglers’ decision-making put forth 
previously in the generic smuggling model and expanded upon with the functional 
schematic of the smugglers’ landscape, this chapter serves to outline the approach to be 
employed in the case studies with respect to the generic smuggling model. Furthermore, 
it also highlights the various data gaps inherent to the analysis of black markets, as well 
as the extant sources of information within this issue area.
However, while this particular study is predicated on geography, it is worth 
examining in brief some of the competing models of smuggling, which vary for the most 
part in terms of conceptualization depending upon the aspect that is being emphasized.
In general terms, smuggling models fall into two groups, namely those stressing the 
security dimension of smuggling and those more concerned with the economic and social 
issues that drive black markets. Such divergences are hardly surprising if one accepts 
that smuggling itself is, in some respects, a manifestation of the inherent tension between 
politics and economics. While this dichotomy is understandable in light of the 
complexity involved, and each side certainly has something to add to the understanding 
of this multifaceted issue, alone neither approach is wholly satisfactory in terms of 
explanatory value.
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On the one hand, security-based models that concentrate on threats to the nation­
state tend to minimize such factors as the underlying profit motives of smuggling actors 
and the two-way nature of such transactions. As discussed earlier, the threat presented by 
smuggling actors to nation-states is often more a byproduct of their activities than a 
primary objective, barring an overt political agenda to the contrary. In fact, the responses 
of national and international bodies represent a risk that must be either avoided or 
mitigated from the smugglers’ perspective, and as such it can be in their interests to 
minimize direct threats to the nation-state wherever possible.
As noted in Chapter II, the intellectual dominance of realism within the field of 
international security and its reliance on the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis 
appears overly limiting in this context, given the transnational dimension of the issues 
involved. For instance, the certification process embodied by the INCSR represents an 
excellent starting point in terms of data collection. However, one analytical drawback to 
such an approach is that, while individual nation-states’ efforts are a necessary condition 
to curbing such criminal activity, they are by no means sufficient, as at the transnational 
level smuggling actors operate largely outside any single venue.
As such, integrating other types of data from levels of analysis both above and 
below the nation-state threshold can facilitate a greater understanding of the functional 
aspects of the smuggling phenomenon and even lead to a higher order of threat 
assessment. Furthermore, by taking the smuggler’s perspective into account, the 
potential for sounder policy analysis also takes shape. That being said, while only 
addressing half of the equation, analyses predicated on threat do serve a definite function,
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namely to focus the nation-state’s priorities in order to formulate policy, allocate limited 
resources and protect national interests.
However, similar criticisms of models predicated strictly on smuggling as either 
an economic or development issue can also be made. In particular, the servicing of 
otherwise unmet demand is sometimes presented as a positive force regardless of the 
commodity in question, often in comparison to inefficiencies or injustices on the part of 
specific nation-states and their policies.1 By contrast, a more holistic view that considers 
the motivations of the smuggling actor, and how these motivations interact with the 
policies of the nation-state, offers a much wider analytical scope.2
As such, the methodology of this study focuses on the smugglers’ landscape, the 
elements of which revolve around the spatial attributes of access, risk and connectivity. 
Returning to the generic smuggling model, access and risk are operationalized primarily 
at the national level of analysis, most saliently with reference to aspects of physical, 
economic, political and human geography. Similarly, connectivity is most meaningfully 
addressed at the transnational level of analysis. In particular, this involves the 
introduction of the smuggling vector as a convention to more empirically measure paths 
of least resistance.
Before moving on to consideration of the smugglers’ landscape proper, the next 
section examines the issue of data sources and gaps. Conceptually, the use of a
1 Examples o f  an economic approach to smuggling analysis include Yeong-Her Yeh, “On Tariffs and 
Smuggling,” International Advances in Economic Research 6, no. 3 (August 2000), 578-80, and Jian-Ye 
Wang, “Macroeconomic Policies and Smuggling: An Analysis o f Illegal Oil Trade in Nigeria,” IMF 
Working Paper WP/94/115-EA (September 1994). Analyses that stresses the potential benefit or so-called 
“welfare effect” o f black market activity include John McLaren, “Black Markets and Optimal Evadable 
Taxation,” Economic Journal 108, no. 448 (May 1998), 665-79; and Tullock, 6-14.
2 An excellent example o f  such an approach can be found in Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Task Force, Global Organized Crime Project, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1996).
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theoretical platform with a relatively open architecture, such as the one already outlined, 
serves as far as is feasible to leverage all extant sources of data to the utmost in the 
attempt to analyze the decision-making processes of smuggling actors with respect to 
route selection. Nonetheless, major obstacles to obtaining data are inherent to the subject 
and must be either overcome, circumvented or otherwise mitigated.
Limits o f the Known: Data Sources and Gaps 
The geographic analysis of smuggling represents an attempt to sort, in a 
meaningful way, the diverse manifestations of a highly complex phenomenon. By its 
nature, smuggling activity and, by extension, route selection, is often exceedingly 
difficult to observe, let alone assess. The uncertainty surrounding smuggling activity can 
be sorted in terms of three basic challenges. The first involves the type and quality of 
information available, while the second revolves around the timing of and access to that 
information. Finally, there are hurdles relating to the causal interactions that shape 
smuggling route selection. These aspects become more apparent as this study unfolds, 
and serve to drive the need for an approach that can deal with this uncertainty.
To begin with, incomplete information can almost be regarded as a hallmark of 
criminology. Donald Cressey has even likened the study of organized crime to 
archaeology, in that both seek “knowledge about inaccessible affairs from consideration 
of affairs accessible to study,” using inferential reasoning to draw conclusions “about 
both norms and interaction processes.”3 Similarly, in 1999 The Economist noted that,
“By definition the shadow economy cannot be measured precisely; it requires some
3 Cressey, 3-4.
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cunning economic detective work.”4 More recently, Janet MacGaffey and Remy 
Bezenguissa-Ganga also discuss the difficulty involved in researching activities outside 
the law, particularly with respect to field research.5
As R. Thomas Naylor writes, “Bridging the gap between perception and reality of 
the criminal marketplace requires, first and foremost, accurate information. Yet, even for 
the legitimate economy, information is getting harder to collect, and official data are 
becoming increasingly misleading. These problems are multiplied when economic 
activity is clandestine.”6 In the case of smuggling actors, there is, of course, no such 
thing as an annual report, despite their many organizational and functional parallels with 
MNCs noted previously. On the contrary, in general TCOs actively engage in the 
intentional obfuscation of their operational parameters.
As such, there is the overarching question of dissemination of information. 
Uncertainty surrounding what is known, when it is known, and by whom is thus of 
paramount importance. Ideally, the most accurate picture would emanate from those with 
first-hand knowledge of smuggling activity, either directly or via other interaction with 
criminal elements. However, the problems, and even dangers, involved with inquiries 
along these lines are obvious.
This opacity in turn calls for a more indirect measurement of many of the 
constituent elements of smuggling and related activities.7 In the context of drugs, for
4 “Black hole,” The Economist, 28 August 1999, 59
5 MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 25-7. See also Janet L. Jackson, Janet C. M. Herbrink and Robert 
W. J. Jansen, “Examining Criminal Organizations: Possible Methodologies,” Transnational Organized 
Crime 2, no. 4 (Winter 1996), 83-105.
6 R. Thomas Naylor, “Mafias, Myths and Markets: On the Theory and Practice o f Enterprise Crime,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), 1.
7 As an example, measures used by U.S. Customs to determine their impact on smuggling organizations are 
nearly all indirect. These include the number o f arrests, both organizationally and in cooperation with other
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instance, statistics relating to the interception of drugs in transit are a key metric, though 
not without drawbacks, as pointed out in the previous chapter.8 The UNDCP has also 
noted the divergence between an ideal yet largely unavailable data set of direct indicators 
and the use of indirect indicators that, though being the only viable alternative, are much 
more subjective.9 While this may seem patently obvious, with respect to drug issues it is 
important to note that views of even this heavily scrutinized market are remarkably 
divergent and based largely on extrapolation and educated guesswork.10
As discussed in Chapter II, smuggling routes and methods are constantly evolving 
in response to changing market conditions and risks imposed by nation-states. Moreover, 
factors involved in path dependency, such as known past activities and accumulated 
knowledge pertaining to smuggling actors can also be incorporated in their historical 
context. The related topic of publicly available versus classified information also comes 
to the fore, as the sensitivity surrounding such data collection is obvious. In some cases 
data may be available but subject to significant time lags or other restrictions, such as that 
from an ongoing legal proceeding. When available, these sources are, for the most part, 
of the greatest utility in the tracking of trends.
agencies; the number and amount o f  contraband seizures; the number of convictions; the number o f port 
runner incidents; the ratio o f seizures to the number o f cargo examinations; the ratio o f seizures to number 
o f passenger examinations; the value o f  assets seized from smuggling organizations; the number o f internal 
conspiracies disrupted; and the number o f intelligence products generated. U.S. DOT, Customs Service, 
U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 19-20.
8 Despite seizure data being one o f the best indicators o f smuggling activity available, its limitations are 
evident to anyone who has to work with these numbers on a regular basis. In fact, these statistics have even 
been likened to the use o f  the “body count” during the Vietnam War, with this particular characterization 
coming from a conversation with an analyst from the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), February 
2000. This characterization is echoed in UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 24-5, which also urges 
caution in the interpretation o f drug seizure data. For more on the underlying methodology o f this subject, 
see also Farrell, “The Global Interception Rate o f Illicit Opiates,” 134-49.
9 UNDCP, World Drug Report { 1997), 12-13.
10 Though focused primarily on cocaine, the inherent analytical challenges applicable across a wide 
spectrum o f smuggled commodities are admirably set out in Clawson and Lee, 4-10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
However, the two most prominent ongoing and publicly available efforts to assess 
drug-related activity come from U.S. government agencies and from the various entities 
operating under U.N. auspices. A number of these sources of information have already 
been incorporated into the previous chapter, and are further utilized in the context of the 
case studies. While each adds to a holistic understanding of the issue, it is important to 
understand the potential biases that can skew analysis.
In the case of the U.S. government, while in general an excellent source of 
information, its reports are understandably concerned with national interests and thus 
may tend to reflect the current relationship between a given country and the United States 
during the period in question.11 Similarly, in the case of the United Nations much of the 
data is self-reported by participating countries, which may in turn have an interest in 
presenting the relevant issues in the most positive light.12
Outside of the aegis of either the U.S. or the U.N., there is also a wide range of 
other extant data sources of varying reliability. To begin with, this includes journalistic 
accounts, which often prove highly useful as snapshots of smuggling activity. 
Furthermore, upon occasion there have also been first-hand accounts either published or 
otherwise integrated into research efforts. Such information may come from those who 
have been incarcerated or otherwise coerced into providing information by law 
enforcement agencies.
11 While this point has been made in the previous chapter, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 
(2000), 8- 10.
12 The UNDCP gathers much o f its data from member states via its Annual Report Questionnaire, a survey 
designed to both provide information on both national drug problems and control efforts. See UNDCP, 
World Drug Report (1997), 33, for more on this process.
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Finally, as discussed previously, in many respects the now-defunct OGD served 
as a valuable counterbalance to the U.S. and U.N. in assessing drug issues, particularly 
with respect to geographic patterns and other spatial manifestations. By the same token, 
not all of OGD’s publications were necessarily as comprehensive as either of its main 
counterparts, and tended to focus on certain countries while not specifically addressing
n
the situation in others.
While none of these sources should be considered authoritative and thus be used 
with impunity, taken together they provide the most complete picture available of the 
transnational drug trade. Furthermore, the areas where their data and conclusions are not 
in accord may provide important insights into what is not readily discernible. By 
extrapolating from the available body of facts, and keeping in mind the various initial 
assumptions noted in the introductory chapter, even more gaps may be filled with varying 
degrees of confidence. Often this is the best that can be hoped for by way of evidence, 
though as an open architecture the smugglers’ landscape should be well poised to 
incorporate additional information as it becomes available to further refine the analysis.
As noted in Chapter I, in addition to calling for more sophisticated methodologies 
that are not necessarily predicated on a rigid preoccupation with numbers, Williams 
observes that an important endeavor of data collection and analysis relating to 
transnational organized crime should be anticipating developments and even, potentially, 
detecting anomalies in predicted outcomes.14 For instance, with respect to the latter, at
13 By way o f methodology, OGD noted that its final annual report was compiled “based on the 
contributions o f  some 200 correspondents drawn from the press, scientific and NGO communities o f about 
100 countries,” in addition to information shared with other national and international organizations and 
research carried out by its staff. OGD, World Politics o f  Drugs (2000), 10.
14 Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 82-5.
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some point in time a particular smuggling actor may be observed exercising influence 
beyond that which is expected otherwise. While this can be perhaps traced to an 
organizational realignment, a strategic partnership or other factors leading to an increased 
competitive market advantage, in general such an anomaly may be taken as an indication 
that the situation is evolving and thus warrants further scrutiny.
Overall, much of this analysis is qualitatively rather than quantitatively based, in 
that the level of fidelity implicit in the latter simply does not exist or is otherwise 
inaccessible. As such, it focuses on the smuggling routes themselves and consciously 
trade off detail for broader explanatory value, in some ways paralleling attempts to frame 
legitimate business activity in ways that are less rigorous but also richer than more formal 
approaches. While this is largely necessitated in the smuggling context by the lack of 
concrete data, an effort has been made to emphasize those factors that appear to have the 
most pronounced impact on transnational patterns of smuggling activity.
If the appropriate data both existed and was available, however, a potentially 
fruitful extension of this study would be to attempt the modeling of transnational 
smuggling routes via the use of geographic information systems (GIS). In simplest 
terms, any data with a spatial dimension can be stored, managed and displayed in a 
dynamic interactive setting. The facilitated analysis of spatial relationships is also 
represents a key benefit of using a GIS platform.
The utility of GIS across a wide range of applications seems self-evident, as 
witnessed by its explosive growth in recent years, particularly in such fields as municipal 
planning, environmental analysis and marketing. While GIS certainly encompasses a 
technological dimension, an ongoing debate persists among practitioners as to the role
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these systems should play.15 Furthermore, as a vehicle for modeling the real world and 
establishing relationships and patterns among spatial variables, GIS at present is limited 
by a lack of reliable standardized data sets, particularly at the international level. Though 
as of this writing the extant data is for the most part not fine enough to support such 
applications at the international or even the national level, there are existing GIS 
applications dealing with related issues on a smaller scale.16
As these systems grow from encompassing individual projects to more 
comprehensive platforms, their analytical potential will become increasingly apparent. 
However, it should be kept in mind that, for much of the world, many of the data gaps 
noted above apply beyond the criminal context. Even for statistical information on 
legitimate commercial activity, in much of the world such data is underreported, 
unreported or intentionally misreported.17
15 Framing the parameters o f  this debate, see Dawn J. Wright, Michael F. Goodchild and James D. Proctor, 
“GIS: Tool or Science? Demystifying the persistent ambiguity o f GIS as ‘tool’ versus ‘science,’” Annals o f  
the Assoc, o f  American Geographers 87, no. 2 (June 1997), 346-62, and its response by John Pickles, “Tool 
or Science? GIS, technoscience, and the theoretical turn,” Annals o f  the Assoc, ofAmerican Geographers 
87, no. 2 (June 1997), 363-72.
16 Directly germane to this study are a number o f related applications currently in place that help to clarify 
GIS’s potential in this context. In terms o f mapping potential risks, with particular respect to corporate 
holdings, GIS applications in the area o f property and casualty insurance constitute one such example. See 
Charles C. Ashley, “Putting Risks on the Map,” B est’s Review: Property-Casualty Insurance Edition 98 
(January 1998), 84-6. In this context, such a system can map those factors, such as the distance to a toxic 
waste site, a seismic fault or a flood plain, which can have an impact on corporate holdings. Such systems 
are used to compute the cost o f coverage, validate the underwriting process and coordinate claims. 
Furthermore, the issue o f crime mapping is considered significant enough to warrant a targeted research 
initiative under the auspices o f the U.S. DOJ, National Institute o f Justice, Crime Mapping Research 
Center. See also Keith Harries, Crime Mapping: Principles and Practice, NCJ 178919 (Washington, DC: 
National Institute o f Justice, 1999), available at http://www.ncirs.org/html/nii/mapping/index.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. However, at present the thrust o f  GIS implementation relating to law enforcement 
is toward the local level; an example o f this may be found in Monica Alexander and Wei-Ning Xiang, 
“Crime Pattern Analysis Using GIS,” GIS/LIS  (1994), 1-3, which looks at one such system implemented 
in Charlotte, North Carolina. The underlying concepts can certainly be expanded to an appropriate degree 
o f refinement, as data becomes more widely available, to encompass the national and international levels of 
analysis.
17 Although this observation holds true for any number o f available data sets, see John H. Noer, 
Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense
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Within the field of international relations, the range of potential applications for 
GIS seems limited only by the imagination, despite the current lack of applicable data. 
However, the aim here is merely to take a single step forward by laying the groundwork 
for future work along these lines.18 With respect to smuggling, the various obstacles 
pertaining to data availability will persist for the foreseeable future. However, keeping in 
mind the question of how to most effectively maximize the extant sources of information, 
the next section examines the concepts of access and risk introduced in Chapter I, with 
the intent of further conceptualizing the smugglers’ landscape at the national level of 
analysis.
Assessing Access and Risk: The National Level o f Analysis 
While the generic smuggling model and the constituent decision-making domains 
with regard to route selection have already been put forth, in general access and risk may 
be thought of as existing in equilibrium, with connectivity both determining and being 
determined by their interaction, in a feedback loop of sorts. To begin to assess the 
reciprocal dynamics of access and risk, which are incidentally relevant not only at the 
national but also the sub-national level of analysis, it is useful to first revisit the 
intellectual foundations of the smugglers’ landscape in a more holistic way.
University, 1996), 49, where the author emphasizes this point with respect to Southeast Asia. However, a 
similar characterization can be made for the other regions discussed in the context o f the case studies.
18 For instance, one example o f a potentially complementary methodology is the U.S. Customs’ Strategic 
Problem Solving (SPS) process, which is used to address persistent law enforcement problems. Since 
1996, more than three hundred projects have been initiated using this methodology, including an effort to 
reduce heroin smuggling via air passengers at Chicago and West Coast international airports. See William 
S. Heffelfinger, “A Snapshot of Strategic Problem Solving,” U.S. Customs Today 36, no. 5 (Januaiy 2001), 
pages not available.
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The concept the smugglers’ landscape has been used to characterize the types of 
factors that have a spatially meaningful impact on such actors’ respective operational 
environments. As noted at the outset, these environments tend to be not only highly 
complex with respect to their causal components, but also quite turbulent in their 
interdependencies.19 The resultant analytical template offers the opportunity to rise 
above traditional approaches by integrating elements from a wide range of disciplines, 
most saliently physical, economic, political and human geography. As such, these 
dimensions form the basis of discussion for the analysis of access and risk at the national 
level, though other perspectives are integrated as they arise in context.
As discussed previously, access encompasses all the potential efforts that a 
smuggling actor can take to maximize operational efficiency in moving contraband 
through a logistical network linking points of origin to final destinations, with the 
underlying motivation of profit serving as the upper bound on such activity. As noted in 
the previous section, the direct observation of smuggling actors as they carry out their 
operations can be exceedingly difficult. As such, at the national level of analysis the 
parameters of access can be delineated by reference to such factors as the existence and
19 For a theoretical foundation o f this concept outside the specific context o f smuggling, see Paul Krugman, 
“Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography,” American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (May 1994), 412-6. 
In particular, the author notes the advantages o f interdisciplinary analysis in assessing the dynamic forces 
that shape such landscapes. Other precedents for this type o f  approach include Noer’s work, as well as 
Marc D. Lax, Selected Strategic Minerals: The Impending Crisis (Lanham, MA: University Press of  
America, 1992). Incidentally, a key characteristic o f the latter study is the use o f  various strategic minerals 
such as chromium, manganese and titanium as benchmark commodities, much as this analysis relies on 
heroin. Furthermore, in addition to the physical sources o f  these minerals, Lax pays particular attention to 
political factors that could potentially lead to scarcity. While the end o f apartheid in South Africa and the 
passing o f  the Cold War era have largely superseded the more pressing aspects o f the issue, the utility o f  
the approach remains sound. For more background on this topic, with an emphasis on southern Africa, see 
Michael Shafer, “Mineral Myths,” Foreign Policy 47 (Summer 1982), 154-71; Jock A. Finlayson and 
David G. Haglund, “Whatever Happened to the Resource War?” Survival XXIX, no. 5 (September / 
October 1987), 403-15; and Koos Van Wyk and M. Anton Von Bulow, “The Debate on South Africa’s 
Strategic Minerals Revisited,” Comparative Strategy 1 (1988), 159-82.
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condition of physical infrastructure, the distribution of supply and demand for the given 
commodity, existing and projected legitimate flows of commerce, and various aspects of 
demography.
By contrast, those factors that serve to impede the efforts of smuggling actors fall 
under the heading of risk, defined as the probability that a given smuggling route will 
result in a successful transaction, with the implication that there are forces at work that 
may either intentionally or unintentionally be working to reduce that probability. As 
noted elsewhere, most often risk denotes the effectiveness of the nation-state’s response 
to smuggling activity, which tends to be most visible at the national and sub-national 
levels where the nation-state is most capable of directly exercising its various forms of 
available leverage.
From the smugglers’ perspective, the importance of risk aversion is abundantly 
clear. More sophisticated TCOs manage risk by employing a wide range of techniques, 
many of which parallel those found in the realm of legitimate commerce. These would 
include changing operational methods quickly and often, relying heavily on outsourcing, 
insisting that contractors provide collateral, paying contractors in kind rather than in cash, 
compartmentalizing operations, reducing the product’s time in transit, and assigning 
responsibility for losses.20
However, with respect to the illegal trade in drugs, the lucrative profit margins 
involved, the volume of turnover and the size of the market result in correspondingly 
higher and discrete levels of risk that may be associated with each transaction. As the 
one U.N. report notes, “entry into the industry is not cost-free, and one of the most
20 Zabludoff, 30-1.
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important costs is risk. The illicit drug industry carries a high penalty for inefficient risk 
management.”21
In terms of risk assessment, it is useful at this juncture to introduce the topic of
political risk analysis and its underlying methodologies, some of which are analogous to
the approach taken by this study. However, before moving further along there is an
important matter of terminology to be resolved, namely regarding the use of the term
“risk.” Unless otherwise noted, its usage will remain focused on the smuggler’s
perspective as initially introduced. Since the constituent elements of political risk serve
to determine the broader aspects of the playing field upon which both the smuggling actor
and the nation-state must operate, which is to say both the smugglers’ access and risk, the
distinction will be made explicit in the context of the discussion.22
Generally speaking, political risk analysis refers to a structured approach in
predicting how various types of events and policies can affect the business climate for a
given country, particularly with respect to the decision-making of investors or other
commercial entities. In terms of methodology, as David M. Raddock notes:
Many risk analysts state that they prefer a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
approach to examining the political risk for foreign businesses in a given country, 
and they may go even further and suggest that they have no explicit formula for 
the work they perform. Indeed, every country and political culture is unique, and 
sometimes these characteristics have a direct bearing on the business 
environment. Nevertheless, political risk analysis, as an art or technique, does not
21 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 129-30.
22 While not meaning to further cloud the issue, risk assessment is also an important component o f  the
nation-state’s efforts to thwart smuggling activity, often used as an extension o f  threat assessment. In 
simplest terms, while a threat may be though o f as an undesired event or outcome, risk encompasses the 
additional dimension o f consequences. Specifically highlighting this as an accepted customs function 
internationally, a recent report on best practices among customs services projected that risk assessment as a 
skill set will account for 15% of the total in demand over the next five years. World Customs Organization 
(WCO), Survey o f  Customs Reform and Modernization Trends and Best Practices (4 October 2000), Chart 
10, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics issues/customsmodemizationintegritv/surve e.htm. 
accessed 15 July 2004.
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preclude an explicit structure. If it is indeed an art, it is not a free-form art. 
General descriptions of how to do it and what questions to ask are indeed 
possible.23
For the most part, while political risk analyses are used to determine the potential 
consequences for legitimate businesses operating within specific countries, most are 
generated on the basis of subjective or historical analysis.
By way of metrics, some common components of political risk include economic 
expectations versus reality, past economic planning failures, political leadership and party 
development, quality of bureaucracy, law-and-order tradition, corruption in government, 
involvement of the military or organized religion in politics, ethnic tensions, terrorism, 
civil war, and external conflict.24 As such, the determination of levels of political risk 
may be considered akin to both an art and a science, with its own intricate methodology 
that ranges well beyond the boundaries of this discussion.
As these measures of political risk were originally formulated with respect to 
legitimate business operations, their presence or absence and degree of intensity serve to 
illustrate the potential impact on that type of economic activity. However, as described 
previously, illicit commercial enterprises incur risks that are not always inversely related 
to those encountered by their legitimate counterparts. While a subject worthy of more
23 David M. Raddock, Assessing Corporate Political Risk (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 4-5.
24 A number o f political risk methodologies are outlined in Llewellyn D. Howell, ed., The Handbook o f  
Country and Political Risk Analysis, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: The PRS Group, 1998). These variables are 
specifically set forth in the ICRG Risk Rating System, although elements o f the Coplin-O’Leary System 
are also incorporated. Moreover, according to ICRG risk components are grouped into three major 
categories, political, financial and economic, which are computed separately and used to develop a 
composite risk rating. See also Jean-Claude Cosset and Jean Roy, “The Determinants o f  Country Risk 
Ratings,” Journal o f  International Business Studies 22, no. 1 (Spring 1991), 135-43; and Llewellyn D. 
Howell and Brad Chaddick, “Models of political risk for foreign investment and trade: an assessment of 
three approaches,” Colombia Journal o f  World Business 29, no. 3 (Fall 1994), 70-91. Incidentally, while 
the term “country risk” is at times distinguished from political risk, for the purposes o f this discussion the 
two may be considered for the most part to be analogous.
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extensive study in its own right, at this juncture it is sufficient to note this distinction with 
respect to political risk factors and to highlight the most salient such differences.
For instance, where high levels of public sector corruption exist, smuggling may 
thrive while other business activity is stifled. Conversely, factors that negatively affect 
the overall level of legitimate trade that in turn serves to camouflage the illicit movement 
of goods, such as a major war, can also cause segments of the corresponding black 
market to shrink. While a full examination of this complex interaction falls beyond the 
bounds of this study, an attempt has been made to discuss such issues in the context of 
the case studies.25
Although established political risk methodologies are not directly applicable and 
thus are not strictly adhered to in the course of this analysis, a number of the underlying 
concepts have been utilized. To begin with, as most available risk ratings and related 
data sets are geared toward the national level, thus providing a common denominator and 
point of departure among potential units of analysis. However, reference to other levels 
of analysis is generated via a range of methodological approaches as seems most 
appropriate in context.
For instance, as discussed previously, smuggling actors tend to operate on a 
transnational basis, with organizational ties often arising from ethnic or other analogous 
affiliations centered on a particular region. However, by virtue of sovereignty, nation­
states’ actions tend to be relatively unrestrained below the national threshold. Though 
more rigidly circumscribed with respect to the wider international arena, in certain cases 
nation-states or supra-national actors are able to impose risk on smuggling actors. As
25 In addition to the various political risk methodologies outlined in Howell, passim, see also Raddock, 7- 
38, focusing on linkages among risk factors.
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such, despite a national focus, a full consideration of access and risk must encompass 
these levels as well.
As such, each case study begins with a consideration of the national level of 
analysis, with particular reference to the impact of physical, economic, political and 
human geography on smuggling activity centered on the country in question. This takes 
the form of a predominantly qualitative and historical analysis, supported by quantitative 
data, supporting maps and other sources of information where applicable and available.
From there, attention extends progressively outward in a series of concentric rings 
as the benchmark commodity moves further from its point of origin to its final destination 
along the path of least resistance. While access and risk shape the smugglers’ landscape 
at the national level at each point along the path of least resistance, the next section 
examines how to conceptualize, to the greatest extent possible, the dynamic nature of this 
connectivity at the transnational level of analysis.
Characterizing Connectivity: Transnational Smuggling Vectors 
In many respects, the smugglers’ landscape and its constituent transactions can be 
considered analogous to a vast circuit board across which an energy source supplies the 
current. While the smuggling actor parallels the energy source and the components of the 
circuit board can be seen as corresponding to the national level of analysis, connectivity 
at the transnational level is comparable to the current itself. As initially discussed in 
Chapter I, a primary assumption of this study is that smuggling activity tends to follow 
the path of least resistance in pursuit of profit. While the previous section centered on the 
aspect of resistance and how it is overcome, as determined by the interaction between
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access and risk, connectivity as a decision-making domain revolves around the route 
itself and its attractiveness from the smugglers’ perspective.
To develop this concept more fully, this section introduces the convention of the 
smuggling vector to illustrate various aspects of connectivity, particular in the context of 
trend analysis. By analyzing sets of both observed and expected smuggling vectors, 
certain patterns emerge whereby the approach outlined in this study may itself be 
assessed in terms of its capacity to identify the divergences between theory and reality.
In turn, these deviations from what may be considered the norm can be used to refine the 
model and gain deeper insight into the behavior of smuggling actors as they respond to 
changes in their operational landscape.
Given the difficulties inherent in assessing black market activity, and with an 
overriding desire to rely on solid empiricism as far as possible, the development of the 
smuggling vector concept logically enough builds upon prior related efforts. By way of 
precedent, beyond the specific context of smuggling counterfactual approaches to 
transportation economics have been employed in the past.26 Similarly, the work of both 
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (ICCSS), focusing 
on maritime facilities as nodes for a wide range of criminal activity, and the parallel 
initiative undertaken by the state of Florida in a recent security study of its own seaports 
have utilized relevant methodologies with respect to threat assessment.27
26 For an application o f this concept in dealing with legitimate trade patterns, see Noer, 95-7.
27 In addition to smuggling, the ICCSS report also addresses terrorism, cargo crime and a wide range o f  
other security issues. U.S. ICCSS, Report (Fall 2000), 85-7, 92-6, 106. See also Florida, Executive Office 
o f the Governor / Camber Corporation, Florida Seaport Security Assessment Final Report (Tallahassee, 
FL: Florida State University, Office o f  Special Projects, September 2000), with particular emphasis on the 
threat assessment section.
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In simplest terms, each smuggling vector geographically represents a discrete 
smuggling transaction. As such, it can be spatially depicted as a single iteration in which 
an illicit commodity, of a certain type and volume, moves under the guidance of a 
distributor along a specific route from point of origin to final destination. As noted at the 
outset of this study, from the smugglers’ perspective a given route’s attractiveness vis-a- 
vis alternatives lies in the perception that its use will result in the greatest probability of a 
successful transaction.
As such, the notional set of all possible transnational smuggling vectors for a 
given commodity in theory contains every route and method by which that type of 
contraband can and does move across international borders. Furthermore, in spatial terms 
the total flow of an illicit commodity for a particular geographic area can be expressed as 
the sum of all smuggling vectors that cross though that area. In the context of this study, 
the selection of case studies serves to progressively narrow the set of possible smuggling 
vectors from one containing all avenues of approach at the national level of analysis 
down to its constituent expected and observed subsets. Specifically, this is done by 
tracing such activity outward from the target country through the surrounding region and 
beyond.
The commodity, the distributor and the path form the three basic smuggling 
vector components. Of these, the commodity has been standardized via the selection of a 
benchmark commodity, in this case heroin, to facilitate the analysis. Having set the type 
of contraband, however, there are also questions relating to the amount of each shipment 
and total volume of trade. Other important considerations are the percentage of the 
commodity that is diverted along the way between the contraband source and its final
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destination, where along the route the diversion takes place, and for what reason the 
contraband is diverted, as outlined in the cornstalk diagram in the previous chapter.
These issues are addressed in the context of each case study, in as much detail as possible 
given the relative paucity of data.
Similarly, the distributor in each case is dealt with in much the same way, by 
direct observation when feasible but otherwise by inference. In the broadest sense as 
well as in transactional terms, this component relates to the owner or primary controller 
of the commodity in question. As discussed previously, as a category these smuggling 
actors encompass a wide range of criminal elements spanning from the highly 
sophisticated to the relatively limited.
With respect to heroin, given the level of coordination involved and the 
prominence of high value shipments of contraband, as noted previously in this 
conceptualization the average distributor will most likely be skewed toward the more 
organized end of this continuum, primarily TCOs. For instance, the use of such risk- 
avoidance measures as bribery, corruption and intimidation to facilitate smuggling imply 
both organized behavior and a relatively higher profile for such activity. However, 
lower-level functionaries such as mules should not necessarily be considered as part of 
the distributor component, as relatively little decision-making authority resides there. 
Often these can be seen in functional terms as mechanisms of transportation or 
intermodal transition, and as such more properly falls within the realm of the route 
component.
As the focus of study, however, assessment of the path itself receives the most 
extensive attention. To begin with, the building blocks of each path are legs and nodes.
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In turn, each path can have multiple legs, with each leg in turn having its own associated 
path segment, mode of transportation and handling method. Nodes form the transitions 
between each leg, most often where the contraband crosses national borders or otherwise 
changes jurisdictions, transport systems or custody. Both legs and nodes also have a 
certain set of individuals involved as well, either directly or indirectly, particularly with 
respect to the transfer of control and responsibility for the shipment. Paralleling Figure 5 
from Chapter II, the diagram below serves to illustrate the basic premise behind the 



















(variab le in num ber)
Fig. 13. Path components (legs and nodes) of smuggling vectors
To further expand upon the elements that constitute each leg, it is necessary to 
define each more concretely. First, the path segment represents the actual geographical
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course the commodity takes along the given leg. Second, the mode of transportation 
means the physical means utilized to move the contraband, to include the associated 
infrastructure, which in turn is often characterized in terms of a network. Different types 
of networks include the aforementioned modes of land, water and air, discussed at length 
in Chapter II. Finally, the handling method involves not only the physical receptacle 
serving to house the commodity as it moves, but also any personnel involved and the 
associated measures taken to conceal or otherwise facilitate its transportation.
By contrast, nodes represent the various types of transitions that may be found 
between adjoining legs. Each may be thought of in both a notional and a concrete 
geographical sense. In general, these may be broadly categorized as either intramodal, 
those that link legs sharing the same mode of transportation, or intermodal, where the 
legs change to a new mode. Along the path of a given smuggling vector, nodes can be 
found at any number of points. These would include, but not be limited to, where an 
international border is crossed, an administrative transition such as where a checkpoint 
search or an official inspection takes place, or under other circumstance where the 
contraband changes custody or mode of transit.
Very often, nodes are situated at points along the existing physical infrastructure 
network. As such, facilities such as seaports and airports may be considered as both the 
terrain and as a functional entity in its own right, with cargo, passengers, vessels and 
personnel associated with logistical processes constituting the main types of “moving 
parts” in any given scenario, generically outlined in Chapter II.28 Moreover, variables
28 At a given facility, there are a number o f security factors that play a role in determining the smugglers’ 
risk. In terms o f physical security, a fenced perimeter, high mast lighting and the presence o f non-intrusive 
inspection technology serve to raise security posture tremendously. Other procedural deterrents include a
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such as topography, intermodal connectivity, public policy and other relevant on-site 
economic activities may also play definite roles in determining nodal placement and 
characteristics.
Finally, as noted above, each leg and node has its own associated human element. 
In most cases, the legs will have some sort of courier exercising authority over the 
contraband, usually either a crew member or passenger in the commercial context, or an 
analogous arrangement where a private conveyance is involved. The alternative to such a 
scenario would be where a totally unwitting courier is utilized. There may also be some 
sort of facilitator at each stage as well, such as a corrupt official or a member of an 
internal conspiracy that can bring any combination of access, authority and specialized 
knowledge to bear. Moreover, the role of the facilitator becomes more crucial in the 
nodes than the legs, which generally represent goods in transit. At any node, the courier 
may either change or remain constant.
One additional benefit of constructing a smuggling vector in this manner is that it 
allows for the examination of the various efforts a nation-state can undertake to deter, 
deny, disrupt, delay, detect, or interdict contraband along each leg and at each node, 
functionally increase resistance along a given path from the smugglers’ perspective. For 
the nation-state, in theory this approach can also provide a systematic framework for 
evaluating the consequences of and relative effectiveness among different procedural and
visible law enforcement presence, coordinated interagency security efforts, effective cargo tracking 
capabilities and criminal background checks. However, smugglers may circumvent all o f  these factors if  
operational guidelines are only established in theory but not in practice. In turn, a number o f factors that 
facilitate smuggling activity can be found where these deterrents are lacking. These include easy access to 
manifest data or related information, ineffective or non-existent physical access controls, a high cargo 
volume that overwhelms monitoring capabilities, and extended idle periods for vehicles, vessels and 
aircraft. While a number o f transportation industry standards exist, one o f the most comprehensive 
available publicly can be found in U.S. DOT, National Science and Technology Council, Office o f Science 
and Technology Policy, Intermodal Cargo Transportation.
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physical countermeasures. Furthermore, as an analytical tool in the hands of law 
enforcement entities, looking at the issue from the smugglers’ perspective can help to 
more astutely assess the ramifications of observed smuggling vectors activity and 
anticipate potential smuggling vectors, and then strategize accordingly.
As outlined in the previous section, determining connectivity with respect to a 
given country is predicated upon an understanding of specific conditions pertaining to the 
national level of analysis. By delineating the relevant sets of smuggling vectors, from the 
smugglers’ perspective the paths of least resistance can be rendered with respect to the 
relative attractiveness of different routes via a notional cost-benefit analysis. In practice, 
this takes the form of trend analysis, comparing the set of potential smuggling vectors 
that may exist within a given area with the set that can be observed or is otherwise known 
to exist. However, in generating the potential set of smuggling vectors the key lies in 
assessing the plausibility of each option in terms of access and risk.
For instance, while the space-based movement of contraband is currently 
unavailable to smuggling actors as a mode of transit, this implausibility may be linked 
directly to the generic smuggling mode in that the access does not exist under present 
conditions and thus the option may not be seen as viable. However, it should be noted 
that until recently the use of drug smuggling submarines, as noted in Chapter III, was 
hardly considered feasible by most observers until reports to the contrary indicated that 
the method was being actively pursued and had in fact neared fruition.
As smuggling vectors dart across the complex landscape of access and risk, there 
will only be a relatively small number that are observed, while the remainder can only be 
guessed at with varying degrees of accuracy. Some, the most successful from the
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smugglers’ point of view, will not be detected at all. A “typical” smuggling vector thus 
constitutes only the nominal point of departure and perhaps the final destination. 
However, in truth it must be acknowledged that there is no such thing; each has its own 
set of individual characteristics in terms of space, time and method. While all smuggling 
vectors are in fact unique, and should be treated as such, the aim of each case study is to 
establish commonalities among them, specifically with respect to the benchmark 
commodity within the area in question.
It should be kept in mind at all times that in terms of the spatial dynamics 
involved, profit serves as the primary motivation within the context of this 
conceptualization, as it is a fact that value is a function of both space and time. The 
following three case studies, focusing on manifestations of the global heroin trade in 
Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria, respectively, serve to illustrate many of the more 
prominent aspects of smuggling discussed thus far.
In addition to being one of the two primary sources of opium Afghanistan also 
presents a range of features that appear to facilitate smuggling, such as porous borders, 
relatively remote terrain, endemic civil war and a high degree of ethnic diversity. 
Although many of these characteristics can also be found in Burma, these themes are 
much more pronounced in the case of Afghanistan. Furthermore, recent events have led 
to an immense transition that is sure to have a most salient impact on the smuggling 
landscape throughout the Golden Crescent and beyond.
For its part, Colombia has seen a recent trend toward the growth of domestic 
poppy cultivation, largely in an attempt on the part of TCOs at product diversification 
vis-a-vis their more longstanding market dominance in cocaine. As noted above, an
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endemic civil war and relatively remote terrain are also extant factors. However, in 
contrast to Afghanistan, Colombian drug traffickers exhibit not only a much higher 
degree of both horizontal and vertical integration, but also cater primarily to a single 
major market, namely North America. As such, the utility of Colombia as a case study 
lies not only in the similarities to Afghanistan but also in its differences.
Finally, Nigeria in some respects represents a departure from both of the 
aforementioned cases, in that heroin smuggling patterns do not appear to be determined 
by geographic location, but almost in spite of it. While not itself an opium producer of 
note, Nigeria nonetheless has emerged as a major transshipment hub for heroin.
Moreover, the roles of endemic corruption, immigration and ethno-linguistic ties in 
facilitating transnational trafficking activity are also very pronounced in this context. In 
particular, the spatial dispersion of Nigerian TCOs, often ranging far beyond Nigeria’s 
borders, and the application of strategies that serve to undercut competition, such as the 
use of relatively expendable couriers, is also addressed.
In terms of format, each case study begins with an assessment of the smugglers’ 
landscape at the national level of analysis. In particular, attention is paid to conditions of 
terrain, tradition and domestic turmoil, as well as the historic role of the heroin trade and 
related criminal activity within the country. This also includes the various modes and 
methods by which heroin can theoretically cross the target country’s borders, in an 
attempt to measure their relative porosity.
The analysis then moves on to examine the set of observed and potential 
smuggling vectors that move through the target country into adjacent regions.
Subsequent linkages to primary markets are also discussed in terms of the integration
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between selected countries and regions into the global heroin trade to form a seamless 
whole. At each stage, the roles of access and risk, as well as the resultant connectivity, 
form the primary analytical structure in terms of the relevant physical, economic, political 
and human geography. A summary assessment of these various factors in the context of 
the underlying geographic smuggling framework concludes each case study.
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CHAPTER V 
OF TURMOIL AND THE TALIBAN:
AFGHANISTAN AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING VECTORS
This chapter examines the smugglers’ landscape of the Golden Crescent drug 
nexus region, centering on Afghanistan, with respect to the geographic analytical 
framework introduced at the outset of this study. As the pivotal nation-state in the 
regional context of heroin production, Afghanistan’s role is crucial. Along with Burma, 
as mentioned previously the country remains one of the two largest world producers of 
opium, with that commodity constituting its single largest source of national income. Its 
porous and mountainous borders with Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia are particularly 
conducive to smuggling, especially on a small-scale basis that is difficult to prevent even 
under optimal conditions. Moreover, a paucity of viable economic alternatives, decades 
of political unrest, and a tradition of transnational smuggling activity have all served to 
bolster this phenomenon.
Moving outward, heroin smuggling activity originating in Afghanistan must then 
cross international borders into the surrounding region, particularly Pakistan, Iran and the 
former Soviet Central Asian states, before moving onward to their final destinations. The 
sets of observed and expected smuggling vectors through these concentric rings of 
neighboring countries and those further out, with subsequent linkages to other regions 
and markets, are assessed in terms of their relative attractiveness. As noted previously, 
the paths of least resistance among available routes are predicated upon their physical, 
economic, political and human geographical dimensions, with their relevant spatial
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Fig. 14. Afghanistan and the surrounding region1
Heroin in Afghanistan: A Dearth o f  Options 
Recent events have brought Afghanistan to the forefront of world affairs in the 
context of terrorism. However, even before 9/11, within the international system the 
country was already of great importance in both symbolic and concrete terms. For
1 Map source: U.S. CIA, CIA WorldFactbook (Washington, DC: CIA, 2002), available at 
http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. accessed 15 July 2004.
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instance, under a Huntingtonian conceptualization of clashing civilizations, Afghanistan 
lies at the fault line of three civilizations, the Islamic, Russian Orthodox and Chinese, and 
near a fourth, the Hindu, making it a natural pivot point for systemic stability or chaos.2 
Incidentally, the idea that the country’s position, squarely in the Central or Inner Asian 
region, makes it a vital center of strategic gravity for the entire Eurasian landmass is not 
new, dating back at least to the writings of Halford J. Mackinder, Nicholas J. Spykman, 
and, more recently, Ray S. Cline.3
Following its role as a catalyst in the end of the Cold War, with the rise of the 
Taliban government Afghanistan also served for a time as a bell-weather of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Furthermore, a number of the same factors that provided a safe haven 
for al-Qae’da activity and related phenomena within Afghan borders also served to 
facilitate the production of opium and the subsequent smuggling of heroin. While not the 
only means of funding available, the enhanced liquidity provided by the drug trade meant 
that Islamic fighters could be more autonomous from local society, which in turn helped 
pave the way for imported fundamentalist tenets and facilitate the entry of foreign, mostly 
Arab, combatants.4
As such, the widening operational scope of non-state actors, often in conjunction 
with at least certain elements of national governments, is hardly surprising where the
2 This analytical framework can be found in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the 
Remaking o f  World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), passim.
3 Specifically, see Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable Publishers, 
1942; reprint, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996); Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography o f  Peace (New 
York, Harcourt Brace, 1944); and Ray S. Cline, World Pow er Assessment: A Calculus o f  Strategic Drift 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1975).
4 See Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London, UK: Pluto 
Press, 2001), 131-3, which notes the influx o f volunteers from across the Islamic regions o f the world, and 
in particular the impact o f the Saudi contingent, which included Usama bin Laden. See also Ahmed 
Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 128- 
40. As will be discussed at greater length below, many o f the governments o f the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) are particularly concerned with the spread o f this phenomenon into their territory. For a concise 
overview o f this issue, see “The crusade against the Wahhabis,” The Economist, 4 July 1998, 36-7.
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economic rewards are so great and political power is so diffused. As discussed in
Chapter II, the literature on failed states is thus particularly relevant in this context. For
instance, Goodsen calls Afghanistan “the archetype of the failed state and a perfect
example of how non-state actors move into the vacuum created when a state fails.”5
Moreover, the author continues by noting a number of factors extant within
Afghanistan that exemplify this phenomenon, several of which have a definite, if not
explicit, spatial component:
Weak states have distinctive political, social, economic, demographic and even 
geographic characteristics. Among these characteristics are limited political 
institutionalization and penetration in society, strong ethnic, linguistic, and/or 
religious divisions, and slow economic and social development. Some other 
characteristics may also be present, such as rapid population growth and/or 
resource problems, the interference of neighboring countries and/or big powers, 
and even geostrategic location.6
However, to more fully understand the roots of this failure, as well as to establish the
necessary context for later discussion, a brief overview of Afghanistan’s recent history is
in order.
Afghanistan as a modem nation-state dates only back to 1919, when the end of 
the Third Afghan War led to a cessation of previous British influence. This prior state of 
affairs was in turn part of the wider geopolitical struggle between Czarist Russia and the 
British Empire known as the “Great Game” that encompassed much of Central Asia
5 Goodsen, x. As an archetype o f the “weak state syndrome,” themes within the literature on Afghanistan 
include its traditionally inefficient and ideologically bankrupt central government unable to adequately 
distribute resources, common borders with several regional powers, a history o f superpower involvement 
and international manipulation, and the resurgence o f ethnic conflict. For an earlier perspective on this 
phenomenon, see also Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War (New York: Darwin Press, 
1995). Another very interesting analysis o f non-state actors with a state-like coercive capacity in the 
context o f civil war, using Afghanistan’s ethnically-based militias as a case study, can be found in Kristian 
Berg Harpviken, “Transcending traditionalism: the emergence o f non-state military formations in 
Afghanistan,” Journal o f  Peace Research 34, no. 3 (August 1997), 271-88.
6 Goodsen, 11-2. An solid survey o f Afghanistan’s traditional yet enduring geopolitical significance can 
also be found in Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid (New Delhi: 
HarperCollins India, 1998), 54-69.
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during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.7 Thus, upon independence the reign of 
Amanullah Khan from 1919 to 1929 was marked by attempts to modernize the county.
The subsequent reigns of Nadir Shah, from 1929 until his assassination in 1933, 
and his son Zahir Shah, culminated in Afghanistan’s first constitution and consultative 
assembly. However, a coup staged by Daud Khan, a former prime minister and first 
cousin of Zahir Shah, abolished the ruling Durrani dynasty and established the Republic 
of Afghanistan in 1973. In turn, Daud was himself overthrown and executed in April 
1978 by many of the same Marxist military officers that assisted him in his earlier bid for 
power.8
As the Marxists in turn split into factions and internal resistance to their rule 
began to mount, the Soviet Union felt the need to come to the aid of its “progressive” 
neighbor and thus sent troops into Afghanistan in September 1979. It was the advent of 
the Soviet invasion that formed the turning point in recent Afghan affairs by galvanizing 
resistance along a wide political and ethnic spectrum.9 A puppet regime was installed, 
led initially by Babarak Karmal until he was deposed by the Soviets in favor of the head 
of the secret police, Mohammed Najibullah. Though the Soviet withdrawal following a 
series of international agreements in April 1988 weakened Najibullah’s position
7 Two excellent overviews o f  the region during this period, focusing on the various Great Power 
machinations, can be found in Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle fo r Empire in Central Asia 
(New York: Kodansha International, 1992); and Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament o f  
Shadows: The Great Game and the Race fo r Empire in Central Asia (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 
1999). For a synopsis o f  Afghan history up to 1919, see Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History 
(Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2001), 1-85; Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Surrey, UK: 
Curzon Press, 1995), 20-110; and Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 
Great to the Fall o f  the Taliban (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 1-219.
8 For a concise analysis o f  this train o f events, see Victor G. Korgun, “The Afghan Revolution: A Failed 
Experiment,” in Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. Dale F. 
Eichelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 101-13.
9 For an analysis o f  the mujahidin opposition in military terms, see Tanner, 243-70.
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considerably, continued material support and the failure of the various mujahidin factions 
to unite sustained his government until its final collapse in May 1992.
The ensuing series of coalition governments was marked by ongoing civil war 
among the former mujahidin leadership, notably Ahmed Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin 
Rabbani representing the Tajiks, Rashid Dostum representing the Uzbeks, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and the Hizb-i-Islami party representing the Pashtuns, and the Hizb-i-Wahat 
party representing the Hazaras.10 This state of affairs, involving unstable ruling 
coalitions and attacks centering on the capital of Kabul by those not in power, lasted until 
the rise of the Taliban movement in 1996 with the rise of the Taliban movement.11 While 
Afghanistan’s ethnic dynamics with respect to the issue of smuggling is examined at 
greater length below
Largely Pashtun in character, the Taliban’s emphasis on piety capitalized on 
Afghan war-weariness, which encouraged the movement’s spread, while external and 
illicit funding, largely from Pakistan, helped to solidify support which culminated in the 
capture of Kabul in September 1996.12 In response, many Tajik and Uzbek mujahidin
10 The dynamics o f the various mujahidin factions during the struggle against the Soviet occupation are 
examined at greater length in Shah M. Tarzi, “Politics o f the Afghan resistance movement: cleavages, 
disunity and fragmentation,” Asian Survey 31, no. 6 (June 1991), 479-95. Subsequent internal dissention is 
also discussed in Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan’s ethnic conflict,” Survival 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 114-26.
11 For more on the genesis and early successes o f the Taliban movement, see Ewans, 179-90; Griffin, 33- 
68; Rashid, Taliban, 17-54; and Tanner, 271-87. In particular, the Taliban’s ability to develop support in 
Pashtun-majority areas was crucial. As Rashid notes, “The Taliban had won over the unruly Pashtun south 
because the exhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviours and peacemakers, if  not as a potential 
force to revive Pashtun power which had been humiliated by the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Many surrenders had 
been facilitated by pure cash, bribing commanders to switch sides -  a tactic that the Taliban were to turn 
into a fine art form in later years and which was sustained by the growth of their income from the drugs 
trade, the transport business and external aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.” Rashid, Taliban, 35.
12 Goodsen, 109-10. Upon taking Kabul, one o f the first acts o f the Taliban was to forcibly extract 
Najibullah from a UN compound, where he had taken sanctuary since the fall o f his government in 1992, 
and publicly execute him. Interestingly, one of his last interviews was remarkably prescient in foretelling 
the near future o f his country: “We have a common task -  Afghanistan, the USA and the civilized world -  
to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism. If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will 
continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a centre o f world smuggling for narcotic drugs. 
Afghanistan will be turned into a centre for terrorism.” Quoted in, Griffin, 5.
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factions reconstituted into the opposition Northern Alliance, with Massoud as their most 
prominent leader, a state of affairs that lasted up until his assassination heralding the 
events of 9/11. As of this writing, the outcome of the resultant U.S.-led regime change in 
the county and the subsequent establishment of the provisional government led by Hamid 
Karzai, remains to be seen.13
It is difficult to assess the damage done to the Afghan socio-political structure due 
to its recent hardships. Decades of continuous warfare led not only to the destruction and 
incomplete replacement of prewar elites, but also to an increased role of violence in 
society that Goodsen refers to as “Kalashnikovisation.” The underlying statistics starkly 
illustrate the level of anarchy involved as the result of decades of endemic conflict.
Nearly 2 million Afghans have been killed, in addition to at least 150,000 Soviet soldiers, 
as well as between 600,000 and 2 million wounded. Furthermore, over 6 million 
Afghans have been displaced across international borders into both Iran and Pakistan, and 
another 2 million internally displaced. In other words, over 50% of the Afghan 
population has been killed, wounded or made homeless.14
Sheer human suffering aside, in the context of this discussion the most salient 
effect of this extended period of turmoil has been the rise and entrenchment of the 
transnational heroin trade. While the attempt here is to sort among the effects of the 
relevant physical, economic, political and human geography, it should be kept in mind at 
all times that none of these factors exist in a vacuum. Wherever possible these
13 As Magnus and Naby point out, however, the challenge to successive Afghan governments has been to 
develop and maintain both internal and external legitimacy. In some respects, these may often be found in 
inverse proportion, if  at all. Magnus and Naby, 161-71.
14 Goodsen, 5.
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interactions are addressed as they arise, though at times themes may be introduced in one 
context only to be developed more fully in another.
However, to set the context of the smugglers’ landscape in Afghanistan, an 
understanding of the target commodity’s spatial disposition is in order. While the 
cultivation of poppies and the subsequent processing of the raw product into heroin are 
not the focus of this study, in the case of Afghanistan it is difficult to separate these 
phenomena, and particularly their spatial aspects, from the logistics involved in moving 
the product to market.15 As such, these issues must be addressed in order to provide a 
background for subsequent analysis, especially with respect to the impact of vastly 
expanded opium production over the past three decades.
Writing from the vantage point of the mid-1970s, Lamour and Lamberti note that, 
“Afghanistan and northern Pakistan represent a source of opium as yet virtually untapped 
by European traffickers whose supplies came from Turkey until poppy cultivation was 
banned there in 1972.”16 This productive potential was soon to escalate sharply into a 
reality between 1970 and 1982, as Afghan heroin production tripled, from 100 tons to
17 • •300 tons. The catalyst for this massive expansion was the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, which set the stage for a number of events that accelerated this 
trend.
15 It should also be noted that Afghanistan, along with Pakistan, also cultivates appreciable amounts of 
cannabis. As Interpol noted in 1998, while Afghan production is greater than its Pakistani counterpart, 
Afghanistan’s lack o f a coastline means that its cannabis “is exported mainly via Pakistan, although some 
passes through Iran, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.” This routing is significant due to the parallels with the 
opium trade, as will be discussed in the next section. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 2.
16 Lamour and Lamberti, 177.
17 Chepesiuk, 28. Incidentally, the U.S. heroin addict population also rose by 25%, to 450,000 users, 
between 1971 and 1982. While it is difficult to actually prove a correlation, the timing of an explosive rise 
in both supply and demand is suggestive nonetheless.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
In response to this final major maneuver of the Cold War, the Carter 
administration started shipping arms to the mujahidin resistance, a policy that gained 
momentum under the Reagan administration. However, even at the time, some 
administration officials expressed a reluctance to support an insurgency in the midst of a 
major opium cultivation area, drawing parallels with similar previous involvement in 
Vietnam.18 In retrospective support of this view, Alfred W. McCoy notes the evidence 
showing Afghan heroin flooding the world market from 1979, much as U.S. support for 
Chinese nationalist forces in Southeast Asia helped to bolster the Burmese opium crop 
yields from the 1950s.19
However, rather than a direct involvement in the heroin trade by the U.S. 
government, a more apt characterization is that there were extensive sins of omission. As 
Booth observes, “It has been said that the CIA were not as instrumental or as actively 
involved in the Golden Crescent as they had been in the Golden Triangle, but their 
intervention certainly encouraged a considerable increase in opium production. Even 
when it was known the rebels were dealing in drugs, the CIA would not withdraw support
18 Specifically, David Musto and Joyce Lowinson, members o f President Carter’s White House Strategy 
Council on Drug Abuse, wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times outlining their concerns in this 
respect. Cited in Chepesiuk, 64. This trend was accelerated by the Reagan administration, as noted in Bob 
Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars o f  the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Pocket Books, 1987), 357-9, 425.
19 See Alfred W. McCoy, “What War on Drugs? The CIA Connection,” The Progressive (July 1991), 21-6. 
Proven instances o f  officially sanctioned involvement in the international drug trade under the auspices of  
nation-states are relatively rare. Much more common is either direct but unauthorized involvement, or a 
more indirect complicity that serves to enable drug trafficking without first-hand transactional participation. 
However, allegations o f the former phenomenon certainly do exist. Examples o f this type o f scholarship, 
often with more or less obvious ideological undercurrents, include Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics o f  
Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, 
Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 
1991). However, with respect to the Cold War era, it would be remiss not to mention the other side’s 
policies within this arena. For instance, Jordan traces strategic involvement in the global drug trade on the 
part o f the People’s Republic o f China, as well as both the Soviet Union and Cuba, to the understanding 
that support for such activity could serve to weaken its enemies from within. In the case o f China, both the 
U.S. domestic market and military personnel stationed in the Far East appear to have been targeted, 
beginning during the rule o f  Mao Tse-tung. Jordan, 62-5. See also Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Red Cocaine: 
The Drugging o f  America (Atlanta: Clarion House, 1990).
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9flfor fear of jeopardizing their political stand.” As in other instances, drugs were 
considered the lesser evil as other considerations took precedence. However, in 
functional terms it can be scarcely denied that, as Ikramul Haaq notes, “CIA intervention 
provided the political protection and logistical linkage that joined Afghanistan’s poppy
91fields, through Pakistan’s land mass, to heroin markets in Europe and America.”
For the most part, the spatial distribution of opium cultivation in Afghanistan is 
centered in the southwest, in Helmand and Kandahar provinces; the east, in Nangahar 
province; and the northeast, in certain parts of Badakshan province. However, there has 
been a dramatic spread of such production over the last twenty years. By 1999, 104 
districts in 18 out of 34 provinces reported significant poppy growing areas, while that 
number rose to 123 districts by 2000.22
The reasons for this trend include the virtual destruction of legitimate agricultural 
infrastructure such as irrigation networks, roads and factories, and the mining of 
cultivable land. As a result, subsistence farmers could neither grow enough food for their 
families, nor afford the delays involved in legitimate and relatively higher-retum crops
20 Booth, 289. Jordan, 65-8, also discusses the involvement of the U.S. government in the drug trade, 
specifically relating to Vietnam, Afghanistan and Central America, which he sees as indirect complicity 
more than direct culpability.
21 Ikramul Haaq, “The Pak-Afghan drug trade in historical perspective,” Asian Survey 36, no. 10 (October 
1996), 946. Like McCoy, the author also notes the parallels between CIA involvement in Southeast Asia, 
and the drug trafficking activity that outlasted the relevant covert operations in both instances. Going even 
further in an attempt to establish causality, John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and 
International Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 5, notes that, “Never has so much South 
Asian marijuana, opium and semi-processed opium products and heroin, reached the drug pushers, the adult 
addicts, the children and the general population o f the West, as in the late 1990s. Much o f this was another 
direct consequence o f the CIA’s holy war of 1979-89.”
22 “Afghans lead world in opium growing, UN drug chief reports,” CNN.com, 14 September 2000, 1-3; 
Christopher S. Wren, “U.N. Forsakes Effort to Curb Poppy Growth By Afghans,” New York Times (web 
edition), 17 September 2000, 2; and Haaq, 951-2. For more on the challenges o f  estimating Afghanistan’s 
opium production, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 44-5.
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such as fruit.23 The impact of other cultivation trends under the Taliban regime is 
discussed at greater length below 24
In its impact, however, this de facto opium monoculture also parallels that of 
cotton imposed by the Soviet regime throughout its Central Asian territories. The 
difference lies in the fact that in the latter case the system was implemented from above 
via a highly centralized decision-making apparatus, while in the former the imperatives 
of decentralized anarchy and limited economic alternatives were the primary stimuli.25 In 
both cases, however, the effect has been to move farmers away from traditional staple 
crops, such as wheat, as well as to stifle the emergence of greater agricultural diversity, 
and hence more economic stability. As a result, the dearth of other options leaves large 
numbers of Afghan farmers with no other alternative to opium cultivation.26
23 Goodsen, 102. Furthermore, as noted in “The gardens o f  Eden,” The Economist, 21 September 2002, 42, 
in the 1970s the export o f fruits and nuts provided 40% o f the country’s foreign exchange, while roughly 
60% of the world’s dried fruit came from Afghanistan. However, in addition to war-related damage to 
agriculture, the extensive orchards, vineyards and other crops were also severely impaired by the ongoing 
drought.
24 However, the scope o f  Afghanistan’s drug production near the end of the Taliban regime is discussed in 
U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Africa Strategic Unit, “Afghanistan Country Brief: 
Drug Situation Report,” (Washington, DC: DEA, March 2001), available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/inteEintel0901 .html. accessed 15 July 2004. See also U.S. ONDCP, “Drug 
Policy Perspectives,” 3, which links the cultivation boom dating from 1995 to a strain o f “super-poppy,” 
having both a higher potency and a greater rate o f proliferation. Interestingly, this document also estimates 
that, while Afghan opium production tripled between 1990 and 1995, from 450 MT to 1,250 MT, it 
dropped slightly in 1996 to 1,230 MT. However, there is a notation that their 1996 figure does not 
correspond with the UNDCP’s o f 2,300 MT. The stated explanation for this discrepancy is that, unlike the 
U.S. government, the UNDCP has been able to conduct actual field survey in recent years. This point 
would tend to give the U .N .’s statistics a greater credibility.
25 As such, the impact o f  supply and demand on price is readily discernible. For instance, as noted in 
“Afghanistan’s poppy politics,” The Economist, 18 September 1999, 46, the higher price o f opium in 1998, 
$60 a kilo, encouraged Afghan farmers to grow more in 1999, as reflected in a lower price, about $37 a 
kilo.
26 For instance, note the following: “Traders offer growers advances to finance inputs, and tide growers 
over while the crop is in the ground. They visit households to buy opium. This credit, or advance payment 
on future opium production is an integral part o f  livelihood strategies in poppy producing areas of 
Afghanistan. The relatively stable value o f opium and its nonperishability mean that it also serves as an 
important source o f savings and investment among traders and cultivators.” U.S Department o f State, INL, 
INCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia -  Afghanistan.”
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Moreover, despite a long history of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, “local 
processing of heroin is entirely a post-1980 phenomenon.” Up to that point, the bulk of 
this activity had taken place further downstream, primarily across the border in Pakistan. 
A number of factors precipitated this development. However, perhaps the most salient 
was the Pakistani response to dramatically increased level of domestic drug abuse and 
external pressure from organizations such as the UNDCP and the DEA in the early 
1990s, which served to push heroin labs back across the border into Afghanistan.27
To support this geographic shift, and as Afghan opium production expanded in 
absolute terms, another consequence has been a corresponding rise in local demand for 
the necessary precursor chemicals, especially acetic anhydride. For instance, several 
seizures of German and Chinese shipments moving through United Arab Emirates have 
been made in recent years, while Kazakhstan has become a major source of supply as 
well. Moreover, the large quantities of acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan seized 
in Uzbekistan during 1999 “underscore that the regional drug infrastructure operated in 
both directions.”29
As for the smugglers’ landscape itself, predicated upon an examination of its 
spatial attributes, this analysis begins with a consideration of physical geography. A 
combination of rugged topographical features, high altitudes and harsh climate, along 
with a general lack of economic development, has served not only to isolate Afghanistan 
internationally, but also to insulate its people from any efforts at centralized
27 Goodsen, 102.
28 Thomas Land, “Middle East drug traffic set to rise,” The Middle East, no. 258 (July-August 1996), 20-2.
29 U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 6.
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government.30 As put forth by Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, the country can be divided 
into eight distinctive geographic zones, ranging from mountain to desert to semi-tropical, 
further underling not only the diversity of climates but also of the peoples living in these 
areas.31
Moreover, among the three primary modes of transportation discussed in Chapter 
II, namely those of land, water and air, options for smuggling routes are for the most part 
limited to the first. As a landlocked nation, waterborne methods are very limited, except 
for a few riverine systems.32 Similarly, air transportation is highly circumscribed by 
virtue of the country’s very few venues for civil aviation, though such facilities may 
become more common with the ouster of the Taliban regime.
As such, land routes for smuggling heroin out of Afghanistan understandably 
predominate. However, there is an important distinction to be made between those land- 
based modes supported by a physical infrastructure, such as road and rail networks, and
30 See Goodsen, 13; and Haq, 946. Moreover, as Rashid observes, “For few countries in the world is it 
more true that geography determines history, politics and the nature o f a people.” Rashid, Taliban, 7. 
Magnus and Naby, 1-2, also note the country’s topography has also provided ample opportunities for 
individuals and groups to remain isolated for a range o f reasons, such as avoiding religious persecution or 
carrying out guerrilla activity.
31 See Magnus and Naby, 5-7. Specifically, these eight zones include the high-altitude Wakhan corridor in 
the northeast, extending toward China; the southern mountain valleys o f Badakhshan, Panjshir and 
Nuristan; the semitropical lowlands o f Kunar, Logar, Jalalabad and Laghman; the southeastern mountains 
of greater Paktia; the plains and foothills o f the Kandahar region; the central mountains o f Hazarajat; the 
northern plains known as Afghan Turkestan; and the western region along the Iranian border, centered on 
Herat.
32 For instance, the Amu Darya, forming part of the Afghan boundary with both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
is “a sluggish river, more suited to black market smuggling” than other commercial or cross-cultural 
activity. As such, it does not constitute a major trade artery linking any primary production centers to 
markets. See Griffin, 101. For more on the country’s various lake and river systems, generally utilized 
more for irrigation than transportation, see also Magnus and Naby, 2-4, 7-9.
33 Interestingly, several Afghan warlords contesting power with the Taliban began their own airlines in 
early 1996. Though quite limited in scope, these were useful in not only bringing in arms, but also in 
smuggling out both drugs and gems. However, the obstacles involved included the uncertain state o f both 
the planes and the pilots, a lack o f control towers, and bomb-damaged runways. See Ahmed Rashid, “Fear 
of flying,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 July 1996, 86. In particular, Dostum’s Uzbek militia was 
able to operate its own “Balkh Airlines” to move smuggled goods from Dubai into northern Afghanistan. 
Rashid, Taliban, 57.
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more informal border crossing such as those utilized by the various transnational and 
often nomadic groups in Afghanistan. Thus, understandably enough, political control of 
various sections of the international border can carry lucrative economic rewards. This 
latter set of smuggling vectors is discussed at further length below, under the headings of 
both political and human geography.
In general, the overall state of Afghanistan’s physical infrastructure may be 
considered as rudimentary at best, even before the recent decades of conflict. The 
primary national thoroughfare on the ground is the “Ring Road,” running from Torghundi 
in the northwest, south to Herat, southeast to Kandahar and north to Kabul and Mazar-i- 
Sharif, before returning to Torghundi. Major spurs extend from the main circle out from 
Mazar-i-Sharif north to Termez on the Uzbek border, and from Kabul east to Jalabad, 
continuing on to the Pakistani border via the Khyber Pass.
Moreover, few sections of this road are maintained beyond the bare minimum of 
upkeep. Highlighting the difficulty of even of intra-national travel, it was only upon 
completion of the Salang tunnel in 1964 that overland travel between Kabul and the north 
became possible during the winter season. Furthermore, except for a few miles of Soviet- 
built track to move natural gas from the Shibarghan field to the Uzbek border, there are 
no extant rail lines in the country.34 Therefore, to effectively move contraband, there is 
also a reliance on informal routes, particularly those used by the nomadic groups know
i f
collectively as kuchis.
34 Goodsen, 19-20. For more on the initial development and subsequent decline o f Afghanistan’s road and 
rail infrastructure, see also Magnus and Naby, 64-6.
35 Incidentally, the term “kuchi” appears to be a generic term for nomad, rather than a reference to a 
member o f any particular ethnic or tribal group. However, in practice its usage can be more specific in its 
denotation.
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In terms of access, the physical geography of Afghanistan seems at first glance to 
be not particularly conducive to smuggling, or even to efficient legitimate commercial 
activity, without a massive investment in upgraded infrastructure. However, the ready 
availability of large amounts of a highly lucrative and internationally traded commodity 
serves as an important economic incentive to find imaginative ways to maximize access 
and mitigate risk, thus optimizing connectivity. The manifestation of this may be found 
all along Afghanistan’s porous borders, with countless numbers of illicit transactions 
involving various commodities facilitated in large part by the various groups controlling 
the adjacent areas.
This may be seen in some ways as overcoming the concept of friction of distance, 
whereby factors beyond mere proximity serve to deter trade, as noted previously. In 
particular, the application of both political leverage and human networks serve to offset 
risk, as discussed at greater length below. However, at an even more basic level, this 
trend is even further stimulated by a lack of viable economic alternatives. Furthermore, 
many of these patterns are inextricably linked to the country’s political geography, 
predicated largely on the decentralization of power to local warlords.
Once again, the Soviet invasion of 1979 serves as a line of departure for 
subsequent developments by establishing certain precedents and entrenching other 
preexisting features of Afghanistan’s economic geography. To return once more to 
Goodsen, “The war so shattered the traditional Afghan economy that an opium-heroin 
economic sector based on drug trafficking emerged to replace it.”36 During the protracted 
conflict, the two primary funding options available were external and internal, neither of 
which was particularly beneficial to Afghan society as a whole.
36 Goodsen, 97.
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To begin with the external, Afghanistan has long been accustomed to a heavy 
reliance on outside sources of income, generally distributed with an eye more toward 
private gain than social betterment by the relevant political actors at both the national and 
local levels. During the era of Soviet control there was a drastically increased 
dependency on aid and external loans, often in return for below-market sales of natural 
gas to the U.S.S.R. Since the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, the U.N. and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provided for most relief and reconstruction 
efforts, as both the mujahidin and Taliban factions spent nearly all of their own resources
T7fighting one another.
The watershed for this trend came with the U.S.-led international response to the 
Soviet invasion, namely the provision of weapons and aid to the mujahidin resistance, 
countered by the allocation of military assets to the other side from their own sponsors. 
Numerous other parties were also involved in this practice of tunneling aid to favored 
factions, to greater and lesser degrees, in particular the Pakistanis and the Saudis. For 
instance, up to the advent of the Taliban, Hekmatyar was a primary recipient of Pakistani
Q O
largesse. The Hazaras appear to have been supported by both the Iranian and, later, the
37 In addition to freeing up factional resources for continued warfare, this aid had the untended effect of 
further stimulating the cultivation o f opium. “Between 1988 and 1992, over $1 billion had streamed into 
Afghanistan, a ‘peace dividend’ that turned aid into an industry on par with heroin and which, in the view 
o f some critics, essentially assisted its transformation into the world’s largest opium producer by funding 
the repair o f  its myriad irrigation systems.” Griffin, 166. Rashid goes even further, noting that the only 
effective NGO activity that the Taliban allowed was consciously geared toward benefiting smuggling and 
drug trafficking, such as repairing roads, setting up gasoline pumps and inviting foreign businesses to set 
up mobile telephone networks. Rashid, Taliban, 213.
38 An insider’s view o f the Pakistani government’s efforts to cope with the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan 
can be found in Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977-1988 (Karachi, 
Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1995), 318-28. Later on, while it was in power virtually all o f the 
Taliban government’s $10 million annual budget was provided by grants from Pakistan. As a more 
generalized effect o f  this phenomenon, Goodsen also notes that, “The spillover of arms from the Soviet and 
American pipelines and the profitability o f the opium-heroin industry have promoted the 
Kalashnikovization o f society in Afghanistan.” Goodsen, 101-2. See also Griffin, 202-3.
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post-Soviet Russian, governments, most notably during their struggle against the 
Taliban.39
As this weapons pipeline gained momentum, Barnett R. Rubin notes, it “provided 
ample opportunities for corruption,” including such practices as issuing false receipts, 
and then selling the difference for personal profit or funneling it into other 
entrepreneurial ventures. Continuing further, he also points out that, “The logistics 
system was ideally suited for trade in drugs: it operated under military control and 
provided a large network of trucks running loaded to the Afghan border and empty 
coming back.”40
Similarly, Ahmed Rashid also notes that the logistics of these operations were 
remarkably simple: “The donkey, camel and truck convoys which carried weapons into 
Afghanistan were coming back empty. Now they carried raw opium.”41 This trend was 
still evident through the Taliban era, where both gray and black market arms transfers to 
various combatants in Afghanistan could be observed 42 The arrangements set up under 
these auspices paved the way for a discrete set of subsequent smuggling vectors, 
particularly with respect to the Pakistani border.43
39 See Ahmed Rashid, “Playing dirty,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 November 1996, 26-8.
40 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 198. See also Goodsen, 102, and Ewans, 163-5.
41 Rashid, Taliban, 121.
42 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 14. The salient 
distinction between gray and black market arms transactions is that the former makes use o f  legitimate 
export procedures, though often using fraudulent licenses to disguise the recipient or the supplier.
43 However, predating even the Soviet invasion, the institutional cornerstone o f illicit trade across the 
Afghan-Pakistani border was the Transit Trade Agreement (TTA), initiated in 1965. This govemment-to- 
govemment agreement entitled Afghan merchants and their Pakistani partners to import unlimited amounts 
of duty-free goods through the port o f  Karachi, allegedly for domestic Afghan consumption. However, in 
practice millions o f dollars’ worth o f goods were almost immediately smuggled back into Pakistan, 
particularly after official Afghan oversight mechanisms broke down in 1992. See Griffin, 141-3; and 
Rashid, Taliban, 189-92. It should be further noted that fewer goods being smuggled in from Afghanistan 
was regarded as one among several factors serving to boost the Pakistani economy in the wake o f the 
Taliban’s ouster from power in Afghanistan. See “Bombarded,” The Economist, 17 November 2001,40-1.
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Beyond these external sources of income, the only other feasible option for 
participants in the ongoing conflict was to move toward various forms of internal self- 
funding, all based largely on opportunism. For instance, according to the Swedish 
Committee for Afghanistan, the mujahidin resource base could be divided into six 
categories. Of these, only two, official and private donations, had an external basis. 
Another two were forms of Islamic direct taxes, namely ushr, a tithe on annual 
production, and zakat, a 2.5% levy on stocks of wealth, collected with little regard to the 
wishes of the local populace, as taxation with representation was an alien concept.
The final two sources of funding demonstrate both directly and indirectly the 
challenges to normalizing an economy under conditions of anarchy. These are the 
seizure of war booty, and, speaking more directly to the crux of this analysis, indirect 
taxes on goods in transit, particularly along major trading routes and on high value 
commodities including carpets, lapis lazuli and emeralds, as well as opium.44 With 
respect to the latter, as the most lucrative cash crop available its cultivation was also 
actively encouraged, as noted above. The importance of these economic dynamics, both 
internal and external, is that they took place under the auspices of a wide range of 
political factions, with the control of territory becoming not only an end unto itself, but 
also the primary vehicle for monetary gain.
Thus, stemming from the convergence of internal and external factors, the 
underlying economic geography of Afghanistan has made the various types of black
However, subsequent tensions with India over Kashmir have underscored the many causes for concern 
noted in this article.
44 Rubin, Fragmentation, 189-90. The two external sources o f funding discussed by the Swedish 
Committee are direct aid from both Western and Arab sources, including that provided through 
international relief organizations, and donations from wealthy individuals, especially Saudis.
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market activity, including heroin smuggling, overwhelmingly pernicious.45 Furthermore, 
it is the transnational linkages of this activity that serves to make it a tangible concern 
both regionally and globally, as under conditions of autarky the situation in Afghanistan 
would most likely be of little interest to outsiders except on humanitarian or perhaps 
geopolitical grounds. With respect to any given smuggling vector, control of at least a 
section of the path is essential to make a profit, with international borders being both the 
most logical and the most lucrative pieces of real estate available. This drive to control 
territory naturally leads to the topic of political geography.
In some respects, the ensuing regional warlordism in Afghanistan over the past 
few decades resembles nothing so much as a medieval political structure with an 
admixture of automatic weapons. While it would be all too easy to catalogue the various 
factional disputes that have characterized a series of nominal governments, the focus here 
is on the continuity of purpose that allowed heroin smuggling to flourish in spite of the 
shifting sands upon which various attempts at government were built. With respect to the 
smugglers’ landscape, the reciprocal relationship between economic and political 
geography lies in the fact that the first encourages those smuggling vectors that maximize 
profit, while the second provides the aegis under which such vectors may operate without 
impediment.
45 For a more focused analysis of this linkage see also Barnett R. Rubin, “The political economy o f war and 
peace in Afghanistan,” World Development 28, no. 10 (October 2000), 1789-803. Moreover, note the 
following passage and the numerous parallels between the Southeast Asian situation, particularly in Burma, 
and that in Afghanistan: “Heroin and methamphetamine production in Southeast Asia is dominated by 
ethnic drug-trafficking armies operating mostly in Burma’s remote opium producing region. The drug 
trafficking armies had begun as insurgent groups and still claim to have an ethnic-based social and political 
agenda, but the largest have become primarily engaged in the production and trafficking o f heroin and 
methamphetamine and in other illicit and lucrative activities -  including gem smuggling and illegal logging 
and timber smuggling.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 
24. As with the average subsistence-level Afghan poppy grower, cultivation o f the crop within the Golden 
Triangle, particularly among the various impoverished hill tribes in the region, constitutes a major source of 
income.
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The career of Istamullah Muslim is illustrative of many of these dynamics.
Though initially trained by the Soviets, he had the distinction of being the first Afghan 
military officer to be imprisoned by them. His subsequent activity as the leader of the 
Achekzai tribe of Pashtuns, traditionally situated between Kandahar and the Pakistani 
border, maintained the tradition of smuggling that dated back “since at least the time of 
Elphinstone.” Though not singular, his primary motivation in response to a shifting 
political climate appears to have been to maintain military control of the key transit 
points and roads in his sector that provided a vital link to Pakistan.
As a mujahidin commander, Istamullah conducted military and smuggling 
operations in parallel, but fell out with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) in 1984 over the issues of both smuggling and his refusal to join any of 
the Pakistani-sponsored Islamic parties. As a result, he then defected to join the 
Najibullah regime and was made a general, though he later tried unsuccessfully to defect 
back to the mujahidin side.
Istamullah’s militia was finally defeated at Spin Boldak following the Soviet 
withdrawal, and he died in a Soviet hospital in 1991 from drug and alcohol 
complications.46 Though his tactical changes of allegiance may be interpreted as merely 
duplicitous, an alternative argument can be made that he was in fact true to his primary 
goal of self-aggrandizement, and opted to cooperate with any party that allowed him the 
freest hand to pursue that end.
Thus, as the generation of wealth became increasingly predicated on the control 
of territory, an even greater fervor was added to an already keen competition for power.
46 Istamullah’s career is related in Rubin, Fragmentation, 158-9. Incidentally, the Elphinstone reference is 
to Mounstuart Elphinstone, who led the first official British mission to Afghanistan in 1809.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
204
This was particularly noticeable during the scramble to fill the vacuum left by the 
departure of Soviet troops. However, it would not be at all accurate to say that factional 
tendencies in Afghan politics do not predate this period. Geographic position and a long 
history of invasions have left a distinct impact on Afghanistan’s politics.
For instance, one emergent theme in Afghan history involves the defense of 
territory, in that while Afghans generally do not hesitate to fight amongst themselves, 
they quickly unite to face any external enemy.47 Given this tradition, resistance to the 
Soviet invasion, as well as to the subsequent Najibullah regime, was perfectly 
understandable. What is most salient about the Soviet incursion is how thoroughly most 
Afghans became united in their opposition. As such, this series of events delineates a 
change in scope rather than one of character. While this pattern seems to have 
accelerated over the past several decades, it is too early to tell whether the pendulum 
toward centralization will swing back in the post-Taliban era.
As Soviet influence waned, local commanders began to enjoy more autonomy, 
with many turning the promotion of opium cultivation as discussed above. Furthermore, 
Rubin notes that these warlords were “enabled once again to levy tribute on road 
transport -  by traders, smugglers and government suppliers alike.” This points to a 
degree of local latitude largely uncontestable by either external forces or any central
47 As Tanner notes, “The Soviet invasion achieved that rarity in Afghan history: a unifying sense of  
political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines.” Tanner, 243. See also 
Magnus and Naby, 50-2. Underling Afghanistan’s long history o f invasions, Goodsen notes the impact of 
individual conquerors such as Darius the Great, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and Babur. 
He also offers the following list o f dynasties and empires that have held all or part o f present-day 
Afghanistan: Seleucid, Greco-Bactrian, Indo-Greek, Mauryan, Parthian, Saca, Yueh-Chin, Kushan, 
Sassanian, Hepthalite, Hindi-Shahi, early Muslim Arab, Abbasid, Tahirid, Samanid, Saffarid, Ilkhan Turk, 
Ghaznavid, Ghorid, Seljuk, Kwarazm Shah, Delhi sultanate, Mongol, Kart, Timurid, Shaybani Uzbek, 
Safavid and Mogul. Goodsen, 23-5. Interestingly, neither Russian nor British involvement in Afghan 
affairs is mentioned in this otherwise quite exhaustive list. Incidentally, the author also notes elsewhere 
that, as a result o f this turbulent history, “one important trait o f the Afghans has been their flexibility in 
adapting to new military technology and tactics.” In the context o f this study, this trait helped facilitate the 
adoption o f modem weapons, as they became available, by smugglers. Goodsen, 38-9.
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government. In general, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, “and especially helicopters,” 
allowed local commanders to once again seize booty and charge tolls at will. Rubin 
continues by observing that this was a return to the same type of activity such “as tribal 
warlords had done for centuries before the strengthening of the Afghan state in the 1950s, 
and as they had started to do again when that state broke down in 1978-9.” 48
During the final days of the Najibullah regime, in the resulting power vacuum 
only Hikmatyar and Massoud controlled factions both strong enough and mobile enough 
to actively contest power at the national level. In particular, Hikmatyar’s forces were 
propped up by both drug money and extensive support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 
As Rubin notes, “Hikmatyar was the only leader to exploit opium profits systematically 
as a basis for a hierarchically organized party and conventional army.”
Furthermore, anticipating a rapid Soviet withdrawal during the summer of 1988 
and a subsequent loss of revenue, Hikmatyar appears to have sent his men out to search 
for precious stones and to more actively encourage poppy cultivation. He was later to 
become intimately involved in heroin refining, in partnership with Pakistani syndicates, 
as opposed to other warlords who were for the most part content to sell raw opium at 
bazaars 49
48 Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1995), 117, 256. Supporting this observation, Rashid notes the plight o f  the trucking 
mafia operating between Kandahar and Quetta, Pakistan, subjected to more than 20 separate checkpoints 
and accompanying demand for money. As such, the advent o f the Taliban in concentrating these tolls was 
considered a welcome development. Rashid, Taliban, 22.
49 Rubin, Fragmentation, 257. Echoing some o f the themes noted above in the context o f economic 
geography, the author elsewhere notes the role o f opium in that the “sale o f a cash crop to foreign markets 
could substitute for access to external political networks. Thus, the warriors o f the Helmand valley 
developed a financial base for despotic warlordism from agricultural exports to developed capitalist 
countries.” Ibid., 226. For more on the deterioration o f relations between Massoud and Hikmatyar, see 
also Ahmed Rashid, “Warriors o f the north,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1992, 12-3; Griffin, 
21-3; and Salamat Ali and Ahmed Rashid, “Separate ways: guerrilla groups seek backing for breakaway 
states,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 September 1992, 18-9. The latter article in particular is salient 
in that it raises the issue o f the partition o f Afghanistan along ethnic Pashtun, Hazara and Tajik-Uzbek
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However, even Massoud, the mujahidin commander least identified with drug 
trafficking during the Soviet occupation, was to be co-opted by circumstances. Once in 
Kabul following the fall of the Najibullah regime, he was forced to accede to a tacit 
agreement not to interfere with the opium crop in pivotal Pashtun areas along the 
Pakistani border. These included Nangahar province, centering on the city of Jalalabad, 
and Paktia province, centering on the city of Gardez. Moreover, his primary rival, 
Hikmatyar, whose involvement was already well established, unsurprisingly joined him 
supporting this concession.50
This leads to the interesting question, to which perhaps there is no real answer, of 
whether or not any actor involved in Afghan politics would have been able to totally 
eschew a role in opium production. This is not only due to the opportunity costs in the 
form of lost revenue, but also to a fear of antagonizing the populaces of poppy growing 
areas, not the most politically expedient course of action when vying for national or even 
local power.
Furthermore, under such overwhelming systemic constraints, the very concept of 
corruption as developed in Chapter II hardly seems to apply. At no time during the post- 
Soviet period has any central government been in charge of the entire national territory of 
Afghanistan, though the Taliban came the closest, and thus no concerted effort was ever 
made to curb the drug trade. Indeed, there was very little incentive even to make the 
attempt, other than to curry external favor.51
lines. This option was seldom discussed in a conflict generally characterized by a winner-take-all attitude 
among the contestants and an international reluctance to alter any existing borders.
50 Rubin, Fragmentation, 277. With respect to Gardez, the author notes that poppies were “planted right up 
to the roadside in the spring o f 1997,” the first growing season after the Taliban seizure o f Kabul. See also 
Ewans, 154-6.
51 As an interesting aside, the Afghan government did ban opium in 1958, but as no penalties were involved 
this was routinely ignored. Booth, Opium, 252.
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With the advent of the Taliban and its early successes moving out of Kandahar 
and both west into the Helmand valley and northeast into Ghazni, their practice of 
denouncing the drug trade and burning poppy fields had the effect of “gaining some
9̂credibility in the eyes of the United States.” However, as the movement continued its 
ascent, the UNDCP appealed to its leaders to outlaw opium production under Islamic 
sharia law. The Taliban steadfastly reserved to itself the right to finally arbitrate these 
legalities.53 Furthermore, while strongly discouraging the domestic use of drugs, there is 
considerable evidence that the export of opiates was actively encouraged.54
In general, external exhortations to control the drug trade served only to highlight 
the inability of the international community to enforce its will beyond highly 
circumscribed parameters. As Goodsen notes, “Despite early Taliban claims that they 
would eradicate opium-heroin production, since early 1994 it has increased in areas they
52 Rubin, The Search for Peace, 140. Even earlier, as Griffin notes, “With the capture o f Kandahar in 
October 1992, the Taliban took command o f the southern outlet o f a smuggling empire which, since the 
withdrawal o f  Soviet forces, had expanded deep into Central Asia and beyond, opening a back door into 
Pakistan’s heavily-protected market o f  135 million people. In this prototype o f a regional trading bloc . . .  
entrepreneurs inside Afghanistan and an 18,000-strong community o f  expatriates in the port o f Karachi 
played -  and continue to play -  pivotal roles as middlemen and hauliers.” Griffin, 141. Furthermore, with 
the capture o f Helmand in January 1995, the immense poppy fields o f that province also fell under the sway 
o f the Taliban as well. During the course o f  the operation, smaller drug warlords were encouraged to 
switch sides against Ghaffar Akhunzadeh, the largest and potentially most dangerous local rival to the 
Taliban, with various promises o f future support and assurances o f a continued flow o f revenue. See 
Rashid, Taliban, 33-4.
53 “Drugs and Islamic law,” The Economist, 6 September 1997, 44. In conjunction with this urging on the 
part of the U.N., there were simultaneously stillborn attempts at crop substitution to convince the opium 
farmers to grow fruit instead. See also Ewans, 183-5, and Hannah Bloch, “The Taliban Drug Trade,” Time 
International, 13 July 1998, 33. Of particular interest, the latter article includes a photo o f  the Taliban’s tax 
collectors handing out receipts to opium farmers, and border control officials stamping papers to permit the 
export o f  these narcotics.
54 See, for instance, Ahmed Rashid, “Drug the infidels,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 May 1997, 25-6. 
An extensive documentation o f Taliban support for the opium trade can also be found in Rashid, Taliban,
117-27. Concurring with this assessment, Goodsen also notes that, despite lip service to the contrary, the 
“unprecedented leap in opium production showed that the Taliban were making no serious inroads in 
curbing the narcotics traffic.” Goodsen, 83. Moreover, with respect to the growth o f domestic heroin use in 
Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and throughout various Afghan refugee camps, a Taliban court order o f  
October 1997 decreed that all addicts should receive treatment. However, in practice the regime most often 
incarcerated drug users rather than treating them. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Southwest 
Asia -  Afghanistan.”
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control.” Their “half-hearted justifications for continued tolerance of an obviously un- 
Islamic practice” testified to the trade’s strength and influence in high government circles 
within both Afghanistan and Pakistan.55 Moreover, despite public condemnation of 
narcotics industry, “virtually all of Afghanistan’s opium poppy cultivation and morphine 
base and heroin processing laboratories are located in Taliban-controlled territory.”56
By 2000, various pressures on the Taliban government led to a renewed effort to 
attain international acceptance. Immediate pressures included renewed Northern Alliance 
activity and an ongoing regional drought that led to rising food prices and a subsequent
cn
wave of refugees. In response, though still openly supporting the Taliban regime, 
Pakistan closed its border to refugees in November 2000, citing donor fatigue. 
Furthermore, as a result of Usama bin Laden’s continued residence in Afghanistan, new 
U.N. sanctions had been applied in the wake of the October 2000 bombing of the USS 
Cole in Yemen. Ongoing international criticism of the Taliban’s treatment of women, 
part of a wider spectrum of human rights concerns, also contributed to the regime’s
co
ostracism.
55 Goodsen, 102. However, while the heroin tax remained too important to curtail, similar measures to 
stem the less lucrative hashish trade were implemented by the Taliban during this period. Further evidence 
for tacit support in the face o f rhetorical opposition lies in reports that the Taliban even distributed fertilizer 
to opium farmers in an effort to expand their tax base. See U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 3; 
and Rashid, Taliban, 124-5.
56 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20.
57 According to the World Food Programme, this drought throughout much o f the southern part o f the 
country was the worst in thirty years and persists as o f this writing. Over 3 million people were directly 
affected, with a further 8 million threatened less directly. Its projected deleterious impact on the opium 
crop may well have precipitated the Taliban’s decision to ban such cultivation for the 2000 planting season. 
Moreover, the government is alleged to have told its citizens that the cause of the drought was “their 
impiety and discontent.” See “Drier and more desperate,” The Economist, 12 August 2000, 39; and Griffin, 
246-7. Exacerbating the effect o f the drought has been the extensive deforestation o f the country in recent 
years. For instance, latest estimates o f  Afghanistan’s forest cover are 0.5%, down from 3% in 1980. It is 
projected that by 2005 all the natural woods may be gone. “Bare mountains, poor people,” The Economist, 
3 November 2001, 24.
58 For more on gender issues in Afghanistan under the Taliban, see Rashid, Taliban, 105-16.
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Reacting to these various pressures, the Taliban announced a ban on opium 
cultivation in July 2000, “in an unsuccessful attempt to gain Afghanistan’s seat at the 
U.N. and, more generally, international recognition.”59 Although Afghan opium 
production for 2000 was considerably lower than that for 1999, much of that drop may be 
attributed to the drought.60 However, it will never be known if the profits from taxing 
both the production and movement of heroin would have been too lucrative to give up, 
even had the political will truly existed, as the Taliban regime would not be in power by 
the time of the next harvest.61
Though expressing its disapproval of Afghanistan’s failure to stem its outflow of 
heroin, the United States appeared either unable or unwilling to apply appreciable 
leverage other than annual decertification, a moot point in concrete terms as unilateral aid 
was already suspended on other grounds. Some explanations for this tendency may be a 
lesser sense of domestic urgency on the heroin trade vis-a-vis the cocaine trade, and an
59 Goodsen, 84-5.
60 See Christopher S. Wren, “U.N. Forsakes Effort to Curb Poppy Growth By Afghans,” New York Times 
(web edition), 17 September 2000, 1-2, which cites U.N. figures. However, according to U.S. Department 
o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia -  Afghanistan,” between 1999 and 2000 opium cultivation in 
Afghanistan actually rose 25 percent despite the drought. Incidentally, a more positive view o f the 
Taliban’s opium ban can be found in “Afghanistan’s opium fields,” The Economist 24 February 2001, 43. 
Though conceding that the Taliban did manage to enforce their ban for the 2000 harvest, the existence of 
government opium stockpiles was also acknowledged. Furthermore, though never to be tested, the 
continuing temptation to revert to large-scale opium cultivation is recognized as well, particularly as prices 
for commodities rise in response to relative scarcity. It should also be noted that, compared to most crops 
other than wheat, opium poppies require minimal water and, moreover, its harvested resin can be stored for 
years before being processed into heroin. For more on traditional irrigation practices, as well as the 
challenging the continued use o f these systems, see also Magnus and Naby, 7-9.
61 Though not conclusive, counterfactual evidence does exist that had the Taliban opted to allow a 
resumption of opium cultivation, their strategy in terms of justification would place the blame squarely on 
outsiders. See “Journal Condemns US, Russian Role in World Narcotics Trafficking,” FBIS transcribed 
text IAP20010302000022 o f Mustafa Hamid, “The Narcotics Crisis and International Trafficking,” The 
Islamic Emirate, 1 December 2000,21-8. In addition to making the case for Afghanistan’s government as 
a moral exemplar, the author also notes the roles o f the U.S., in conjunction with its puppets the UN and 
“the well-organized Russian Mafia that is run by the decision-making Jews” in exploiting the Afghan 
opium farmer. Furthermore, parallels between oil in the Middle East and opium in Afghanistan are made, 
whereby a plan is also put forth by which opiates form the cornerstone o f Afghan economic recovery, 
expanding even further to service a burgeoning notional pharmaceutical industry within the country.
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unwillingness to further roil turbulent relations with other predominantly Islamic 
countries in the region for minimal expected returns. Despite avowed concern for issues 
such as drugs, as well as human rights considerations and in particular the treatment of 
women, it was the regime’s role in supporting international terrorism that was eventually 
to bring the full wrath of the United States’ military down on the Taliban.62
Finally, two features of Afghanistan’s human geography have been crucial in 
facilitating a favorable smugglers’ landscape. The first is the ethnic diversity and 
stratification of Afghan society, polarized even further by decades of war, as noted 
above.63 On this issue, Goodsen notes that among the centrifugal forces in Afghan 
society are deep ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal and racial cleavages, all of which “are 
reinforced by a spatial pattern of population distribution into different regions of the 
country.” Furthermore, “the social system is based on communal loyalties and emphasize 
the local over higher-order identity formulations.”64 However, it should be noted that 
Islamic identity often takes precedence over even local sentiment, as demonstrated by the 
jihad-inspired solidarity fueling the reaction to the Soviet invasion.
62 In early 2000, the ONDCP reported that, “The U.S. has little, if  any, leverage with the players involved 
in Afghanistan: It has no control over any o f the current Afghan combatants; its sway over Pakistan has 
been considerably reduced since Washington terminated all assistance to that country in 1990 as a response 
to its nuclear weapons program (i.e. the Pressler Amendment); it cannot pressure Saudi Arabia, which has 
its own sources o f money and knows it is central to the U.S’s vital interests in the Gulf; and finally, it has 
little or no influence in the regional states opposing the Taliban, namely Iran, Russia, India and the Central 
Asian States.” U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 3. The difference in the regional balance of 
power in the period o f less than a year is startling.
63 For an excellent generic analysis denoting the characteristics o f ethnically hierarchical societies, see 
Horowitz, 21-36.
64 Goodsen, 12-3. This point is further underlined in Magnus and Naby, 91-4.
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Fig. 15. Ethnolinguistic groups in Afghanistan65
The map above illustrates the spatial distribution of the country’s myriad ethno­
linguistic groups. With regard to the general ethnic make-up of Afghanistan, as Rashid 
observes, geography plays no small part:
The country is split by a north-south divide along the massive Hindu Kush 
mountain range. Although there was much intermingling of the races in the 
twentieth century, a rough division shows that to the south of the Hindu Kush live 
the majority of the Pashtuns and some Persian-speaking ethnic groups, to the 
north live the Persian and Turkic ethnic groups. The Hindu Kush itself is 
populated by the Persian-speaking Hazaras and Tajiks. In the far northeast
65 Map source: University o f Texas at Austin, Maps o f  Afghanistan (1997), available at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbrOO/video/cbr ctd/cbr ctd 53b.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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comer, the Pamir mountains, which Marco Polo called ‘the roof of the world,’ 
abut Tajikistan, China and Pakistan. The inaccessibility of the Pamirs means that 
there is little communication between the myriad of diverse and exotic ethnic 
groups who live in its high, snow-bound valleys.66
The traditional ethnic hierarchy in Afghanistan begins with the Pashtun at the apex. For
example, the former royal family hails from the Muhamadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe,
part of the Durrani confederation of Pashtuns. Along with the Durrani, the primary
contenders for power among the Pashtun have been the Ghilzai, while other important
tribes include the Afridi, Wazir, Mohmand, Mahsud, Jaji, Mangal, Zadran, Kakar,
Khatak, Orakzai and Shinwar.
Historically, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens have comprised the middle layers
of society, with the Hazaras having the “lowest status of any group in Afghanistan.”67
Interestingly enough, the Hazaras are the only major ethnic group whose traditional
territory does not overlap with international borders, and hence appear to have the least
direct involvement in transnational smuggling.68 However, numerically smaller groups
such as the largely nomadic Baluch, with ethnic ties extending into both Iran and
Pakistan, maintain a much higher profile in terms of smuggling.
66 Rashid, Taliban, 7. Moreover, the author also notes the linguistic diversity in Afghanistan that presents a 
further hurdle to effective nation-building. “Western Afghanistan was dominated by speakers o f Persian or 
Dari as the Afghan Persian dialect is known. Dari was also spoken by the Hazaras in central Afghanistan, 
who were converted to Shiism by the Persians, thereby becoming the largest Shia group in an otherwise 
Sunni territory. In the west the Tajiks, the repositors o f Persia’s ancient culture also spoke Dari. In 
northern Afghanistan the Uzbeks, Turcomans, Kyrgyz and others spoke the Turkic languages o f Central 
Asia. And in the south and east the Pashtun tribes spoke their own tongue, Pashto, a mixture o f  Indo- 
Persian languages.” Rashid, Taliban, 9-10. In many ways, these observations parallel those regarding 
Afghanistan’s eight geographic zones made by Magnus and Naby, 5-7, as discussed above.
67 Rubin, Fragmentation, 28-31. It is important to remember that, as elsewhere, ethnic labels can vary 
widely by numerous factors, including language, religion and area o f residence. Other groups within 
Afghanistan include the Qizibash, Persian-speaking Shias descended from Turkmen tribes brought in 
during the Safavid era for administrative purposes and largely continuing to be members o f the urban elite; 
the Nuristanis, relative latecomers to Sunni Islam inhabiting isolated valleys in the northeast; and the Waki 
and Kirgiz o f the Wakhan corridor extending eastward toward China. See also Ewans, 7-8; and Magnus 
and Naby, 9-17, 81-94.
68 For a more extensive study o f this ethnic group, see Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras o f  Afghanistan: 
An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1998).
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With respect to the Pashtun-dominated period of nation-state building dating from 
1919 to 1979, Rubin writes, “The structure of the old regime in Afghanistan imposed a 
pattern of ethnic stratification on the diverse and fragmented local societies. This 
stratification defined the relation of various groups to the state, although local systems of 
identity and ethnic relations differed from those defined by the state.”69 However, 
underlining the hurdles of centralized rule in such a divided society, Rubin continues by 
noting that, “It is misleading to say that the government tried to break large units into 
smaller units; among non-tribal peoples it tried to reinforce limited kinship- or residence- 
based political identities. Such a pattern is typical of a weak state attempting to retain its 
power through fragmentation.”70
The second relevant feature of Afghanistan’s human geography is the long­
standing tradition, facilitated by transnational ethnic ties, of smuggling that remains both 
alive and well in the form of informal border crossings. These same ties have operated 
much the same way for centuries, as the region has been a trading hub dating at least back 
to the heyday of the Silk Road. Historically, attempts to reign in smuggling have been 
fraught with obstacles, as demonstrated by King Amanullah’s 1919 decision that
69 Rubin, The Search for Peace, 23. For instance, in its original meaning the terms “Afghan” and 
“Pashtun” were considered interchangeable, which by extension implies that although all residents o f the 
country are legally citizens, “the term retains its ethnic meaning in popular usage” and resultant 
connotations o f exclusion. Further examples o f the historical usage and etymology o f these terms can be 
found in Ewans, 3-5. Rashid also offers evidence that the ethnic fragmentation o f Afghan society is 
continuing: “Afghans no longer call themselves Afghans, or even Pashtuns or Tajiks, but Kandaharis, 
Panjshiris, Heratis, Kabulis or Jowzjanis. Fragmentation is both horizontal and vertical and cuts across 
ethnicity to encompass a single valley or town.” Rashid, Taliban, 208. A more optimistic analysis o f  
Afghan society can be found in Magnus and Naby, 167-8. In particular, the authors note the potential for a 
“multiethnic deterrent,” based not only on internal centrifugal forces but also the large number of 
transnational groups along the country’s borders, to underpin both national and regional stability.
However, given the present polarization such a scenario does not seem likely for the foreseeable future.
70 Rubin, Fragmentation, 25. Echoing similar sentiments, Goodsen notes even more succinctly that, “The 
allegiance o f  the individual almost never goes beyond the tribal unit.” Goodsen, 14.
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“simplified customs duties and actually tried to collect them, which in turn brought him 
into conflict with border tribes who lived by smuggling.”71
Nomadic groups, including elements of the Pashtun, Baluch and Brahui, the latter 
living primarily in the southwestern desert region, are able to exploit porous borders and 
are thus ideally situated for smuggling activity. Traditionally for some nomads, as Rubin 
points out, “smuggling has been a source of more income than agriculture or 
pastoralism.” However, their seasonal migration patterns have been disrupted throughout 
history by war and other social disruptions.72 In functional terms, these cross-border 
human links serve as an integral part of the handling methods for the legs involved in the 
relevant smuggling vectors, as discussed in Chapter III. This issue is also addressed 
further in the next section.
As noted at the outset of this discussion, the confluence of physical, economic, 
political and human geography has had a salient and lasting impact on heroin smuggling 
out of Afghanistan. Having broken down these factors, it is beneficial to recombine them 
all into a single example that serves to illustrate in detail the many facets of this 
phenomenon. In this way, the difficulty of effectively dealing with these endemic and 
well-entrenched dynamics all the way from the grass roots to the international level 
become readily apparent.
In southern Afghanistan, following the Soviet withdrawal, the local warlord 
Mullah Nasim Aksudzada decreed an expansion of opium cultivation within his area of 
control, the Helmand Valley region. While a traditional crop in the mountainous north,
71 Rubin, Fragmentation, 55. Incidentally, Amadullah also wanted to build a national railroad, a plan that 
has yet to reach fruition, and tried to prevent extortion by border tribes to allow caravans to pass. However, 
he did manage to open several new roads and improve existing ones.
72 Ibid., 33.
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he not only encouraged the practice in the south, but also instituted a “salam” system, 
under which farmers are paid at the time of sowing at a lower rate than they would 
normally receive at the time of harvest. In addition to so exploiting these subsistence 
farmers, production quotas were also set. For example, in 1989, 50% of arable land was 
earmarked for opium production, with anyone not fulfilling the quota forced to pay the 
difference. Both torture and execution were used at times to enforce collection of such 
debts.
The opium produced under this system was sent primarily to the Gird-i-Jangal 
bazaar, where refinery representatives bargained on behalf of the six main refineries run 
by Hekmatyar’s Pakistani-backed Hizb-i-Islami party, in Koh-i-Sultan. Smugglers were 
then hired to transport the finished product to Baluchistan via Robat. To facilitate this 
cross-border transfer, Nasim even maintained an office in nearby Zahidan, Iran. These 
arrangements worked well enough until the summer of 1989, when local commander 
Yahya Sayyaf tried to levy taxes on Nasim’s opium passing through his territory. In 
response, Nasim conquered Yaha Sayyaf s stronghold.
For its part, the U.S. began to increase its pressure on the Pakistani ISI to cut 
Nasim’s funding. However, in the winter of 1989-1990, he showed up at the U.S. 
embassy in Islamabad and attempted to broker a deal with Ambassador Robert Oakley 
for $2 million in return for halting poppy cultivation within his area of control. While 
Nasim expected cash, the agreement actually called for development aid administered 
through the U.S. Agency for International Development. Nonetheless, in the spring of 
1990 Nasim held up his part of the bargain and proceeded to order a drastic cut in such 
activity.
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However, Nasim was assassinated in Peshawar, Pakistan, in late March of that 
same year. Not surprisingly, this incident happened to coincide with the start of the 
poppy- planting season. The killing was attributed to both rival drug cartels and the 
Hizb-i-Islami. In a final irony, the State Department informed Oakley that the deal would 
not have been honored anyway, in keeping with a policy of non-negotiation with drug 
traffickers. In this power vacuum, Nasim’s brother Ghulam Rasul later took up where his 
sibling left off. However, he has stated in interviews that he would be willing to come to 
a financial arrangement with the U.S. along similar lines as those pursued earlier.73
In the decade that followed this episode, despite the waxing and waning of 
individual fortunes, there was relatively little change, and certainly none for the better.
By early 2001, Afghanistan had already been reduced to a pre-modem level, as given the 
collapse of the formal economy “virtually no industry functioned, and the most vibrant 
economic activities were the transit trade, opium growing, heroin manufacturing and 
smuggling, and other small-scale agriculture.”74 Following the ouster of the Taliban 
regime by U.S.-led and indigenous forces in late 2001, the dawn of a new era for 
Afghanistan could be hoped for. However, numerous challenges remain in stemming the 
outward flow of heroin.
To begin with, the lack of viable economic alternatives persists, often in 
combination with continuing warlordism. For instance, Ismail Khan’s control of four 
ethnically diverse provinces in western Afghanistan along the border with Iran and 
Turkmenistan, centered in Herat and comprising approximately 20% of the national
73 Ibid., 213, 263-4.
74 Goodsen, 96. The author further notes that, as an example, in 1997 Afghanistan’s GDP was $5 billion, 
half o f which came from the transit trade with Pakistan, and exports other than narcotics limited to some 
timber and gemstones.
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population, forces aid to be funneled under his auspices rather than those of the central 
government.75 Even should the Afghan economy begin to recover, the financial 
structures simply do not exist to handle much economic development. Paradoxically,
7 (sefforts to address these issues may in turn carry their own risks.
Moreover, it appears that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for 2002 have yielded 
levels approaching those of the mid-1990s, despite earlier wishful thinking to the
77contrary. Earlier in the year, it was reported that, “While American and European 
officials have considered measures like paying Afghan opium poppy farmers to plow 
under their fields, they have concluded that continuing lawlessness and political 
instability will make significant eradication all but impossible.” Rather, a less ambitious 
strategy including the targeting of processing facilities and brokers, as well as funding for 
anti-smuggling measures in neighboring countries is more likely.
In addition to the inherent difficulty, the primary rationale for avoiding concerted 
drug control measures in Afghanistan is that any intense eradication effort could imperil
75 See “Nation Building, Or How to Handle A Warlord’s Wants,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, 28 
February 2002, A -l, A-4. The ambiguity surrounding Ismail Khan is highlighted by two profiles from the 
same source over the space o f  three weeks. In “As good as it gets,” The Economist, 3 November 2001, 24, 
Khan is called both “the West’s favorite warlord” and “a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy landscape,” 
largely on the strength o f his previous record o f relatively enlightened, though autocratic, rule in the Herat 
region. However, as noted in “Sharing power is hard to do,” The Economist, 24 November 2001, 17, 
returned to power once again in the wake o f the Taliban collapse, he “still has the air o f a chief, not a 
politician.” Furthermore, there is a concrete interest in maintaining control o f this area, as it encompasses 
an important cross-border trade conduit with Iran. In fact, when this region was first wrested from Ismail 
Khan’s control by the Taliban in September 1995, the big winners appear to have been the various 
smuggling and transport mafias that now had better access to Iranian and Central Asian markets. See 
Rashid, Taliban, 36-40, which includes a brief outline o f the city’s tumultuous history dating back to the 
time o f Genghis Khan and Tamerlane.
76 Note the following: “Civil war in Afghanistan appears to have destroyed most o f  the country’s primitive 
banking infrastructure . . .  If Afghanistan’s financial infrastructure is rebuilt according to Islamic banking 
principles, the cash-free nature o f Islamic banking could create additional vulnerabilities to money 
laundering.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
77 See “The poppies bloom again,” The Economist, 20 April 2002, 38; and “A bumper crop,” The 
Economist, 12 October 2002,42. As discussed at the outset, the latter article quotes one Afghan farmer on 
the dearth o f options outside o f opium cultivation: “All our life depends on the income from the poppy, it is 
the best cash crop. If there are alternatives we will leave poppy.”
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the stability of the government and thus hamper the ongoing military campaign against
78remnants of the Taliban and al-Qa’eda. However, as Hooman Peinani notes, “The 
Afghan drug ‘industry’ will continue as long as Afghanistan suffers from two major 
deficiencies: the absence of a strong central government, and the lack of a viable 
economy capable of generating enough revenue for the government and adequate
• 70numbers of well-paid jobs for the people.”
With the regime change in Afghanistan, the opportunity to mitigate some of the 
domestic factors involved in facilitating the heroin trade also presents itself. However, in 
and of itself this is not enough to effectively alter the wider regional smugglers’ 
landscape. In June 2002, Afghanistan and nine neighboring countries, namely 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, agreed under U.N. auspices to enhanced cooperation in combat the 
transnational drug trade.
As the press release accompanying this announcement noted, all of these 
countries are not only effected by drug smuggling and related criminal activity, but are 
also situated squarely within “the world’s largest opium-, morphine-, heroin- and 
cannabis-producing and trafficking region.”80 The next section focuses on the various
78 Tim Golden, “U.S. Braces for Rise in Opium Output,” International Herald Tribune, 2 April 2002, 3. 
However, a more optimistic tone was sounded only days later, in Charles J. Hanley, “Afghan Opium Crop 
Targeted,” USA Today, 5 April 2002, 4A. This article outlines the Afghan interim government’s promises 
to use both the carrot and the stick in eradication efforts, though offering farmers $500 per acre to destroy 
their crops seems to hold little appeal when $3,400 is the market value implies a greater potential reliance 
on the latter. Interestingly, both articles favorably note the Taliban regime’s 2000 poppy cultivation ban 
without reference to the odds, slim in this author’s opinion, that such a policy would have been adhered to 
in practice over any appreciable period o f time. This view is also echoed in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  
Drugs (2000), 45-7.
79 Hooman Peimani, “Afghan-Based International Drug-Trafficking: A Continued Threat,” Central Asia /  
Caucasus Analyst, Biweekly Briefing (8 May 2002), pages not available.
80 This pledge o f  cooperation was formally announced in U.N. Information Service, “Afghanistan, 
Neighboring Countries Join Counter-Narcotics Fight,” Press Release UNIS/NAR/753 (14 June 2002), 
available at http://www.undcp.org/press release 2002-06-14 3.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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sets of heroin smuggling vectors as they emanate outward from Afghanistan, first 
regionally and then further out toward their final destinations.
T u r k e y
I r a n
I N D I A
Fig. 16. Heroin smuggling routes out of Afghanistan81
Smuggling Vectors Out o f Afghanistan: The Crescent and Beyond 
Heroin moving across Afghanistan’s borders and into the wider region of the 
Golden Crescent can be represented by corresponding smuggling vectors radiating 
outward like the spokes of a wheel, in accordance with smugglers’ perceptions of access, 
risk and connectivity. It is the transnational complexity of these constantly evolving 
iterative patterns that lies at the heart of the demonstrable success of the relevant
89smuggling actors.
81 Map source: U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
82 As Haaq notes, “The opium and heroin flow from Afghanistan transits Pakistan, India and then Sri Lanka 
by overland air routes. Another route transits Pakistan to Hong Kong and Malaysia and then to North 
America by ship, while others transit Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon by land and then to Europe by land or sea 
through the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal, and on the key markets in Europe and 
North America.” See Haaq, 951. Taking an even wider view, Griffin echoes this sentiment by noting,
“The concentricity o f drugs, arms and smuggling rings around a single imploded state created the
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As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the countries immediately adjacent to 
Afghanistan tend to be the most affected by this phenomenon, namely Pakistan, Iran and 
the Central Asian states. As such, Afghan heroin moving across these borders constitute
oo
the three major sets of threat vectors discussed m this section. Further out, these 
smuggling vectors continue onward, particularly across Turkey, India, Russia and the 
Gulf States, before moving on to their final markets.84
However, even beyond the context of smuggling, the historic impact of 
Afghanistan’s geostrategic position linking its immediate neighbors cannot be 
underestimated. As Magnus and Naby note, “Despite changes in form of government, 
ideology, and even the configuration of ethnic groups and international boundaries, this 
role of Afghanistan as the vital link and intersection of the Asian landmass gives the land 
a significance far beyond its troubled road to political and economic development. In 
purely political terms, location puts Afghanistan on par with its neighbors.”85
conditions for the birth o f a unique, post-modern phenomenon: an illegal trading empire that defied 
customs, frontiers and laws, connected New York and Dubai with Osaka and the two Koreas but which, to 
all intents and purposes, was controlled by scarcely literate warlords living hundreds o f miles from the 
nearest bank or fax. Its capital market was the roadside money booth where, amid bundles of bills from a 
coterie o f nations, the only real currency was trust -  and the fears o f reprisal, if  it were broken.” Griffin, 
142.
83 Although Afghanistan does share a common border with China at the eastern end of the Wakhan 
Corridor, given the rugged terrain involved, the lack o f infrastructure and established Chinese access to 
Southeast Asian heroin production, this does not appear to be a significant smuggling route. As Magnus 
and Naby point out, these mountain passes are snowbound for up to nine months a year, and construction in 
this environment is daunting in the extreme. However, it should be noted that the major link between 
China and Pakistan, the Karakorum Highway, does in fact lie directly south o f  the Wakhan Corridor and 
offers a more viable vector through the area. Similarly, international air connections with Afghanistan are 
minimal, but if  further developed could offer the potential for smuggling vectors to bypass the country’s 
immediate neighbors. See Magnus and Naby, 66. However, there is some evidence that Uighur and other 
Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in China’s Xinjiang autonomous region have developed heroin smuggling 
networks with links to both the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle. OGD, World Geopolitics o f  
Drugs (2000), 62-3.
84 At this juncture, however, it is important to note that not all the heroin coming out o f Afghanistan 
actually leaves the region. For instance, the ONDCP estimated in 2000 that the region’s growing addict 
population at between 3.5 and 5 million. U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 5.
85 Magnus and Naby, 25.
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Though often seen by its neighbors as a danger, in the case of Pakistan and, to a 
lesser extent, Iran, it also represents an opportunity. The Economist recently noted, with 
respect the post-Taliban era, “As their hosts of Afghan refugees show, Pakistan and Iran
o/
have vastly more to lose from disorder in Afghanistan than do any other outsiders.” 
Similarly, the perceived threat to the Central Asian states from the Afghan export of 
Islamic fundamentalism has also become an issue, as discussed at greater length below.
However, in economic terms, “No longer merely a buffer state, Afghanistan is 
now a crossroads between states that want and need trade, as both Pakistan and Iran 
engage in a struggle for access to Central Asia’s mineral wealth and markets.”87 A 
particularly salient example of this trend can be found in the efforts of various 
governments and multinational corporations to reach an understanding with the Taliban 
government by which Afghan territory could be incorporated into competing pipeline 
proposals.88 It is thus hardly surprising that Afghanistan’s role linking Pakistan, Iran and 
the Central Asian states holds the potential for serving as a conduit for transnational
86 “Now for the equally hard part” The Economist, 17 November 2001,16. Furthermore, there is a definite 
linkage between the cross-border refugee situation and a range o f  smuggling activity, including the 
movement o f heroin, as discussed in Goodsen, 151. Interestingly, an earlier piece in The Economist noted 
that, in conjunction with the trafficking o f heroin, smuggling refugees out o f  Afghanistan had “long been 
the only profitable industry in the country.” “Afghanistan’s opium fiends,” The Economist, 24 February 
2001,43. For more on these refugees as they proceed toward other destinations, particularly in Europe, see 
also “Not my problem,” The Economist, 8 September 2001, 40-1.
87 Goodsen, 21. Ewans, 36, also links Pakistani support for the Taliban to its efforts to develop road and 
rail links to Central Asia in order to better compete with Iran. For more on Pakistani efforts to utilize 
Afghan territory to access Central Asian markets, see also Rashid, Taliban, 26-30. In particular, the author 
notes the tensions between Pakistani military and intelligence circles, various Afghan factions, and 
competing smuggling mafias on both sides o f the border. Even more broadly, Magnus and Naby, 54-5, 
note the potential for Afghanistan to once again resume the role of a regional economic link, functioning to 
the advantage o f  its inhabitants as in the long-ago heyday o f the “Silk Road.” However, this will not 
become a reality until the current political chaos and lack o f economic options can be replaced by a 
measure o f stability.
88 The issue of pipeline politics and their underlying geography, centering on the efforts o f  various 
governments and multinational corporations, is dealt with extensively in Rashid, Taliban, 143-82.
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crime as well as for economic development, though in recent years the former has been 
more common than the latter.
Among these three areas, Pakistan has arguably had the most longstanding and 
intimate relationship with Afghanistan, particularly in the context of heroin. However, 
before examining the nature of these cross-border ties, an understanding of the history 
that has shaped the two countries’ border area is a necessary precursor. Much of this is 
can be traced to the colonial influence throughout the region, the calculus of which was in 
turn driven by the fears of the British in India of Russian encroachment throughout 
Central Asia, the “Great Game” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries noted 
previously.
The most salient cartographic legacy of this era can be found in the two countries’ 
border demarcation. Specifically, the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak, signed in the midst of 
the Second British-Afghan War, in turn led to the establishment in 1893 of the Durand 
Line as an arbitrary demarcation between Afghanistan and then-British India, now 
partitioned into Pakistan and, to the south, India. In effect, this split both Pashtunistan 
and Baluchistan, lands traditionally occupied by the Pashtun and Baluch peoples, 
respectively, between nominal Afghan and British colonial rule, a border inherited by the 
successor governments on both sides that persists up to the present day.89
89 The Durand Line was drawn up by, and duly named for, Sir Mortimer Durand as a “boundary o f mutual 
convenience separating Afghanistan from India.” Furthermore, as noted above, “such arbitrary boundaries 
over sprawling tribal areas left large portions of Afghanistan’s leading ethnic groups on the wrong side of 
its borders,” particularly Pashtuns in Pakistan’s northwestern border area, and Baluchs in both Pakistan and 
Iran. Haaq, 946. Moreover, as Griffin points out, the breadth and scale o f smuggling activity across this 
border is a tribute to Afghan resourcefulness and the strength o f family ties, which had easily outlasted the 
creation, a century earlier, o f the Durand Line. Referred to, only half jokingly, as Pashtunistan’s ‘Berlin 
Wall,’ it was transformed by Afghan merchants into a vast Panama Canal, allowing commercial passage 
between divided hemispheres and the free circulation o f otherwise banned commodities and substances.” 
Griffin, 142.
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This division has led directly to decades of tension along the common border, a 
trend that accelerated with the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947.
A primary issue of contention centers on which country should legitimately control 
traditionally Pashtun tribal areas, Afghanistan or Pakistan, which has become serious 
enough at times as to lead to the total breakdown of relations, as between 1961 and 
1963.90 More recently, the desire on the part of Pakistani policy-makers to mitigate this 
political friction can often be seen in the various forms of leverage exercised via support 
for various of the warring Afghan factions, most notably those of Hekmatyar and, 
subsequently, the Taliban, as discussed in the previous section.91
On the Pakistani side of the border, the territory in question is the North-West 
Frontier Province (NWFP), divided into six tribal agencies, those of Khyber, Mohmand, 
Kurram, North and South Waziristan, and Malakand.92 As a 1997 U.S. government 
report notes, “The most significant barrier to drug control in Pakistan is that the Pakistani
90 Though data is difficult to obtain, an estimated 15% of Pakistanis are Pashtun, while, according to U.S. 
CIA, CIA World Factbook (2002), 44% of Afghans are also Pashtun. For more on the background o f this 
friction, see Arif, 298-304; and Ewans, 107-9. Furthermore, while residing in Peshawar on the Pakistani 
side o f the Khyber Pass during 1986-7, Goodsen notes that the city was, “as it had often been in the past, an 
Afghan town.” Goodsen, vii. See also Salamat Ali, “Khyber bypass,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 
June 1999, 44; and Tim Fischer, “Up the Khyber: down with super-terrorism,” Business Asia 9, no. 9 
(October 2001), 26. Interestingly, Peshawar has often served as the primary conduit for emeralds 
originating from Afghanistan’s Panishir valley, as noted in “In business again,” The Economist, 14 
September 1991, 40.
91 Rashid also notes the inherent irony o f the refusal o f the Pakistani-supported Taliban to recognize the 
Durand Line or to drop long-standing claims to parts o f Pakistan’s NWFP. This may be attributed in large 
measure to the resonance o f “Greater Pashtunistan,” within certain segments o f Afghan society and a theme 
of successive governments for decades. Rashid, Taliban, 187.
92 Interestingly, Haaq notes that during the colonial period the British did not actively encourage opium 
cultivation in what is now Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, unlike elsewhere in India, holding to 
the view that such activity could have a destabilizing effect in an already relatively chaotic area. Haaq,
947. See also Cooley, 59-60. Moreover, the case o f Malakand offers a number o f interesting parallels with 
neighboring Afghanistan. In addition to its Pashtun ethnic affinity, the local leadership o f Sufi Muhammed 
echoes many o f the religious strictures implemented under the Taliban. However, there appears to be little 
interest in exporting these tenets. In the context o f  this particular discussion, all o f these tribal areas joined 
Pakistan at a relatively late date and receiving special tax concessions as a result. Furthermore, their 
location adjacent to the border with Afghanistan allows for easy access to smuggling. See “In the shadow 
o f the Taliban,” The Economist, 8 September 2001, 68.
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government does not control the Northwest Frontier Province . . .  Local tribal groups 
were given control when the area was divided upon the British departure from the region, 
and the government is reluctant to interfere with their rule and illegal drug processing and 
trafficking activities, fearing a civil war.”
As noted in the previous section, the genesis of much of the heroin smuggling 
through Pakistan can be found in the arms pipeline arrangements used to supply the anti- 
Soviet resistance, at the time comprised of three discrete three parts, namely the CIA, the 
ISI and the various mujahidin factions.94 The control of these routes with respect to a 
wide range of goods continues to be an important issue. Evidence of this can be found in 
an earlier attempt by the Pakistani ISI to close the main smuggling route between Jalabad 
and the Pakistani border, via the Khyber Pass, that aroused a wave of protest from tribes 
living along the route. When a settlement was reached in the spring of 1991, tolls were 
again to be split between the local tribes and the Afghan mujahidin fronts operating in the 
area95 By 1995, this illegal cross-border trade was estimated at $3.5 billion.96
93 U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia,” 13. On the other hand, this 
report also notes the pressure put on successive Pakistani government by the U.S. with respect to this issue, 
as well as the mixed results. For instance, in an attempt to appear to be making progress, in 1996 an 
alleged Pakistani seizure o f 2 tons o f  opium was later shown to have been a hoax.
94 During this period most o f the heroin was shipped via cargo container through from Rawalpindi, the 
headquarters for the ISI’s Afghan unit, and to a lesser extent from Quetta. Rubin, Fragmentation, 197.
The author also relates that in 1983, the director o f ISI, General Aktar Abdul Rahman, had to remove o f the 
entire Quetta operation as a result o f its having been entirely compromised by involvement in bribery, 
gunrunning and drug smuggling. The architect o f this illegal activity was Ismatullah Muslim, whose career 
was discussed in the previous section, and this setback precipitated his defection to the Najibullah regime. 
On the Pakistani side, there was also consequently a reorganization o f  its mechanisms to funnel aid only to 
recognized and approved mujahidin parties. Rubin, Fragmentation, 158-9, 199. See also Scott and 
Marshall, 4-5, which draws parallels between the CIA’s role in the rise o f Afghan heroin with that o f Latin 
American cocaine.
95 Rubin, Fragmentation, 262.
96 Ahmed Rashid, “’’Nothing to Declare: The political void in Afghanistan has spawned as vast smuggler’s 
market that is crippling Pakistan’s economy and threatens its neighbor’s own economies,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review 150, no. 19 (11 May 1995), 58-61. The author also notes that during this period the 
Taliban drew most o f  its funding from traders grateful for open roads.
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As noted in the previous chapter, Pakistan itself has been a major producer of 
opium in the past, with the NWFP at the center of this activity.97 However, in recent 
years there has been a significant downward trend, “primarily attributable to a precipitous 
decline in Pakistani opium prices, which in turn was due mainly to Afghanistan’s 
sustained high levels of production.”98 Moreover, up to mid-1990s, most heroin 
processing took place in Pakistani territory adjacent to Afghanistan, though it has since 
moved further upstream. A combination of alternative development policies and law 
enforcement is generally credited with this diminished output.99
Even as Pakistani production was falling, however, domestic consumption 
continued to rise. For instance, in 1992, Pakistan had between 1.1 and 1.2 million addicts 
consuming approximately 55 tons of drugs while the country was producing only 18 tons. 
The underlying irony in the situation was that, since 97% of the Afghan poppy-growing 
land was under Taliban control and taxation, a regime largely supported by Pakistan was 
supplying the bulk of its addicts.100 While more recent statistics are difficult to come by,
97 Haaq links the genesis o f  Pakistani heroin production to a young official from the Pakistan Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research who traveled to the tribal areas o f the NWFP to show the local opium 
growers how to process their crops into heroin. The tribes were understandably delighted, as this increased 
their profit margin by tenfold. Haaq, 954-5.
98 U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 5. This report also notes that its estimates for Pakistan’s 1999 
opium production, 75 MT, represent a decline o f  over 50% compared to that o f 1995, 155 MT. Moreover, 
this is also “the lowest level o f Pakistani opium production since we began crop estimates in 1986.” The 
Pakistani government’s ongoing efforts have helped to support this trend, despite resistance in areas where 
opium production is deeply entrenched, primarily within the NWFP. See Salamat Ali, “Opiate o f  the 
frontier: Pakistan’s tribes find it hard to give up the poppy crop,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 
1993, 18.
99 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 47-9. For instance, in terms o f drug control, Pakistani 
officials seized 25,427 tons o f drugs along the tri-border region with Afghanistan and Iran, including 
16,320 tons o f  hashish, 7,630 tons o f opium and 1,417 tons o f heroin. However, this report also notes the 
appearance o f new poppy cultivation zones within the tribal areas o f the NWFP, specifically in Khyber and 
both North and South Waziristan.
100 Goodsen, 102. See also Rashid, Taliban, 120, 183-95.
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in 1997 the Pakistani delegate to an Interpol conference reported that Pakistan’s addict 
population had risen nearly four-fold to 4.5 million.101
In addition to a thriving domestic demand for drugs, Pakistan also exhibits a 
number of social and institutional characteristics favorable to smuggling activity. Like its 
neighbor to the north, Pakistan has significant internal ethnic cleavages that range beyond 
those discussed above in the context of the NWFP.102 Furthermore, a combination of 
poor pay for civil servants and the strong traditional role played by the Pakistani military 
in politics has served to provide the political protection that allows smugglers to operate 
without fear of arrest.
This quasi-official tolerance of drug trafficking has led in recent years to a boom 
in drug use, particularly in urban areas, as well as what has been described as overall
1OT“heroinization” of Pakistani society. The impact of this development has in turn 
increased the prevalence of drug-based corruption in Pakistani politics, by which the
101 Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 3. Moreover, as noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20, the U.N. has estimated that there are between 3.5 and 5 
million local addicts in the major source and transit countries at the crossroads o f the Southwest Asian 
heroin trade. While the majority o f these apparently reside in Pakistan, by contrast in 1980 the country 
reported virtually no such incidence o f drug abuse.
102 See, for instance, Charles H. Kennedy, “The politics o f ethnicity in Sind,” Asian Survey 31, no. 10 
(October 1991), 938-55; and Christopher O. Hurst, “Pakistan’s ethnic divide,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 19, no. 2 (April-June 1996), 179-98.
103 Haaq, 952-4. For a wider analysis o f the issue o f the Pakistani armed forces’ involvement in politics, 
see also Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ’’The Military and Politics in Pakistan,” Journal o f  Asian and African Studies 
26, no. 1-2 (January-April 1991), 27-42, which discusses the challenges faced by Benazir Bhutto following 
her 1988 election in the wake o f General Zia al-Haq’s death in office. A more recent and ongoing example 
o f this tendency in Pakistani politics can be found in General Pervez Musharraf s assumption o f power and 
efforts to maintain his rule. With respect to urban areas, as the DEA noted in 1998 most o f the Pakistani 
heroin trade is controlled from the city of Quetta by a loose consortium of three families known as the 
Quetta Alliance. Although these groups appear to be operationally independent, they often cooperate to 
establish facilities, maintain supplies, meet large orders and shield themselves from law enforcement 
authorities. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 55.
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laundering of drug profits creates immense political leverage up to the highest levels of
104government.
While the U.S. has categorized Pakistan as both a major drug producing and 
trafficking country, in the past it has often received certification only via strategic waiver. 
As discussed in Chapter III, such waivers are granted on the grounds of U.S. national 
interest due to issues peripheral to the drug trade and illustrate the relative priorities 
among policy-makers. In the case of Pakistan, its growing nuclear capability, highly 
unstable economy and, currently, its role in the ongoing war on terror for the time being 
all supercede U.S. concerns over drug control. However, military and intelligence links 
to Kashmiri insurgents, known to be involved in the illicit movement of arms and other 
supplies, can easily be used to facilitate the shipment of other types of contraband as 
well.105
In terms of heroin transit, despite the decline in opium production, trafficking 
networks involving a significant Pakistani component serve to ensure that the flow of 
heroin remains unimpeded not only into the country to meet domestic demand, but also 
across its borders and beyond. These networks, spanning the often notional boundary 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are based on long-standing transnational ethnic, tribal
104 An indicator o f how high this corruption reached can be seen in the case o f the 1982 arrest in Oslo, 
Norway, o f  Hamid Hasnain, vice-president o f  the Pakistani government-controlled Habib Bank and Zia’s 
personal banker, as related in Haaq, 957. It may be argued that many of the anti-corruption measures 
undertaken by Pakistani Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi helped to undercut his political support and thus 
pave the way for Musharaff s seizure o f  power. See Salamat Ali, “No drugs, no doubts: tough terms in 
store for election candidates,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 September 1993, 15.
105 Even before the current upsurge in tensions between Pakistan and India over the issue o f Kashmir, 
smuggling through this area was already well established. For instance, in the late 1980s reports o f a major 
drug smuggling route through Pakistan’s NWFP into Kashmir through the Karakoram Pass, and then into 
China’s Xinjiang Province and Tibet, before moving on into Nepal. Nepalese sources confirmed this route, 
noting that the drugs could easily pass across the porous Indian-Nepalese border and on to a seaport for 
shipment abroad. See Haaq, 950; and OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 50-2, which also 
discussed the activities o f  both local networks linked to Indian TCOs, and networks based on foreigners 
living in the country.
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and political affiliations that give them the capability to negotiate transactions, assemble 
drug shipments and transport these goods to wholesale buyers, frequently in cooperation 
with other networks.106 As discussed earlier, many of these links are based on Pashtun or 
Baluch ethnic ties.
A sizable number of smuggling vectors thus transit from Afghanistan into 
Pakistan using such means. By land, large quantities of opiates and hashish are 
transported through this mountainous terrain to the Makran coast or to the port of Karachi 
by four-wheel-drive vehicles or pack animals. In particular, camel caravans can avoid 
drug enforcement officials, as these animals are capable of traveling over very rugged 
terrain. Drugs are also moved through the country by road and rail to seaports concealed 
in legitimate shipments.
From the coast, drug shipments are generally either placed on small coastal craft 
for delivery to ships at anchor, or fed into the existing commercial infrastructure. In 
particular, Karachi is one of the largest and busiest ports in the region, moving high 
volumes of both containerized cargo and bulk goods internationally.107 Moreover, some
106 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 22. As Rubin notes, 
“After the Soviet withdrawal, as military pressure on the countryside eased, agriculture and trade revived, 
much o f this renewed production took the form o f opium growing, heroin refining and smuggling; these 
enterprises were organized by combines o f  mujahidin parties, Pakistani military officers, and Pakistani drug 
syndicates.” Rubin, Fragmentation, 183. Goodsen echoes this observation, writing that, “The collapse of 
Afghanistan’s formal economy has empowered many . . .  private actors, especially the drug barons and 
smugglers with Pakistani connections, because they provide most o f  Afghanistan’s tiny annual GDP.” 
Goodsen, 113. The author also provides insight into the state o f the Afghan economy at the time, as 
discussed length in the previous section: “The only significant activities in Afghanistan . .  . other than 
subsistence agriculture, are illegal or quasi-legal, at least outside o f Afghanistan -  narcotics manufacturing, 
arms trafficking, and smuggling o f  duty-free goods.” Goodsen, 96.
107 The availability o f these modes o f transit in the Pakistani context are discussed in U.S. DOJ, DEA, 
Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Affica Strategic Unit, “Pakistan: Country Brief,” DEA-02012 
(Washington, DC: DEA, March 2002), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02012/02012.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. The port o f Karchi is also discussed in U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20. Magnus and Naby, 178, further underline the 
importance o f Karachi in this capacity. The Pakistani government has also considered developing an 
alternative port at Gwadar in its Baluchistan province, but prospects for Central Asian trade must greatly 
expand in order to make such a course o f action economically viable.
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smuggling vectors can be traced out of Afghanistan into Pakistan via the NWFP, and
1 / \Q
which then re-enter Afghanistan via Badakhshan province for transit to Central Asia.
Before turning elsewhere, however, India also offers a potential outlet for heroin 
smuggling vectors crossing from Pakistani territory, even beyond the issue of contraband 
moving into Kashmir as noted above.109 Indian criminal organizations became involved 
in the trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin during the mid-1980s when the Iran-Iraq 
War disrupted traditional routes through Pakistan and Iran to Turkey. India’s well- 
developed transportation infrastructure, a long and porous coastline, and lax export 
control policies help facilitate not only drug trafficking but also the smuggling of gems 
and other contraband. Moreover, its inland container depots, designed to move goods 
from the interior to major seaports such as Mumbai (Bombay), Goa, Chennai (Madras) 
and Calcutta, all handle a large volume of international trade that can be readily 
subverted by TCOs.110
For its part, Iran’s contiguous borders with both Pakistan and Afghanistan have 
presented a number of challenges to successive regimes.111 As Haaq notes, “Prior to the 
1970s, Afghan opium production was linked to events in Iran, where opium usage . ..
thbecame a major problem in the early 20 century.” With an addict population estimated 
at over one million by the early 1950s, the Shah’s government banned poppy cultivation 
in 1955, and Afghan entrepreneurs moved in to make up the subsequent shortfall.
108 See U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia -  Pakistan,” which also notes many 
o f the same routes and methods already mentioned.
109 See U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Pakistan: Country Brief.”
110 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20-2.
111 Moreover, as noted in Magnus and Naby, 31-2, the various dynasties based in Afghanistan and Iran have 
also historically shared a number o f cultural affinities even during periods o f strife.
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In 1969, Iran modified its ban to allow limited opium production, and to make 
drugs available to government-recognized addicts via a coupon system. In spite of these 
policies, Haaq continues by pointing out that, “Afghan traffickers found the movement of 
opium into Iran relatively easy and well worth the effort, despite the death penalty if 
caught smuggling drugs and the frequent clashes with Iranian law enforcement along the 
Afghan-Iran border.”112
Lamour and Lamberti note the common regional drug trafficking pattern as of the 
early 1970s, whereby opium was first routed through Kabul, and then on to Iran for either 
domestic consumption or transshipment. In the latter case, the smaller Persian Gulf ports 
were often utilized, with Dubai specifically noted as a desirable distribution center 
primarily due to its contemporary involvement in the black market gold trade with India
and its longstanding reputation for asking few questions with regard to commercial
i ntransactions.
The fall of the Shah in 1979 initially eroded law enforcement capabilities, 
particularly with respect to deterring domestic opium cultivation. Thus, coincidentally, 
as the Iranian market for Afghan opium shrank, the invading Soviet forces also blocked 
the traditional smuggling routes into Iran.114 As the Afghan state continued to collapse
112 Haaq, 947-8. Furthermore, as noted in “Go home. Please,” The Economist, 6 April 2002, 41, Iranian 
suspicions o f  the 2.3 million Afghan refugees in the country are not limited to allegations o f involvement in 
drug smuggling, but also encompass prostitution and the more prosaic concern of stolen jobs. However, as 
noted in Cooper, 51, cross-border smuggling has traditionally been controlled by various Baluch tribes with 
members residing in both Iran and Afghanistan.
113 Lamour and Lamberti, 185-6. Interestingly, when questioned by the authors as the point where the 
opium was processed into heroin, the smuggler providing the information did not appear familiar with 
anything but raw opium. Moreover, these trafficking patterns can be very resilient over time, as can be 
seen from the following observation from late 2000: “Traffickers use historical routes to move drugs, as 
well as other contraband, from Southwest Asia through Iran to Turkey, or to Iranian Persian Gulf coast 
seaports and harbors for shipment to the Arabian Peninsula.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20.
114 This confluence o f events is noted in Haaq, 949.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
231
into civil conflict, an influx of refugees and weapons, as well as drugs, into Iran became a 
major cause for concern.115
During the Taliban era, Iran maintained a consulate in Herat despite an absence of 
diplomatic relations. However, a turning point of sorts came about in October 1999 when 
General Pervez Musharraf ousted the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan. Musharraf s 
government almost immediately tightened the border controls with Afghanistan in order 
to crack down on smuggling, resulting in an immediate rise in Afghan wheat prices and a 
devaluation of the value of the Afghan currency, the afghani.
This in turn paved the way for a thaw in relations between Afghanistan and Iran 
in late November 1999, resulting in the common border reopening for trade at Islam 
Qala, west of Herat.116 As noted in mid-2001, “The advantage for the Taliban is that Iran 
is fairly relaxed about its borders with Afghanistan, despite the UN sanctions that have 
stopped most of the Afghans’ external trade . . .  The advantage for Iran is that it can keep 
on good terms with a worrying neighbor.”117
However, with an addict population recently estimated at more than two million 
out of a population of approximately 63 million, and a heroin price in early 2001 of $.50 
per dose, it is certainly in Iran’s interest to stem the flow of cheap Afghan opiates into its 
national territory. Toward this end, Iran has stationed 30,000 troops along its border with 
Afghanistan, as well as fortifying lengths of it with trenches, concrete barriers and other 
types of fortifications.
115 Rashid, Taliban, 203-6.
116 Gooden, 83.
117 “The odd couple,” The Economist, 26 May 2001,41. This article also notes several incidents marring 
these countries’ relations, including a 4 May 2001 explosion in Herat blamed on Iran, that in turn led to an 
anti-Iranian riot, and the deaths o f eleven Iranian citizens in 1998 when the Taliban captured the city o f  
Mazar-i-Sharif. For more on Iranian efforts to reach a modus vivendi with the Taliban, to include 
cooperation with Pakistan on the issue, see also Griffin, 240-2.
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Moreover, although accounting for between 70 and 85 percent of worldwide 
seizures of drugs in recent years, Iran also reported having lost nearly 3,000 men in
1 | n
policing the border, mostly in conflict with armed smuggling gangs. From the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 up to 1997, Iran claimed 12,500 law enforcement personnel killed by 
drug traffickers.119 However, despite sustained efforts to control the drug trade across its 
borders, smuggling vectors utilizing pack animals, private automobiles, buses and
• 17(1commercial vehicles continue to be detected.
As UNDCP estimated in 1998, three-quarters of the heroin seized in Western 
Europe passed through Iran, indicating a sustained and even expanding set of smuggling
« «  •  • 191vectors transiting the country under the auspices of various organizations. However,
while crossing Iranian territory, these shipments may either be broken down into smaller 
parcels or diverted directly to the domestic market. In addition to the Iranian border with 
Afghanistan, much of this contraband comes overland from Pakistan’s Baluchistan 
province through to northwestern Iran, which is inhabited by Kurdish groups with
118 See “Drugs and decay,” The Economist, 31 March 2001,42; and “Iranian police seize nearly 2 tons o f  
drugs,” CNN.com, 16 September 2001. The latter article in particular gives several details on two specific 
seizures. In the first, 1,650 kilos o f unspecified narcotics were taken from smugglers moving their goods 
on eleven camels through the desert in Baluchistan province coming from Afghanistan. In the second, 328 
kilos o f opium and 26 kilos o f morphine were taken from the back o f a truck in the same area. Rashid, 
Taliban, 193, also notes the impact o f petroleum products smuggled from Iran through Afghanistan and on 
to Pakistani markets, using the same routes and methods as drugs, though in reverse.
119 This figure was reported by the Iranian delegate at an Interpol conference, as reported in Interpol, 
“International Drug Trafficking,” 3. A “wide-ranging operation” undertaken by the Iranian authorities in 
Baluchistan, a key conduit for the regional heroin trade, was also mentioned.
120 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC  (1998), 55.
121 “Ally against drugs,” The Economist, 4 July 1998, 41. Similarly, while noting the Iranian government’s 
sustained commitment to drug control, particularly with respect to opium poppy eradication efforts, a 
recent U.S. assessment continues to say that, “Land routes across Iran constitute the single largest conduit 
for Southwest Asian opiates en route to European markets. Entering from Afghanistan and Pakistan into 
eastern Iran, heroin, opium, and morphine are smuggled overland, usually to Turkey but also to 
Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Drugs are also smuggled by sea across the Persian Gulf.” U.S. 
Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Iran.” However, as noted in 
Chapter III, the U.S does not currently consider Iran a major drug producing or transit nation.
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• 122 extensive ties to their Turkish compatriots. Once over the border, any unrefined opium
and morphine is processed in heroin conversion laboratories there.123
Since the U.S. currently maintains no diplomatic relations with Iran, it has 
ostensibly been unable to verify claims of eradication and enforcement. However, it is no 
secret that harsh punishment is regularly meted out in Iran for drug trafficking offenses, 
with thousands having been executed since draconian anti-drug legislation was 
introduced in 1988.124 Despite a host of other outstanding areas of friction, counter­
narcotic efforts pose an important potential area for common ground in initializing U.S.- 
Iranian diplomatic contacts, should both sides reach that point in the near future. 
Furthermore, with the regime change in Afghanistan, Iran must also brace itself for even 
more drug trafficking activity across the common border.125
While traditional trafficking routes passing through Pakistan and then overland 
through Iran or by sea to heroin refineries and distribution points in Turkey, these routes 
“have been used less as traffickers have developed new routes through the FSU [former 
Soviet Union] - particularly the Central Asian states. As a result, in now appears that 
regional traffickers are trying to reap more profits for themselves and, by bypassing
122 In addition to motorized methods, both horses and mules are used to cross the mountainous 300-mile 
border with Turkey. Cooper, 52. Furthermore, as noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, 
“Africa and the Middle East -  Iran,” “Shipments o f  opiates enter Iran overland from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan by camel, donkey or truck caravans, often organized and protected by heavily-armed ethnic 
Baluch tribesmen from either side of the frontier. Once inside Iran, large shipments are either concealed 
within ordinary commercial truck cargoes or broken down into smaller sub-shipments. Foreign embassy 
observers report that Iranian interdiction efforts have disrupted smuggling convoys sufficiently to force 
smugglers to change tactics and emphasize concealment. The use o f human mules reportedly is on the 
rise.”
123 U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Pakistan: Country Brief.”
124 “Give the Devil his Due,” Time International, 13 July 1998, 20. While officially decertified for 1998, 
Iran was taken off the majors list for 1999 in December 1998.
125 See “What the Taliban banned,” The Economist, 16 March 2002, 51, which also notes that during a two- 
week period in early 2002, Iran’s security forces seized six tons o f drugs and allegedly killed ninety 
smugglers.
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refineries in Turkey, have begun to process more heroin in Afghanistan.” However, 
despite the growth of these alternatives, heroin smuggling from Pakistan and Iran into 
Turkey remains very viable as a path of least resistance.
As such, before turning north it is necessary to further trace the smuggling vectors 
crossing both Pakistan and Iran, in general moving by land into Turkey, or by sea through 
the various ports throughout the Middle East. According to Interpol statistics, during the 
late 1990s three quarters of all drug seizures and arrests in Europe involve either Turkish 
drug traffickers or narcotics smuggled through Turkey.127 As previously discussed at 
length, during the 1970s Turkey was one of the largest producers of opium. However, 
generally speaking, Turkish criminal organizations now function primarily as brokers, 
who play a “critical role in buying morphine base and heroin from producers in 
Southwest Asia and moving the drug to distribution networks in Europe and North 
America.”128
Generally speaking, drugs arrive in Turkey for transshipment to European 
markets either across the land border with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, or by sea from or via Syria and Lebanon.129 In 1998, the DEA noted three primary
126 U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 5.
127 Cited in U.S. Department o f State, INL, “INL Country Programs -  Turkey,” 19 November 1998. 
Another indicator o f the volume o f heroin moving through Turkey is the fact that seizures there accounted 
for 35% o f the global total in 1997. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1. More recently, OGD, 
World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 15, also noted that, “Turkey has become the main heroin producer for 
the European market, importing its raw material (opium and morphine base) from Afghanistan and Iran.”
128 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 21. This source also 
links the PKK to the practice o f levying taxes on traffickers moving drugs through Iranian border crossings 
and across territory it controls in southeastern Turkey. However, at present, it is unclear whether or to what 
extent the leadership o f the PKK is directly involved with these activities.
129 See Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime,” 30-1. The author also notes that routes are both flexible and 
under constant review, with back-up routes and expansion into new markets as related goals. Evidence of 
the former can be found in the development o f  alternate “Baltic” routes through Russia, while the latter is 
demonstrated by the opening o f links to both North and West Africa. For more on drug smuggling through 
the Baltic region, see also Christopher Ulrich, “Transnational Organized Crime and Law Enforcement 
Cooperation in the Baltic States,” Transnational Organized Crime3, no.2 (Summer 1997), 79-81.In
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methods of smuggling morphine base into Turkey for processing. These were by sea 
from the coasts of Pakistan and Iran into the ports of Istambul, Izmir, Samsun and 
Trabzon on merchant shipping; overland by motor vehicle from Baluchistan, Pakistan, 
and across northwest Iran into Turkey via vehicles, pack animals or human couriers; and 
from Afghanistan through the Central Asian republics, across the Caspian Sea by ferry,
1 TOand then through Georgia into Turkey.
In terms of transit, by virtue of both geography and tradition Turkey remains a 
nexus for heroin smuggling as the easternmost linchpin of the “Balkan Route,” despite 
competition from developing routes through the former Soviet Union. This long-standing 
set of smuggling vectors leading from Turkey into Western Europe have undergone 
significant evolution over time in response to both political developments and law 
enforcement efforts. For instance, in the 1970s the transport of drugs from Turkey into 
Europe began shifting from maritime to overland modes.131
More recently, during the breakup of Yugoslavia, existing smuggling routes 
shifted to alternate northern routes through Romania into Hungary, Poland and the former 
Czechoslovakia, as well as through Albania, the Caucasus and Russia into Eastern 
Europe, with the most favored final destinations being Switzerland and Germany as of
particular, the author notes that, “These shipments make their way to the Baltic States, Kaliningrad or St. 
Petersberg via two corridors: through Belarus and Russia, or through the Balkans, Belarus, Poland, and 
Ukraine. Drug shipments transit the Baltic States by land, air, sea, and rail.” For a more specific focus on 
Lithuania, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs f l 000), 115-8.
130 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 57. This report also notes the role o f ethnic Kurdish elements in 
facilitating much of this activity.
131 Lamour and Lamberti, 25. For more recent drug trafficking trends in Turkey, see also U.S. Department 
o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia -  Turkey.”
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1 30the mid-1990s. However, a 1998 Interpol report concluded that Yugoslavia had 
“apparently reopened for drug traffic.”133
As further evidence of the many permutations available to determined smugglers, 
it was reported in December 2000 that Bulgaria had become a primary point of entry for 
heroin smuggling vectors moving into European markets. This activity was facilitated by 
the high volume of trucks crossing from Turkey, up to a thousand per month in the 
busiest season, despite the fact that these conveyances are bonded and sealed in 
accordance with International Truck Route procedures.134
Turing to the Middle East, in some respects Afghan heroin smuggling vectors 
moving through this generally repressive and often tumultuous part of the world represent 
merely one type of contraband among many. As The Economist noted in 1998, “The
132 See “The Albanian connection,” The Economist, 29 October 1994; R. E. Kendell, “Drug control: 
policies and practices o f the International Criminal Police Organization,” U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, no. 1- 
001 (1992), 5; and Carter, 141-2. Characteristic o f the E.U. and the concerns o f its particular members, 
Germany offers a particularly apt example. A wide range o f drug trafficking organizations currently 
operate in Germany, including Chinese, Italian, Russian, Colombian and Japanese groups. However, there 
remains a continuing primacy o f the conduit through Turkey and the related issue o f involvement in the 
heroin trade by Turkish resident aliens. Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 95, 98-99. Drug trafficking through 
Hungary is discussed in Alan Wright, “Organized Crime in Hungary,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, 
no. 1 (Spring 1997),72-3. Similarly, for more on drug smuggling via Poland since the political changes of 
1989, see Emil W. Plywaczewski, “Organized Crime in Poland,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 3 
(Autumn 1997), 114-6. In particular, the author notes that Colombian, Turkish, Dutch, German and 
Scandinavian TCOs are all in contact with local criminal groups. For more on the Czech Republic’s role as 
a storage and distribution node for drug trafficking organization, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  
Drugs (2000), 121-4. This report specifically notes that, “Arabs, Nigerians, Asians (especially Vietnamese 
and Chinese), Latin Americans (mostly Colombians and Peruvians), Turks, Kurds, and Balkan gangs are all 
trafficking drugs in the country, either separately or in joint ventures.”
133 Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1. This report also notes that in 1997 over 80% of the heroin 
seized in Europe transited the Balkan Route.
134 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 8, which does 
not discuss the obvious issue of apparent loopholes in the applicable international standards. However, 
observing the same phenomenon, the increasing suspicion o f Turkish truck drivers throughout the region is 
noted in Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime,” 31-2. For another example o f the adaptability o f smuggling 
routes through the region, see also “The criminal crucible that is Kosovo,” The Economist, 17 February 
2001, 52. Though an estimated four to eight tons o f  heroin a month transit the Balkans, much of this 
particular activity currently avoids Kosovo since NATO troops on the ground are on the lookout for illegal 
weapons shipments. However, the province has become noted for luring large numbers o f  young women 
from Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine into sex-slavery with offers o f  fictitious jobs in Western 
Europe.
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region is a smugglers’ paradise -  not just for illicit imports like drugs or illegal 
immigrants, but for everyday household goods subject to high tariffs or stifling
I O C
regulations.” The issue of sanctions against both Iraq and, in the case of the U.S., Iran, 
have also provided lucrative incentives for smuggling by land through the Caucasus, 
Turkey, Syria and Jordan, and by sea through the Persian Gulf.136 Similarly, with respect 
to Egypt, INCSR 2001 notes that, “The transshipment of Southwest Asian heroin is made 
easier by Egypt's long uninhabited borders and by the high level of shipping which passes 
through the Suez Canal.”137
For a number of reasons, the United Arab Emirates, and Dubai in particular, have 
evolved into an important logistical node for Southwest Asian heroin on its way to both 
Europe and Africa. To begin with, the U.A.E. was one of only three countries to 
officially recognize the Taliban regime, the other two being Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
In recent years it has also emerged as a regional commercial, banking and transportation 
hub in its own right.
Specifically, the U.A.E. has an advanced maritime infrastructure including at least 
fifteen commercial seaports handling nearly five million cargo containers a year, 2.8
135 See “A goat, a rug, special price?” The Economist, 3 April 1999, 38-9. This article further notes that, 
“While “generous subsidies in some countries create irresistible opportunities for arbitrage,” the “biggest 
incentive to smuggling comes from the high import duties levied by almost all countries in the region.”
The commodities involved range from cigarettes, alcohol and pornography to goods both more exotic, such 
as artifacts and saffron, and more mundane, such as gasoline and bananas. Moreover, such activity has a 
longstanding history throughout the region. As noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International 
Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 19, “Criminal organizations with international networks centered in 
Turkey, Pakistan, India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Cyprus operate within a centuries-old 
commercial tradition o f moving contraband merchandise through the South Asia -  Middle East -  Eastern 
Mediterranean region.”
136 For more on the issue o f sanction avoidance, see Appendix A. The specific trend toward an increasing 
incidence o f  drug smuggling activity through the Persian Gulf is also discussed in “High in the Gulf,” The 
Economist, 28 February 1998, 51; and Land, 20-2.
137 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Egypt.” This report also 
notes that increased border surveillance and alternate routes through Central Asia appear to have 
diminished the incidence o f heroin trafficking through the country.
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million in Dubai alone. Moreover, 70% of these containers are in transit and thus not 
generally subject to customs scrutiny. Extensive air connections also exist, with over 60 
airlines linking Dubai with more than 150 foreign destinations. In the past, Dubai has 
also served to funnel precursor chemicals from various suppliers to destinations in both
1 38Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Finally, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, there has been considerable 
apprehension that the former Soviet republics of Central Asia would either provide an 
alternative to the traditional smuggling route for Afghan opium and heroin to Europe via
1 "30Iran and Turkey, or else become major producers themselves. There also exists the 
potential for a related dynamic to become manifest, namely the apparent correlation 
between volume of drug traffic and subsequent levels of drug abuse most notably 
demonstrated in the cases of Pakistan and Burma.140 This set of countries, comprised of 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan actually bordering Afghanistan, with
138 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 22. Griffin, 141, also 
notes that, “Dubai is the main entrepot for trans-Afghan smuggling, with 80 companies dedicated to trading 
across the Strait o f  Hormuz to the Iranian port o f Bandar Abbas. From there, it is just five days’ journey by 
road to the Pakistani border, at freight prices one-quarter o f the alternative routes.” For a more recent 
characterization o f the country, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the 
Middle East,” which notes that, “Although it is not a drug producing country, the UAE is a crossroads for 
west-east trade and is proximate to major drug-producing and transit countries, including Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iran and India. It has 700 kilometers o f coastline, is situated in a relatively affluent region, and 
has a domestic banking system that only recently (December 2000) adopted formal anti-money laundering 
regulations. These factors, combined with the country's laissez-faire attitude toward trade, make it 
vulnerable to narcotics trafficking.”
139 As Rashid notes, “Central Asia was the hardest hit by the explosion in Afghan heroin. The Russian 
mafia, with ties to Afghanistan established during the Soviet occupation, used their networks to move 
heroin through Central Asia, Russia, the Baltics and into Europe. Tajikistan and Kygyzstan developed 
important opium routes and became significant opiate producers themselves.” Rashid, Taliban, 120.
140 “After the silk came the smack,” The Economist, 28 May 1994, 33. This correlation is echoed by the 
GAO, which noted in 1997 that, “Heroin is not used in large quantities by opiate abusers in Russia and the 
Central Asian Republics. However, U.S. countemarcotics and government officials in the region believe 
that heroin abuser populations are likely to expand and create more demand for illicit drugs in these 
countries as opium, heroin, and other illicit drugs become more readily available.” U.S. GAO, “Drug 
Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia,” 8.
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Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan further out, is beset by a host of economic, political and 
social challenges endemic among both newly independent and developing nations.141
As discussed in the previous chapter, the FSU has become both a significant 
market and a viable transit alternative to the more traditional Balkan Route for Southwest 
Asian opium, heroin and hashish smuggling vectors. In addition to advantages imparted 
by sheer proximity and lax law enforcement, good east-west rail connections from 
Central Asia to Ukraine and western Russia also help explain the flow-through of Afghan 
heroin production that has fed the domestic drug market in Russia over the past five 
years.142 Furthermore a proposed road linking the Pamir Mountain region of Tajikistan 
with the Karakorum Highway, which runs from Kashgar in Chinese province of Xinjiang 
south through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, has the potential to 
facilitate the movement of contraband as well as legitimate commercial goods.143
An ONDCP assessment in early 2000 noted that, “Today the easiest exit for 
Afghan opium runs due north, through the FSU states of Central Asia. Law enforcement 
forces across the FSU republics -  particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan -  
have faced a rising tide of Afghan opium and hashish.”144 Generally speaking, the
141 For a concise overview o f these issues, as well as o f the region’s potential, see “The five young 
orphans,” The Economist, 25 October 1997,42. For a more holistic analysis o f this region, see also Firuz 
Kazemzadeh, “Central Asia’s Foreign Relations: A Historical Survey,” in The Legacy o f  History in Russia 
and the New States o f  Eurasia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 195-215; and 
Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question i f  the Post-Soviet States (New York: Longman, 1996).
142 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 12. See also Colin 
Barraclough, “Will new railway open door to Central Asia?” Insight on the News 11, no. 49 (25 December 
1995), 14-17, which discusses an Iranian plan for a new railway line linking its warm-water port o f Bandar 
Abbas on the Persian Gulf all the way to the northern border with Russia and, presumably, Russia’s 
extensive rail system.
143 See “A road to riches?” The Economist, 1 August 1998, 36.
144 Among the former Soviet Central Asian states, this report also calls Tajikistan “possibly the most 
vulnerable o f them” to narcotics trafficking. However, it is also noted in contrast to the governments of 
both Pakistan and Afghanistan, that Central Asian governments have been aggressive in confronting the 
issue, though limited by a lack o f both resources and experience. “All have cooperated closely with the US 
agencies in sharing information on international trafficking organizations, and most have made good-faith
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Central Asian countries appear increasingly willing to respond to the call for action, 
despite limited resources, in stemming the flow of Afghan heroin through the region. In 
particular, the governments of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan have publicly linked 
drug trafficking to their respective insurgencies as a source of funding. However, a 
recent U.S. government assessment singled out Tajikistan as “the major gateway for 
Afghan heroin being smuggled into Russia.”145
A further complication in the region is an ongoing and often active Russian 
involvement in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors.146 The most salient such 
instance of direct foreign intervention in recent years has been its role in the civil war in 
Tajikistan, primarily in the use of Russian troops to patrol the Tajik-Afghan border, 
numbering fifteen thousand by 1993. This conflict, revolving around the traditional 
enmity among four clans, namely the Khujent, the Kulyab, the Garm and the Pamiris,
efforts to address the legal issues o f the narcotics industry, including money laundering.” U.S. ONDCP, 
“Drug Policy Perspectives,” 3-7.
145 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 10-4. This 
observation is echoed in Stephen Franklin, “Increased Heroin Smuggling Feared, Tajikistan Dealers Await 
Fresh Crops,” Chicago Tribune (we site), 19 October 2001. See also “Inhalable exports,” The Economist, 
28 October 2000,38. The latter article also notes, “A vicious cycle o f war, economic collapse, opium 
exports and terrorism cannot be addressed by individual governments, say the politicians and experts. They 
must work together and outsiders must help too.” For more on the exponentially increasing drug abuse in 
both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, see OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 40-3. In particular, 
strategies targeting the young, such as free samples, have become more common, while the drug treatment 
infrastructure remains very limited.
146 In the context o f  security, there appears to be a dichotomy within the more activist aspects o f Russian 
foreign policy toward the region. This is between maintaining a veneer o f former imperial influence in 
Central Asia, such as demanding a say in commercial arrangements with MNCs, and grappling with the 
numerous legitimate threats emanating from the region, such as Islamic fundamentalism in the case of 
Tajikistan. Analysis o f  these issues can be found in Rajah Menon, “In the Shadow o f the Bear: Security in 
Post-Soviet Central Asia,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 149-81; and V. I. Slipchenko, 
“Russia’s Political and Military Problems in Central Asia,” European Security 6. no. 1 (Spring 1997), 114- 
24. Moreover, in geographic terms, a major issue among these countries is that, in general, they do not 
have national borders that correspond to their ethnic ones, but rather borders deemed convenient during the 
early days o f the Soviet Union. In this respect, there are many parallels with the post-colonial situation in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For more on the region during the Bolshevik era, when Lenin and Stalin established 
and solidified most o f these boundaries, see Helene Carrere D ’Encausse, The Great Challenge:
Nationalities and the Bolshevik State, 1917-1930, trans. Nancy Festinger (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1992). In the context o f  the fall o f the Soviet Union, this theme is discussed, in far greater detail, in Olivier 
Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation o f  Nations (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
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consisted primarily of a struggle “both for power in the Tajik government and for control 
of the smuggling routes used to take opium from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan to 
Russia, and from there to Europe.”147 Although by the late 1990s the situation had 
largely stabilized, the underlying issues of inter-clan power sharing and the role of
i 4o
Islamic fundamentalism spreading from Afghanistan remain.
In general, Tajikistan has good cross-border roads along the Afghan border, 
largely as the result of the country’s use as a staging area during the Soviet involvement 
in Afghanistan. During the Tajik civil war, Russian troops stationed there reportedly 
accepted bribes to facilitate the movement of Afghan heroin into Central Asia, as well as 
being directly involved themselves in drug trafficking. In one salient incident, Tajik 
officials seized 109 kilograms of opium from a Russian Border Guards helicopter.149 
Furthermore, as Olivier Roy notes, “The Pamiris succeeded in preserving their autonomy 
both de jure and de facto in Gormo-Badakshan, having reached a compromise with the 
government (actually Russian) frontier guards. Their territory became a prime location 
for the transit of drugs coming from Afghanistan to Osh in Kyrgystan.”150
For its part, Uzbekistan also faces a combination of drug trafficking and 
insurgency. Specifically, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, operating from guerrilla
147 “The empire strikes back,” The Economist, 7 August 1993, 36. For more background on this conflict, 
see also James Sherr, “Escalation o f the Tajikistan Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 5, no. 11 
(November 1993), 514-6; and Brian Austen, “Tajikistan today,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 2 
(April-June 1996), 199-212.
148 See Ahmed Rashid, “The Fires o f Faith in Central Asia,” World Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 
45-56; and “A peace o f  sorts,” The Economist, 20 September 1997, 46. Underlining the artificiality of  
regional borders, this same article also characterizes Tajikistan, somewhat pithily but no less accurately, as 
“a collection o f valleys that was forced into a nation under Stalin.” See also Magnus and Naby, 175-6.
149 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 16. This is by no 
means an isolated phenomenon. For instance, the ONDCP notes that standards o f living throughout Central 
Asia are so low that “narco-traffickers have been known to bribe impoverished border guards for as little as 
a loaf o f  bread or $1 USD in cash.” U.S. ONDCP, Drug Policy Perspectives,” 6.
150 See Roy, The New Central Asia, 141. As discussed above, the primary Afghan road north into 
Uzbekistan runs through Mazar-i-Sharif.
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bases in Tajikistan, spilling over via the Fergana Valley, which stretches from 
Afghanistan into several neighboring Central Asian states, has also been linked to 
regional heroin trafficking. The Uzbek government at least partially attributed this 
activity to the rebels’ desire “to create havoc to keep the borders open for the heroin 
flow.”151
The rebels’ stated goal is an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley, where the 
borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan come together, with its primary 
strategy being to topple the government of Uzbekistan. According to Kyrgyz 
government spokesmen, the rebels are also trying to defend the interests of drug 
traffickers in moving opiates through the region and on to Russia and Europe, while the 
Uzbek government has labeled the militants as “common criminals.”152
However, according to OGD, it is Turkmenistan that has become the most 
prominent Central Asian route for exporting Afghan opiates, as well as for importing 
precursor chemicals. In addition to being geographically contiguous, the two countries 
also share cross-border Turkmen ethnic ties, solidified during the Soviet era, with links to 
Turkmenistan’s security forces. Other factors that have strengthened the country’s role 
as a conduit for heroin smuggling vectors include a weakening demand for its natural gas 
and cotton, and the fact that its border is much less rigorously patrolled than that with 
Iran.153
151 Douglas Franz, “Guerrilla Attacks Raise Worries in Central Asia,” New York Times (web edition), 6 
September 2000. Approximately a week after this article appeared, the U.S. placed the Islamic Movement 
o f Uzbekistan on its list o f foreign terrorist organizations, precluding its citizens from contributing money 
or material support to the group, as well as denying visas to or deporting members o f the group. See Judith 
Miller, “U.S. Puts Uzbek Group on Its Terror List,” New York Times (web edition), 15 September 2000.
152 See “The militants take aim,” The Economist, 26 August 2000, 32.
153 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 39-40. This report goes on to note, “It is particularly 
easy to use the Kushka border post, as enormous quantities o f goods o f diverse origins pass through it on 
the way to a wide variety o f destinations. The drugs then go to the Turkmen and Kazakh ports on the
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Finally, ethnic Russian TCOs both supply their domestic markets and facilitate 
transnational smuggling vectors throughout the region. These organizations are presently 
expanding aggressively into Central Asia and up to the borders of Afghanistan, and are 
largely responsible for paving the way for the alternate routes into European markets that 
currently compete with those that enter via Iran and Turkey.154 Also of importance is the 
opening of extensive former Soviet air, rail and highway networks in facilitating the 
movement of contraband throughout the Eurasian landmass.155
Similarly, the Baltic ports and routes through the Ukraine and Eastern Europe are 
also important conduits for smuggling vectors with respect not only to drugs, but also to 
both black market arms and illegal immigrants into Western Europe. Russian criminal 
organizations are also particularly well connected in the Black Sea ports of Odessa and 
the Crimea.156 Further afield, even the strategically located naval base at Cam Rahn Bay 
in Vietnam, currently leased to Russia, has emerged as a trafficking hub in this context.157
As noted in INCSR 2001, “Dominating all other drug issues in Russia is the 
continued dramatic increase in the flow of Afghan heroin into the country across the
158southern border.” Taking advantage of this trend, Russian TCOs, especially those
affiliated with the military or particular ethnic groups, are also poised to take up a greater 
share of the relevant heroin smuggling vectors. These groups are also establishing and
Caspian Sea. Direct routes connect [the Turkmen capital of] Ashgabat with Tehran, Istambul, Karachi, 
Dushanbe, Tashkent and Moscow.”
154 Arkady Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, trans. John and Elizabeth Roberts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1991), 248. Transit routes from Pakistan and the Middle East through the Caucasus to Eastern Europe have 
also become increasingly important. See also “After the silk came the smack,” The Economist, 28 May 
1994, 33. Long-standing ties to Afghanistan, especially in the case o f former military officers, are seen as 
particularly problematic.
155 Handelman, 197.
156 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 13.
157 J. Michael Waller and Victor J. Yasman, “Russia’s Great Criminal Revolution: The Role o f the Security 
Services,” in Ryan and Rush, 195.
158 See U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia -  Russia.”
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maintaining contacts with Latin America cocaine producers and engaging in drug 
trafficking from New York to Miami.159
For its part, as noted in The Economist, “The Caucasus is -  or should be -  a 
splendid transit route between east and west, north and south, for goods, money, people 
and ideas.”160 In particular, the potential of Armenia in this respect is salient. Because of 
its geographical position, the country has the potential to become a significant transit 
point for transnational heroin smuggling vectors, though at present it is only a secondary 
route due to limited transportation links to neighboring countries. However, an estimated 
75 percent of all opiates in Armenia are being smuggled from Iran. While at present its 
borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, when these borders open such activity could increase significantly.161
As discussed previously, a significant portion of heroin smuggling vectors leaving 
Afghanistan reach their final destination in European markets, particularly throughout 
Western Europe. As such, geography is one of the primary factors in the growth of 
organized crime in Eastern and Central Europe, as discussed previously in the context of
159 The geographic extent o f this phenomenon, ranging across much of Eurasia and beyond, is discussed at 
length in Mark Galeotti, “Red Mafias and National Security,” Janes ’ Intelligence Review 5, no. 1 (January
1993), 21-2; “Redfellas,” The Economist, 15 March 1997, 31-2; and Cooley, 171-3.
160 An excellent survey o f  the region can be found in “Where worlds collide,” The Economist, 19 August 
2000, 17-9. Of particular interest in the context o f smuggling is a table that includes a column assessing 
mafia involvement by area, summarized as follows: Abkhazia (unrecognized separatist republic within 
Georgia), “Lightly supervised port offers great potential;” Ajaria (autonomous region within Georgia), 
“Russian mobsters have been spotted there;” Armenia, “War profiteers, corrupt officials;” Azerbaijan, 
“Ruling elite very corrupt;” Georgia, “Rampant cronyism at all levels;” Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijani 
enclave), “War profiteers, veterans’ groups;” Nakichevan (Armenian-controlled territory within 
Azerbaijan), “Officialdom does conspicuously well;” Pankisi Gorge (Chechen-populated part o f Georgia), 
“Don’t ask;” and South Ossetia (separatist region o f Georgia), “Tunnel to Russia offers huge potential.”
161 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia -  Armenia.” Moreover, 
“The Armenian community abroad provides useful connections to traffic drugs and launder money in the 
Middle-East (Lebanon), the Americas (Argentina, United States, Canada) and Russia.” OGD, World 
Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 20. This report also notes that Armenia’s huge and largely abandoned Soviet- 
era industrial infrastructure serves as the source for non-ferrous metals and iron that are bartered with Iran 
and the Gulf states for heroin and other goods.
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1 ^9the “Balkan Route.” In terms of both transit and distribution, migrant populations in 
Western European urban areas have led to the establishment of criminal cells with ties to 
Turkey, Iran, North Africa, the Balkans and other regions. For instance, Turkish and 
Albanian groups dominate the trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin in many European 
Union countries.163
However, a case in point for the evolution of these trends can be found in the 
U.K., where 95 percent of the heroin comes from Southwest Asia, chiefly Afghanistan. 
With respect to the ethnic and often immigrant-based issue of drug distribution, recently 
there has been a rise of Pakistani gang activity in the country rivaling traditional Turkish 
dominance of street-level heroin sales, reputedly a $1.5 billion market. Overall, the U.K. 
has a much larger and more geographically dispersed Pakistani community in comparison 
to its Turkish counterpart. Moreover, facilitated by direct airline connections between 
Pakistan and Manchester, Pakistani drug rings have begun using larger numbers of mules 
to profit in a strategy of "little-but-often." By contrast, Turkish and affiliated Cypriot 
drug traffickers have tended to rely on larger cross-channel shipments by truck.164
While Europe remains the primary market for Golden Crescent heroin, the U.S. 
remains an important secondary target for both large organizations and smaller 
independent traffickers. As the DEA notes, “The United States was a secondary target
162 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 7.
163 Furthermore, “Although Turkish criminal groups remain the primary source o f supply, ethnic Albanian 
crime groups appear to have largely replaced the Turks as the principal distributors o f Southwest Asian 
heroin to parts o f Western Europe, according to press reports. They are also challenging Italian criminal 
syndicates for control o f other rackets in Western European countries.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 3. See also Gus Xhudo, “Men o f Purpose: the Growth o f  
Albanian Criminal Activity,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 1-20; and U.S. DOJ, 
DEA, NNICC (1998), 57. While other groups have superseded the traditional dominance o f Italian groups, 
who were generally supplied by Turkish traffickers with Southeast Asian heroin, new links with Russian, 
Albanian and Asian crime groups appear to be emerging. See Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime,” 32-3.
164 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia -  United Kingdom.”
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for Southwest Asia’s largest heroin trafficking organizations that generally consider 
Europe their primary market. Most of these organizations stored heroin supplies in 
secure European locations and only sent shipments to the United States after a buyer had 
been identified and partial payment received.” By contrast, groups less well established 
in European markets appear to be attracted to the U.S. and have been known to depend 
not only on established European routes, but also to develop alternative transshipment 
nodes through Africa and Canada.165
The DEA also noted in 1998 that the importation and distribution of Southwest 
Asian heroin for the U.S. market is much less centralized than for its Southeast Asian 
counterpart, both geographically and with regard to the relevant trafficking groups. In 
general, it appears that a relatively limited quantity of Southwest Asian heroin was 
available in the U.S., primarily in the Northeast, Midwest and, to a lesser extent, on the 
West Coast, where there are relatively larger populations of Southwest Asian origin.
As such, networks based on membership from a number of ethnic groups with 
links to the region have been associated with this type of activity, including Afghans, 
Pakistanis, Iranians, Turks, Lebanese, Israelis and Greeks. While for the most part 
stemming from familial, religious or tribal affiliations, these networks tend to be highly 
cohesive, difficult to penetrate and cautious in their dealings with outsiders.166 In some
165 See U.S. DOJ, DEA, “The Availability o f Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States” (Washington, 
DC: DEA, May 1996), available at http.//www.fas.org/irp/agency/doi/dea/product/swa heroin.htm. 
accessed 15 July 2004. This report also notes that these trafficking and distribution patterns “are generally 
more prevalent in cities with large populations from Afghanistan, Greece, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey, 
such as Chicago, Detroit, and New York City. For more on trends relating to Afghan heroin within the 
U.S. market, see also U.S. DOJ, NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2002; and U.S. DOJ, DEA, 
Intelligence Division, Domestic Heroin Unit, “Southwest Asian Heroin -  Selected Data,” Drug 
Intelligence Brief, DEA-02015 (Washington, DC: DEA, March 2002), available at 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02015/02015.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
166 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), xi, 45-6.
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ways, parallel characteristics can be seen in the structure and activities of West African 
TCOs, as discussed in Chapter VII.
By way of a conclusion, having traced the movement of heroin produced in 
Afghanistan outward across the borders of immediately adjacent countries and beyond 
via widely divergent modes of transportation, it becomes necessary to assess this body of 
empirical data in terms of the models, conventions and parameters introduced in previous 
chapters. As such, this analysis reviews the most salient elements of the smugglers’ 
landscape as they apply to Afghanistan, the wider Golden Crescent drug nexus region, 
and the many paths out to subsequent final destinations.
Afghan Heroin Smuggling Vectors: An Assessment 
To begin with Afghanistan itself, in terms of the political risk factors discussed in 
Chapter IV, it would be difficult to imagine a more adverse set of conditions for a 
legitimate business to operate. However, the demonstrable success of opium cultivation 
and heroin production can largely be seen as the result of the country’s terrain, traditions 
and domestic turmoil, aspects of which can be geographically sorted by their physical, 
economic, political and human attributes. In turn, these factors serve to set a very 
favorable balance of access in comparison to risk, resulting in high degree of connectivity 
with adjacent countries with respect to smuggling vectors.
Among the primary types of conveyance discussed in Chapter II, namely land, 
water and air modes of transportation, the physical geography and lack of developed 
infrastructure found in Afghanistan serve to constrain outbound smuggling vectors, as 
well as other types of logistical activity, primarily to the use of land routes. As noted
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above, the country is landlocked, waterways are limited to a few riverine systems, and air 
transportation is highly circumscribed by a lack of aviation facilities. However, even 
land-based smuggling vectors must overcome the generally poor condition of existing 
roads and the absence of railways. Much of this “friction of distance” is overcome by a 
combination of profit motivation, political involvement in smuggling at various locations, 
and cross-border ethnic ties.
Moving on to the country’s economic geography, the convergence of numerous 
internal and external factors in Afghanistan has made various types of black market 
activity overwhelmingly pernicious. With respect to the focus of this study, the lack of 
viable economic alternatives to and cultural embeddedness of opium cultivation and 
heroin processing have led to the country to become one of the largest sources of supply 
at the global level, and that commodity constitutes the single largest source of national 
income. The spatial distribution of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, centered in the 
southwest, the east and the northeast, though extending further over the last two decades, 
also tends to allow for relatively easy access to porous border areas.
Similarly, the fragmenting of Afghanistan’s political geography has been 
accelerated by decades of occupation, civil war and other forms of endemic unrest, which 
have in turn been precipitated by, though certainly predating, the Soviet invasion of the 
county in 1979. The lack of a central authority, ensuing regional warlordism and access 
to large amounts of weaponry in the country over the past few decades have pushed the 
concept of corruption far beyond what is conceivable in most other countries, with 
political control of various opium production areas and along pivotal sections of the 
border carrying lucrative economic incentives as well. With respect to a given smuggling
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vector, control of at least a section of the path is essential to make a profit, with 
international borders being among the more desirable pieces of real estate.
This reciprocal relationship between economics and politics underlines the 
cyclical nature of this phenomenon, in that the former provides the motivation in the form 
of profits, while the second enables a wide range of criminal activity, including but 
certainly not limited to smuggling, to thrive under its aegis while simultaneously reaping 
the revenues necessary to maintain the relevant political structures. Rather than dwell on 
the specific factional alignments and disputes that have characterized Afghanistan’s 
recent history, the key point here is the relative continuity of purpose among diverse 
actors that have allowed heroin smuggling to flourish. At this pivotal point in Afghan 
history, for the first time in decades there is at least an opportunity to break this cycle.
Finally, two salient features of Afghanistan’s human geography come to the fore 
in the context of facilitating a favorable operational environment for heroin smuggling. 
The first is the ethnic diversity and stratification of Afghan society, predating yet 
polarized by the events of recent decades, as noted above. The second is a long-standing 
tradition of smuggling dating back for centuries that has proved quite resistant in the face 
of periodic efforts to control the border.
This is particularly true in the case of ethnic groups divided by relatively recent 
and often arbitrary international borders. Furthermore, nomadic groups, including but not 
limited to elements of the Pashtun, Baluch and Brahui, are able to exploit porous borders 
and are thus ideally situated for smuggling activity despite periodic disruption by war and 
other events. In functional terms, these informal cross-border human links serve as 
integral “legs” for smuggling vectors leaving Afghanistan, as they are much less
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constrained by the lack of a developed transportation infrastructure than more 
sophisticated commercial activity.
Thus, in terms of access and risk, although Afghanistan’s physical geography may 
seem at first glance to be not particularly conducive to smuggling or other licit forms of 
trade, the ready availability of large amounts of a highly lucrative and internationally 
traded commodity serves as an important economic incentive to find imaginative ways to 
maximize access and mitigate risk, often through political protection and the strength of 
ethnic ties. All along the country’s porous borders, countless numbers of illicit 
transactions involving various commodities testify to the impact of this favorable 
smugglers’ landscape that is not conditional on mere proximity or ease of transit.
The resultant connectivity can be seen in the massive volumes of heroin that 
move across Afghanistan’s borders and into the wider region of the Golden Crescent and 
beyond. The demonstrable capability of the relevant smuggling actors in this respect can 
be linked to constantly shifting and iterative smuggling activity that is both flexible 
enough to evolve in new ways when necessary and embedded enough to embrace 
historically successful patterns of behavior.
However, even beyond the context of smuggling, the impact of Afghanistan’s 
geostrategic influence within the region cannot be underestimated. Though often seen by 
its neighbors and much of the rest of the world as a source of instability, drugs, weapons, 
and religious fanaticism in the case of Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran, it also 
represents an opportunity in terms of access to the current and potential resources of 
Central Asia. Thus, although not readily apparent from its recent history, Afghanistan 
does in fact hold the potential to act as a conduit for economic development as well.
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To return to the issue in question, the confluence of the physical, economic, 
political and human geography within Afghanistan has a salient and lasting impact on 
heroin smuggling out of the country. Specifically, as noted above, the three major sets of 
smuggling vectors out of the country cross the common and highly porous land borders 
with Pakistan to the south, Iran to the west, and the former Soviet states of Central Asia 
to the north. The terrain in these areas is generally mountainous or desert, and is 
particularly conducive to smuggling, especially on a small-scale basis that is difficult to 
prevent even under optimal conditions.
Among these, Pakistan arguably has the most longstanding and intimate 
relationship with Afghanistan, particularly in the context of heroin. This interaction can 
be best seen against the often-contentious backdrop of competition regarding which 
country should legitimately control traditionally Pashtun, and to a lesser extent Baluch, 
tribal areas along the common border, though these ethnic ties also serve to facilitate a 
wide range of smuggling vectors as well. Moreover, many of the underlying smuggling 
mechanisms between the two countries date from the period of the Soviet occupation. 
These transnational networks give the relevant smuggling actors the capability to 
efficiently negotiate transactions, assemble drug shipments and transport their goods to 
wholesale buyers, frequently in cooperation with other networks.
Pakistan’s social and political climate that allows smugglers with the proper 
protection to operate with virtual impunity, service the country’s sizable and growing 
domestic demand for drugs, and transship a significant amount of heroin onward. 
Logistically, the sizable number of smuggling vectors carrying opiates as well as other 
forms of contraband thus enter from Afghanistan via both vehicle and pack animal, where
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smugglers can take advantage of a substantially more developed road and rail 
infrastructure and access to various forms of waterborne conveyance. Taken together, 
this set of conditions enabling access and mitigating risk has resulted in a high degree of 
connectivity both in to and out of Pakistan. This connectivity in turn has led smuggling 
vectors for Afghan heroin to easily move into India as well, in particular to take 
advantage of that country’s relatively more developed infrastructure, access to maritime 
modes of transportation, and lax export regulations.
In the case of Iran, its contiguous borders with both Pakistan and Afghanistan 
present a high degree of access to inbound heroin smuggling vectors either for 
transshipment or to meet domestic demand. Patterns of opium moving first through 
Kabul, and then on to Iran, often via Herat, date back at least thirty years, though an 
increasing volume of contraband can be seen crossing first from Afghanistan into 
Pakistan and then into Iran. Traditionally, from Iran these smuggling vectors then 
continued on by land through Turkey and on through the “Balkan Route” into Western 
Europe, or by water through various Persian Gulf ports on the way to other, 
predominantly European, markets.
However, despite this longstanding set of factors enabling access, in terms of risk 
Iran also offers a relatively less favorable operational environment than Pakistan. For 
instance, successive regimes have struggled to overcome these access dynamics since the
th  •early 20 century, with the current leadership demonstrating the willingness as well as 
the capability to deal very harshly with traffickers entering its territory. This includes not 
only armed interdiction along known smuggling routes, but also the use of the death 
penalty for drug trafficking offenses. Nonetheless, despite this level of commitment and
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the resultantly high statistics relating to seizures, it appears that access to Iran as a node 
for smuggling vectors is facilitated by its inherent attractiveness regardless of the risks 
imposed, with the resultant connectivity being quite evident.
Finally, smuggling vectors through the Central Asian states to the north from 
Afghanistan present an increasingly viable alternative to more established routes via 
either Pakistan or Iran, particularly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In addition the 
advantages of relatively more effective means of transportation, in particular by land 
utilizing the Soviet-built road and rail infrastructure, Afghan heroin smuggling vectors 
transiting Central Asia not only have access to the growing regional market for drugs but 
also service Russian and European demand.
Furthermore, a number of cross-border, ethnically-based TCOs and other non­
state criminal actors, to include various Islamic fundamentalist groups, have also been 
involved in the Central Asian drug trade. However, while mitigating against unrestricted 
access is the enduring presence of Russian security forces in key states, for the most part 
the risk associated with smuggling vectors out of Afghanistan into Central Asia are more 
than offset by the access they provide. As a result, the region’s attractiveness is 
demonstrated by its connectivity, which in turn becomes empirically evident by an 
examination of the relatively high volumes of drugs seized or detected in transit.
In summation, while heroin smuggling vectors leaving Afghanistan vary in terms 
of modes and methods, they are constrained by a number of factors and thus can be seen 
for the most part as passing though a rather discrete set of conduits. However, it is the 
transnational implications of this activity that serve to make it a tangible concern both 
regionally and globally, as under conditions of autarky the situation in Afghanistan would
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most likely be of little interest to outsiders except on humanitarian or perhaps geopolitical 
grounds.
Further out, however, the situation becomes much more complex, particularly as 
the same actors that move heroin out of Afghanistan are seldom the same as those who 
provide these illicit drugs to consumers. As such, an increasing number of TCOs, often 
ethnically-based, become involved as middlemen and, eventually, distributors within 
primary European and North American markets. In keeping with the open architecture of 
this analytical framework, the success of these groups hinges upon their ability, at 
varying levels of analysis, to effectively create access, mitigate risk and thus enable 
connectivity along their respective sections of a given smuggling vector.
This chapter began with a consideration of heroin in Afghanistan and went on to 
trace the more prominent sets of smuggling vectors extending outward from that country. 
However, despite a commonality in terms of origin, the high degree of fragmentation 
both in terms of geography and organization is readily apparent. By contrast, the next 
chapter examines Colombia and its smuggling vectors, which tend to be characterized by 
TCOs that are much more cohesive and sophisticated in their control of the relevant 
logistical channels. Furthermore, though their reach continues to expand, Colombian 
TCOs for the most part remain focused on a single major market, namely the United 
States.
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CHAPTER VI 
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS . . .  AGAIN:
COLOMBIA AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING VECTORS
In the case of Colombia, the rise in poppy cultivation and subsequent heroin 
smuggling is inextricably linked to the more longstanding phenomena of the country’s 
cocaine industry. This trend represents a conscious effort on the part of the relevant 
TCOs, nothing if not opportunistic, to encourage product diversification in an attempt to 
maximize profit margins and expand into new markets.1 In particular, a primary 
consideration lies in successfully moving Colombian heroin to the U.S. market, where the 
vast majority of production eventually goes. Furthermore, the domestic interactions 
between the drug trade, kidnapping and guerrilla activity are also particularly salient. 
Paralleling the case of Afghanistan, the themes of corruption, endemic civil unrest and 
relatively remote terrain also can be seen as having a distinct and ongoing impact.
The first section will focus on the internal geographic components that drive the 
Colombian drug trade, while the second examines the transnational logistics of this 
activity. With respect to the latter, in addition to the wider spatial parameters of 
legitimate regional trading patterns, the main areas of interest in this context are 
Colombia’s external land, sea and air connections. All three major modes of transit have 
historically been exploited by TCOs to varying and often cyclical degrees of intensity.
1 While this theme has been discussed in previous chapters, it is particularly salient here. As one ONDCP 
report notes, specifically with reference to Colombian TCOs, “International trafficking organizations 
operate like multinational corporations, which are profit oriented and risk averse. They seek to develop 
new markets, and they are ruthlessly competitive and violent. It is clear that drug traffickers view heroin as 
a growth industry.” U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 1.
2 For instance, Europe is fairly well supplied via other sources, as outlined previously. However, there are 
indications that Latin American heroin has the potential to expand beyond current North American markets 
in the future, as will be discussed below.
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Colombia’s national territory directly borders on that of Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, 
Venezuela and Panama. Moreover, the country’s maritime boundaries give it access via 
its seaports and along an extensive and porous coastline not only to the greater Caribbean 
basin but the Pacific Ocean as well. Finally, both primary and secondary air connections 
also serve to facilitate the transnational movement not only of heroin and other types of 
contraband, but also of licit goods.
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Drugs and Dirty Wars in Colombia: “Plata o Plomo ”
Although a relatively recent phenomenon in Latin America, the cultivation of 
opium poppies on a commercially viable scale and the resultant rise in heroin production 
is a natural extension of the country’s previous experience with drug trafficking. As 
such, it represents the latest and potentially the most lucrative of a succession of illegal 
enterprises on the part of both domestic and transnational criminal organizations based in 
Colombia, and an opportunity that such groups are capable of leveraging to a high 
degree.4
For instance, after noting that Colombia’s current drug problems lie in the 
decision by traffickers thirty years ago to turn the traditional Andean coca crop into a 
global business, Rafael Pardo continues by writing, “Two decades later, in much the 
same way, they would capitalize on growth in heroin.”5 To fully understand both the 
potential and demonstrated impact of Colombian heroin, it is necessary to address the 
issue of its antecedents, primarily cocaine.
Furthermore, drug trafficking is inextricably linked with a broad spectrum of 
criminal activity and civil unrest that have served to undermine the social fabric of 
Colombia. For decades, leaders and average citizens alike were been caught between the 
dual coercive leverages of bribery and violence, colloquially referred to as “plata o 
plomo,” silver or lead.6 As a result, endemic and entrenched corruption, driven primarily
4 As evidence o f  this pragmatism, Chepesiuk quotes an unnamed U.S. official regarding an additional 
reason for this product diversification: “As a stimulant, cocaine will bum out a user in maybe a few months 
to a few years, whereas heroin is a depressant and will be used by a junkie over a period o f decades.” 
Chepesiuk, 148. Incidentally, a more concrete example o f  direct interaction between cocaine and heroin at 
the street level is the common practice among addicts o f  using heroin to decrease the “crash” following a 
cocaine high, known in slang as a “speedball.”
5 Rafael Pardo, “Colombia’s Two-Front War,” Foreign Affairs 79, no.4 (July-August 2000), 64.
6 As Winfred Tate notes, “The power and violence o f the drug industry came to permeate all facets o f  
Colombian society, as signified by the saying “plata o plomo,” -  silver or lead -  meaning “take the bribe or
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by the proceeds of drug trafficking, has spread across nearly all aspects of society.
Moreover, a systemic breakdown of law and order can also been seen, including outright
attacks on the police and judiciary.7
This situation has progressed to the extent that “Colombianization” has become a
byword for similar situations in other countries, much as the term “Balkanization”
denotes a generic socio-political fragmentation along ethnic lines.8 Moreover, as
Francisco Thoumi observes:
The particular structure of Colombian society has been a very strong incentive for 
the illegal industry to be positioned there. In many respects Colombia is the most 
modem of the Andean countries, a fact that reflects the greater weakness of its 
traditional institutions: as modernizing forces overwhelmed these institutions, 
they liberated Colombians from many traditional restrictions and produced an 
extreme individualistic society. It facilitated the concentration of the illegal 
industry in Colombia and also led to a very high level of violence.”9
By contrast, other Latin American countries where crime has been a problem, such as
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, have shown rates of violent death of only 15 and 20
percent of that seen in Colombia. Moreover, in 1998 this statistic was ten times larger
than that of the United States, the most violent developed country.10
take the bullet. Drag lords achieved unprecedented political influence through threats, bribery, and 
political contributions.” Winifred Tate, “Colombia’s Role in International Drag Trafficking,” Foreign 
Policy in Focus 4, no. 130 (11 November 1999), 1.
7 Incidentally, in the run-up to the most recent election, provincial mayors have been favorite targets.
While numerous sources attest to this phenomenon, recent observations and analyses include Alma 
Guillermoprieto, “Colombia: Violence Without End?” New York Review o f  Books, 27 April 2000, 38-9; and 
Pardo, 64-73. In particular, Pardo notes that despite having “one o f the most sophisticated legal systems in 
the hemisphere and every conceivable law in the books,” 70% o f all crimes in Colombia remain unsolved. 
See also James L. Zackrison and Eileen Bradley, “Colombian Sovereignty Under Siege,” Strategic Forum, 
no. 112 (May 1997), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforam/SFl 12/foruml 12.html. accessed 15 
July 2004, which discusses the risks to both the Colombian state and the wider region.
8 In particular, the case o f Colombia graphically illustrates the following synergy: “Three interrelated 
phenomena work synergistically to produce the narcostate: organized crime, governmental policy, and 
transnational capitalism.” Jordan, 9. However, the author further notes that states transitioning 
economically from statism to capitalism, or from authoritarianism to democracy, can be seen as especially 
vulnerable, conditions that are less applicable to the Colombian context.
9 Thoumi, 91.
10 Ibid, 83.
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Another key indicator of this chaotic state of domestic affairs in Colombia can be 
seen in the endemic incidence of kidnapping. Criminal actors across the ideological 
spectrum have engaged in such activity for motives ranging from inciting public outrage 
and exerting political leverage to the more straightforward accrual of profit.11 As Alma 
Guillermoprieto notes, “Kidnappings are the worst danger for civilians who are travelling 
overland.” In addition to roadblocks set out to indiscriminately gather up unwary 
travelers, various groups also plan and execute a large number of targeted abductions, 
totaling 2,945 such incidents in 1999, and a record 3,707 kidnappings in 2000.12 Aspects 
of this phenomenon will be addressed further in their analytical context.13
Following the format laid out in the preceding chapter, this section will examine 
the elements of Colombia’s physical, economic, political and human geography that 
provide the foundation for the domestic drug trade and its attendant consequences. In
11 This phenomenon has also led to the parallel growth o f another unfortunate practice, that o f  “ransom 
brokering,” whereby an intermediary arranges for the safe return o f the victim in exchange for a 
percentage. In effect, competition for such services serves to raise the market price, and thus the appeal, o f 
kidnapping. An additional issue is that o f kidnap insurance and related involvement o f various types of 
security professionals, which can not only further inflate ransoms but also obfuscate the scope o f the 
problem. In fact, in 1993 the Colombian government went so far as to enact a controversial law not only 
barring private negotiations with kidnappers, but also freezing the assets o f  captive’s families and 
employers. However, in addition to the numerous methods available to circumvent these strictures, the 
Colombian Supreme Court has even gone so far as to rule this law unconstitutional. See Ann Hagedom 
Auerbach, Ransom: The Untold Story o f  International Kidnapping (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1998), 
33,250-1. Throughout this work, the author also offers copious anecdotes involving Colombian 
manifestations o f  this global phenomenon.
12 See “Miami nice,” The Economist, 5 May 2001,26; and Guillermoprieto, “Colombia: Violence Without 
End?” 31. The same author also notes one distinction between such activity as undertaken by the leftist 
rebels and the rightist paramilitaries, namely the much slimmer odds of being returned alive after being 
abducted by the latter. Alma Guillermoprieto, “The Children’s War,” New York Review o f  Books, 11 May 
2000,40. Elsewhere, the author also notes reports o f  guerrillas “buying” kidnap victims from ordinary 
criminal organizations that do not have suitable types o f  safe hiding places, such as locations deep in the 
jungle. See Alma Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” New York Review o f  Books, 13 April 
2000,37.
13 Though discussed at further length below, a harrowing account o f  Medellin cartel leader Pablo Escobar’s 
kidnapping o f prominent Colombian citizens to use as leverage against the government during the early 
1990s can be found in Gabriel Garcia M&rquez, News o f  a Kidnapping, trans. Edith Grossman (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1996). In a further link between the drug trade and kidnapping, as Guillermoprieto notes, 
“Many drug traffickers, for example, got their startup capital through kidnapping and continued to use it as 
a source o f  income and power.” Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 37.
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particular, the relative underdevelopment of many rural sections of the country has led to 
significant freedom of action for both drug traffickers and insurgents. However, as in the 
previous case study, in order to establish the initial framework for the analysis, a brief 
overview of Colombia’s history is necessary.
To begin with, there is the dual legacy of both the multifaceted indigenous 
cultural heritage and the Spanish colonial experience, the latter most saliently persisting 
in the widespread Roman Catholic faith and its predominantly unifying influence.14 
With the initial campaigns against Spanish rule in Latin America dating from early in the 
nineteenth century, the independence of Gran Colombia was declared in 1821 by Simon 
Bolivar, comprising what is now Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama.15
14 The wider issues revolving around the European exploration and subsequent conquest o f the New World 
is slightly beyond the purview o f this study. However, an interesting analytical framework regarding the 
ways in which disparate cultures have historically interacted in terms o f contacts, collisions and ongoing 
coexistence can be found in Bitterli, passim. In particular, see 70-86, where the author discusses the 
Spanish experience vis-a-vis indigenous cultures. See also J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1990). For a more recent analysis o f indigenous cultural 
identities throughout the region, often juxtaposed with other forms o f nationalism, see Michael Kearney 
and Stefano Varese, “Latin America’s Indigenous Peoples: Changing Identities and Forms o f Resistance,” 
in Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America, ed. Sandor Halebsky and Richard L. Harris (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1995), 207-31.
15 An excellent and highly readable account o f the campaigns for Latin American independence from Spain 
can be found in Robert Harvey, Liberators: Latin America’s Struggle for Independence, 1810-1830 
(Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000). Incidentally, only two years later, and particularly salient in light 
of later U.S. involvement throughout the region, the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, in essence a 
warning to the European powers to eschew future efforts to extend their influence in the Western 
hemisphere. From the Latin American point o f  view, the inherent irony is self-evident. As early as the 
1850s, the adventurism o f Tennessee native William Walker throughout Central America became an 
enduring symbol o f Yankee hemispheric ambitions. In this context, an excellent study o f early non­
governmental actors operating to various degrees under U.S. sponsorship can also be found in Lester D. 
Langley and Thomas Schoonover, The Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central 
America, 1880-1930 (Lexington, KY: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1995). By 1904, an activist 
extension o f the Monroe Doctrine had been articulated by Theodore Roosevelt. As a justification for U.S. 
involvement throughout Latin America, though in practice limited primarily to the greater Caribbean basin, 
the Roosevelt Corollary was hardly popular with regional neighbors. The move away from the Monroe 
Doctrine began in the 1930s with an affirmation o f multilateral inter-American treaties, such as the Rio 
Pact guaranteeing reciprocal assistance in time o f war, ratified in 1947, and the Charter o f  the Organization 
of American States, ratified in 1948. However, though used as a rationale for the overthrow o f the 
Guatemalan government in 1954, the Bay o f Pigs invasion o f 1961, and the intervention in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965, by the 1980s and 1990s the doctrine had largely outlived its relevance in international 
relations.
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However, in 1830 both Venezuela and Ecuador broke away, while with U.S. support 
Panama gained its independence in 1903, resulting in Colombia’s present international 
borders.
In terms of domestic politics, the dual primacy of the Liberal Party and the 
Conservative Party was already established in Colombia by the 1850s and, maintained by 
both legal and extra-legal means, continues up to the present day.16 Illustrative of the 
periodic shifts in power between the two, the Liberals were dominant from 1863 to 1885, 
when the Conservatives came to power and promulgated the 1886 constitution that was in 
effect until 1991.
By 1930, a resurgence of Liberal rule was facilitated by the Great Depression, 
which lasted until a narrow Conservative presidential victory in 1946 despite continuing 
Liberal congressional control. With the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitan in 1948, the era of oligarchic democracy gave way to the period of undeclared 
civil war known as La Violencia, and the genesis of the most prominent guerrilla 
movements of the last four decades.17
This state of affairs led in turn to the military government of General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla from 1953 to 1957. The subsequent return to civilian rule was facilitated by
16 With reference to these two parties, one source notes that, “Their history includes periods o f hegemonic 
one-party rule, civil wars, and coalition government. The parties often mobilized armed bands larger than 
the national army, indicating the weakness o f the state and the military.” Jonathan Hartlyn, “Colombia,” 
The Oxford Companion to Politics o f  the World, ed. Joel Krieger (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 154. Thoumi also notes that, even more perniciously, “Colombia is the only Latin American 
country in which the traditional parties and elite neutralized all political reform efforts. There were never 
serious land reform programs, and the two political parties retained control and evolved into electoral, 
clientelistic machines that co-opted dissidents but prevented social change. The lack o f political space for 
both the extreme left and right is at the root o f guerrilla development.” Thoumi, 86.
17 A compelling overview o f both Gai tan’s murder, only two hours before a scheduled meeting with a 
young Fidel Castro, as well as the outbreak o f La Violencia, can be found in Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: 
The Hunt fo r the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 7-11. For a more 
comprehensive analysis o f  this pivotal era in Colombian history, see also Gonzalo S&nchez and Donny 
Meertens, Bandits, Peasants and Politics: The Case o f  “La Violencia” in Colombia, trans. Alan Hynds 
(Austin: Universty o f Texas Press, 2001), passim.
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an agreement between both parties to form a National Front to share power equally, even 
going so far as to agree to alternate control of the presidency from 1958 to 1974. Despite 
progress in some areas by the resultant series of coalition governments, in other respects 
many of the social problems endemic to Latin America, such as unequal divisions of 
wealth and related issues of development and representation, found increasing expression 
in guerrilla and other illegal activity.
Following these decades of civil unrest, the current state of affairs in Colombia 
can thus be seen in some ways as the logical extension of this legacy, as are the 
government’s ongoing attempts to stabilize the situation. Successive administrations 
have continued to confront these issues, while at the same time maintaining functional 
democratic institutions, with varying degrees of success.18 Since the early 1980s, this 
includes the administrations of Conservative Belisario Betancur from 1982 to 1986, 
Liberal Virgilio Barco from 1986 to 1990, Cesar Gaviria from 1990 to 1994, Emesto 
Samper from 1994 to 1998, Andres Pastrana from 1998 to 2002, and Alvaro Uribe, 
elected in 2002.
In many respects, Colombia’s underlying physical geography also contributes to
the country’s present socio-political situation. As The Economist notes:
What makes Colombia so different from its neighbors? A geography that is 
difficult even by Latin American standards predisposed the country toward 
introversion, regionalism and a weak central state. In southern Colombia, the 
Andes break into three chains, splaying out towards Panama, the Caribbean coast 
and Venezuela respectively. The highland valleys and tablelands, where most of 
the population lives, are separated from each other by the tropical valleys of the
18 For instance, Colombia has been under various forms o f martial law ever since the civil war o f 1948. 
Jorge Nef, “Demilitarization and Democratic Transition in Latin America,” in Halebsky and Harris, 85. 
More starkly, Bowden notes that, “By the 1960s Colombia had settled into an enforced stasis, with Marxist 
guerrillas in the hills and jungles (modem successors to the bandito tradition) and a central government 
increasingly dominated by a small group o f rich, elite Bogota families, powerless to effect change and, 
anyway, disinclined.” Bowden, 13-4.
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Magdalena and Cauca rivers. The Pacific littoral is clothed in dense rainforest, 
much of the Caribbean one backed by swamps or semi-desert. To the south-east 
of the Andean chains, almost half of the country is occupied by the tropical 
lowlands of the llanos.19
Similarly, though more poetically, Paul Bowden writes, “Colombia is a land that breeds
outlaws. It has always been ungovernable, a nation of wild unsullied beauty, steeped in
mystery. From the white peaks of the three Cordilleras that form its western spine to the
triple-canopy jungle at sea level, it affords many good places to hide.”20
While central governments in Latin America have traditionally been relatively
weak, Thoumi notes the dual roles of both geography and international trade in the
concentrating populations in national capitals. However, in the case of Colombia,
development took the form of a collection of weakly linked regions, as illustrated by the
four major cities, each with over two million residents, and several dozen with more than
a quarter million inhabitants. Moreover, though Bogota is located in the center of the
country, it has never been a primary conduit for any of Colombia’s major exports.21
In addition to fostering political fragmentation, this geography also serves to
impede intrastate economic interdependence due to logistical hurdles. In terms of land
transportation, roads are difficult to traverse due to both terrain and political instability,
though their condition is generally better in the north than in the south or in the east.
Similarly, the country’s railroad network is for the most part antiquated and provides only
limited services between cities.
19 “Drugs, war and democracy: A survey o f Colombia,” The Economist, 21 April 2001, 5.
20 Bowden, 12. Moreover, as observed by Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido, the political violence o f  the 
1950s diverted government attention from huge sections o f  the country that were potentially productive but 
largely undeveloped for lack o f roads. As the author notes, ‘Colombia has considerable unexploited rural 
wealth but preferred to concentrate finance in the towns. This resulted in vast tracts o f  land in the hands o f  
criminals.” Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido, The FARC Cartel (Bogota: Ediciones El Faron, 1996), 97-8
21 Thoumi, 84.
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In general, Colombia’s access to water modes of transportation holds much more 
commercial potential. The country’s seaboard encompasses both the Caribbean basin and 
the Pacific Ocean. In particular, the ports of Buenaventura on the Pacific, and Cartagena 
and Barranquilla on the Caribbean are the most active commercial seaports, while 
relatively isolated coastal areas along the Gulfs of Uraba and Morrosquillo and the 
Guajira Penninsula also offer ample scope for maritime smuggling.22
However, river navigation, particularly of the Magdalena and Atrato basins 
running south to north along the western part of the country, the Orinoco basin along the 
border with Venezuela, and the Amazon basin in the east, is also important in domestic 
terms. Unfortunately, guerrillas and kidnappers often block land access to both seaports 
and river landings. This in turn has led to a high dependence on air transport, which as 
noted at the outset of this chapter is crucial to linking the nation’s disparate regions.
Furthermore, as in the case of Afghanistan, the physical control of territory is
'J'Xparamount to the drug trade. In Colombia, the competition for the spatial projection of 
power exists largely between the central government and the various non-state actors, of 
which guerrilla groups and TCOs are among the most salient. To further complicate the 
issue, at various times these non-state actors can be either coexisting or even cooperating 
with the central government and in conflict with one another.
22 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 5.
23 Though slightly beyond the purview o f this analysis, issues relating to land ownership and the legitimacy 
o f competing claims are key elements o f many endemic Latin American socio-economic problems. An 
excellent and wide-ranging discussion on these topics can be found in Roderic Ai Camp, ed., Democracy in 
Latin America: Patterns and Cycles, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996). A further parallel 
with Afghanistan can be found in the deleterious ecological impact o f the drug trade. For instance, an 
estimated 85 percent o f poppy cultivation areas are the result o f deforestation, while highly toxic pesticides 
and the chemicals used to process heroin all find their way into the Colombian watershed. See Villamarin 
Pulido, 95.
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For instance, with respect to the often-uneasy relationship between rebels and 
traffickers throughout the Colombian countryside, Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido notes, 
“The bottom line was the rudimentary but true geopolitical criterion of controlling vast 
tracts of land.”24 The specific regions of the country that have traditionally been most 
problematic in this respect will be discussed below. However, in general two types of 
non-state criminal actors can be seen in Colombia, namely those with economic motives 
and those with political motives, though at times the line between the two can become 
blurred enough to make them virtually indistinguishable, as will be discussed below.
In the first category, that of economically motivated criminal actors, the most 
prominent in Colombia are drug trafficking organizations. However, in the past 
Colombian drug cartels have resorted to campaigns of violence against government 
institutions and the general public, resulting in the phenomenon of “narcoterrorism,” 
most saliently manifest in kidnappings, bombings and assassinations.25 Furthermore, 
elements of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups that constitute the second category have 
become increasingly involved in various aspects of the drug trade as a source of 
funding.26
Taken as an aggregate, drug trafficking shapes the country’s economic geography 
to a high degree, and vice-versa.27 However, as Shelley notes, Colombia is in a different
24 Ibid., 11-7. This interaction will be addressed further below, in the context o f the insurgents’ 
involvement in drug trafficking.
25 While this phenomenon has been discussed in previous chapter, the most prominent example in the 
Colombian context can be found in the career o f Pablo Escobar, as will be discussed at greater length 
below. However, for a broad description o f Escobar’s terrorist campaign at its height, largely in an attempt 
to avoid extradition to the United States between 1989 and 1991, see Bowden, 61-105.
26 Bentham, 11-12, also makes the broader case for the drug trade facilitating regional trends toward 
militarization in Latin America.
27 According to Sanchez and Meertens, 195, the comparative advantages that Colombia offers to the drug 
trade include “its complex and propitious geography, the quality o f  its soil, its strategic location for 
international markets, and its accumulated tolerance o f illegal activity.”
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category from either Afghanistan or Burma in that the overall economy is more 
diversified, even though drugs have become the largest revenue source.28 Nonetheless, 
despite deriving some monetary benefits from the drug trade, Colombia still can be seen 
as suffering a net negative economic impact from this phenomenon.
For instance, the influx of dollars into the domestic economy has hurt the 
competitive capabilities of traditional industries, promoted speculative investments and 
diverted drug money into areas that were suitable for money laundering but not actually 
profitable. Moreover, in perpetuating a climate of violence, the drug trade has 
discouraged foreign investment, encouraged domestic capital flight, and increased costs 
for the commercial sector as a whole by forcing it to invest heavily in security.29
It is worth noting, however, that in a controversial move the government of 
Colombia went so far in 1999 as to propose including income earned from the cultivation 
of coca, opium poppy and marijuana crops into the calculations of its gross national 
product (GNP). This recalculation would serve to significantly increase the country’s 
GNP, with projections for trade in illicit drugs ranging between one-quarter and one-third 
of the country’s legal exports, roughly $4 billion per year.30
Drug trafficking trends in Colombia over the past two decades can be seen in 
terms of a dual evolution. One involves commodities, primarily the shift from cocaine to 
a more diversified product line that includes a growing market presence of heroin. The
28 Shelley, “Identifying, Counting and Categorizing,” 6. However, the author also observes that Colombia 
TCOs, in contrast to many o f their counterparts, have not expanded their illicit economic activity much 
beyond the drug trade and other directly related black markets, such as precursor chemicals and money 
laundering.
29 Schmid, 54.
30 Larry Rochter, “Colombia Adjusts Economic Figures to Include Its Drug Crops,” New York Times, 27 
June 1999, A-3. See also Claire Poole, “Colombia’s Gross Drug Product,” Latin Trade 7, no. 9 (September 
1999), 26, which cites estimates as high as $7 billion per year when the value o f  processed heroin and 
cocaine are added to the figures.
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other encompasses the changing nature of the organizations in questions, particularly 
with respect to the displacement of the Medellin and Cali cartels by a multitude of less 
hierarchically structured smuggling actors. Moreover, both the U.S. market for illicit 
drugs and the U.S. government’s policy toward the region with respect to this issue area 
can be seen as having a discrete impact on, as well as responding to, these developments.
As mentioned at the outset, it is difficult to even approach the issue of heroin in 
Colombia before first addressing that of cocaine. Cocaine is a chemical derivative of the 
coca leaf harvested from several varieties of the Erthroxylum coca shrub.31 Globally, 
coca cultivation centers on Latin America, specifically Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.32 In 
contrast to the case of both Peru and Bolivia, it is worth noting that, in Colombia, “the 
illegal industry started with the manufacturing and smuggling processes. The agricultural 
part of the industry developed as a backward linkage to the manufacturing stage.”33
Incidentally, one trend that predates the issue of either coca or opium in Colombia 
is that of cannabis. While Colombia has traditionally been a major foreign source of 
marijuana for the U.S. market, most significantly between the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
this activity has waned for years despite a limited resurgence in the late 1990s.
Previously concentrated in the Sierra Nevada and Serrania de Perija Mountains of 
northern Colombia, marijuana cultivation has shifted primarily to the north-central and
31 A wide-ranging discussion o f this drug, to include not only its history but also its socio-cultural impact, 
can be found in Dominic Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2001). Furthermore, as a stimulant cocaine is technically not a narcotic, the root o f  which comes from the 
Greek narcos, “to sleep,” despite the continued use o f  the misnomer as an umbrella term for all illegal 
drugs
32 For a survey o f the drug trade’s manifestations in these three countries, see Thoumi, 67-96; and Clawson 
and Lee, passim. See also Bentham, 6-9, which notes the extremely detrimental impact o f  coca cultivation 
on Latin American ecosystems, which has in some cases been further compounded by various types o f  
eradication efforts as will be discussed below.
33 Thoumi, 90. Zabludoff, 21-4, also notes the parallels between large-scale agribusinesses and the 
Colombian drug cartels.
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western portions of the country. Furthermore, eradication efforts focusing on coca and 
opium poppy growing have allowed marijuana farmers to operate largely unmolested in 
these areas.34
In general, Colombian trafficking organizations have tended to dominate both
cocaine refining and transnational modes of distribution throughout the region. As
Guillermoprieto notes:
Colombia, which has a much smaller indigenous population than Bolivia or Peru, 
used to cultivate less coca, and for many years it grew what was considered an 
inferior product -  meaning that the Colombian leaf produced a less potent 
alkaloid. But Colombia had a lackadaisical government, uncharted waterways, 
and a tradition of smuggling that dated back to colonial days. A small but 
flourishing illegal trade in marijuana, emeralds, and pre-Hispanic artifacts had 
kept smuggling techniques up to date, and by the early Eighties non-Indian 
hustlers . . .  had consolidated their hold on the manufacture of cocaine from coca 
leaf, and on the export of refined cocaine to the United States.35
During the early boom years, the Colombian cocaine trade was dominated by two main
cartels, respectively centered in the cities of Medellin and Cali.36
Underlining the differences between the two, Bunker and Sullivan put forth as
part of their model of cartel behavior three evolutionary phases, in which the first, the
“Aggressive Competitor,” is represented by the Medellin cartel, and the second, the
“Subtle Co-Opter,” by its Cali counterpart.37 Moreover, despite its common usage in this
34 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 83.
35 Guillermprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 36. Among other things, successful methods o f smuggling 
the necessary precursor chemicals necessary to process cocaine, primarily acetone and ether, from the 
United States was a key to the early development o f the regional drug trade.
36 Williams and Savona, 18, note that the Colombian cartels were in many ways unique among TCOs in 
that they tended to engage almost exclusively in drug trafficking, rather than the wide range o f illegal 
activities undertaken by other criminal organizations.
37 Bunker and Sullivan, 59-70. The third and final phase, that o f  “Criminal State Successor,” has yet to 
truly emerge, though in some ways the first two phases manifest certain transitional aspects.
Characteristics o f TCOs theoretically capable o f  successfully challenging nation-states more directly phase 
include their involvement in an expanded range o f  business sectors and markets, institutionalized global 
economic reach, full spectrum technology use and the expanded use o f mercenaries and other specialized 
criminal actors. As examples approaching this situation, the authors specifically cite Haiti, parts o f  Mexico 
and Cuidad de Este, the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.
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context, definitional issues with the term “cartel,” if taken in the traditional sense of a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade generally undertaken to divide up the market for a given 
commodity, restrict its supply and thus drive up prices. Given the large numbers of 
manufacturers and distributors, many of whom are independent agents contracted on a 
fee-for-service basis, there is little basis for making the case for any concerted effort to 
monopolize the business
That being said, however, in general it is worth noting several features that 
characterize most Colombian drug trafficking organizations, the two major cartels as well 
as their successors in their various manifestations, and at least partially account for their 
sustained prominence. First and foremost, all are innovative organizations with highly 
adaptive capabilities.39 For instance, this can be seen in the responses to periods of 
declining consumption and prices, as well as to rising seizure rates.
Moreover, there has been a constant attempt to raise profit margins by increasing 
production efficiency, such as introducing more efficient harvesting processes, the 
recycling of precursor chemicals and vacuum packing. In terms of transit, improved and 
diversified smuggling methods are constantly appearing, as will be addressed further in 
the next section. Finally, an increased downstream penetration of critical U.S. markets,
38 Naylor, “Mafias, Myths and Markets,” 20-3. The author puts forth one explanation for the persistence o f  
this concept, namely that both policy-makers and the general public tend to more readily respond to the 
existence o f a single clear-cut adversary rather than a chaotic multitude o f actors.
39 This point is well made in Michael Kenney, “When Criminals Out-Smart the State: Understanding the 
Learning Capacity o f Colombian Drug Trafficking Organizations,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no.
1 (Spring 1999), 97-119. In particular, this article tracks the evolution of Colombian drug trafficking from 
small-time networks largely coordinated by Chilean, Cuban and U.S. TCOs, through the development o f  
their own transnational logistical operations, and up their present primacy within the Western Hemisphere. 
See also Zabludoff, 23-4, who notes that, “As entrepreneurial groups, the Colombian narcotics 
organizations have demonstrated the flexibility needed to maintain their leading market position.”
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primarily by setting up exclusive distribution networks, can also be seen, as well as
extensive market and product diversification.40
The rise in the popularity of cocaine, and the corresponding profits stemming
largely from North American markets, in turn helped create a number of secondary
benefits to Colombia. To return to Guillermoprieto, in cocaine:
Colombia had found what most developing countries lack, a cheap crop that can 
produce the levels of employment, return on investment, and national growth that 
only industrial goods normally provide. Construction soared, the service sector 
exploded, antiquities dealers thrived, airline companies expanded their routes, 
artists made more than a decent living and, beginning in 1992, many campesinos 
also felt less gnawed by hunger.41
However, while cocaine trafficking indeed brought undreamed-of economic returns to
Colombia, the dark side of the trade also exacted a high social cost, most obviously
manifest in the growing wealth, power and influence of the Colombian drug cartels. As
Nobel laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez points out, “Colombia had not been aware of her
own importance in the international drug trade until the traffickers invaded the country’s
highest echelons through the back door, first with their increasing ability to corrupt and
suborn, and then with their own ambitions.”42
The rise and fall of the Medellin cartel, is exemplified by the meteoric career of
Pablo Escobar and his ultimately futile quest for legitimacy that helped further engulf the
40 Clawson and Lee, 11-2. The authors also note that the rise o f  heroin refining and distribution came about 
at least partly “in recognition o f  the fact that the U.S. cocaine market is approaching its saturation point.” 
For its part, UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 260, echoes many o f the factors contributing to 
Colombian TCOs competitive advantage in this respect. Among those already discussed are the country’s 
physical geography, experience moving contraband and entrepreneurial ethos. Others noted include the 
presence o f active guerrilla movements, legal and illegal immigration primarily to the U.S., and a high 
degree o f familiarity with black market exchanges and money laundering, all o f which will be addressed 
below.
41 Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 36. This observation is echoed by Bowden, who notes 
that the drug traffickers “wanted the state to legitimize their enterprise, and given the money they were 
willing to spread around. . .  some intellectuals saw the cocaine trade as potential economic salvation for 
Andean nations, akin to the discovery o f vast oil fields in the Persian Gulf.” Bowden, 31.
42 Marquez, 21.
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entire country in a cycle o f violence, is a case in point.43 Much o f this activity centered 
upon a campaign of terror consisting of a staggering number of bombings, kidnappings 
and assassinations, all designed to exert pressure on the Colombian government to accede 
to the demands of Escobar and the rest of the cartel’s leadership. As the human costs 
mounted, such atrocities effectively served to undermine any previous romantic images 
of drug traffickers as latter-day folk heroes.
Specifically, the domestic backlash against drug trafficking and related activity 
can be traced to the murder of crusading justice minister Rodrigo Lara in early 1984, 
allegedly by Escobar, which in turn led the Barco administration to cooperate more 
closely with the U.S., particularly with respect to extradition. However, it was the 
assassination, also attributed to Escobar, of leading presidential candidate Luis Galan in 
1989 that led the Colombian government to declare all-out war on the Medellin cartel44
In parallel with these events in Colombia, the notoriety of the drug traffickers also 
brought the issue to the attention of the U.S. government. The genesis of the U.S. “war 
on drugs” and its primary policy tool, the certification process, has been discussed at 
length in Chapter IV. With respect to Latin America, however, U.S. foreign policy has 
traditionally focused more on the strategic denial of influence from rivals outside the 
hemisphere and maintaining regional political stability than on more entangling issues. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, both the Reagan and first Bush administrations
43 With respect to Medellin, Bowden tellingly notes that even before Escobar’s time, “The region was 
famous for contrabandistas, local heads o f organized-crime syndicates, practitioners o f  the centuries-old 
paisa  (street hustler) tradition o f smuggling -  originally gold and emeralds, now marijuana, and soon 
cocaine.” Bowden, 18. Furthermore, Morrison, 5, correlates the rise in Colombian drug trafficking to the 
demise o f the nation’s textile industry, perhaps not coincidentally centered in Medellin. A similar case can 
be made for Nigeria with the collapse o f  oil prices in the mid-1980s, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
44 Bowden, 44, 63-4.
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began to focus increasingly in the issue, in particular by putting it into the context of 
national security.45
A major turning point in this respect was the November 1989 bombing of an 
Avianca Airlines commercial flight in an assassination attempt on the subsequently 
successful Colombian presidential candidate, Cesar Gaviria. This act caused 110 deaths, 
and included two American citizens among the victims. As a result, the explicit linkage 
between drug trafficking and terrorism was made in U.S. foreign policy circles, with the 
most prominent impact in the domestic Colombian context being the aforementioned 
issue of extradition 46
As early as 1985, in response to the increasing pressure from both the Colombian 
and U.S. governments, Escobar began acting through a nominal and largely self- 
aggrandizing organization called the “Extraditables,” which took the level of violence to 
a new level to pressure the Colombian authorities into blocking extradition efforts. In 
addition to gaining leverage via intimidation, this move was predicated upon gathering 
public support by tapping into the less than tacit insult that extradition represented to 
Colombian sovereignty.47
45 For instance, in 1986, Reagan signed a classified National Security Decision Directive that referred to the 
flow o f drugs across U.S. borders to be a “national security threat.” Moreover, in 1989 Bush authorized 
National Security Directive 18, which called for $250 million to be allocated to intelligence, law 
enforcement and military budgets to fight drug trafficking, with an additional $65 million earmarked for 
security assistance to Colombia itself. Bowden, 64-5. See also Vincent T. Bugliosi, The Phoenix Solution: 
Getting Serious About Winning America’s Drug War (Beverly Hills: Dove Books, 1996), 13-8.
46 Bowden, 80-1, which also notes the resultant increase in U.S. military involvement that also arose from 
this event.
47 Ibid., 51-9. The tactics used by Escobar under the auspices o f this group ranged from angry public rants 
in the media to kidnapping, assassination and a wide-ranging campaign o f bombing. For an overview o f  
the scope o f this domestic unrest and cycle o f  violence, see Marquez, 128-30. In addition to assorted car 
bombings and even the downing o f passenger planes, four presidential candidates were assassinated before 
the 1990 campaign. Moreover, in the first two months o f  1991, there were hundred murders, an average o f  
twenty a day, in Medellin. A total o f 457 police were also killed in the first few months o f  that year. 
Mdrquez, 178. The author further notes that the going rate for the murder o f  a police officer was five 
million pesos, and 800,000 for each on wounded. Attempts at compromise on the part o f  the Colombian
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In particular, extradition was seen by a significant segment of Colombian society 
not otherwise in sympathy with the drug traffickers as not only implying that the country 
was too weak to administer justice itself, but also that the U.S. somehow saw itself as a 
higher moral authority. The initial outcome of this phase was the negotiated 
incarceration of Escobar in June 1991, which lasted until his escape in September 1992. 
His death at the hands of Colombian police while still at large occurred in December 
1993, and for the most part the Medellin cartel was subsequently dismantled.48
By way of an epitaph for Escobar and the cartel he exemplified, Bunker and 
Sullivan note that, “In retrospect, the Medellin model can be understood as a new and 
very successful, albeit short-lived, form of criminal entity. Its leaders, while tactically 
and operationally brilliant, were strategically ignorant. Their attempt at directly taking on 
a Westphalian state, politically and militarily, was both organizationally and individually 
suicidal.”49
By contrast, the Cali cartel, led by the brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez 
Orejuela, maintained a more low-key operational stance as well as purported links with 
elements of both the paramilitary organizations and the national security forces, 
particularly among the Politia Nacional de Colombia (PNC, or Colombian National 
Police). As Williams and Savona note, rather than confronting the government directly 
as their counterparts in Medellin had, the Cali cartel adopted a strategy of infiltration.
government seldom went as far as Escobar felt necessary, as in September 1990 when the Decree 2047 
under Martial Law was issued. This stated that those who surrendered and confessed to their crimes would 
receive the right not to be extradited, while further cooperation with the authorities could have their 
sentences reduced by up to half. This was modified by Decree 3030 in December 1990, which provided for 
the judicial accumulation o f sentences in that only the longest o f a series would have to be served.
Marquez, 74.
48 The circumstances surrounding these events are discussed at length in Bowden, 119-53,203-49. See 
“Colombia contemplates extraditing its dragsters,” The Economist, 31 May 1997, 33, and 
“Unextraditable?” The Economist, 20 September 1997, 36-8.
49 Bunker and Sullivan, 62.
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This was predicated upon presenting a front of legitimate commercial activity and co­
opting local power structures through patronage.50
Together, and allegedly with the collusion of elements of the U.S. government, 
these groups tacitly cooperated to target Escobar’s operations during his brief period at 
large between September 1992 and December 1993. This cooperation took the form of a 
response in kind to the actions of the Extraditables, utilizing methods that the legitimate 
authorities where unable to utilize. A shadowy organization, known as “Los Pepes,”
(Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar, or People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), was pivotal in 
undermining the Medellin cartel’s hierarchy from the lowest to the highest levels, and 
setting the stage for Escobar’s demise.51
In the wake of Escobar’s death and the resulting chaos within the Medellin 
organization, there were grave concerns that their counterparts in Cali would expand even 
further without any major competitors. However, following the election of Ernesto 
Samper in 1994, contributions to his campaign by the Cali cartel came to light, leading to 
decertification by the United States twice during the mid-1990s.52 The Samper scandal 
led to a subsequent crackdown on their operations as well, culminating in the 
incarceration of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in 1994.53 Despite this development, 
there is evidence of a continuing though diminished presence of the cartel, and
50 Williams and Savona, 18-9.
51 Bowden, 175-200. Specific reference to the Cali cartel financing Los Pepes can be found in Bowden, 
197. See also M&rquez, 231.
52 “Allies or enemies,” The Economist, 22 February 1997, 53; “Policy, which policy?” The Economist, 20 
February 1999, 34; and Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 34-9. The potential impact of 
decertification by the U.S. on the Colombian domestic situation is considerable. In fact, by 1999 Colombia 
had become the largest recipient o f  U.S. foreign aid in the hemisphere and the third largest globally, after 
Israel and Egypt. For more details o f these expenditures, see U.S. Department o f State, INL, “INL Country 
Programs -  Colombia” (Washington, DC: Department o f State, 23 April 1999), available at 
http://www.state.gOv/g/inl/rls/fs/12603.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
53 Bowden, 269-72. However, allegations o f close cooperation between the Cali cartel and Marxists 
guerrilla groups, including the sharing o f  radio frequencies, can be found at least up to 1996, as discussed 
in Villamarin Pulido, 11-7.
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allegations that its leaders still maintain control of a considerable share of their former 
operations.54
However, the resultant power vacuum did not lead to a decline in Colombian drug 
trafficking activity. As Winifred Tate notes, the two major cartels “have since been 
replaced by smaller, more vertically integrated trafficking organizations whose nimble, 
independent traffickers are more difficult to detect and infiltrate.”55 Echoing this 
sentiment, Chepesiuk writes that Colombian TCOs continue “gliding smoothly into new 
markets and concentrating on making the drug-trafficking business a truly multinational 
enterprise.” Moreover, by combining an established smuggling network with expanding 
poppy cultivation and heroin production, “The criminal entrepreneurs, who brilliantly 
introduced the business concept of vertical integration into the international traffic in 
cocaine, were about to do the same to the heroin trade.”56
54 See, for instance, “The mobsters rub each other out,” The Economist, 28 November 1998, 34-5.
55 Tate, 1.
56 Chepesiuk, 23. For a contrasting view o f Latin American drug trafficking with that found in other 
regions, see also U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast 
Asia,” GAO/NSAID-96-831 (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1996), 1. Specifically, this report notes that, 
“Unlike most South American cocaine organizations, heroin trafficking organizations are not vertically 
integrated and heroin shipments rarely remain under the control o f  a single individual or organizations as 
they move from refinery to the streets.”
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Fig. 18. Opium cultivation areas of Colombia
The map above illustrates the current spatial distribution of such activity 
throughout the country. However, even before the displacement of the two major cartels,
57 Map source: U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, “The Drug Trade in Colombia: A Threat 
Assessment,” DEA-02006 (Washington, DC: DEA, March 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/Dubs/inteE020Q6/index.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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product diversification away from a strict dependence on cocaine was already underway. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, with respect to heroin Latin America was considered 
more a gateway to the U.S. market than an actual center of production. During this 
period, a two-way trade in which Latin American cocaine found its way to European 
markets in return for Southwest Asian heroin also emerged.58 According to the former 
chief of the PNC, Roso Jose Serrano, the Cali cocaine cartel began to diversify into 
opium cultivation during the early 1990s, using consultants from both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.59
As early as 1992, U.S. officials estimated that Colombia was producing as much 
as four tons of heroin per year. Despite this relatively limited production, “The 
availability of South American heroin, produced almost exclusively in Colombia, has 
increased dramatically in the United States since 1993.”60 By 1996, there were an 
estimated 2,100 hectares of opium poppies in Colombia, centered on the departments, or 
provinces, of Cauca, Huila and Tolima, where the higher elevation and rugged terrain 
both provide ideal growing conditions and hamper eradication efforts. However, because 
three crops can be harvested per year, actual production figures were placed at 6,600 
hectares.61 Furthermore, in 1997 Interpol reported that, “as predicted in 1996,” heroin
58 Lamour and Lamberti, 50-5, 57.
59 Jos6 Roso Serrano, Interview, “America’s New Heroin Epidemics: Along Comes A Horse,” MSNBC, 
aired 7 January 2001. Chepesiuk also notes that experienced Golden Triangle heroin “cooks” were lent to 
the Colombians for this endeavor as well. The quid pro quo behind the sharing o f such expertise was the 
opportunity to observe the Latin American marketing and logistical operations, commonly considered 
analogous to the “best practices” found in the legitimate business sectors. Chepesiuk, 23. See also Booth, 
Opium, 324-5, for more on the learning curve in the transition from coca to opium cultivation.
60 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 41. This expansion in market share was largely due to a decreasing 
availability o f Southeast Asian heroin.
61 Ibid, 48. Furthermore, as noted in Villamarin Pulido, 85, “Poppy production coincides with guerrilla 
growth in rural economies, formerly characterized by small stable farmers in the Andean region. The 
arrival o f  the guerrilla and poppy plantations had been accompanied by a high degree o f violence, continual 
agrarian conflicts and the rapid buying and selling o f land.” The author also points out that, as o f  1996, 
insurgent activity has been found in 123 o f the 179 municipalities where poppies are grown. Moreover,
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from South America supplied more than just the North American market, with seizures of
ft)shipments originating in the region having been made in Europe.
The competitive advantage of Latin American heroin is only partially a function 
of effective smuggling methods adapted from the transnational movement of cocaine. As 
discussed in Chapter III, by volume heroin offers a considerably higher profit margin
ft\than cocaine. Moreover, poppy cultivation is also harder to locate, as the plant is not a 
perennial like coca. In fact, according to U.S. officials, it was known that Colombian 
drug traffickers were cultivating opium there years before evidence could be found.64 
However, it should also be noted that opium cultivation throughout Latin America is 
much less culturally embedded that that of coca.
Both purer and cheaper than its chief competitor in the U.S. market, Southeast 
Asian heroin, Colombian heroin has been particularly impressive in terms of market 
penetration.65 As one DEA report notes with respect to South American heroin, “High 
purity was essential to establishing a clientele and maintaining user loyalty in the fiercely 
competitive U.S. market. Consequently, Colombia-based traffickers smuggled heroin that 
commonly ranged between 80 and 95 percent pure.” Furthermore, at these levels of 
purity, it is possible to discard the traditional heroin paraphernalia involving the use of
underling the fact that this is not strictly a rural phenomenon, heroin processing reportedly continued, 
“particularly in the urban areas o f many Departments throughout the country.” Interpol, “International 
Drug Trafficking,” 1.
62 Ibid., 1.
63 According to Clawson and Lee, 17, while coca yields $4,000 per hectare, a crop o f opium poppies can 
earn between $13,000 and $14,000. One reason for this price differential is that many farmers can readily 
convert the raw opium to morphine base, which can in turn be used to produce heroin at a 1:1 weight ratio.
64 “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995,44.
65 Chepesiuk, 148. As discussed in the previous chapter, at present the bulk o f Southwest Asian heroin is 
destined for European markets.
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the intravenous syringe in favor of either sniffing or smoking. As such, a larger needle- 
averse segment of the potential market could thus be reached more effectively.66
By early 2000, as the Latin American drug industry continued to diversify, the 
cultivation of opium poppies had not only expanded within Colombia, partially in 
response to a contraction of this activity in Peru’s mountainous northern region.67 
Although as a whole the Andean countries supply less than 10% of the world opium 
output, their share is rising and their product, being extra-pure, is especially attractive 
even to markets beyond North America.68 As such, an earlier prediction by Flynn does 
not seem nearly as far-fetched as it may have a decade ago, namely that, “The 
Colombians almost certainly have the means to become the chief world heroin suppliers 
of the 21st century.”69
Moreover, as mentioned above, the capabilities of the relevant TCOs also 
continued to evolve as their product line expanded.70 For instance, in 1999 The 
Economist noted that the times when Colombian drug smuggling “was dominated by the 
Medellin and Cali cocaine mobs are long gone. Nowadays, the industry deals in heroin
66 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 42. Moreover, other street level marketing include offering first-time 
buyers small quantities on credit, insisting that established cocaine distributors also purchase and sell 
heroin, and undercutting competitor’s prices.
67 Decreased Peruvian drug cultivation in recent years is largely due to the chain o f radar sites known as Air 
Bridge Denial, preventing small planes from crossing into Colombia and southwestern Brazil. However, as 
a result Peruvian traffickers have been actively seeking out alternatives, such a greater use o f sea routes. 
OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 10.
68 “A crop that refuses to die,” The Economist (web site), 4 March 2000. Moreover, some observers also 
note that Colombian guerrillas have begun poppy cultivation activity across the border in Venezuela and 
possible Ecuador. Villamarin Pulido, 6.
9 Flynn, “Worldwide Drugs,” 29. As o f the late 1990s, there were few domestic reports o f heroin use 
within Colombia. However, in time Colombian opium poppy cultivation and heroin production has the 
potential to stimulate local heroin abuse. UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 263.
0 For example, beyond the purview o f the drug trade, the U.S. Secret Service estimates that roughly a third 
of the counterfeit dollars distributed in the country over the past several years has originated in Colombia, 
facilitated by trafficking networks and lax law enforcement. Incidentally, as the global currency o f choice, 
American dollars are the most commonly counterfeited in the world. U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 24. See also Fialka, 138.
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as well as cocaine, and has fragmented into hundreds of small, anonymous organizations.
71And it is even more productive than ever.” This view was contemporaneously echoed 
in an official U.S. assessment, which noted that despite the setbacks suffered by the 
cartels, “Colombian traffickers not only continue to meet most of the world’s cocaine 
demand, but have become the largest supplier of heroin to the United States.”72
In addition to the characteristics already outlined, the successors to the two major 
cartels are increasingly more tactically and technically proficient, both by inclination and 
from necessity. They are smaller and more discreet, exhibiting less conspicuous 
consumption but more equitable profit sharing, and largely rejecting the extravagant
n ' i
lifestyles and overt violence of their predecessors. While still endowed with greater 
expertise, more capital and better overseas networks than emerging rivals, “This new 
generation of Colombian trafficking groups maintains lower profiles, focuses on limited 
aspects of the drug trade, and forms more ad hoc alliances that make them more difficult 
law enforcement targets.”74 Finally, being much more highly specialized and difficult to 
infiltrate, they are also much more elusive.75
In particular, an overarching and well-developed command, control, 
communications, computer and intelligence capability, known as C4I in military 
parlance, on the part of Colombian TCOs is becoming a prominent hallmark of their 
organizational sophistication. For instance, according to the DEA, Colombian drug
71 “Colombia: A new class o f  drug trafficker,” The Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
72 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 42.
73 See Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 2; and “Colombia: A new class o f  drug trafficker,” The 
Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
74 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 42.
75 As The Economist notes, “Today’s traffickers are also much harder to catch. The police reckon they are 
mostly aged 25 to 40, have no criminal records and work through legitimate small businesses. Estimates o f  
the number o f trafficking organizations range from 80 to 250. Increasingly, they act as coordinators, 
contracting out everything from manufacturing to transport to specialist groups.” “Colombia: A new class 
o f drug trafficker,” The Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
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wholesaling and money laundering networks are comprised of multiple organizational 
cells that maintain meticulous records and use the most advanced commercially available 
technology including personal computers, pagers and fax machines.76
Furthermore, many drug trafficking groups have demonstrated an active interest 
in acquiring increasingly sophisticated technology, particularly with respect to secure 
communications equipment. Additional security measures utilized by trafficking 
organizations include the use of a wide array of counter-surveillance techniques, while 
disinformation efforts include the witting use of suspected telephones and the staging of 
fake drug transactions to thwart law enforcement efforts.77
Moving from the issue of strictly economically-motivated organizations to more 
politically-motivated ones, involvement in the drug business as well as with other 
criminal activity finances, supplies and gives military strength to non-state actors across 
the ideological spectrum. Given the fragmented nature of Colombia’s political 
geography, the ability to leverage these resources on an ongoing basis effectively puts 
such groups on a near-equal footing with the legitimate central government, barring 
external support.
Furthermore, in addition to independently funding their activities, both guerrilla 
and paramilitary commanders are able to solidify a local primacy within their areas of 
operation by inserting themselves, by force when necessary, into the illegal economy that 
is the primary source of income for many rural populations.78 As Thoumi notes:
76 Other illicit communications techniques include the limited-time use o f cloned cellular telephones and 
stolen calling cards. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), ix.
77 Even earlier, Escobar was reported to be intensely interested in such technological developments, both as 
assets and as threats to his operations. Marquez, 198-9.
78 For instance, within their areas o f operation both the leftist guerrilla and rightist paramilitary forces 
“support a widespread illegal economy or illicit activity that is the primary source o f income for the local 
population.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 6. Bentham,
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Many coca and poppy growers in Colombia are peasants displaced by political 
and criminal violence. They have settled individually difficult-to-access lands 
and their lives have been marked by violence. In contrast with Bolivia and Peru, 
armed peasants settled in coca and poppy growing areas in Colombia. Illicit crop 
regions in Colombia have been very violent and neither state nor civil society 
could provide peaceful conflict resolution systems.79
Moreover, even when the local populace would rather not be involved in the drug trade,
economics and the stark realities of power favor few other options.
In some respects, this state of affairs represents an alternate form of plomo o plata
directed primarily toward the non-urban Colombian countryside. At present, on the left
the Marxist-oriented guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the smaller Ejercito de
Liberacion Nacional (ELN, or National Liberation Army) continue their brutal struggle
o n
against the central government, a conflict marked by atrocities on both sides.
Simultaneously, on the right, bands of paramilitary vigilantes or autodefensas, 
mostly organized under the umbrella organization of the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC, or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), ostensibly wage their own 
covert and semi-sanctioned campaign against the guerrillas despite repeated charges of 
self-enrichment and human rights violations. A number of these groups have also been
9-10, also notes the lack o f viable economic alternatives for rural populations. A geographical overview of 
the regions o f  Colombia most affected by this phenomenon can be found in Villamarin Pulido, 173-8. For 
more on the coercion o f rural populations to cultivate illegal drug crops, see also UNDCP, World Drug 
Report, 128.
79 Thoumi, 68-9.
80 For more general background on the FARC’s development, see George H. Franco, “Their Darkest Hour: 
Colombia’s Government and the Narco-Insurgency,” Parameters XXX (Summer 2000), 83-93; 
Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 34-9; and “Colombia’s other gangsters,” The Economist, 25 
March 1995,48. In particular, Guillermoprieto’s first-hand account o f meetings with the FARC leadership, 
beginning in 1986, offers copious details regarding the personalities o f  these individuals. Incidentally, an 
interesting internal organizational feature o f the FARC is that an estimated 30% of its guerrilla troops are 
female, while a significant proportion are also minors, both voluntary and coerced. Guillermoprieto, “The 
Children’s War,” 37-40.
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linked to elements of the Colombian security forces, particularly with respect to 
combating the common adversaries, the leftist guerrilla groups.
At the international level, during the 1980s the popular notion of trafficker- 
guerrilla cooperation held considerable sway within U.S. foreign policy circles, however 
questionable some of the assumptions regarding the convergence of interests between the 
two types of groups might have been.81 The notion certainly found receptive audiences 
in Washington, still in the grasp of the prevailing East-West conceptualization of the 
Cold War, and with Latin American governments that found it expedient to publicly and 
politically link its primary enemies.
As with many distortions or oversimplifications, it is the grain of truth involved 
that is most problematic. While guerrillas and drug traffickers may not be natural 
partners, during the period in question cooperation against various government forces in a 
pragmatic and cynically symbiotic manner was a logical response to their mutual threat.82 
Rhetoric aside, the complex interaction between these two types of non-state actors is a 
phenomenon that defies simplistic monocausal analysis.
The current wave of sustained political instability in Colombia began during the 
Gaviria administration in the early 1990s, when economic reforms led to an increased
81 Characteristic o f  analyses predicated upon this assumption, albeit in the latter stages o f its intellectual 
evolution, is Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andes 
States and Panama, Washington Papers No. 137 (New York: Praeger, 1989). By contrast, though writing 
at the same time, Renselaer W. Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 13, characterizes the overall relationship as more hostile than 
cooperative, a stance largely out o f step with the prevailing conventional wisdom but more justified in 
hindsight. At the other end o f this spectrum are the views o f Villmarin, whose primary thesis is that the 
FARC was involved at all levels o f  production and trafficking to the extent that they became “the third and 
most dangerous o f the drug cartels in Colombia.” Villamarin Pulido, 17-9.
82 Clawson and Lee, 178-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
284
prosperity that was not distributed evenly.83 This state of affairs was most keenly felt
throughout the more remote regions along the Putamayo and Guaviare river basins in
southern and eastern Colombia, and in the north along both the Panamanian and
Venezuelan borders. Also during this period, however, a new constitution provided for
the reintegration of some leftist insurgent elements into civil society.84
Beginning with the largest of the active guerrilla organizations, the FARC, the
genesis of this movement can be found in the period of La Violertcia lasting from 1948 to
1954. It emerged in 1966 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party, one of
a number of groups receiving extensive Cuban backing. As George H. Franco notes:
Rhetorically, the objectives of the FARC have remained largely unchanged 
throughout its existence. The group seeks to overthrow the ruling order in 
Colombia and to drive out what it perceives to be the imperialist influences of the 
United States in Latin America. FARC still publicly clings to its Marxist-Leninist 
platform of massive redistribution of land and wealth, state control of natural 
resources, and large-scale government spending on social welfare. Additionally, 
the group’s predilection for attacking economic targets has placed it squarely at 
odds with both domestic and international business interests.
However, ideological trappings aside, the author also points out that the FARC’s success
in recent years “stems from the crafting of a new and largely apolitical motive of self-
interest that has connected with several dissimilar groups.” This partnership of
83 For an enlightening overview o f this period, as well as o f the preceding Barco administration, see Harvey 
F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994 (Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1999).
84 This opportunity was grasped by both M-19 and the Ejercito de Liber acion Popular (ELP, or People’s 
Liberation Army), though by neither the FARC nor the ELN. Incidentally, the FARC briefly had its own 
political party, the Union Patriotica, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and enjoyed some success in 
the mayoral elections o f 1988, though thirteen o f its successful candidates were subsequently assassinated. 
By 1992, the legitimate wing o f the FARC was no more. With respect to M-19, Villamarin Pulido, 30-3, 
reports that it was the first guerrilla group to enter into a mutually beneficial undertaking with drug 
traffickers in October 1981. This interaction appears to have initially arisen as drug traffickers and 
guerrillas cooperated to move weapons into Colombia. Moreover, before renouncing violence and joining 
the mainstream political process, in November 1995 M-19 commandos took over the Colombian Supreme 
Court building in Bogota, an operation that left forty rebels and fifty civilians dead, among the latter eleven 
o f twenty-four justices. In addition to crippling the legal system, over six thousand criminal case files were 
also destroyed, including those pertaining to Pablo Escobar. It was later alleged that the guerrillas had been 
paid approximately a million dollars by Escobar to carry out this raid. Bowden, 53.
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convenience includes migrant and landowning drug cultivators, trafficking organizations, 
and, increasingly, disaffected individuals in urban areas.85
Even earlier, the loss of funding from Soviet, Cuban and other Communist 
sources has led leftist Colombian insurgent and extremist groups to find alternate sources 
of income, primarily through various illegal activities as noted in previous chapters.86 
The success of these criminal ventures has in turn led to speculation as to whether or not 
these groups are more interested in maintaining the current anarchical status quo and the 
associated opportunities for profit than actually seizing power.
In particular, both the FARC and ELN have became deeply involved in both drug 
trafficking and kidnapping, as these activities tend to be more lucrative than other 
available options such as bank robbery.87 Moreover, the ELN has also developed its own 
niche extorting money from oil companies by threatening their infrastructure.88 As 
Franco writes, “These economic activities have become so dominant and lucrative that 
they are now seen as an end in themselves.”89
With respect to the power vacuum left by the collapse of the major cartels in the 
mid-1990s, the various Marxist guerrilla groups moved into the void as protectors of both
85 Franco, 83-4. Noting the same divergence between Marxist theory and profit-seeking practice, 
Villamarin Pulido, 144-5, traces the rapid conversion o f the FARC into a major drug trafficking 
organization to the August 1990 death o f the organization’s intellectual leader, Jacobo Arenas, and the 
subsequent shift in priorities. A skilled though vicious propagandist, Arenas was allegedly opposed to 
having the capitalist aspects o f  the drug trade taint the movement.
86 This phenomenon is not linked specifically to Colombia, though the country does in fact offer a 
singularly salient example. See Michael K. Steinberg, “Generals, Guerrillas, Drugs, and Third World War- 
Making,” The Geographical Review 90, no. 2 (April 2000), 260-70.
87 Auerbach, 25. The author also notes the impact o f “double displacement,” with the crackdown on the 
drug trade causing layoffs among members o f  this criminal class, who then turn their skills and resources to 
other illegal activities.
88 For instance, between 1985 and 2000, the ELN bombed Colombia’s main pipeline approximately 700 
times, spilling 1.7 million barrels o f  oil and causing serious environmental damage. Pardo, 66. See also 
“BP at war,” The Economist, 19 July 1997, 32-3.
89 Franco, 84. Going even further, with respect to the Marxist-Leninist dictum that the end justify the 
means, Villamarin Pulido, 94, notes that for the FARC in particular, the urge to increase drug profits has 
overcome ideology to the extent that the means have become the end.
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poppy and coca growers, in exchange for a 10 percent tax on traffickers operating in their 
territory. Furthermore, insurgents have also been known to guard drug-processing labs 
for a fee, and even run their own labs and distribution operations in more remote parts of
i 90the country.
Some analysts estimate that FARC earns nearly half of its total revenues from 
taxing the drug trade, with the remainder coming from kidnapping, robbery and other 
criminal activity.91 To return once more to Franco, the FARC’s connections with the 
largely apolitical drug cultivators and with the often right-wing trafficking organizations 
“provided it with the means to contest the state for power. By facilitating an environment 
for drug activities, FARC was able to mobilize resources on an unprecedented scale.” 
[author’s italics] 92
In addition to the involvement of leftist insurgencies such as the FARC in the 
drug trade, right wing paramilitary organizations, or autodefensas, have also been linked 
to numerous types of criminal enterprises.93 These groups initially arose in response to 
various political and social pressures in Colombia during the past several decades under 
the auspices of powerful forces whose interests were being jeopardized. Though not
90 Chepesiuk, 233. See also U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. 
II, 6. As discussed in Villamarin Pulido, 21-6, initially this cooperation was more favorable from the 
traffickers’ perspective, as the guerrillas have gained more knowledge of and contacts within the drug 
business their partners have become more expendable. Moreover, a parallel situation can be found across 
the border in Peru beginning in the late ‘80s in the activity o f  the Maoist-oriented guerrilla organization 
Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path). This issue, as well as that o f transnational Colombian 
involvement with these groups, is discussed in the following section.
91 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 40.
92 Franco, 86. The author also cites sources within the Colombian National Police that the FARC has 
reportedly exchanged drugs directly for both money and weapons from Chechen, Russian, Ukrainian and 
Uzbek TCOs, used similar methods to obtain arms from the Middle East and Central America.
93 Ibid., 86. In particular, the author notes those led by the Castaflo and Carranza families as being directly 
involved in criminal activity. See also “Drugs, war and democracy: A survey o f  Colombia,” The 
Economist, 21 April 2001, 3; “Colombia’s drug-bedevilled hopes o f peace,” The Economist, 3 October 
1998,39; Tate, 1; and Guillermoprieto, “The Children’s War,” 40. Several members o f  the Castaflo family 
were also allegedly linked to Los Pepes, as discussed above. Bowden, 197.
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exclusively a rural phenomenon, for the most part their genesis was precipitated by 
ongoing leftist guerrilla activity.94
For instance, beginning in the early 1980s, there was the “drastic miscalculation” 
on the part of the guerillas to start targeting relatives of drug traffickers for abduction. To 
counter this threat, the traffickers created and financed the organization Muerte a los 
Seuestadores, or “Death to the Kidnappers,” which began working with the military to 
strike back at the guerrillas and anyone suspected of supporting them. This organization 
in turn is seen as laying the groundwork for the emergence of the rightist paramilitary
95groups.
In their present incarnation, led by the AUC, paramilitary organizations appear to 
be increasingly involved in drug trafficking. The leader of one major organization has 
stated publicly that 70% of his budget came from such sources.96 While the FARC 
remains predominant throughout the south and west, in the northwestern part of the 
county and in particular along the border region adjoining Panama the autodefensas hold 
sway. As The Economist noted in 1998, “The northwest is a traditional hub of the drugs 
trade; it contains smaller but important areas of coca cultivation, and its heroin trade is
94 Bowden notes that, for decades, wealthy landowners in the central Magdalena Valley, which the FARC 
used as a stronghold, had employed private armies to protect their property and terrorize peasants who 
expressed support for the guerrillas. However, by the mid-1980s, the largest landowners in the region were 
the leaders o f  the Medellin cartel, who had both the resources and the ruthlessness necessary to go after the 
rebels with more aggressiveness than the Colombian Army ever had. As such, they both funded and 
equipped various paramilitary organizations and facilitated links to the national security forces. Bowden, 
33. However, the author also notes that, even as Escobar and his cohorts were assisting the government 
against the rebels in that region, elsewhere other members o f the cartel were collaborating to various 
degrees with the FARC, ELN and M-19. Bowden, 43
95 The catalyst for this was the 1981 kidnapping o f Martha Nieves Ochoa, sister o f two o f Pablo Escobar’s 
closest associates, by the M-19 guerrilla group, as discussed in Villamarin Pulido, 93-4; and Bowden, 33. 
Furthermore, Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 37-8, also relates the story o f another 
kidnapping by guerrillas in 1981, that o f  Fidel Castafto, a minor drug trafficker and the father o f  Carlos 
Castaflo, currently the prime mover behind the AUC. For more on the revenge kidnapping o f kidnapper’s 
relatives, see also Auerbach, 359-62.
96 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 41.
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said to be the lifeblood of the paramilitaries that dominate the region. Most of the 
country’s drugs exports, and its arms imports, pass through the area.”97
At times, some observers have claimed to discern a disparity in U.S. policy 
toward Colombia in that, despite a public recognition of the extent of the drug trade 
throughout the country, much more pressure is exerted on the Colombian central 
government to crack down on the FARC-controlled areas. However, former U.S. 
Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera stated in January 2000 that, “Everybody in the drug 
business -  guerrillas, autodefensas, or drug traffickers -  will be the focus of these
• ORoperations.” In June 2000, an initiative negotiated between the Clinton administration 
and that of Andres Pastana appeared set to become the most concrete and ambitious 
bilateral effort to date to address this nexus of issues.
Known originally as Plan Colombia, this effort called for $7.5 billion in aid both 
to fight the drug trade and support Colombian peace efforts, including $1.3 billion in 
military aid. It represented the largest strategic U.S. commitment in Latin America since 
its involvement in the Central American insurgencies in the 1980s. A central aim was to 
sever the link between drug money and guerrilla activity, in particular by targeting drug 
cultivation through the spraying of herbicides, in a sense striking at the lowest level of 
drug trade.99 As such, its focus appeared to be on the upstream end of the drug trade,
97 “Colombia’s drug-bedevilled hopes o f peace,” The Economist, 3 October 1998, 39. See also “War 
crime,” The Economist, 11 May 2002, 35, which notes the use by both the AUC and the FACR o f the 
Atrato River valley as a smuggling corridor to export drugs and import cocaine.
98 Quoted in Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 39. Beyond the rhetorical, evidence o f  the 
U.S. commitment to target all extra-legal actors engaged in the drug trade regardless o f  ideology can be 
seen in the September 2002 indictment o f AUC leader Carlos Canstafio and subsequent request for 
extradition. See “Castafio’s gamble,” The Economist, 28 September 2002, 36; and “An olive branch o f  
sorts,” The Economist, 7 December 2002, 38.
99 Domestic Colombian perspectives on the genesis o f  Plan Colombia are discussed in Guillermoprieto, 
“Colombia: Violence Without End?" 31-40. More broadly, the evolution o f this initiative over time can be 
seen in the following series o f articles: “Putamayo’s tense wait for the arrival o f  Plan Colombia,” The
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rather than the seizure of drugs in transit as has been the norm for the past several 
decades.
One factor complicating the potential impact of Plan Colombia was Pastrana’s 
December 1998 decision to give the FARC its own “demilitarized” zone of 16,216 square 
miles in south central Colombia as an incentive to negotiate. This was seen by many as 
exacerbating the problem by giving the rebels their own base of operation in which to 
consolidate and expand their already considerable influence. In addition to providing a 
safe haven for guerrilla activity, the drug trade was also able to become both more open 
and even further entrenched within this area.100 For a range of reasons, the Pastrana 
government “remilitarized” this area in late February 2002.101 However, as of this 
writing, its successor, the Uribe administration, though taking a harder line toward the 
FARC, is still grappling with the legacy of these previous concessions.
A particularly interesting feature of Plan Colombia is the official U.S. position 
that the initiative aims strictly at the drug trade and not wider guerrilla activity, when in
Economist, 19 August 2000, 29-30; “The gringos land in Colombia,” The Economist, 2 September 2000, 
32-3; “A hug in the Colombian jungle,” The Economist, 17 February 2001; and “Into battle,” The 
Economist, 8 September 2001. Incidentally, this initiative also envisions a forward operating location in 
Ecuador, consisting o f radar sites and an air base, as well three other interdiction facilities actually within 
Colombia territory. Roos, 43-4.
100 See “Fighting over drugs,” The Economist, 8 July 2000, 34. In some respects, as noted in Franco, 88, 
Pastrana’s dealings with the FARC can be seen as an extension o f the preceding administration, Ernesto 
Samper’s, policy o f “peace at any cost.” Furthermore, at present it is unlikely that a similar demilitarized 
zone of 1,550 square miles proposed for the ELN will become a reality, as discussed in “Haven sent,” The 
Economist, 7 April 2001, 38.
101 The immediate impetus behind the decision was the kidnapping o f senator and dark-horse presidential 
candidate Ingrid Betancourt, though the opinions o f both the military and the general public also supported 
this move. See “A call to arms,” The Economist, 2 March 2002, 36-7. For more on the context o f this 
situation, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 142-7.
102 In addition to an avowed ideological stance against the FARC, the guerrilla group not only tried to 
assassinate Uribe in April 2002 but was also previously responsible for killing his father in 1983 during a 
kidnapping attempt. The progression o f the Uribe administration’s policies against the FARC can be seen 
in “State o f commotion,” The Economist, 17 August 2002; “Calling up reinforcements,” The Economist, 21 
September 2002, 37; and “More order and less law,” The Economist, 9 November 2002, 37-8. The 
FARC’s efforts to recreate their enclave on a larger scale is discussed in “Rebel mini-state,” The 
Economist, 15 June 2002, 38.
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fact the two are largely intertwined. For instance, with respect to direct military aid to the 
Colombian armed forces, the guidelines of using these resources solely to fight drug 
trafficking is not reasonable in practice. In fact, concerns over the militarization of this 
issue led to Plan Colombia being rechristened as the Andean Regional Initiative, with 
money split between law enforcement and development efforts, as well as spread to
• 1 m «involve Colombia’s neighbors as well. Furthermore, since 9/11 there have been 
various attempts to link such funding to the wider “war on terror.”104
Finally, turning to human geography, a key issue with inherent physical, 
economic and political dimensions is the transnational spatial disposition of indigenous 
ethnic groups, whose identities are increasingly extending beyond strict national 
boundaries. This phenomenon can be found not only in Colombia, but also throughout 
Latin America in general. However, in contrast with both Peru and Bolivia, Colombia is 
predominantly a mestizo country that has largely assimilated indigenous groups and 
institutions.105
103 Though as o f  this writing the final budget has not been approved, the revised plan calls for a significant 
budget request to cover “not just Colombia, but Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, as a 
geographic area.” Moreover, it is balanced so that Colombia does not have the 85 percent funding that it 
had under Plan Colombia, but rather a roughly 50/50 split between Colombia and the others. Beers and 
Brown, “2000 Narcotics Certification Determinations” (1 March 2001). See also “The struggle to 
eliminate a much-loved Andean shrub,” The Economist, 26 May 2001, 35-6. However, to effectively 
augment these proposed measures, there also exists a pressing need for trade incentives that will open up 
U.S. markets to legal Colombian goods, paralleling those that granted access to Central American products 
following the wars in that region during the 1980s. See Pardo, 73.
104 See, for instance, “Staying alive,” The Economist, 25 May 2002, 37. A broad analysis o f this issue since 
the events o f 9/11 can also be found in John A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy,”
Strategic Forum no. 194 (October 2002), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF 194/sfl 94.htm. 
accessed 15 July 2004. However, an even earlier indication o f the realization that drug trafficking and 
guerrilla activity have become increasingly interconnected is that, prior to 1998, U.S. military aid to 
Colombia was listed as “Category 4,” denoting operations not involving hostilities. The 1998 aid package 
was the first to be upgraded and put through as “Category 2,” for military operations just short o f  war. See 
“Policy, which policy?” The Economist, 20 February 1999, 34.
105 See Thoumi, 84. The author also posits that the existence o f significant indigenous communities in Peru 
and Bolivia may have encouraged discriminatory and racist attitudes, but also bolstered social controls on 
individual behavior. However, “Colombia, on the other hand, is and extreme individualistic society in 
which many people simply do not care about the effect o f  their actions on anybody else.”
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By their nature, cross-border kinship ties not only serve to facilitate migration, but 
potentially a wide range of unofficial transactions as well.106 As Donna Lee Van Cott 
notes:
After independence, the new states remained centralized, with the majority of the 
government apparatus located in the capital city and some important provincial 
commercial centers. By this time, the majority of the indigenous population had 
fled or been forced into the more remote areas of the country: the unexplored 
jungles, the highest mountain ranges, and along the blurry borders between the 
emerging nations. The borderlands were particularly desirable destinations, as 
they represented the furthest distance between the centralized power of the state 
and thus the weakest zone of power.107
Furthermore, left with few other viable economic options, a high proportion of drug
cultivators are members of indigenous ethnic groups. As such, indigenous peoples in
relatively anarchical areas of Colombia who are forced to coexist in complex and often
uneasy relationships with drug traffickers, guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups
and official security forces in the relatively anarchical parts of the country.108
Finally, there is the more pervasive dilemma of displaced persons throughout the
country, in the context of both internal and external migration. With respect to the
106 As Kearney and Varese observe, “In many Latin American countries indigenous groups span national 
borders. This transnational, transborder, transstate character o f Native American ethnic groups is rooted in 
colonial territorial partitions and their post colonial confirmation . . .  The transnationalism o f numerous 
indigenous peoples is also accentuated by their migration across national boundaries.” Kearney and 
Varese, 217. See also Donna Lee Van Cott, “Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American 
Security,” McNair Paper no. 53, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 
(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996), 1-6.
107 Ibid., 8. In the case o f Colombia, while the majority o f  Colombians are o f mixed descent, roughly half a 
million indigenous citizens are concentrated in the southwest and the Amazon basin. They comprise 
roughly 81 distinct ethnic groups speaking 64 separate languages.
108 Ibid., 13-28. Of particular interest in illustrating these complexities vis-a-vis the central government, the 
author notes the following: “While the majority o f  guerrilla insurgencies in Latin America are class-based, 
nonindigenous movements, there are several instances o f  Indian-led guerrilla movements and others where 
the leadership and ethnic orientation is murky. The most clear-cut case o f an Indian armed movement is 
the Quintin Lame, formed in 1981 by Indians in the Cauca region o f southwestern Colombia to defend 
indigenous communities from attacks by guerrillas, drug traffickers, local landowners, and state security 
forces . . .  While the Colombian government considered the group to be no different than the country’s 
other insurgencies, the Quintin Lame was a local self-defense movement with no national political or 
military aspirations.” In May 1991, the group put down its weapons and became a legal political 
organization.
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former, there has been a longstanding and ongoing demographic shift from rural to urban 
areas. At least part of this trend may be attributed to the chaos and lawlessness that is 
endemic to much of the Colombian countryside, as discussed throughout this section. 
However, in some cases the displacement of people back toward more remote areas in 
some cases has partially offset earlier movements to shanty-towns and slums.109
Similarly, with respect to external migration, over the past several years 1.5 
million Colombians have been displaced from their country. In 2000, 366,000 
Colombians applied for non-immigrant visas to the U.S., more than double the number 
for 1997. In recent years, as a national category they are second only to the Chinese in 
terms of numbers of political asylum seekers.110 While by no means is more than a small 
group directly involved in any kind of illegal enterprises, as discussed in Chapter II, the 
mere presence of an extensive expatriate community is pivotal for the expansion of 
ethnically-based TCOs.111
As a result of the many economic, political and security-related pressures on the 
social fabric of the nation, “Colombia is considered to have one of the largest refugee
119problems anywhere outside of Africa.” As in the case of Afghanistan, a large and
growing pool of often desperate potential “legs” to facilitate the transnational movement
109 Bentham, 11.
110 Interestingly, the United States announced in 2001 that anyone having ever paid a vacuha, or protection 
money to potential kidnappers, would be ineligible for political asylum on the grounds o f supporting a 
terrorist organization. “Miami nice,” The Economist, 5 May 2001, 26. This article also notes that Miami 
itself, perhaps the most important commercial hub in the greater Caribbean basin, is now home to 130,000 
Colombians, demographically the second largest group after Cubans.
111 For more on this phenomenon, see Bovenkerk, 120-1.
112 Franco, 87. See also Thoumi, 86; and Kearney and Varese, 218, which discusses the economic 
pressures on rural inhabitants to move to urban areas. It is also noted in “When is a refugee not a refugee?” 
The Economist, 3 March 2001, 23-6, that Colombia ranks second only to Sudan in number o f internally 
displaced people, with between 2 and 3 million.
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of contraband is an asset that drug trafficking organizations have effectively leveraged 
whenever possible.
In general, continuing civil unrest in Colombia compounded by the ongoing 
activities of both drug trafficking and guerrilla organizations provides for a highly 
favorable smugglers’ landscape in the country for the foreseeable future. However, as 
Thoumi notes, “Despite the frightening violent death rates and other social ills that 
Colombia has suffered in the past 25 years, it is not wise to look at Colombia as an 
aberration. Instead, it should be viewed as a precursor of problems that can arise in any 
society that experiences drastic social change.”113
In conjunction with the more established cocaine trade, heroin and its attendant 
profits will continue to provide the necessary incentives to keep improving existing 
smuggling routes and methods and to move onward toward new business opportunities. 
At present, the already immense global reach of Colombian trafficking organizations is 
poised to become even longer as these trends accelerate. The next section focuses on 
both the transnational activities that this reach entails, with a particular emphasis on the 
most pivotal set of heroin smuggling vectors leading to markets in North America.
Smuggling Vectors Out o f Colombia: All Roads North 
Paralleling the case of Afghanistan, heroin moving outward across Colombia’s 
borders and into the wider hemispheric region can be represented by corresponding 
smuggling vectors radiating outward like the spokes of a wheel, in accordance with 
smugglers’ perception of access, risk and connectivity. As discussed above, much of this 
analysis will by necessity revolve around the parallel issue of the cocaine trade, as in
113 Thoumi, 92.
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many cases trafficking in both types of drugs is inextricably linked if not actually shipped 
together. The map below serves to illustrate some of the more salient spatial trends that 




Fig. 19. Central and South American heroin flows114
Over the past several decades, Colombian TCOs have dominated the transnational 
logistics of the black market for drugs throughout the greater Caribbean basin, especially 
with respect to linking South American suppliers to North American and, increasingly, 
other markets. However, as discussed in Chapter III, in some respects it is the demand
114 Map source: U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
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side of this equation that provides much of the impetus to exploit all available roads 
north.
The innermost of the concentric rings through which transnational heroin 
smuggling vectors originating in Colombia must pass includes Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, 
Venezuela and Panama by land, with direct access to the sea available along both the 
Caribbean and Pacific coasts. Further out, the isthmus of Panama forms the first step in 
along the land bridge that leads through Central America and Mexico to the U.S. border, 
while the many islands throughout the Caribbean have also traditionally played an 
important role in drug transit. International air connections in some ways leapfrog the 
other two modes, and will be addressed primarily in the context of their entry into the 
United States. Finally, as all of these vectors close in on their final destination, the last 
obstacles remain the border controls of their respective consuming countries.
Despite the lucrative profits involved, smuggling drugs through this region will 
always be a complex endeavor involving a limitless number of iterations against as many 
obstacles as the U.S. and other governments are able to impose. As Tate points out, in 
order to maintain their primacy in this trade, Colombian TCOs “employ new and 
constantly changing shipping routes through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean 
for moving cocaine and, increasingly, heroin.”115
While these organizations have already established a considerable degree of 
access to key production areas and markets, and demonstrated the capability to 
compensate for the risks inherent to the practice, in order to maintain this primacy 
constant innovation and vigilance are necessary. This is true not only with respect to the 
law enforcement efforts of nation-states but also to potential loss of market share to
115 Tate, 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
296
competing groups. However, even as smuggling routes and methods continue to evolve 
over time, the corresponding parameters of route selection on the part of Colombian 
TCOs remains constrained by geography.
From the U.S. point of view, the transit zone through which such contraband must 
travel is defined as “the 2-million square mile area between the U.S. and South American 
borders and covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Mexico, and 
the Eastern Pacific.”116 Furthermore, within the U.S. strategic conceptualization this area 
not only delineates the outer perimeter that is actively guarded by military means, but 
also the arena in which the bulk of drug interdiction operations take place.
As discussed more generically in Chapter II, the principal agencies charged with 
national border control are customs services. In the United States, the USCS in fact has a 
drug control strategy built into its overall Strategic Plan.117 However, in November 1993 
a presidential directive called for a gradual shift in the focus of U.S. drug efforts from the 
transit zone to source countries further upstream, in theory taking the struggle to the 
enemy but in practice leaving vital avenues of approach less protected.
Moreover, other types of missions have also taken precedence in the competition 
for limited interdiction resources. An example of this can be found in the early 1990s, 
when the U.S. Coast Guard reallocated assets from counter-drug missions in response to 
mass exoduses from both Haiti and Cuba, though in 1995 a formal reemphasis on
116 The definition is laid out in detail in U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Interdiction in the 
Caribbean,” GAO/T-NSIAD-96-171, Statement by Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, to the House of 
Representatives, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, 
International Affairs and Criminal Justice (19 September 1996), 1.
117 For instance, see U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 13-4. As 
discussed in Chapter II, in addition to other more massive efforts on the part o f the U.S. such as Plan 
Colombia aimed directly at source countries, a number o f Customs programs such as the ACIS also target 
drug smuggling via commercial cargo and similar conveyances. Under the auspices o f this particular 
program, Colombia is in fact a major focus o f such attention, along with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela,
Panama, Costa Rica and Mexico.
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interdiction activity was announced.118 As a similar shift in priorities can also be seen in 
the wake of 9/11, when border control resources were refocused to address potential 
terrorist threats and the possibility of covertly introducing a weapon of mass destruction 
into United States territory.119 With land, water and air routes, as well as various 
combinations thereof, offering innumerable potential smuggling routes, the challenge 
posed by this activity and the potential range of contraband involved is truly daunting.
To begin with Ecuador, there have been many documented instances where that 
country has been used as a conduit for Colombia heroin smuggling vectors into the U.S. 
One important reason for this is that, in general, less scrutiny is given to travelers and 
goods departing from there than from Colombia, thus making it a more desirable transit 
country. Ecuador borders Colombia to the north, as well as Peru to the east and south, 
and as such offers vast potential access to both poppy and coca cultivation areas.
As evidence of the porosity of the border between Ecuador and Colombia in 
particular, kidnappings undertaken primarily by Colombian guerrillas and facilitated by 
local bandits have been reported in this region.120 Furthermore, a reverse in the flow of 
illicit trade from that in drugs can be found between the Ecuadorian provinces bordering 
both Colombia and Peru, namely Esmeraldas and El Carche in the north and Loja and El 
Oro in the south, with respect to gasoline and diesel fuel. Although a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the quadruple cross-border price differential has been too lucrative for
118 See U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations,” 3; and Bill Stump, “Back to the War on Drugs,” Navy 
Times (6 March 1995), 24.
119 Robert Pear and Philip Shenon, “Customs Switches Priority From Drugs to Terrorism,” New York 
Times, 10 October 2001, B -l 1.
120 Auerbach, 71-2. However, the author also notes that while tourists have been kidnapped elsewhere in 
Ecuador, such occurrences are more often in protest o f alleged ecological damage or government policies 
than for profit.
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smugglers to ignore, and has in turn led Ecuador to militarize its gas stations along the 
border in April 2000 to prevent the these resources leaving the country.121
With respect to sea modes of smuggling, one U.S. government report notes that, 
“Ecuador’s harbors and seaports have become more important as Colombian traffickers 
make greater use of eastern Pacific maritime routes.”122 As for air travel, the relative lack 
of scrutiny, particularly prior to 9/11, has provided incentives compelling enough that 
couriers have traveled overland from Colombian territory to Quito, Ecuador, and then
taken international flights from there. In other cases, couriers have begun in the U.S. and
10'!brought in heroin on the return leg of the trip. Finally, the role of Ecuador in
laundering the proceeds of drug smuggling is coming under increasing scrutiny, a 
situation facilitated by the absence of controls on the amount of currency that can be 
brought either in or out of the county.124
Turning to Peru, there are two important issues that relate directly to this analysis. 
The first is the combination of rural insurgency and large-scale production of both coca 
and opium poppies, that in many ways parallels the activities of the FARC in Colombia, 
as noted in the previous section. The second is the fact that, in terms of transnational 
smuggling vectors, Colombian TCOs have managed to maintain control of many of the 
upstream aspects of drug production and distribution in Peru. There is evidence, 
however, that Peruvian coca and poppy growers are seeking to circumvent the existing
121 Juan Pablo Toro, “Ecuador Militarized Border Service Stations to Control Smuggling,” The Oil Daily 
50, no. 80 (26 April 2000), Item 0211600C.
122 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 41.
123 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 49.
124 “Although Ecuador is not considered an important financial center, it is widely viewed as a significant 
laundering center, due largely to its proximity and close economic and social ties to Colombia. There is 
limited financial intelligence concerning the source o f illegal proceeds or the magnitude o f the money- 
laundering problem in Ecuador. It is believed, however, that money laundering occurs in both the banking 
and non-banking sectors, and that the bulk o f the funds laundered stems from Colombian drug sales.” U.S. 
Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,” 65-6.
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trafficking links with Colombia by making contact with both Mexican and Russian 
organizations.125
Beginning with the domestic insurgency, the relationship between the Sendero 
Luminoso (SL, or Shining Path) guerrilla organization and both the drug cultivating 
peasantry and various domestic trafficking organizations exhibit many of the same 
dynamics found in Colombia.126 SL has had a violent Maoist-oriented strategy dating 
from the beginning of its insurgency in Ayacucho department in 1980. As formulated by 
its founder, the former academic Abimael Guzman, this type of guerrilla warfare is 
predicated upon control of the countryside and support among the peasantry. Eventually 
the insurgency grew into a major threat to the central government’s control of large 
stretches of territory.
During the mid-1980’s under the administrations of both Fernando Belaunde and 
Alan Garcia, the “dirty-war doctrine” held sway, characterized by a willingness on the 
part of the police, and later the military, to condone high rates of civilian casualties in an 
attempt to crush the insurgency.127 This official onslaught accounts for much of SL’s
125 “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995, 44. The search for alternatives to Colombian 
transshipment has also been spurred by the success o f Air Bridge Denial, as noted above.
126 For an excellent overview o f the movement, see Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in 
Peru (New York: Times Books / Random House, 1992), 134. While SL is not the only active insurgency 
in Peru, it may be distinguished from the rival Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA, or Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in many important ways. The MRTA represents a middle-class and 
largely urban-based movement operating primarily in Lima, with both external and internal ties with other 
groups. It is generally more interested in staged actions to gain publicity and to obtain funds rather than to 
instill fear in the population. Even at its height, the MRTA was considered by SL to be not only the stooge 
of the Peruvian government but actually the greatest potential threat to their movement by siphoning off  
resources which SL considered to be within its own purview. While reduced to minimal activities in recent 
years, MRTA demonstrated its capability to grab headlines in the 1997 assault on the Japanese embassy in 
Lima. However, such actions, despite their spectacular nature, are more indicative o f  a fringe group than o f  
a well-developed movement with mass support. See Sandra Woy-Hazelton and William Hazleton,
“Shining Path and the Marxist Left,” in The Shining Path o f  Peru, 2d. ed., ed. David Scott Palmer (New  
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 235; and Strong, 212-3.
127 In many respects, the U.S. emphasis on countering drugs in Peru was not always in accord with the 
Peruvian government’s conceptualizations o f  its own internal security priorities. While in Lima’s view  
coca was simply a raw material, with the real threat and profit entering the picture further upstream, from
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impetus toward commandeering the coca trade in its quest for survival as a movement.
As a result, much of SL’s strength during its azimuth in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s
can be directly linked to the acquisition of these resources.
By 1987 the group had begun extorting money from drug cultivators and
traffickers via “taxes” levied on coca production and cocaine processing throughout the
Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), the primary coca-producing region in the country. For
their part, SL provided security, albeit in the form of a protection racket writ large, for the
traffickers in return not only for money, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
weapons. However, this complex and coercively asymmetrical relationship meant that
the alliance was difficult for SL to control in times of tactical setbacks.
While the relationship was marked by mutual suspicion, at its height the drug
trade still garnered an estimated $20 to $30 million annually for the organization.128
Such financial self-sufficiency from the proceeds of drug trade in turn mitigated the need
for outside sponsorship or funding, which unlike the FARC was not particularly 
1forthcoming anyway. In fact, Jose E. Gonzalez goes so far as to argue that there is no
the time SL and the drug traffickers opted to cooperate Peruvian forces were content to attack both. In 
some respects this association actually made the internal security situation seem less daunting 
intellectually, though still formidable in actuality. However, once these criminal interests diverged, it 
became clear that the Peruvian government priority would be to eliminate SL first and then the drug trade. 
See Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 270.
128 During this period, one estimate puts SL’s portion o f UHV coca profits at 10 percent. Woy-Hazleton 
and Hazleton, 232-3. These revenues in turn allowed the organization to pay its insurgents $500 per 
month, five times the average Peruvian monthly income. Moreover, charges o f  $3,000 to $7,000 per drug 
flight leaving the UHV were also collected by SL, either in cash or in kind, as coca paste or base. These 
figures taken from captured SL documents, as noted in Clawson and Lee, 179-80. However, conflicting 
accounts remain regarding actual control o f the landing strips used for drug flights during this period. For 
instance, John Simpson contends that the largest profits went to the Army, not the SL, with the latter as a 
convenient scapegoat for both Peruvian and the U.S. governments. John Simpson, In the Forests o f  the 
Night: Encounters in Peru with Terrorism, Drug-Running and Military Oppression (New York: Random 
House, 1993), 132.
129 Since its founding, SL has been almost entirely bereft o f  external sponsorship and thus less affected in 
terms o f funding by the fall o f communism and the easing o f  Cold War tensions than similar groups. 
Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, “The Organization o f Shining Path,” in Palmer, 203.
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way to separate the issues of drug trafficking and guerrilla activity in the UHV during 
this period.130 However, following Guzman’s capture by Peruvian troops in September 
1992 there was a subsequent and logical diminution of guerrilla activity, as well as an 
eventual split within the residual leadership.
This crisis on the part of SL in turn led for a time to a loss of influence over the 
traffickers as well. While the traffickers were generally forced to pay off the SL when 
the latter was relatively well entrenched, they were also in turn just as likely to bribe the 
military to fulfil the same roles when the guerrillas weakened. As the trafficker is first 
and foremost a businessman, to behave otherwise would make little sense from a purely 
commercial point of view. In many respects this is indicative of the simple lack of a 
common ideology between guerrilla and trafficker.131 Once SL had managed to rally its 
remnants, however, the cooperative pattern emerged again in the face of the mutual 
government threat, albeit on a more subdued scale.
As of the mid-1990s, Peru still accounted for roughly two-thirds of world coca 
production, though its share has been dropping somewhat due to the increasing Peruvian 
army presence in the UHV. However, with respect to heroin, initial attempts by 
Colombian traffickers to extend poppy cultivation into Peru began as early as 1992. In 
1995, The Economist noted that, “Both local and American officials say it [opium poppy]
130 In addition to providing a source o f income, the relatively isolated UHV also served SL as both a 
training ground and logistical base o f  operations. Jos6 E. Gonzalez, “Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper 
Huallaga Valley,” in Palmer, 138-40.
131 For instance, as Simpson notes, the conspicuous spending typical o f many traffickers is exactly the sort 
of activity that most SL hard-liners would find offensive. Simpson, 131. Despite benefiting from the 
proceeds o f  the coca trade, SL’s ideological stance should not be construed as supportive o f drug usage 
within its own areas. In general, coca and cocaine abuse were both taken as signs o f a politically 
degenerate society such as the U.S., and as a means o f further European oppression o f indigenous peoples. 
Its propagandists also hold that the U.S. is more interested in controlling the international cocaine trade 
than in eliminating it. Strong, 103-5, 107. Moreover, at one point, and understandably enough for a group 
consciously advocating the repeal o f the laws o f supply and demand, SL tried to establish an exorbitantly 
high floor price for coca leaf production within its sector. This resulted in a glut as the market was 
unwilling to bear the additional costs. Clawson and Lee, 180.
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has never been found in Peru in commercial quantities. But drugs policemen and farmers 
alike confirm that opium poppies are now being grown along the sierra, notably near
• 1 'JO  , ,
Cajamarca.” Other plantations have also been found in the northern departments of 
Amazonas, Piura and Chiclayo, in the central department of Huanuco, and in the southern 
department of Puno, though government pressure on both growers and a resurgent SL
1 3 3appears to have made much of this activity unfeasible.
However, the question of the Peruvian traffickers’ particular vulnerability to both 
SL and Colombian influence remains. The answer to this can be found on a number of 
levels. To begin with, Peruvian groups tend to be disorganized, especially when 
compared to their Colombian counterparts. Nothing analogous to the Medellin or Cali 
cartels has ever existed in the domestic Peruvian context to either effectively resist SL or 
challenge the central government directly.
Moreover, it is not overstating the case to characterize drug production in Peru as 
virtually dependent on the Colombians. In fact, part of SL’s initial platform in dealing 
with the traffickers was to present themselves as the only indigenous Peruvian force 
capable of defending the drug trade from various types of interference, if only with 
respect to its domestic rather than its transnational dimensions. However, while appeals 
to both nationalism and greed may have helped to stir animus against the Colombian 
TCOs controlling much of this activity, the point remained that their assistance was 
invaluable to bringing the product to overseas markets.134
132 “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995,44. As an interesting aside, this article also alludes 
to the introduction o f both a fungus engineered to destroy coca plants and a coca-munching caterpillar 
allegedly developed in the United States and released on Peruvian territory.
133 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 160-3.
134 Strong, 109. Thoumi, 90, also notes the competitive advantage enjoyed by Colombian trafficking 
organizations in being accustomed to using widespread violence as leverage to eliminated the competition 
and to intimidate both law enforcement officials and society at large.
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By the late 1990s, out of the twenty-one known drug trafficking organizations 
operating in Peru, eleven were Colombian and seven constituted joint Colombian- 
Peruvian ventures, while only three were Peruvian. Furthermore, nearly all Peruvian- 
grown coca is sold unprocessed or only minimally processed, as either coca paste or base, 
leaving the more value-added aspects of the trade to take place further upstream along 
smuggling vectors predominantly moving under the auspices of Colombian TCOs.
While there has been some effort by Peruvians to increase native control of the 
coca trade, Colombians remain the dominant partners. By extension, an ongoing source 
of friction has been the corresponding pattern of behavior on the part of the Colombians 
vis-a-vis their Peruvian counterparts.135 However, LaMond Tullis does note that the 
balance may be tipping in favor of the Peruvians, largely by virtue of an increasing 
number of outbound smuggling vectors via Brazil and Ecuador.136
Further inland, Bolivia also has a significant experience in the cultivation of 
drugs, forming the third of the major coca-producing countries along with Colombia and 
Peru. However, in general Bolivia has not been plagued by large-scale guerrilla 
involvement in its drug economy, perhaps due to the strength and legal status of domestic 
collective growers’ associations, as well as the high level of cultural embeddednesss of 
such activity. The legitimization of the coca-growing peasant’s aspirations at the grass­
roots level may at least partially explain the lack of support for either the development of 
an indigenous insurgency or of SL influence across the border.137
135 Clawson and Lee, 181. This may account for the inclination on the part o f the Peruvians to take more 
active measures and lessen their dependence on the Colombians, most notably by seeking alliances with 
mafiosi “from Mexico to Moscow.” See “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995.
136 LaMond Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), 70-1.
137 Strong, 224-31. This policy o f tacit tolerance toward coca cultivation within the body politic o f  Bolivia 
has not always endeared it internationally. For instance, early in 1995, the United States lost patience with
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Moreover, as in Peru, Colombian TCOs have traditionally controlled most of the 
upstream transnational smuggling vectors that transport the drugs produced in Bolivia.
As the country is landlocked, this is perhaps more readily understandable than in the case 
of Peru.138 However, in addition to riverine connections to Brazil via the Amazon basin, 
Bolivia is also linked to via the Paraguay-Parana river system to container terminals with 
access to international trucking routes and railways. While drugs have been seized along 
both of these waterways, the planned Hidrovia project to further develop the latter and 
thus connecting the interior of South America directly to the seaports of Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, and Montevideo, Uruguay, may offer a wider scope for future smuggling
1 - IQ
vectors transiting these nodes.
With respect to Brazil, drug smuggling vectors moving to the east out of both 
Colombia and Peru by air and via the Amazon River basin has become a major issue. 
Raids into Brazilian territory by both Colombian rebels and government troops along the 
1,600 kilometer-long common border have also strained relations. Particularly
Bolivia’s failure to meet coca eradication targets. Dependent on American certification and subsequent aid, 
Bolivia sent its troops in force to destroy coca crops and signed a new extradition treaty. While the United 
States favors alternative development, primarily in the form o f crop substitution, in fact coca is both easier 
to grow, more resistant to drought and pests and considerably more profitable than most other available 
options. “The charms o f coca,” The Economist, 28 October 1997, 52. See also Simpson, 128-32; and 
Cristdbal Kay, “Rural Latin America: Exclusionary and Uneven Agricultural Development,” in Halebsky 
and Harris, 37; OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 154-8; and Jordan, 132-7, which specifically 
notes the parallels with the case o f  Peru.
138 Moreover, as noted in Villamarin Pulido, 83, the increased use o f glyphosate in drug eradication efforts 
in both Bolivia and Peru during the mid-1990s helped contribute to greater cultivation o f both poppy and 
coca crops within Colombia itself.
139 See U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Cocaine Smuggling From Bolivia,” 4-8. Incidentally, Chilean authorities 
have also noted that efforts to facilitate closer logistical integration among Andean countries, such as 
giving Bolivia maritime access and setting up inter-ocean trading corridors, may also allow traffickers 
greater transshipment opportunities as well. OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs {2000), 163. This report 
also notes the use o f Chilean seaports to export drugs, particularly to Europe and often in food shipments, 
as these tend to receive less scrutiny than goods coming directly from neighboring drug-producing 
countries. Incidentally, with respect to Argentina, U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “South 
America -  Argentina,” notes that, “Within the last several years, Argentina has become a transit area for 
Colombian heroin en route to the U.S. East Coast (primarily New York), although there is no evidence that 
the quantities involved significantly affect the U.S.”
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problematic are the areas where the FARC actively operates, such as Vaupes. In 1991, 
Brazilian troops crossed into Colombia and shot seven suspected guerrillas in response to 
an earlier incursion that killed three soldiers and wounded a dozen more. However, in 
the past the Colombian government has felt free to cross the border as well, as when in 
1998 it used a Brazilian air base without authorization to attack a nearby FARC guerrilla 
stronghold.
By way of response, later that same year the Brazilian government approved a law 
allowing the air force to shoot down planes that enter its airspace illegally. Brazil’s 
capability to effectively carry out this policy, however, is hampered by a lack of the 
means to monitor its own territory. This situation should be remedied by the deployment 
of Sivam, a $1.4 billion land- and air-based radar system that is due to come into 
operation after 2002.
Moreover, though officially downplayed, apprehensions in Brazil remain that 
further Colombian encroachment will occur as Plan Colombia gains momentum. Such a 
turn of events may threaten the general aloofness the Brazilian government has shown 
toward its neighbor’s internal strife. In mid-2000, Brazil moved 6,000 troops to its 
Amazonian border with Colombia in anticipation of an escalation of the Colombian civil 
war and a resultant spillover of drug trafficking, refugees and perhaps even actual 
hostilities.140
However, there is considerable cause to look to a future expansion of 
transnational drug smuggling vectors moving through Brazil. In addition to the various 
other regional externalities, largely due to the country’s economic inequalities and related
140 See “Fear o f  trouble upstream,” The Economist, 30 September 2000, 38; and “The gringos land in 
Colombia,” The Economist, 2 September 2000, 33.
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social pressures the domestic conditions exist for such activity to firmly take root. For 
instance, paralleling Pablo Escobar’s calculated largesse with respect to the 
disadvantaged of Medellin, various criminal organizations exercise an undue influence 
throughout Rio de Janeiro’s poorer neighborhoods in the absence of effective government
141programs.
In fact, Maria Velez de Berliner and Kristin Lado make a compelling case for 
Brazil to eventually equal if not supersede Colombia with respect to drug trafficking. For 
instance, the authors note the country’s regional strategic weight in terms of its physical 
size, economy and porous borders with major drug-producing areas, and its growing 
lawlessness. Moreover, moving the entire spectrum of both production and transit of 
drugs into Brazilian territory poses few practical hurdles.
Specifically, Brazil’s access to existing and potential smuggling vectors is readily 
apparent from its land borders with ten other Latin American countries, its 7,491 
kilometers of coastline encompassing thirty-nine deep-water seaports, and 3,13 usable 
airports.142 As Colombian TCOs continue their transnational expansion, it is important to 
remember that their Brazilian counterparts need not necessarily be relegated to a 
peripheral status indefinitely.
Colombia’s domestic turmoil has led to a number of tensions across the common 
border with Venezuela as well, including the flow of refugees and arms as well as drugs. 
With either the FARC or ELN acting as the de facto government throughout much of this
141 See Anthony Faiola, “As Brazil fails slum dwellers, gangs win favor,” International Herald Tribune, 23 
September 2002,2.
142 With particular resonance in the context o f this study, the authors also assess Brazil’s five distinctive 
regions with respect to current or future roles in drug trafficking. In addition to the ethnic make-up and 
infrastructure o f  each, the Northeast or “Sertao” is noted as having a high potential for the cultivation o f  
opium poppies. Maria Velez de Berliner and Kristin Lado, “Brazil: The Emerging Drug Superpower,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 239-60.
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region on the Colombian side, it is unsurprising that kidnapping and extortion activities 
have also extended into Venezuelan territory. Officials in Venezuela have publicly 
expressed concerns that Plan Colombia or its successors may serve to exacerbate all of 
these trends.143 A further cause for concern is the so-far limited extension of opium 
poppy cultivation into Venezuelan territory, often facilitated by Colombian guerrillas’ 
links to local indigenous peoples.144
As one recent U.S. government analysis notes, “Venezuela is a major 
transshipment avenue for drug shipments bound for the US and European markets 
through the Caribbean.”145 In terms of transit, Venezuela’s mountainous border with 
Colombia, as well as numerous seaports with direct access the greater Caribbean basin,
143 See “Blood on the borders,” The Economist, 16 September 2000,43-4. This article also notes the 
ideological sympathies that appear to exist between the Chavez government and the FARC.
144 In terms o f facilitating transshipment through these areas, traffickers often supply indigenous groups 
with food and alcohol, in return for their expert knowledge o f the area and skills in navigating the Orinoco 
River and its tributaries to the coast. In particular, this mostly pertains to the Warao and other Guarjiro 
tribes, neglected for years by successive Venezuelan central governments. OGD, World Geopolitics o f  
Drugs (2000), 170-1. Similarly, “One small, mountainous area along the northern part o f  the border is used 
to grow opium poppy but heroin processing is carried out in Colombia and the problem has been limited to 
a cultivation area o f under 50 hectares by continued aggressive eradication and expulsion activities by the 
Venezuelan military.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCRS 2001, “South America -  Venezuela.” 
Moreover, the city o f Cucuta on the Colombian side o f  the border has been noted as particularly well 
situated for smuggling both drugs and arms across the Venezuelan border. This area has recently been the 
focus o f considerable guerrilla activity, as discussed in “The fight for the cities,” The Economist, 26 
October 2002,37.
145 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 41. For an even 
earlier example o f  the economic logic o f  routing through Venezuela during the heyday o f Pablo Escobar, 
see Ken Dermota, “Snow Business: Drugs and the Spirit o f Capitalism,” World Policy Journal 16, no. 4 
(Winter 1999), 15. In particular, the author notes one drug smuggler pointing out that the cost o f shipping 
drugs through either Caracas or Maracaibo was only a quarter o f utilizing Colombian territory directly. 
Jordan, 138, also specifically notes the involvement o f  the Sicilian Mafia in Venezuela, represented by the 
Cuntrera brothers, in forming a strategic partnership with the Colombian cartels to transport both heroin 
and cocaine.
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offers vast potential for northbound smuggling vectors.146 In 1998, it was estimated that 
more than 110 tons of Colombian heroin and cocaine passed through Venezuela.147
However, in May 1999, the government of Hugo Chavez announced that U.S. jets 
could no longer utilize Venezuelan airspace for counter-drug efforts. This was a 
particularly critical decision, as in the same month Howard Air Force Base in Panama 
was shut down in compliance with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty. Furthermore, the 
denial of Venezuelan airspace also significantly decreases the effectiveness of new 
monitoring sites in the Dutch colonies of Aruba and Curafao, islands fifty miles off the 
coast of Venezuela.
Though at the time Venezuelan officials maintained that they were capable of 
policing their own borders, the U.S. differed publicly by stating that due to insufficient 
monitoring capabilities, in effect an existing drug trafficking corridor via air from 
Colombia was now opened even further than before.148 As of this writing, the civil unrest 
spurred by popular discontent with the Chavez government tends to puts its capabilities 
in this respect further into doubt. An indicator that smuggling vectors moving through 
Venezuela were increasing in prominence can be seen in two separate drug seizures of 
record volume during August 2000, one for five tons and another for two and a half tons 
of cocaine.
Specifically, Venezuelan authorities speculate that these two shipments originated 
in Colombia and entered by air into the Orinoco River delta region, where the contraband
146 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 167, which specifically names Maicao, San Cristobal, 
Puerto Ayacucho as major drug transit seaports, as well as air facilities at Puerto La Cruz, La Guiara, 
Carupano, Cumana and Caracas’ Maiquetia International Airport.
147 Cited in “Drug Czar: Venezuela Opens Window to Drug Runners,” Defense Week 20, no. 35 (7 
September 1999), pages not available.
148 Ibid.
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was hidden in the jungle along the northern coast of Venezuela to be picked up later by 
sea.149 The alleged drug shipper, a Colombian citizen, was arrested in Venezuela and 
extradited to the United States under charges of moving a total of sixty-eight tons of 
drugs by sea to both the U.S. and Europe. Subsequently, another forty-three individuals, 
including eight Greek shipping operators, were also arrested.
In this instance, the plan appears to have been to use eight to ten cargo ships fitted 
with concealed compartments to take on the contraband off the coast of Baranquilla, 
Colombia, or Venezuela’s Orinoco River delta, and deliver it via speedboat into Miami, 
Amsterdam and other ports. Even further underlining the multinational complexity of 
this issue, a total of eleven countries cooperated with this U.S.-led operation, including 
Albania, Belgium, Colombia, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Great 
Britain, Venezuela and Panama.150
The last of Colombia’s contiguous neighbors, Panama, not only has a history of 
involvement with the drug trade but also constitutes the gateway for smuggling vectors 
moving by land into the rest of Central America. Its territory also encompasses the 
Panama Canal, the most strategic maritime commercial conduit in the hemisphere, 
linking the Caribbean and Pacific Oceans and accounting for a very high volume of both 
containerized and bulk cargo. This waterway was returned to the government of Panama 
in 1999 under the terms of the aforementioned 1977 treaty with the United States. 
Furthermore, by virtue of its flag of convenience, the country also accounts for the 
second-largest tonnage of merchant shipping in the world.
149 See “Venezuela has record cocaine bust, newspaper says,” CNN.com, 20 August 2000; and “Venezuelan 
forces recover more than 2.5 more tons o f cocaine,” CNN.com, 24 August 2000.
150 “Reputed Cocaine Shipper Appears in Court,” Miami Herald (web site), 28 August 2000.
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While Panama has managed to remain largely neutral in Colombia’s civil war, 
both guerrillas and paramilitaries have used Panamanian territory to hide, rest, and 
receive supplies. Despite the possibility that an escalation of the conflict could spill over, 
for the moment Panama appears to be accruing definite economic benefits from the 
situation as wealthy Colombians shift their assets, and sometimes their residences, across
i f  I
the border. As discussed previously, this international boundary, 270 kilometers long, 
runs along Colombia’s northwestern region, a particularly active corridor for smuggling 
activity as noted above.
Moreover, the recent history of Panama, particularly during the regime of Manuel 
Noriega, is intimately connected with regional drug trafficking. The culmination of this
activity came to an abrupt end with the 1989 U.S. invasion and Noriega’s subsequent
1incarceration. Despite concerted efforts by successive Panamanian governments, the 
country’s location, remote coastline, advanced infrastructure encompassing both 
extensive maritime and air facilities, an underdeveloped judicial system, and a relatively 
sophisticated financial services sector make it vulnerable to a wide range of transnational 
crime even beyond the context of smuggling. Furthermore, the country’s heroin seizures
1 ^3for 2000 were the highest ever recorded.
151 “Nervous in Darien,” The Economist, 7 October 2000,46. Beyond the context o f drugs, the country has 
also been used to funnel arms to Colombian insurgents, as discussed in U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Weapons 
Smuggled To Colombian Guerrillas in Commercial Containers, Via Panamanian Ports,” Maritime Security 
Report, no. 1 (August 1995), 16-7.
152 As early as 1983, while still commander o f the Panamanian army and not yet dictator, Noriega 
apparently made an offer to the leaders o f  the Medellin cartel to provide a safe haven and protection for 
their operations in return for a four million dollar fee. However, even after a down payment o f  half that 
amount, the Colombian traffickers soon found a less than warm reception, as Noriega seems to have felt 
that this would draw even more undue attention from the U.S.
153 See U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Canada, Mexico and Central America - Panama,” 
which also notes that the country’s international banking center, the Colon Free Zone, and its U.S. dollar- 
based economy are also very attractive to money launderers.
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When the former U.S. bases in Panama were turned over to Panamanian authority 
in 1999, it was hoped that a “multilateral counter-drug center” under civilian control but 
with a strong military component could be set up in their place. This was in large part a 
move to institutionalize existing counter-drug efforts involving elements of the United 
States military and other agencies with the admixture of contingents seconded from other 
nations. However, Panamanian critics of any continuing U.S. presence were able to 
derail support for such a plan. Furthermore, countries such as Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile, whom the United States fully expected to cooperate in such a venture, were 
reluctant to expose their militaries to the risk of corruption by using them for counter­
drug operations.154
The rest of Central America comprises the land bridge leading first into Mexico, 
and then the rest of North America. Specifically, from south to north this includes Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize.155 In terms of 
connectivity, the Pan-American Highway constitutes the major conduit for smuggling 
vectors travelling north into Mexico and eventually on to the U.S. Furthermore, this 
region encompasses maritime access via both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, as well as 
extensive air connections largely catering to tourism.156
Logically enough given its position along the southern border of the United 
States, Mexico provides access for a high volume of northbound smuggling vectors with
154 “A canal deal,” The Economist, 29 March 1997, 49-50. For a broader analysis o f  this issue, see also 
Ricardo Soberdn Garrido, “Crime in Uniform: Corruption and Impunity in Latin America,” TNI/Action 
Andina (December 1997), pages not available.
155 Interestingly, western Guatemala was noted in the late 1980s as a significant producing area for opium 
poppies. As noted in Booth, Opium, 326, while the U.S. aided Guatemala in 1992 to eradicate poppy 
fields, this activity has since shifted to narrow valleys beyond the reach o f crop spraying. Much o f the 
country’s drug trade takes place under the auspices o f  Mexican TCOs. See also U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC 
(1998), 50, which observes that despite sporadic eradication efforts, the lack o f regular aerial 
reconnaissance may lead to an increase in poppy cultivation in the remote highlands.
156 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Canada, Mexico and Central America -  Guatemala.”
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respect to a wide range of commodities. Augmenting this propitious physical geography, 
increased commercial activity at least partially as a result of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has made smuggling by land a particularly attractive option. 
Smuggling actors are assisted in their operations by the sheer number of border crossings 
involved, as drugs have been found concealed in cars, trucks and recreational vehicles, as 
well as in legitimate tractor-trailer cargo.157
Furthermore, direct access to both the Gulf of Mexico to the east and the Pacific 
Ocean to the west allows for a wide range of commercial and tourist-related maritime 
activity, along with associated opportunities for smuggling. Drug traffickers have also 
exploited extensive air connections between the two countries. Finally, the high volume 
of tourists and migrant workers crossing the border on a regular basis constitutes an 
opportunity that smugglers have not been remiss in exploiting.
In general, the majority of drug smuggling vectors destined for North American 
markets that originate from the south tends to shift cyclically between the southwest land 
border with Mexico and the predominantly maritime routes through the greater Caribbean 
basin. The resistance along either of these main paths can most often be correlated in 
response to the focus of U.S. interdiction efforts at any given point in time. For instance, 
in the 1980s Mexican groups played only a very small role in the major Colombian- 
controlled smuggling routes into U.S., at that point in time for the most part routed 
through the Caribbean.
However, as The Economist noted in 1997, “a fierce American-led crackdown on 
Caribbean routes in the mid-1980s led the Colombians to ship ever-increasing loads
157 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 8-9. Between 1992 and 1996, tractor-trailer and rail-car traffic along 
the U.S.-Mexican border increased by 50 and 58 percent, respectively. For more on the impact o f  NAFTA 
on drug smuggling, see also Dermota, 16-29.
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through Mexican smugglers. By the early 1990s, they had grown reliant on them.”158 As 
Williams points out, in functional terms Colombian TCOs had inadvertently helped to 
create the competition that was to eventually seize a significant portion of their market 
share.159
By the late 1990s, the relationship between the two groups had evolved to one of 
near-parity, emphasized by the apparent division of labor. As one U.S. government study 
notes, “Colombian and Mexican trafficking organizations dominate the drug trade in the 
Western Hemisphere. Colombia supplies most of the cocaine and contributes the largest 
share of heroin, and Mexico is a major avenue for cocaine trafficking in the United States 
as well as a major supplier of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine.”160
158 “Poison across the Rio Grande,” The Economist, 15 November 1997, 36-8. This article also notes the 
rise of Amado Carrillo Fuentes’s drug trafficking organization based in Ciudad Juarez, which was able to 
cut out his Colombian partners by directly linking Andean producers with major North American markets 
via a well-developed network o f Mexican immigrants. This state o f affairs lasted until Carrillo’s demise in 
July 1997, during plastic surgery and just before a planned shift o f his headquarters to Chile. The resultant 
power vacuum was contested by a variety o f  successors, notably the infamous Arellano Felix brothers, 
Benjamin and Ramon, based in Tijuana. The career o f  these siblings was in turn curtailed by the former’s 
imprisonment and the latter’s death, as reported in “The end o f the Arellanos,” The Economist, 16 March 
2002,43. See also U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 8-9. Peter A. Lupshka, “Transnational Narco- 
Corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 
1995), 96-7, also notes the Cali cartel’s infiltration o f the Mexican Cabinet Office o f Communications and 
Transport up to the mid-1990s. In particular, the author notes the use of commercial airports, business 
fronts, trailer trucking firms and railroads. As such, access to the shipping information, official forms and 
seals that only this type o f  government office can provide is essential to carrying out these sophisticated 
smuggling operations.
159 Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 75-6. The author also notes that, in response, 
Colombian TCOs returned their focus to routes through Florida and the Caribbean, often using Dominican 
groups in place o f their former Mexican partners. As o f  this writing, there have been numerous recent 
incidences o f Mexicans carrying Colombian heroin at least as far as Mexico. However, it has yet to be 
ascertained if  this activity is taking place under the auspices o f Colombian or Mexican TCOs. Nonetheless, 
this phenomenon is extensively documented in U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Domestic Heroin 
Unit, “Drug Intelligence Trend: Increase in Mexican Couriers Transporting Heroin to Mexico,” DEA- 
02053 (Washington, DC: DEA, December 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02053/02053.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
160 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6. Similarly, U.S. 
DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 8, notes that in partnership with Colombian organizations, “Mexico-based 
trafficking groups have established themselves as transportation specialists for smuggling drugs across the 
Southwest Border.”
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With specific respect to heroin, in general Mexican chiva or “black tar” heroin 
tends to dominate the U.S. market west of the Mississippi, while purer Colombian heroin 
is more common in the eastern half of the country.161 However, despite a level of 
cooperation within certain operational parameters as noted above, there is evidence that 
both sides actively attempt to expand their operations and respective market shares at the 
others’ expense.162
Within the overall context of U.S. drug policy, the prevailing official stance 
toward Mexico is particularly salient. Since their country’s initial experiences with 
decertification, successive Colombian governments have, perhaps rightly, considered the 
process to both arbitrary and high-handed. However, when the arrest of Mexico’s top 
anti-drug official in February 1997 brought no reciprocal threat of sanction, Colombia’s 
allegations of a double standard gained some credence.163
Further evidence that the Mexican army, traditionally enjoying something of a 
reputation for incorruptibility, may have been heavily involved in the drug trade as far 
back to the 1980’s has since surfaced as well. While U. S. field agents appear to have 
had an idea of the true situation in Mexico, there was supposition at the time that top
161 This type o f heroin is also sometimes found in a brown powdered form known as “Mexican brown.” 
Booth, Opium, 327. Mexican opium poppy cultivation has traditionally centered on the states o f  Durango, 
Sinaloa and Chihuahua, the latter being directly south o f the border with both Texas and New Mexico. 
These crops tend to grow in remote areas, with heroin processing carried out in mobile labs that move often 
to avoid detection. However, in general, this cultivation entails relatively high overhead in the form of 
costly irrigation techniques, as well as considerable bribes to drug enforcement agents. Cooper, 49.
162 As the DEA noted in 1997, “Heroin traffickers from South America, particularly from Colombia, 
solidified their control over East Coast markets, moving into smaller cities, and expanded their efforts to 
supply multikilogram quantities beyond the Mississippi.” U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), x, 45. The 
same report also notes attempts by Mexican TCOs to enter urban heroin markets in the eastern half o f  the 
U.S., even going so far as to seek out the expertise o f  chemists based in Colombia in order to produce the 
higher purity white heroin preferred in that region. See also “Young, white and middle-class,” The 
Economist, 6 December 1997,26-7.
163 Dermota, 22-5.
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officials intentionally downplayed the matter in order to ensure the passage of 
NAFTA.164
By 1999, the case was again being made in the United States that Mexico should 
be decertified for a variety of reasons, though such a decision is extremely unlikely to 
take place for political reasons.165 However, the fact remains that by virtue of its 
geography Mexican control of its borders will always be of interest to the United 
States.166 Moreover, the increasing evidence of drug abuse in Mexico, particularly in the 
northern part of the country, may further encourage the Mexican government to more 
meaningfully address this nexus of issues more from the standpoint of self-interest than
1 SI-1
from external pressure.
With respect to maritime drug smuggling vectors, the greater Caribbean basin 
constitutes the focus of such activity for Colombian TCOs. However, as discussed 
previously, smuggling by sea encompasses all kinds of vessels, though for the most part 
these can be categorized into either private or commercial, with the latter in turn 
delineated into two primary types of activity, namely passenger and cargo. Similarly, the 
relevant landside facilities can range from public seaport to private marina to a deserted 
stretch of the coast. As mentioned earlier in this study, even the use of submarines to 
move drugs has at least been attempted by these smuggling actors.
164 See “Caught red-faced,” The Economist, 22 February 1997,48-53; and “Drug-shocked,” The Economist, 
9 August 1997, 27-8.
165 “Uncle Sam’s war on drugs,” The Economist, 20 February 1999, 33-4.
166 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 74-76.
167 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 137-40.
168 As noted in Chapter II, a partially built submarine, o f a relatively high technological sophistication, was 
found in the remote Colombian hinterland, much to the surprise o f police. Bowden, 34, also notes that in 
his heyday Escobar built two small remote-controlled submersibles, each capable o f carrying two thousand 
kilos o f drugs. These would travel between the northern coast o f  Colombia and the waters off Puerto Rico, 
where the contraband would then be transferred to speedboats bound for Miami.
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In addition to being bounded by the South, Central and North American 
coastlines, the Caribbean itself is dotted with numerous islands, some independent and 
others tied by history to other political entities primarily as a legacy of colonialism.169 As 
a result, this body of water represents a varied mosaic of territorial and international 
waters. Despite an overall willingness to cooperate in the issue of drug transit, however, 
the prevailing U.S. view is that, “most Caribbean nations lack resources and law 
enforcement capabilities and have some corruption problems that hamper their efforts to 
combat drug trafficking.”170
Moving roughly from south to north, the region is comprised of several 
archipelagos and may be divided into the Greater and Lesser Antilles. The former 
includes Cuba, the island of Hispaniola shared between the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, Jamaica and Puerto Rico. Further to the south and east, the latter is comprised of 
the Virgin Islands, Windward Islands, Leeward Islands and the islands immediately to the 
north of Venezuela, which include Trinidad and Tobago.
In general, multi-ton shipments of drugs most often move through the Caribbean 
via the established maritime transportation infrastructure, primarily through seaports. 
Evidence of the viability of smuggling vectors utilizing these modes of transit is abundant 
nearer the major drug source areas. Furthermore, projections are that the expanding use 
of intermodal transportation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean is “expected to
169 For instance, Martinique, Guadeloupe, the French side o f St. Martin, St. Barthelemy, and French Guiana 
are all subject to French law, including international conventions to which France is a party.
170 U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations,” 3. This can be readily seen in the issue o f off-shore banking 
and associated money laundering activity, where the temptations o f lucrative profits have led some 
Caribbean governments to allow such practices to go virtually unregulated. See “Small states, big money,” 
The Economist, 23 September 2000,46. In particular, as noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 
(2000), 22, numerous states in the Caribbean evolved into money laundering hubs via their special 
relationships or former colonial ties with richer countries such as the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Russia and the U.S.
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increase opportunities for traffickers to use commercial containers for shipping large
171quantities” of drugs. Moreover, as many of these islands’ economies are highly 
dependent on tourism, the associated cruise line activity and air connections also offer a 
wide range of smuggling opportunities.
However, given the fluid nature of smuggling activity, increased security at a 
given facility, though desirable in and of itself, can easily lead to a proportional rise in 
smuggling vectors through seaports in adjacent areas or alternate ports of entry. Thus, in 
practice the modified path of least resistance would thus most likely lead to greater usage 
of less protected access routes such as smaller private marinas or even more remote 
landing areas.172 Closer to coastal areas, smuggling activity may often take place on 
weekends to blend in with recreational craft, or at night to off-load contraband along 
remote areas of the coastline, or from larger “mother ships” to smaller “go-fast” boats.173
As of this writing, highlighting the cyclical nature of many smuggling routes, 
instances of seaborne smuggling vectors through the Caribbean basin to the United States 
have become more prevalent once again. In addition to the urge toward innovation 
necessitated by the imperative of maintaining competitive advantage, this resurgence is
171 U.S. ONDCP, “1998 Annual Assessment o f Cocaine Movement,” 1. The report continues by noting, 
“The large quantities o f drugs seized in two recent container seizures in Cartagena indicate that traffickers 
have considerable confidence in this mode o f transportation.” Echoing this trend with respect to the Pacific 
Ocean, according to the DEA, “South American traffickers used commercial maritime cargo as their 
primary means to transship multiton loads to the U.S. West Coast.” U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 9.
See also “Trouble in paradise,” The Economist, 23 November 2002, 36, which quotes a U.N. estimate that 
the Caribbean regional drug trade nets $3.3 billion annually.
172 The DEA, while asserting that, “commercial maritime vessels posed a significant smuggling threat,” 
further notes that, during the relevant period o f analysis, seaborne smuggling operations consisted primarily 
o f go-fast boats. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 4-5. For a more thorough breakdown o f these issues, see 
Aune, 4.
173 Ibid., 7-8.
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largely a response to tighter cross-border controls, as well as higher bribes, along the 
U.S.- Mexican border.174
Realizing the limitations imposed by small populations and limited monetary 
resources among the Caribbean nations, the U.S. in general has tried wherever possible to 
sign bilateral agreements allowing its personnel to conduct operations in the territorial 
waters and airspace of the relevant nations. Thus, by the late 1990s the U. S. government 
had begun pressuring countries adjoining the region to sign “ship-rider” agreements 
allowing U. S. patrols to pursue suspected drug dealers into some twenty-five different
17̂territorial waters within the region.
With respect to specific territories, beginning in the south Trinidad and Tobago 
have evolved as a drug transit hub due to their geographic position opposite the Orinoco 
River delta of eastern Venezuela. Leveraging support from various sectors of the islands’ 
multiethnic societies, made up in turn of Afro-Caribbean, Indian, Lebanese, Chinese and
i n c
Latin American communities, often facilitates this activity. Further east, seven 
Caribbean countries, namely Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines form the eastern edge of 
the Caribbean transit zone for drugs.177 In terms of seizures, Jamaica has also emerged as 
one of the most active parts of the entire Caribbean basin in terms of drug trafficking.178
174 For instance, as reported in mid-2000, “Once again, as it was a decade ago, the Caribbean has become a 
favored route o f Colombian drug traffickers to get their product to the United States and Europe.” “A tidal 
wave of drugs,” The Economist, 24 June 2000,42. This article also notes the various nations in the region 
that have become hubs for drug transit, including Haiti, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Suriname.
175 “Uncle Sam wags its finger,” The Economist, 4 January 1997,44-5. For a broader overview o f maritime 
drug control, see also Fuss, passim.
176 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 170-1. With respect to the Gulf o f Paria between these 
islands and the mainland, this report also notes that, “Since the colonial era, this stretch o f water has been 
the scene o f  intensive smuggling: whiskey, weapons, rare animals and so on.”
177 With respect to this archipelago, U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “ The Caribbean -  
Eastern Caribbean,” notes that “Colombian drug traffickers and various organized crime groups have
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The island of Hispaniola, comprised of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is 
exceedingly well positioned to serve as a transit point for smuggling vectors moving 
through the Caribbean to the United States. In particular, Haiti’s favorable geography for 
smuggling, including the territorial extensions of the country’s northern and southern 
peninsulas, which create five separate coastal segments stretching nearly 1,800 
kilometers. The country’s fourteen seaports are dispersed all along this coastline. 
Furthermore, the Dominican border area, 338 kilometers in length, is mostly 
mountainous, sparsely populated and serviced by few roads with little law enforcement
1 70presence. However, even with its other advantages for smugglers, without the endemic 
corruption that plagues the country it would not play such a pivotal role.180
For its part, at the other end of the island the Dominican Republic has also 
emerged as a significant hub for drug trafficking, particularly with respect to the U.S. 
According to INCSR 2001, both intelligence and seizures throughout the region indicate
infiltrated many o f the eastern Caribbean nations, establishing their own infrastructure and contracting the 
services o f  local criminal organizations. To move the drugs within the region, many traffickers use a barter 
system, paying for services with drugs and/or weapons to limit costs and to increase demand and markets in 
the region.” As these are all small nations in terms o f both population and territory, such activity is 
understandably very destabilizing.
178 Incidentally, the USCS reported in 2000 that Jamaica is the embarkation point o f  the largest number o f  
passengers arrested with drugs at U.S. airports. U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “The 
Caribbean -  Jamaica.” The same report notes that data for the first half o f 2000 indicate that the amount o f  
cocaine transiting Jamaica quadrupled compared to the same period in 1999, making it the leading drug 
transshipment point in the Caribbean by volume.
179 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 43. For more on the 
role of Haiti in the transshipment o f  drugs and other contraband via maritime methods, both directly and 
after crossing the common land boundary with the Dominican Republic, see U.S. DOT, MARAD, 
“Maritime Smuggling o f  Drugs and Contraband Goods Adversely Impacting Legitimate Commerce and 
Development,” Maritime Security Report (April 1997), 1-10.
180 For recent trends on drugs transiting both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, see OGD, World 
Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 173-7. Interestingly, even criminals are not immune from Haiti’s present 
sociopolitical chaos. For instance, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “The Caribbean -  
Haiti,” which notes that the major impediments to the country’s further expansion as a hub for the drug 
trade “may be the difficulties traffickers experienced in moving drugs through Haiti because o f poor 
infrastructure or the seizure o f drugs by rival traffickers or other criminals.” As mentioned in Chapter III, 
in 2001 Haiti was not certified by the U.S. for its lackluster cooperation on drug issues but rather by the 
granting o f a national interest waiver.
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that Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican TCOs have made the country a major 
command and control center. However, many major drug shipments coordinated from 
the Dominican Republic do not actually transit the country. In general, Colombian 
suppliers begin the logistical process, while Dominican networks are more directly linked 
to primarily East Coast markets.181
Only ninety miles from Key West, Florida, Cuba’s unique geography presents an 
inviting environment to both seaborne and airborne smuggling vectors. The island 
stretches over 600 nautical miles from east to west, with over 3,500 nautical miles of 
coastline and more than 4,00Q islets and cays. In particular, its location in the northern 
Caribbean provides direct and indirect paths for drug smugglers attempting to reach the 
United States. Nonetheless, despite a relative lack of authoritative information, at present 
the country is not considered a major conduit for drugs into the United States.182 As 
such, the case of Cuba has traditionally been troublesome in the context of regional U.S. 
drug policy, and would most likely be so even in the absence of the state of enmity 
between the two countries.
In addition to the prevailing hostility toward the communist regime of Fidel 
Castro, in the past various sectors of the public and of the U.S. government have publicly 
accused the Cuban government of direct involvement in drug trafficking. In 1989, in 
what may well have been an instance of killing two birds with one stone, Castro had two 
top military officers executed for alleged drug trafficking, including General Amaldo 
Ochoa, who had with immense popularity among the armed forces and as such was a 
potential rival. Despite broad cooperation with European countries on this issue, the U.S.
181 Ibid., “The Caribbean -  Dominican Republic.”
182 Ibid., “The Caribbean -  Cuba.”
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and Cuba currently work together only on a very limited case-by-case basis.183 However, 
in what may be cause for guarded optimism, recently there has been more de facto 
cooperation, particularly between the respective coast guards.184
Even closer, the Bahamas offers easy access to the U.S. mainland along Florida’s 
eastern coast, particularly by virtue of its tourism and freight-forwarding links. However, 
there has been a shift of drug smuggling away from the Bahamas due to a perception of 
greater risk to drug traffickers due to U.S. interdiction efforts there. Much of this activity 
has moved to Puerto Rico, which in addition to its propitious geography, as a U.S. 
protectorate the island has numerous official and unofficial ties to major East Coast 
markets.185
For its part, Puerto Rico is centrally located astride the three main sets of 
Caribbean smuggling vectors to the continental U.S., namely those coming directly from 
South America, those transiting the island of Hispanola through both Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, and those moving through the Antilles archipelago. While 
Colombian traffickers remain the driving force in moving both heroin and cocaine 
throughout the Caribbean, Dominican groups dominate the transit trade through Puerto 
Rico by capitalizing on their ties to these groups.186
Finally, both private and commercial air links throughout the region have 
constituted smuggling routes from south to north. In the early days of the cocaine trade,
183 See “The disputatious diplomacy o f drags,” The Economist, 11 September 1999, 37.
184 Carol Rosenberg, “Hidden outpost in Keys scores series o f wins against drag traffic,” Miami Herald 
(web site), 3 August 2000.
185 As noted in U.S. GAO, “Drag Control: Observations,” 2, “Puerto Rico has become a major entry point 
for cocaine moving through the Eastern Caribbean into the United States.” See also U.S. DOJ, DEA, 
NNICC (1998), 43, which notes the links to East Coast cities with large Puerto Rican populations, such as 
New York and Orlando, Florida.
186 U.S Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 43. Moreover,
Dominican criminal organizations also play a significant role in the retail-level distribution o f heroin in the 
northeastern United States. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 42.
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this activity utilized primarily small private planes landing in various and generally 
remote staging areas. However, when moving directly to the U.S., recent heroin 
smuggling is most likely undertaken either by commercial passengers carrying small 
quantities, or via shipments hidden inside air cargo. Though variations understandably 
exist, this activity tends to take place on direct flights from South America to major East 
Coast destinations such as Miami or New York.187
As evidence of smuggling routes constantly shifting toward the path of least 
resistance, in 1997 a number of Central American couriers were arrested carrying drugs 
through Texas airports in an attempt to avoid increased airport security on the East 
Coast.188 While the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that same year that, 
“Caribbean traffickers have shifted their operations from primarily air-related activities to 
maritime activities,” given the cyclical and opportunistic nature of smuggling route 
selection successful patterns inevitable resurface.189 In a more recent case, ten 
Colombian nationals were arrested in Cali for concealing more than half a ton of heroin, 
as well as some cocaine, on commercial airliners bound for Miami.190
188 Ibid, 41. Though data is not yet available as o f this writing, as noted previously the dramatic increase in 
airport security across the U.S. in the wake o f 9/11 can only have increased the hurdles for smugglers 
attempting to use these modes o f entry for contraband.
189 U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations,” 1-2. In particular, the use o f both commercial and 
noncommercial maritime vessels became more prevalent during this period, including the documented use 
o f fishing boats, containerized cargo ships, and private motor and sailboats in this capacity. See also U.S. 
DOT, MARAD, “Increased Drug Smuggling Via Lesser Antilles Threatens Growing Maritime Container 
Trade,” Maritime Security Report (January 1997), 1-6.
190 See Jared Kotler, “Colombians smuggled heroin,” Detroit News (web site), 26 August 1999. An airline 
maintenance company, Aercol, servicing American Airlines jets in Cali, employed those involved. These 
mechanics hid the contraband in the tail sections, behind pilot’s seats, and in false compartments, to be 
extracted in Miami by associates. As with a wide range o f other smuggling activities, this operation was 
explicitly predicated on access to nominally secure areas as well as expert knowledge o f various types o f  
flight operations. An earlier investigation in mid-1997, also involving American Airlines, resulted in the 
arrest o f 6 employees for allegedly facilitating the transport o f up to 22 lbs. o f heroin and 1,100 lbs. o f  
cocaine on planes leaving Bogota bound for Miami. An interesting facet o f  this smuggling operation was 
allowing the plane to make one domestic flight to ensure less scrutiny before unloading the contraband, 
indicating a high degree o f  familiarity with security and other procedures. Richard Willing, “Airline Drug
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In terms of distribution patterns within the U.S., as noted above Colombian heroin 
tends to dominate most East Coast markets. However, this in itself is only a relatively 
recent phenomenon. For instance, according to the DEA’s Domestic Monitoring 
Program (DMP), which chemically tests and tracks the purity levels, place of origin and 
retail price of heroin across the country, nearly 85% of heroin samples taken in 1997 in 
the eastern half of the United States were of South American origin.
By contrast, in 1991 Southeast Asian heroin accounted for more than two-thirds 
of the samples, indicating a major shift over a relatively short period of time. One 
explanation for these statistics may be the high degree of reliance on internal and external 
body carriers. Though such methods can be characterized as relatively unsophisticated 
and may account for the high number of Colombian heroin seizures, they are nonetheless 
demonstrably effective.191
However, it is important to note that, in addition to providing the primary market 
and thus much of the demand that helps drive the hemispheric drug trade, the U.S. also 
facilitates such illicit commerce in more indirect ways. For instance, the United States 
itself is a major provider of precursor chemicals for Latin America drug processing, 
primarily due to the relatively shorter distances involved in transporting these often- 
unstable compounds, as well as being a more reliable supplier than many alternative
1Q9sources. An even more important enabling factor for the continuation of the regional
Smugglers Getting Ever more Sophisticated,” USA Today, 1 August 1997,4A. See also “Colombia: A new 
class o f trafficker,” The Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
191 Similarly, data from the DEA’s separate Heroin Signature Program also supports these conclusions, 
noting that their findings for 1997 were that South America was supplying 75% of U.S. heroin market. See 
U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 39-41, and, for more on domestic U.S. cocaine distribution trends, which 
tend to parallel those o f heroin, 11-2.
192 Furthermore, “foreign drug-trafficking groups typically import chemicals into neighboring countries in 
an attempt to disguise their purpose and destination, before diverting and smuggling the chemicals to their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
324
drug trading cycle can be found in the methods by which Colombian TCOs are able to 
repatriate the illegal proceeds of their enterprises earned in the U.S.
The black-market peso exchange is one of the main money laundering 
mechanisms that has been used by Colombian drug traffickers, in which dollar- 
denominated profits are sold at a discount to brokers, who then credit the seller an 
equivalent sum in pesos through a Colombian bank. The dollars are then sold to 
Colombian businesses at an exchange rate exceeding that of the official rate, and used to 
finance the purchase and export of goods from the United States. This system effectively 
circumvents both Colombian and U.S. currency reporting requirements.193
Yet another method allegedly used by Colombian TCOs and both their Mexican 
and Dominican counterparts involves the use of international money remitters to launder 
their profits. These businesses arrange payments via the electronic transfer of funds to 
selected recipients in return for a commission, usually up to 10 percent of the principal.194 
As the regulations governing such transactions have been tightened further since 9/11, it 
would be unsurprising if the risks, and subsequently the commissions, were to rise as 
well. However, in the interim, U.S. law enforcement authorities are able to utilize 
Geographical Targeting Orders (GTOs) against money remitters suspected of money 
laundering, which provides for a sixty-day window in which stricter reporting and record-
drug-producing laboratories.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, 
Ch. Ill, 50.
193 Ibid., Ch. II, 31. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, as much as $5 billion in drug trafficking 
proceeds may be laundered annually using this method. Further details o f this mechanism can be found in 
U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INSCR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
194 Presently in the U.S., money remitters are now required to register with the government and to report 
both suspicious activity and any transactions exceeding $100,000. U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 31.
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keeping requirements can be imposed on specific service providers in a given 
geographical area.195
Similarly, in the context of the physical transfer of currency, many of the 
smuggling techniques described above once more come to the fore, albeit in reverse. 
According to the DEA, money launderers have begun to rely increasingly on bulk 
shipments of cash in commercial export shipments, largely as a result of the successful 
targeting of illicit wire transfers.196 Often such transfers of U.S. currency to Colombia 
utilize commercial maritime freight mechanisms as discussed in Chapter II.197 Moreover, 
because of the Colombian government’s tariff on dollar deposits, these funds are often 
converted into third-country currencies, such as the Venezuelan bolivar or the Ecuadorian 
sucre, and then smuggled into the country.198
Finally, as an additional example of the physical transfer of negotiable assets, 
goods purchased with the proceeds of criminal activity can also be used to circumvent 
money laundering strictures. For instance, according to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
195 For instance, in mid-1996 a GTO was issued in the New York metropolitan area cut the targeted money 
remitters’ volume o f trade with Colombia by 30%, with several halting all such transactions and others 
going out o f  business completely. See U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,” 
12-3.
196 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Statement by James Milford, Acting Deputy Administrator, DEA, before the Subcommittee on National 
Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, 17 July 1997,available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/cnsxtest/ct970717.htm. accessed 15 July 2004. A similar view is also noted 
in U.S. DOT, National Science and Technology Council, Office o f Science and Technology Policy, 
lntermodal Cargo Transportation, 14-5.
197 In general, smuggling currency out o f the U.S. in maritime exports is considered relatively easy given 
the high volume o f containerized trade, and the fact that USCS resources devoted to inspecting cargo 
containers are primarily focused on inbound shipping. For a thorough overview o f this issue with respect 
to Colombia, see U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Currency Smuggling from U.S. Facilitated by Front Companies 
Exporting Containerized Maritime Freight,” Maritime Security Report (January 1996), 3-6. Incidentally, 
once repatriated the physical storage this currency can also become an issue, as in cases where drug 
traffickers reportedly must dig up bundles o f  plastic-wrapped currency buried in the Colombian jungle.
The money is then dried with battery-powered hair dryers so that it does not disintegrate from the humidity, 
and then reburied until such time as it can be safely introduced back into the banking system. Recounted in 
Bentham, 145.
198 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 104-5. Relatives o f traffickers have also been known to have 
incredible streaks o f  good fortune, “winning” millions o f dollars in pesos from various lotteries.
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Tobacco and Firearms, “Colombian drug traffickers often use illicit drug proceeds to 
purchase cigarettes that they smuggle into Colombia for black-market sales, avoiding 
high tariffs and taxes on legal tobacco imports.”199 Similarly, movable assets, such as 
luxury boats, have been purchased in France, sailed back to South America and sold, thus 
legitimizing the drug profits with sales receipts.200
As a prominent gateway from the greater Caribbean basin into the rest of the 
contiguous United States, the state of Florida offers an interesting example in several 
respects. For instance, in terms of physical geography, its relative proximity to primary 
source and transit countries, as well as approximately 1,350 miles of largely unprotected 
continental coastline and additional access by sea via the Florida Keys archipelago, make 
the state very attractive to drug traffickers.
Given the relatively free movement of goods once they enter the United States, a 
well-developed transportation infrastructure, including numerous deep-water seaports, 
international airports, interstate highways and rail lines linking it to the national 
transportation network, all serve to enhance Florida’s appeal in this respect. Moreover, a 
diverse ethnic population, heavily influenced by immigration from Latin America, also 
serves to facilitate a wide range of both formal and informal transnational transactions.
Ironically, many of the same factors that initially drew organized criminal 
elements to Florida also serve to bolster the state’s competitive advantage in legitimate 
international trade. Between 1990 and 1998, this trade increased by 126%, from $30.6 
billion to $69.3 billion. Economic activity at Florida’s seaports accounted for $44.8
199 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 17.
200 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 108.
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billion, or 65%, of that amount. It is not too much to say that Florida by itself exerts a 
powerful international influence throughout the Caribbean basin and Latin America, 
culturally as well as economically.
Throughout the state, the Colombian cartels remain the most prominent criminal 
element. However, theses groups have been working to expand their associations with 
Florida- and Caribbean-based Dominican, Haitian, Puerto Rican and Cuban traffickers. 
Among these groups, South Florida in particular remains an international command and 
control center for drug trafficking as well as money laundering. This part of the state has 
also been identified as having the second largest concentration of Russian and Eurasian 
immigrants in the U.S., after the greater New York metropolitan area, and logically 
enough, related ethnically-based organized crime activity. As the trend toward 
cooperation among criminal groups of differing ethnicities increases, the fluidity of these 
partnerships becomes more apparent as well.
These factors notwithstanding, by the early 1990’s, much of the illegal drug 
traffic entering the United States had shifted further west, focusing on the extensive and 
porous land border with Mexico, as discussed above. The subsequent diversion of 
federal resources to the southwestern border of the United States, as well as concurrent 
hurricane-related infrastructure damage in Central America, led to higher transit costs 
passed on by Mexican smugglers to Colombian producers. This, in turn, helped
201 Florida Seaport Transportation and Economic Development Council, Florida’s Seaports: Dynamic 
Facilitators o f  Commercial and Economic Development (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Ports Council, 2000), iii, 
xi.
202 The DEA notes the use o f Mexican and Caribbean-based trafficking organizations as surrogates o f  the 
Colombian cartels, while Colombian alliances with Dominican and Puerto Rican groups dominated U.S. 
heroin distribution along the eastern seaboard. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), ix-x.
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facilitate the resurgence of traditional routes through the Caribbean into Florida by the 
late 1990s by making them both less risky and more economically feasible.203
At the state level, the best estimate as of early 2000 for the amount of heroin 
coming into Florida was between one and three MT annually.204 Colombian heroin is 
considered a major problem in Orlando and a growing one in Miami, due to many of the 
factors discussed above such as market penetration and higher purity levels.205 In 
recognition of South Florida’s perennial attraction for drug trafficking activity, the South 
Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) was one of the original areas so 
designated in 1990 by the U.S. federal government. Largely in response to a rise in 
heroin fatalities in Orlando, a Central Florida HIDTA was also set up in 1998.206 
Moreover, the ONDCP also notes the emerging role of Jacksonville in the northern part 
of the state as a major transportation hub for large quantities of drugs smuggled into the 
southeastern region of the country.207
203 In particular, trends include both an increase in both airdrops and drops to ‘go-fast’ boats from ‘mother­
ships,’ and greater integration among Caribbean distributing organizations. Florida Department o f  Law 
Enforcement (FDLE), The State o f  Drugs in Florida (Tallahassee, FL: FDLE, n.d.), “Smuggling and 
Trafficking Trends,” available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/osi/crimebriefs/drugassessment/drugs.html. 
accessed 15 July 2004. These conclusions are supported by other contemporary assessments, as noted in 
U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 3-4, 9. In particular, according to the nationwide Federal Drug Seizure 
System, between 1996 and 1997, maritime drug seizures increased most dramatically as a proportion o f  
total seizures, with the Caribbean and South Atlantic regions ranked the highest. These same figures also 
attest to a correspondingly sharp decline in seizures along the southwestern border with Mexico. See also 
U.S. DOJ, NDIC, “Florida Drug Threat Assessment -  Heroin” (Johnstown, PA: NDIC, July 2003), 
available at http://www.usdoi.gOv/ndic/pubs5/5169/heroin.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
204 This figure comes from a consensus among participants o f the state-sponsored Florida Drug Supply 
Estimating Conference, St. Augustine, Florida, 22-23 February 2000. A similar range for cocaine of  
between 150 and 200 MT was also agreed upon.
205 Florida, FDLE, The State o f  Drugs in Florida 1998, Orlando and Miami regional assessments.
206 In general, the HIDTA designation allows for federal funding o f programs within the area in question 
and the establishment o f interagency working groups focusing on various geographic and issue areas. See 
U.S. ONDCP, “Miami HIDTA -  FY 2000 Fact Sheet” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, 2000); and U.S. 
ONDCP, “Central Florida HIDTA -  FY 2000 Fact Sheet” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, 2000).
207 U.S. ONDCP, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, “City o f Jacksonville, Florida: Profile o f  Drug 
Indicators,” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, August 1999), 4.
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Finally the growing penetration of Colombian TCOs into Canadian, European, 
Asian and African markets is a trend that appears to be accelerating.208 With respect to 
Europe, for instance, throughout the mid-to-late 1980s, direct cocaine shipments reached 
the continent primarily through Spain and, to a lesser extent, through Italy, facilitated by 
links with the Sicilian Mafia.209 As a U.S. government analysis notes, “Cultural and 
linguistic ties between the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America are exploited by South 
American drug traffickers who stimulate the demand for cocaine in Western Europe’s 
more profitable market.” In addition to entry points along the extensive and rocky 
Spanish coastline, lax border control at the Netherlands’ deep-water ports in Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam also constitute a major gateway for Latin American drugs entering 
Western Europe 210
Further east, before Colombia began to cultivate its own opium on a 
commercially viable scale, there were numerous indications that both the Medellin and 
Cali cartels made contact with their Sicilian and Russian counterparts to exchange
208 For more on Colombian TCO activity in Canada, see Canada, “Documentation: Criminal Intelligence 
Service Canada, 1996 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, 
no. 4 (Winter 1996), 145-7. See also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 177-8. While noting the 
primacy o f Asian networks in importing heroin, and partnership between Colombian and Canadian criminal 
organizations, this report also discusses several indications that Colombian and Asian TCOs are beginning 
to work together in the eastern half o f  the county as well. For instance, in late 1997 a Vietnamese male 
bound for Montreal was arrested at the Baranquilla airport with a significant amount o f  heroin in his 
luggage. Moreover, drug trafficking routes into the U.S. market via Canada are also increasingly common, 
for a number o f reasons. For instance, see U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Canada, Mexico 
and Central America -  Canada,” which notes, “International drug traffickers attempt to route drug 
shipments, primarily heroin, cocaine and MDMA (ecstasy), through Canada to the U.S. to take advantage 
of the long and open Canada-U.S. border, the massive flow o f legitimate containerized commerce, and the 
lower criminal penalties compared with the U.S.”
209 See Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 105; and Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 75.
210 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 3. OGD, World 
Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 12, 89-94, also notes that in the 1980s many Colombian TCOs relocated some 
command and control functions to the Galician region o f Spain in response to various pressure, but have 
since grown strong enough to function largely without the assistance of their Spanish partners.
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cocaine for heroin.211 However, as Clawson and Lee point out, drug-for-drug exchanges 
of this type seem likely to diminish over time 212 Italian organized crime groups also 
provide money laundering services for Colombian drug traffickers, among others 213 
With respect to other regions of the world, though Japanese yakuza groups 
acquire most of their heroin and methamphetamines from Chinese criminal organizations 
based primarily in Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are reports of links with South 
American traffickers as w ell214 Finally, as will be seen in the following chapter, 
Nigerian TCOs continue to expand their global roles as drug trafficking intermediaries 
for Colombian groups as well as a wide range of other criminal organizations.
Colombian Heroin Smuggling Vectors: An Assessment 
In order to assess smuggling vectors out of Colombia in terms of access, risk and 
connectivity, it is first necessary to revisit the various factors relating to terrain, tradition 
and domestic turmoil that facilitate these vectors at their points of origination. As noted 
at the outset of this chapter, the country displays a very high level of political risk in
211 For instance, in June 1995,480 pounds o f Colombian cocaine were seized in Gdansk, Poland, while a 
few days later the first sizable shipment o f crack cocaine into Eastern Europe was disrupted a few 
kilometers away in Gdynia. See “Cali comes to Gdansk,” The Economist, 10 June 1995, 50. Even earlier, 
in February 1993, nearly a ton o f cocaine was seized in St. Petersburg. Since it would take years for the 
relatively small Russian cocaine market to absorb such a quantity, it was presumed that the final destination 
would be the wider European markets. For more on Colombian TCOs market penetration into Eastern 
Europe, see also Pablo Galarza, “Cocaine Czechs In,” Forbes 149, no. 11 (25 May 1992), 18; and OGD, 
World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 123-4. In particular, the latter notes the activities o f both Colombian 
and Nigerian TCOs in the Czech Republic.
212 The authors note two reasons for this projection, namely the growth of Colombia’s domestic heroin 
industry and the gradual withdrawal o f  the Sicilian criminal organizations that have cooperated in the past 
with Colombian drug traffickers. Clawson and Lee, 77-8. For an earlier view o f this phenomenon, see also 
Sterling, Octopus, 311-2.
213 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 6.
214 Ibid, Ch. Ill, 34. Though Japanese TCOs have not been addressed directly at length in the course o f this 
study, Booth notes that, “ Although it is known that the Yakuza bankroll bulk shipments o f  drugs to 
Western markets, the extent o f  their involvement in present day international drug trafficking is hard to 
assess. They are virtually impenetrable and, given their organizational skills and financial prowess, not to 
say the cover Japanese world trade can afford them, almost impossible to combat.” Booth, Opium, 310.
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terms of the methodologies discussed in Chapter IV, and in many ways parallels the case 
of Afghanistan in its relatively remote terrain, endemic civil unrest and high levels of 
corruption, all of which can be seen as having a distinct and ongoing impact. In addition 
to the ramifications of the thriving trade in illicit drugs, the average Colombian must also 
deal with kidnapping and extortion attempts, periodic bombings in urban areas, ongoing 
depredations by various armed factions in rural areas, and other forms of entrenched 
systemic violence.
With respect to heroin, it is important to note that opium cultivation is a relatively 
recent phenomenon in Latin America and thus not nearly as embedded as coca 
production, though in many ways it can be seen its natural extension. As such, it is the 
latest and potentially the most lucrative of a succession of organized illegal enterprises 
undertaken by both domestic and transnational Colombian criminal groups. Over the 
past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in this activity, as these organizations 
continue to diversify their markets, leverage their competitive advantage by way of 
effective smuggling routes and methods developed to transport cocaine, and realize 
greater profit margins by offering higher purity levels than their competitors, particularly 
in key North American markets.
As discussed previously, the various geographic factors that serve to shape the 
smugglers’ landscape at the national level can be sorted in terms of their physical, 
economic, political and human dimensions. To begin with physical geography, 
Colombia’s terrain is difficult even by Latin American standards, and has historically led 
to a high degree of regional isolation and subsequent autonomy. Transportation by land 
is limited by absent or underdeveloped roads and rail lines, water navigation is for the
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most part constrained by the availability of navigable rivers, and there is a significant 
dependence on domestic air travel.
Thus, within the country, both access and risk are impeded, though the high profit 
potential of the drug trade allows it to flourish nonetheless. However in terms of 
connectivity, Colombia’s porous land borders with its neighbors, ocean access to both the 
Pacific and the Caribbean, and international air linkages allow a wide range of smuggling 
vectors to pass through. For the most part, while certainly limited by physical geography 
there is still a demonstrably wide range of options available to the relevant TCOs.
With respect to Colombia’s economic geography, the dual impact of a weak 
central government and relative regional isolation have led to low economic 
interdependence between different parts of the country, as well as a multiple 
concentrations of populations rather than within the capital itself, in contrast to other 
nations in the region. Furthermore, though near the geographic center of the country, 
Bogota itself has never been a major economic center in relation to the major exports.
This centrifugal tendency has been further compounded by an overall lack of economic 
development in rural areas, which has in turn led large numbers of peasants to become 
involved either voluntarily or involuntarily in drug cultivation and processing.
While more economically diversified than a number of other major drug 
producing countries, the influx of drug proceeds into Colombia have had a net negative 
impact nonetheless. The detrimental effects on the economy include hurting the 
competitiveness of traditional industries, promoting speculative investments, and 
diverting funding away from legitimate investments and into money laundering channels. 
Furthermore, these conditions help to perpetuate a climate of violence that has in turn
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encouraged capital flight and discouraged legitimate foreign investment. However, the 
massive profits created by the drug trade have also served to dislocate Colombia’s 
economic geography to the degree that access has become deeply entrenched and risk is 
largely mitigated by either bribery or coercion.
In addition to a history of ineffective central government and its ramifications, 
Colombia’s political geography is also predicated upon the enduring primacy of elite 
rule, to include the maintenance of power by recourse to extra-legal means when 
necessary. By extension, a range of non-state actors with both political and economic 
motives have arisen to contest power in various parts of the country, with their activities 
often romanticized by various sectors of the population.
In the context of the drug trade, as in Afghanistan the physical control of territory 
is paramount to ensuring access, mitigating risk, and accruing the resultant profits, which 
has led drug traffickers to cooperate with or compete against leftist insurgencies, 
paramilitary militias, or even elements of the government itself at any given point in time 
and space. In particular, leverage over rural populations can be seen as crucial to 
ensuring that drug production proceeds unhindered. With respect to politically-motivated 
non-state actors, ideological trappings became largely secondary to the imperatives of 
accruing profits as external state sponsorship waned at the end of the Cold War, not only 
from the drug trade itself but also from various other illegal activities.
While in the recent past the Medellin and Cali cartels rose and fell in their 
attempts to challenge the nation-state, by respectively direct and indirect means, their 
successors have tended to be smaller, nimbler, and more diverse in terms of both 
structure and commodities offered. However, Colombian TCOs have generally shared a
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number of other attributes that have made them extremely effective, such as their 
openness to innovation, opportunism and extensive transnational presence.
This very success, however, has in turn led the U.S. government to regard drug 
trafficking as perhaps the major threat within the hemisphere. Despite the vast number of 
assets have been dedicated to eradicating the drug trade in Colombia, the results have 
been decidedly mixed, as the empirical evidence suggests that overall connectivity has 
not been appreciably impaired. In addition to programs targeting drug production and 
processing upstream, U.S. vigilance with respect to the transit zone is a hallmark of these 
efforts. While at times other priorities have taken precedence, the linkage of this issue 
area to that of terrorism in the wake of 9/11 should have the effect of further solidifying 
this stance.
Finally, there are two primary features of Colombia’s human geography that have 
an impact on the illicit drug trade, namely the presence of cross-border indigenous ethnic 
groups and trends relating to the movement of populations both domestically and 
internationally. With respect to the first, although the country’s indigenous ethnic groups 
have been largely assimilated, their spatial distribution and sense of identity is 
increasingly transnational, which in turn not only facilitates migration but also other 
forms of unofficial economic activity. It should also be noted that a high proportion of 
rural drug cultivators are members of these groups.
Similarly, the overall number of displaced persons within Colombia shifting back 
and forth between rural and urban areas is significant, as the country has one of the 
highest refugee populations outside of Africa. Externally, large and growing expatriate 
communities have served to extend the potential reach of Colombian TCOs, particularly
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in the U.S. As noted previously, however, this is not to insinuate that members of these 
ethnic groups are either more or less likely to be involved in illegal activity than other 
individuals, but rather that their mere presence can serve to facilitate access and mitigate 
risk with respect to the relevant smuggling vectors.
Thus, as in Afghanistan, a combination of physical, economic, political and 
human geographic factors have come together to create a firmly entrenched drug 
production and processing nexus in Colombia. However, unlike the case of Afghanistan, 
drug smuggling vectors moving outward from Colombia are largely controlled to some 
degree by Colombian TCOs. Over the past several decades, these groups have dominated 
the hemispheric trade in illicit drugs, especially with respect to the linkages between 
South American supply and predominantly North American demand.
As discussed in Chapter III, in some respects the demand side of this equation 
frames the geographic parameters for much of this activity as these smuggling vectors 
move generally northward. Colombian TCOs have been demonstrably success in 
adapting to changes in the smugglers’ landscape by maintaining a considerable degree of 
access to key production areas and markets, and managing their risks by either mitigating 
them or shifting to less risky venues. However, the transnational logistics linking these 
products to primary markets, particularly those in North America are crucial as well.
The relevant sets of smuggling vectors exiting Colombia can be broken down into 
those proceeding respectively by land, by water and by air. By land, Colombia’s borders 
are contiguous with those of Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. By water, 
the country’s maritime access via both seaports and an extensive coastline allow for 
transit through both the greater Caribbean basin but the Pacific Ocean as well. By air,
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both primary and secondary air connections also serve to facilitate a wide range of 
smuggling activity. Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that the transnational 
movement of heroin is often inextricably linked to, and in some cases actually 
coexistence with, that of cocaine.
Beginning with smuggling vectors exiting Colombia by land, there are numerous 
documented instances of drug smuggling vectors exiting the country via Ecuador. In 
terms of access, in addition to types of terrain similar to those found in Colombia, 
evidence of Ecuador’s porous borders can be found in the spread of certain aspects of the 
drug trade, kidnapping and other forms of illicit cross-border activity between the two 
countries. In addition to proximity to both Colombian and Peruvian drug producing 
areas, access to the country’s Pacific seaports and banking structure have allowed 
Colombian TCOs more options for smuggling as well as money laundering. Conversely, 
risk for these organizations is minimized by avoidance of some of the scrutiny that 
travelers and goods departing Colombia must endure.
In the case of Peru, there are a number of parallels with Colombia with respect to 
large-scale drug production and rural insurgency. However, the waning influence of the 
primary insurgent group in recent years has led to more operational scope for Colombian 
traffickers. While at the domestic level the interaction between these two types of non­
state actors is similar to that found in Colombia, the transnational impact of these 
activities is for the most part managed under the auspices of Colombian TCOs. The 
regional preponderance of Colombian TCOs in both Peru and Bolivia can be seen in the 
demonstrable ability of these organizations to gain access to upstream operations at a
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minimum of risk, in turn allowing them to in turn leverage these countries’ potential for 
connectivity as well.
With respect to Brazil, the attractiveness of smuggling vectors out of Colombia 
moving eastward into the Amazon Basin and beyond hinges more on the issue of risk 
than of access. Incursions across the border by both Colombian non-state actors and 
government forces have been met with force as well as diplomatic protests. Furthermore, 
Colombian TCOs are not nearly as dominant in Brazil as elsewhere in the region, with 
some analysts seeing a greater Brazilian presence in the hemispheric drug trade in the 
near future. As such, Colombian TCOs must contend not only with risks imposed by 
government forces from both countries, but by competing criminal organizations as well.
As in Brazil, the spillover of not only drug-related activity but also the flow of 
both arms and refugees into Venezuela has become a significant issue. The failure of the 
current Venezuelan leadership to control this phenomenon has given Colombian 
insurgent groups in particular considerable sway within the border region. A 
combination of lax law enforcement and civil unrest have both enabled access and 
mitigated risks to Colombian TCOs and allowed them to take advantage of the country’s 
considerable connectivity as a result.
As the last of Colombia’s contiguous neighbors, Panama is also the gateway by 
land to the rest of Central America and Mexico, with its control of the Panama Canal 
further multiplying available smuggling vector options. The country’s history of 
involvement in the hemispheric drug trade and the use of routes from northwestern 
Colombia into southern Panama to move illicit drugs also illustrate the reach of 
Colombian TCOs in particular. These organizations have been able to gain access to
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Panama’s transportation infrastructure and financial system, while the relocation of U.S. 
military assets and the relative inefficiency of Panamanian law enforcement and legal 
apparatus serves to keep risks to a minimum as smuggling vectors continue north by land.
The land border between Mexico and the United States is often the last barrier for 
many of the smuggling vectors originating in Colombia and traveling either by land or by 
water. In addition to very favorable access stemming for the most part from its physical 
proximity to major markets, the sheer volume of goods and people moving both legally 
and illegally serves to minimize risk. Moreover, such factors as the ratification of 
NAFTA, high levels of public corruption, and various types of strategic partnership 
between Mexican and Colombian TCOs further mitigate these risks. Generally speaking, 
a cyclical pattern of drug smuggling activity emerges, with activity shifting between the 
Mexican land border and maritime approaches via the greater Caribbean basin, often in 
response to U.S. law enforcement efforts.
Returning to Colombia proper, smuggling vectors by water can exit the country 
across either the eastern Pacific or the Caribbean. In general, routes utilizing the Pacific 
can return to land at any point along the western seaboard of Central or North America 
where risks can be minimized most effectively. Potentially offering more options in 
terms of access by virtue of its many islands and archipelagoes, and consequently more 
complexity, smuggling vectors crossing the Caribbean tend to be dominated by 
Colombian TCOs or their surrogates. However, the risks involved in transiting the region 
by water are highly dependent on the U.S. interdiction posture at any given point in time, 
and different islands or sets of islands offering optimal connectivity as a result.
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Finally, with respect to air modes of transportation, both private and commercial 
aviation serve to facilitate a wide range of drug-related activity within Colombia. 
Outbound smuggling vectors from Colombia utilizing international commercial air links 
tend to involve either relatively small quantities carried by passengers or in luggage, or 
larger amounts in air cargo in cases where access can be controlled. While private air 
transit offers greater latitude, it is still constrained by geography as well as subject to 
monitoring by law enforcement entities. Smuggling vectors moving through airports also 
face tremendously increased scrutiny since 9/11, and thus much greater risk.
In the past, issues revolving around cocaine trafficking held primacy in U.S. 
policy-making, while Europe and other regions of the world have traditionally been more 
concerned with the transnational heroin trade. Though an increasing share of the world’s 
opium supply is now produced in Latin America, by contrast coca is rarely produced 
outside the region. Moreover, the blurring of formerly distinct lines between different 
black markets continues apace. As such, the radical alteration of familiar patterns will 
most likely become increasingly common as the global economic and political climate 
changes.
Colombian TCOs are in many respects uniquely suited to take advantage of this 
evolution, and are continuing to expand their influence well beyond the hemisphere.
These groups exhibit not only a highly sophisticated capability to manage extensive 
transnational supply chains, but also to prosper in the relatively difficult operational 
environment posed by the U.S. This is true not only with respect to drug smuggling 
vectors, as seen in the case of Florida, but also to money laundering as well.
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Given this combination of experience and adherence to “best practices” within the 
field of smuggling, in the future the roads north may not be the only ones eventually 
dominated by Colombian TCOs. However, while these organizations have a 
demonstrable influence over the relevant logistical channels linking both their domestic 
drug production and that of much of the adjacent region to the major hemispheric markets 
in North America, in geographical terms their expansion to date has not been nearly as 
great beyond its core areas of hemispheric operation.
By contrast, Nigerian TCOs can be seen as taking this business model a step 
further by dispensing with the need to actually maintain control of drug cultivation areas 
and focus on connecting areas of supply and demand at a global level. However, before 
moving on to that issue, the next chapter examines the various extant conditions within 
Nigeria that have both facilitated the growth of such entities and continue to provide them 
with a safe haven.




NIGERIA AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING VECTORS
The final case study in this analysis is that of Nigeria. While not itself a major 
producer of opiates, the country has emerged as a major trafficking hub for heroin almost 
in spite of its physical geography. The primary function of Nigerian TCOs in this context 
is particularly important, as they provide the “legs’ for a high volume of transnational 
heroin smuggling activity. This chapter represents a bit of a departure in terms of format 
compared to the previous two case studies, in which the relevant set of smuggling vectors 
reflect heroin solely in transit without the previously associated aspects of production.
As such, the first section deals with the domestic situation in Nigeria that enables 
widespread criminal enterprises, of which smuggling forms only a portion, to flourish.
As such, endemic corruption, the legacy of colonial borders, the impact of oil’s 
dominance on the national economy, and the role of ethno-linguistic social ties and 
tensions are all germane to this discussion. Even in cases where this activity does not 
actually occur on Nigerian territory, the favorable smugglers’ landscape of the country 
provides an important enabling factor.
While the role of Nigeria proper as a base of operations is critical, in terms of 
transnational access, risk and connectivity an analysis of Nigerian TCOs demonstrates 
how discrete regional smuggling actors can interact with wider global black markets to 
form a seamless logistical continuum. The second section addresses the scope and 
activities of these organizations directly, with a focus on their expansion in recent years.
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In particular, the demonstrable adaptability of these groups, particularly with respect to 
routes and methods, has been a major contributing factor to their continuing expansion. 
The Nigerian government’s attempts to address the problem are also addressed, as is the 
spatial distribution of Nigerian and other West African expatriate communities. Finally, 
an assessment is made of the relevant smuggling vectors in terms of models, conventions 
and parameters used throughout this study.
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Fig. 20. Nigeria and surrounding region1
1 Map source: U.S. CIA, CIA WorldFactbook (2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
343
Crime and Corruption in Nigeria: On Fertile Ground 
While perhaps neither better nor worse in terms of crime and corruption than 
many other places in sub-Saharan Africa, what does stand out in the case of Nigeria are 
the scale and the scope of these activities. A multi-ethnic federation of 36 states, plus the 
federal capital territory of Abuja, the country encompasses more than 250 distinct ethno- 
linguistic groups. Furthermore, its demographic weight of 120 million represents 
approximately 20% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa.
Adding to existing internal and regional tensions, Nigeria’s large and ethnically 
diverse populace has long been entangled in an extremely intense competition for access 
to state resources, primarily the massive nationalized petroleum revenues, via a highly 
developed spoils system. As Jeffrey Herbst notes, “Nigeria’s problems stem from a 
peculiarly corrupt political economy combined with an unfortunately generous oil
9 • • •reserve.” Even more succinctly, The Economist observes that, “To understand Nigerian 
politics, you have to go back to one event: the discovery of oil.”3
However, in some respects the root cause of Nigeria’s ills is even more 
fundamental. As starkly put by Chinua Achebe, “The trouble with Nigeria is simply and 
squarely a failure of leadership . . .  The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability 
of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example that are the 
hallmarks of true leadership.”4 The ramifications of this sustained failure of leadership
2 Jeffrey Herbst, “Is Nigeria a Viable State?” The Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 156. The 
author also notes “the pernicious political dynamic in which control o f the state became critical in order to 
regulate the flow o f patronage.”
3 “Let down again: A survey o f  Nigeria,” The Economist, 21August 1993, 4.
4 Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1985), 3. 
Putting the issue even more squarely within the context o f this analysis, U.S. Department o f  State, INL, 
INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Nigeria,” notes that “the narcotics and crime problems in 
Nigeria are deeply rooted in Nigeria's present governmental system, and in Nigerian society. It will require
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across the course of decades will become self-evident as this analysis progresses.
Beyond the national context, this state of affairs is particularly relevant in that the 
combination of Nigeria’s instability and strategic weight has the potential to further 
disrupt an already-fragile West African region, if not the entire continent.
As such, Nigeria offers extensive and fertile ground for a wide range of illegal 
activity, particularly for those with the proper political connections. The country itself 
has been described by one unnamed U.S. expert as a “massive criminal enterprise,” 
largely due to its role as a major transit point for heroin from Asia and other drugs en 
route to Europe and the United States.5 As noted in 1995, “Nigeria’s farmers have not 
gotten around to growing coca or poppies. But its entrepreneurs recognize a commercial 
opportunity when they see one, and there is no business as profitable as selling other 
people’s drugs. Though far from the narcotic-growing zones of Latin America and Asia, 
Nigeria has become a big distribution hub.”6
Since that time these trends have all accelerated. However, from an even wider 
perspective, one recent estimate characterizes nearly 80% of Nigeria’s GDP as coming 
from the “shadow economy.”7 As such, in addition to drug trafficking, a host of related
courageous political will for any Nigerian government to confront these difficult issues and bring about 
meaningful change.”
5 Quoted in Dan Connell and Frank Smyth, “Africa’s New Bloc,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (March-April 
1998), 88.
6 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist (web edition), 26 August 1995. This article also notes the 
increasing use o f  drugs in the country, particularly among young urban males.
7 The supporting data is from a study by Friedrich Schneider o f Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria, 
as cited in “Black hole,” The Economist, 28 August 1999, 59. This is the highest percentage among those 
countries listed, and as such serves as a key indicator o f the level o f corruption endemic to Nigeria. 
Incidentally, the term “shadow economy,” or the gap between the reported and actual GDP, is meant to 
cover not only overtly illegal economic activity but also unrecorded legal income. It is further noted that in 
emerging economies, “the shadow economy is driven not so much by the incentive to avoid taxes, which 
tend to be lower than in rich countries, as by a desire to evade the law.” For a more focused analysis o f this 
issue in the African context, see also Stephen Ellis and Janet MacGaffey, “Research on sub-Saharan 
Africa’s unrecorded international trade: some methodological and conceptual problems,” African Studies 
Review 39, no. 2 (September 1996), 19-42. A contrasting point o f  view is that black markets in Africa
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and subsidiary phenomena necessarily contribute to this state of affairs. For instance, the 
west coast of Africa, off Nigeria and Senegal, is one of the two most piracy-prone areas
o
of the continent. However, another more invasive and far-reaching phenomena is the 
prominence of Nigerian groups in certain types of financial fraud.
In particular, the solicitation of bogus advance fees from both individuals and 
businesses, in return for promised later windfalls, has proved quite lucrative. This class 
of criminal activity is know as “419” fraud, named for the relevant statute of the Nigerian 
penal code. Often, the perpetrators pose as officials representing the Nigerian 
government, banking establishment or national oil company. Furthermore, such groups 
also “capitalize on their ability to produce fraudulent identities and to suborn key 
employees of banks and companies in order to steal customer credit card data.”9
represent a dynamic force allowing the poorest elements o f society to survive in the face o f  failing 
institutions and official corruption. An example o f this perspective can be found in Tom Nevin, “The black 
market: alive and kicking in Africa,” African Business, no. 299 (February 1998), 8-11.
8 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 16; and “Those in 
peril on the sea,” The Economist, 9 August 1997, 40. The other main piracy area in Africa lies off 
Somalia’s east coast. While other regions, particularly Southeast Asia, have experienced more incidents in 
recent years, in Nigerian waters such activity is often coupled with the taking of hostages. Moreover, in 
general, African piracy tends to be characterized by a higher degree o f violence than that found elsewhere. 
Lawrence J. Kahn, “Piracy: A Problem for the 21st Century,” presented at annual meeting o f  the National 
Cargo Security Council, New Orleans, Louisiana, 5 June 2000.
9 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 25-6. See also 
“Nigerian Fraud Syndicate Exposed,” African News Service, 25 August 1999, 100823u6870, which notes 
the solicitation by mail o f British businesses to pay money up front in order to expedite the laundering o f  
money for a percentage o f  the principal. Inevitably the participants see neither their investment again, nor 
the promised profit. Incidentally, in early 2002 the author was approached twice via e-mail by parties 
purporting to represent the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) within the first two months 
of setting up a consulting practice. These messages illustrate a relatively obvious example o f attempted 
advance fee fraud, which aims to entice victims into providing up-front funding for “necessary” expenses 
such as bribes, taxes and legal fees, in return for lucrative windfall profits. For a thorough overview o f this 
phenomenon, see also U.S. Congress, House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime: Testimony 
Provided by U.S. Officials before the Subcommittee on Africa o f the House International Relations 
Committee,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 91-101. For more recent 
permutations o f this phenomenon, see also “Scam o f scams,” The Economist, 24 August 2002, 56.
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Generically speaking, significant ambiguity surrounds Africa’s overall economic 
performance, a situation underlined by the difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics.10 
However, by international and even regional standards, Nigeria represents a particularly 
salient example of economic mismanagement and corruption. For instance, in his study 
of Nigerian business activity, Tom Forrest acknowledges that, “problems of measurement 
exist because of the porous nature of the Nigerian economy. Unofficial flows of goods, 
services, currency and labour across international boundaries in West Africa are 
important and may alter orders of magnitude.”11
The issue of corruption was initially discussed in Chapter II, and is pivotal to 
understanding much of the economic and political activity that occurs across the 
continent. However, it would be unfair to even broach this topic, endemic throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa as well as many other part of the world, without initial reference to 
the enabling factors, predominantly multinational corporations willing to pay the 
necessary bribes in order to do business.12
As the Speaker of the South African Parliament, Dr. Frene Giniwalla, observed at 
a European Business Ethics Conference in Frankfurt that the dictionary definition of 
corruption makes no distinction between the receiver and the payer of a bribe. 
Furthermore, the following point was also emphasized as well: “The truth is that 
international corruption is often tacitly supported and actively encouraged by Western
10 These issues are highlighted in Richard Grant and John Agnew, “Representing Africa: the geography of 
Africa in world trade, 1960-1992,” The Annals o f  the Association ofAmerican Geographers 86, no. 4 
(December 1996), 729-94.
11 Tom Forrest, The Advance o f  African Capital: The Growth o f  Nigerian Private Enterprise 
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press o f Virginia, 1994), 10-1. Moreover, despite a relatively optimistic 
assessment o f the nation’s economic activity and progress, the author does acknowledge that some o f his 
accounts are “overly sanitized” with respect to both political corruption and drug trafficking.
12 For more on this issue as it relates to the African context, see Anver Versi, “On corruption and 
corrupters,” African Business, no. 215 (November 1996), 7.
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countries. While most countries have laws against domestic corruption, only one -  the 
USA -  has made it illegal to bribe foreign officials. Many countries consider bribes to be 
legitimate business expenses that are deductible for tax purposes.”13
As an analytical point of departure with respect to corruption in Nigeria, however, 
it is worth returning to Paulo Mauro’s outline of the relevant casual factors involved in 
public sector corruption, all of which are quite evident throughout the Nigerian body 
politic. In particular, the relevant factors include various forms of government 
regulation, such as trade restrictions, subsidies and price controls, multiple exchange rates 
and low civil service wages. Furthermore, the author also notes the impact of natural 
resource endowments, predominantly oil in this case, and sociological factors, in 
particular strong kinship ties and subsequent ethnic factionalization as will be discussed 
below.14
According to the international organization Transparency International, Nigeria 
remained at the bottom of its annual Corruption Perception Index for 2000. However, 
while acknowledging efforts by the current government to stem systemic corruption, this 
report also noted that such entrenched attitudes take a long time to modify.15 Thus,
13 Quoted in Ibid., 7-8.
14 Mauro, 4-5. Further putting these issues into context, see also Charap and Harm, 14-9. While critical of  
the more apologetic literature with respect to this subject, the authors note that definitions o f corruption 
generally come from modem societies that take political legitimacy for granted and liberally use the term to 
characterize other societies with a wholly different set o f structures and objectives.
15 See Barbara Crossette, “List Shows Corruption is Lingering,” New York Times (web edition), 16 
September 2000. The annual Corruption Perception Index is based on surveys o f risk analysts and 
representatives from international economic organizations. For the report itself, as well as more 
information on the underlying methodology, see Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 
Report 2000, available at http://www.transnarencv.org/cpi/2000/cpi2000.html. accessed 15 July 2004. 
Interestingly, this is the first time that data has covered a three-year period, 1998-2000, rather than just a 
single year, which may serve to make the effects o f Nigeria’s current anticorruption drive take longer to 
register. However, a relatively unprecedented step in the right direction took place in August 2000 with the 
impeachment o f Chuba Okadigbo, the president o f the Nigerian senate and thus the third highest official in 
the country, in relation to irregularities in the awarding o f contracts. See “Nigerian senate president 
impeached after corruption inquiry,” CNN.com, 9 August 2000.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
348
understandably enough, when the roots of corruption run this deep there are no easy 
solutions.
For instance, James T. Gire makes an excellent case that Nigeria’s poor record of 
punishing corruption, particularly among the prevailing oligarchy, has led to other people 
emulating these corrupt activities to the point that the phenomenon has become pervasive 
at all levels of society.16 The tangible impact of this demonstration effect is that as law 
and order are undermined and the judicial system is blatantly skewed in favor of the rich, 
powerful and connected, the faith of ordinary Nigerians in their governing institutions 
becomes still further eroded.
Similarly, and with broader application throughout sub-Saharan Africa, George B. 
Ayittey develops the concept of the “vampire state” to delineate the detrimental effect of 
corruption on countries with weak democratic institutions. As such, Nigeria presents a 
prime example of a predatory oligarchy benefiting from providing less public order and 
avoiding good governance as defined in Chapter II, thus expanding the opportunities for 
corruption.17
Understanding this wider pattern of systemic crime and corruption, as well as its 
evolution, is a necessary precursor to the analysis of Nigeria’s role in the transnational 
smuggling of heroin. In keeping with the structure used in previous chapters, this section 
addresses the key elements of Nigeria’s physical, economic, political and human 
geography that have led to the country’s rise to prominence within the realm of
16 James T. Gire, “A Psychological Analysis o f Corruption in Nigeria,” Journal o f  Sustainable 
Development 1, no.2 (Summer 1999), 1-11. See also George B. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), 249-53.
17 This characterization is developed at length in George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, 1999), 149-84. See also Douglas Marcouiller and Leslie Young, “The black hole o f  
graft: the predatory state and the informal economy,” American Economic Review 85, no. 3 (June 1995), 
630-46; and William Renko, “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa,” Journal o f  
International Affair 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 433-60.
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transnational criminal activity. As with other aspects of this analysis, the divisions 
between these spatial variables are not clear-cut, and interactions among them will be 
discussed in context.
However, as in the previous case studies, to put these issues in perspective a brief 
overview of the Nigerian historical experience serves as the initial framework for this 
discussion. In particular, European colonialism set the stage for many of Nigeria’s 
subsequent ills, most specifically with respect to international borders and endemic ethnic 
tensions. Moreover, many of these same unfortunate legacies can be seen across much of 
the rest of the continent.18 As this era began to unfold, an important component 
underpinning stability of the international system based on a balance of power was the 
capacity of Europe to expand its political, economic and military control of non- 
European territories.19
The watershed of this activity was exemplified by the “Scramble for Africa,” the 
upsurge of European imperialism lasting from the 1870s to the 1890s that formalized the 
political partition of the continent. Incidentally, the imperatives to maintain the overall
18 With respect to pre-colonial West Africa, most relations among political entities appear to have been 
predicated upon asymmetries o f power and the extraction o f various forms o f tribute. For an overview o f  
these issues, see Robert S. Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa, 2nd ed. (Madison: 
University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1989). See also E. A. Boateng, A Political Geography o f  Africa (London, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 105-11, which notes the prior to the arrival o f the Europeans, 
trade had flowed primarily via routes across the Sahara. However, as commercial activity utilizing the 
West African seaboard expanded, a steady movement o f people from the interior to coastal areas began, 
along with a series o f  powerful new kingdoms springing up. Though these were generally short-lived and 
small in area, they mainly conformed to current linguistic and tribal groupings.
19 There can be little doubt that Europe’s relative technical capabilities largely enabled these efforts.
Robert L. O’Connell makes the case that, like the first period o f European imperial expansion following the 
introduction o f firearms, “the second climactic period o f Western imperialism fell neatly in sync with the 
multifarious improvements in arms which took place during the latter half o f  the nineteenth century.” He 
further characterizes the partition o f Africa as taking place with “almost ridiculous ease.” Small groups o f  
Europeans armed with machine guns, “the perfect labour-saving device,” time and again proved perfectly 
capable o f  slaughtering vast numbers o f African warriors. Robert L. O’Connell, O f Arms and Men (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 231. See also Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools o f  Empire: Technology 
and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
However, with respect to both West and Central Africa in particular, the European penetration o f the 
interior also had to wait until suitable anti-malarial drugs had been developed.
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European balance of power during this period led to a convergence of Great Power 
interests in this issue area, with relevance not only to the status of colonial territories but 
also to wider issues involving the existing international system.20
However, neither imperial ambition nor technological prowess alone fully 
explains European motivations. One major drawback of a metrocentric analytical 
approach to this phenomenon is that it gives too much credit to central governments’ 
capabilities and intentions in the planning and execution of colonial endeavors. As the 
Scramble gained a momentum of its own, the relevant national actors were often 
compelled by circumstances beyond their immediate control, often predicated on the 
maneuvers of non-state actors such as missionary groups or private commercial ventures.
As such, rather than well-constructed strategies, either geopolitical or economic, 
the resultant pressures led to a mixed legacy as European colonial powers annexed large 
territories and developed spheres of influence, with varying degrees of administrative 
oversight, as the relatively short-term perceived interests of the time dictated.21 Evidence 
of these decisions, some apparently arbitrary even when being made, can be seen today 
all across the map of Africa.
20 With particular reference to the European partition o f Africa, as informal arrangements became 
increasingly less viable and the competition for influence and territory escalated, it became necessary to 
construct a framework for addressing these potentially volatile issues. The Berlin Conference o f  1884-85 
was in many respects an attempt to establish an international security regime to regulate this competition. 
As such, it aptly fits Robert Jervis’ definition o f a security regime as “those principles, rules and norms that 
permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.” Robert Jervis, 
“Security Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 173. See also Mark B. Slater, Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations (London: Pluto 
Press, 2002), 37-9.
21 These included moves by other powers, initiatives by traders and administrators in existing colonies, 
public opinion, low perceived risk in comparison to returns, and the very situation the Berlin Conference 
was called upon to address, the breakdown o f existing informal arrangements. David Kaiser, Politics and 
War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 283. For 
more background, see also Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); and 
Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble fo r Africa: The White M an’s Conquest o f  the Dark Continent from 1876 
to 1912 (New York: Random House, 1991).
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As part of the British colonial empire, Nigeria was initially governed as three 
separate regions, namely the north, east and west, each with its own capital and 
administration. With respect to these three regions, they also roughly coincided with the 
three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Ibo or Igbo in the south, 
and the Yoruba in the west. While the impact of Nigeria’s multiethnic dynamics is 
discussed in context below, the following map illustrates the underlying demographic 
distribution in spatial terms:
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Fig. 21. Nigerian ethnic groups22
In particular, indirect rule along the lines of the sub-continental Indian colonial
model was common in the north. However, the decision of Frederick Lugard, the first
governor-general of Nigeria, to administratively integrate the culturally disparate
22 Map source: University o f  Iowa, “Art and Life in Africa -  Nigeria Information,” available at 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~africart/toc/countries/Nigeria.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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northern and southern portions of the territory in 1914 was to prove pivotal to the 
country’s future. Furthermore, during this period, the British administration appears to 
have been content to overlook local corruption as long as Africans did not challenge their 
supremacy at the national level, an ominous precedent for the nation’s future.24
Following the Second World War, a broad wave of decolonization began to 
sweep across the globe, with Nigeria achieving self-rule and statehood in I960.25 The 
country’s initial attempt at democracy came under Nnamdi Azikiwe, from 1960 to 1966. 
Following a series of four military rulers, notably Yakubu Gowon from 1966 to 1975, 
and Olusegun Obasanjo from 1976 to 1979, there was a second attempt at democracy 
under Shehu Shagari from 1979 to 1983.26
From 1984 to 1993, the country once again experienced military rule under 
Muhammadu Buhari for the first two years and Ibrahim Babangida for the remainder. 
After a brief interim of civilian rule under Ernest Shonekan in 1993, there came the 
military dictatorship of Sani Abacha that lasted until his sudden death in 1998.27
23 See Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1998), 1-12.
24 See Robert L. Tignor, “Political corruption in Nigeria before independence,” Journal o f  Modern African 
Studies 31, no. 2 (June 1993), 175-202. The author also notes that British officials used the corruption 
issue in an attempt to delay the implementation o f Nigerian self-rule. Underlining the link between the 
colonial legacy and ongoing issues o f corruption, Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 25, further notes that, “The 
elite in Nigeria is factionalized mainly along ethnic, regional, religious and institutional lines, being the 
product o f the uneven development and rivalry which British colonial administration fostered among the 
different segments.”
25 For a broad ranging analysis o f  decolonization in West Africa, see Rudolf Von Albertini,
Decolonization: The Administration and Future o f  the Colonies, 1919-1960 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 
1982), 124-41.
26 The two other military rulers during this period, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi during 1966, and Murtala 
Muhammed from 1975 to 1976, were assassinated in office. For more on patterns o f military involvement 
in Nigerian politics, see also Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 54-6.
27 See “Nigeria’s unexpected chance,” The Economist, 13 June 1998,43. It was widely expected that Chief 
Mashood Abiola, who was widely considered as duly elected when Abacha seized power and thus was 
subsequently imprisoned, would take over as head o f state. However, a month later Abiola was dead as 
well, due to an apparent heart attack while still in custody. See “Abiola’s dangerous death,” The 
Economist, 11 July 1998,47. An excellent time line o f the various Nigerian regimes since independence
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Following a caretaker military government under Abdulsalami Abubakar, Obasanjo 
returned as an elected head of state in early 1999, a position he still retains as of this 
writing.
At the time of independence, Nigeria’s new leaders rejected the former British 
system of a three-region parliament in favor of an American-style federal presidential
• • 98system, in many ways an extension of Lugard’s policies of centralization. Though 
originally the federation centered on the three dominant ethnic groups, as noted above, 
this later expanded to four states in 1963, to twelve and then nineteen in 1976, to thirty in 
1991, and finally to thirty-six in 1996.
However, a key flaw in this national conceptualization from the outset was that 
nearly all allocation of revenues ran outward from center. As such, with respect to the 
prevailing group identities, smaller tribes with no states under their collective control 
often had no real voice in national or even local affairs. Moreover, further compounding 
this situation at all levels, from collective to individual, is the ongoing issue of 
legitimacy.
The example of the British during the colonial period, though not the worst by 
relative standards, was still highly exploitative, and this unfortunate legacy can still be
up to this point can be found in “Nigeria’s long road back to democracy,” The Economist, 12 December 
1998,45.
28 See “Let down again,” The Economist, 5. See also E. Ike Udogu, “The allurement o f ethnonationalism in 
Nigerian politics: the contemporary debate,” Journal o f  Asian and African Studies 29, no. 3-4 (July- 
October 1994), 164-7, in which the author notes that the debate on the potential balkanization o f Nigeria 
into geo-ethnic entities is not new, and in fact can be traced back to the colonial period. Specifically 
germane to this issue, the author includes a 1947 quote by Chief Obafemi Awolowo: “Nigeria is not a 
nation. It is merely a geographic expression. There are not ‘Nigerians’ in the same way there are 
‘English,’ ‘Welsh,” or ‘French.’ The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those 
who live within the boundaries o f Nigeria from those who do not.”
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seen repeating itself in the policies of successive governments.29 Even from the outset, as 
The Economist notes, “When Britain . . .  left Nigeria, it handed authority over not to 
traditional rulers, who were viewed as having some legitimacy, but to doctors, lawyers 
and the horde of literate hustlers who did well in the British bureaucracy and the British 
army and now make up Nigeria’s ruling class.” 30
While the blame for the initial failure of these leaders to connect with ordinary 
citizens must be shared between both the outgoing British and incoming Nigerian 
administrations, the onus must rest upon the latter and their successors for subsequent 
shortcomings.31 As long as these pernicious systemic issues persist, the resultant friction 
between the rule of law and that of expediency will continue to plague the country. For 
instance, it is interesting to note the distinction between the various transitions to civilian 
rule, and that to democracy.
Highlighting this aspect of Nigerian politics, Amadu Sesay and Abiodum Alao 
point out that, “Democratization implies popular participation, free choice, popular will, 
etc., and it can only take place in an atmosphere devoid of military pressure. But the 
handing over of power to civilians by the military rarely takes into cognizance these
29 Even when compared to the rest o f Africa, as Beoteng notes, “Unlike the rest o f the continent, especially 
East, South and North Africa, where the climactic and other physical conditions made a permanent white 
settlement possible, West Africa never experienced permanent settlement by Europeans, and trade and 
other forms o f economic exploitation remained the primary object o f  European colonization efforts within 
the region.” Boateng, 102.
30 “The roots o f violence,” The Economist, 15 September 2001, 42. As evidence o f the ordinary Nigerian 
citizen’s attitude toward those in power, Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 35, notes that, “Most Nigerians collapsed 
into hysterical laughter when they heard their late head o f state, General Sani Abacha, had launched a ‘war 
on corruption,’” as much o f the looting o f state assets was carried out by his own inner circle.
31 Taking a somewhat more charitable view, Herbst argues that the leadership in Nigeria is not significantly 
worse than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, he does continue by noting that, “Nigeria stands 
out as a country whose national design has resulted in a political economy that may prevent it from moving 
forward irrespective o f  who is in charge and that will, seemingly inevitably, spiral downward.” Herbst,
154.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
355
elements of democracy. Thus, many transitions end up as ‘stop gaps.”’32 As such, much 
of Nigeria’s political experience since independence can be seen as a near-perpetual 
transition to democratic rule, an end that appears no closer to fruition now than upon the 
eve of self-rule. Moreover, given the continuity of corruption and incentives to 
clientelism throughout the country’s history, democratization alone does not necessarily 
constitute the antidote to Nigeria’s many ills.33
Within its current boundaries, Nigeria encompasses 923,768 square kilometers of 
territory, with an estimated 4,049 kilometers of shared land borders with Benin, Niger, 
Chad and Cameroon, and a nautical coastline of 1,600 kilometers. A further 9,000 
kilometers of navigable inland waterways, primarily along the Niger and Benue Rivers, 
link the hinterland with the seacoast. The seacoast itself is comprised of a thick belt of 
mangrove swamp stretching from the border with Benin to the west and with Cameroon 
to the east, offering many opportunities for illegal smuggling activity.34 In addition to 
this maritime access via its five major seaports, international airport facilities such as that
32 Amadu Sesay and Abiodum Alao, “Democracy and Security in Africa: The Changing Nature o f a 
Linkage,” in Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security, ed. Adebayo Oyebade and 
Abiodun Alao (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998), 53. See also Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 241-3.
33 As Herbst notes, this became particularly apparent during Nigeria’s second attempt at democracy under 
Shehu Shagari, from 1979 to 1983, “After the fact investigations by subsequent military governments 
discovered levels o f corruption . . .  that astonished many even in a country long familiar with state- 
sponsored theft.” Herbst, 174. The following passage illustrates the disgraceful benchmark this 
administration set: “With a great potential for a viable economy and a sound industrial base, Nigeria, soon 
after independence, launched itself on the path o f economic mismanagement and large scale corruption.
The Second Republic especially epitomized the height to which corruption could climb in an African 
country. In 1979, when the military left the political stage, Nigeria’s external reserve was $5.1 billion. The 
country, in addition, earned some $51.6 billion from petroleum and non-oil exports between 1979 and 
1983. But by the time the civilian administration was terminated in December 1983, the country was 
indebted externally and internally to the tune of $26 billion. This meant that in four years, the government 
o f the Second Republic had access to over $82 billion our o f which $17 billion could not be accounted for.” 
Victor Oguejiofor Okafor and Sheriffdeen Telia, “Economic Development and the Prospect for Economic 
Security in Africa,” in Oyebade and Alao, 21. However, a differing point o f view is offered by Gire, 5, 
who notes that, “ft is common knowledge today that the best time to embezzle money in Nigeria is during a 
military regime because the military is never probed.”
34 These physical parameters and their impact are set out in U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention (ODCCP), “Nigeria Country Profile -  Political and Economic Situation,” (New York: ODCCP, 
22 June 2002), 1.
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in Lagos provide moderately good commercial links between Nigeria and the rest of the 
world.
However, in the context of physical geography, the single most important factor 
contributing to Nigeria’s present situation is the existence of massive petroleum reserves 
within its territory, primarily centering in the Niger River delta region. Oil exploration 
within the county began in 1937 as a joint venture between Shell Oil and British
i f
Petroleum, with the first positive indications of extensive reserves being found in 1956. 
Unfortunately, Nigeria’s overall experience with oil wealth and its subsidiary effects can 
be characterized as highly detrimental, and lends credence to the argument that an 
abundance of natural resources may not always be considered a blessing.36
Rather than being used for productive purposes, in effect Nigerian oil revenues 
both overshadow and taint much of the country’s economic, political and human 
landscape. Dating from the early 1970s, a sharp rise in Nigeria’s revenues from 
petroleum due to a combination of increases in production and higher prices worldwide 
also made political power more valuable, especially after the oil sector was nationalized 
in 1979.37 As a result, the already heated competition among the various ethnic groups 
for control of the state and its attendant political processes can be seen as becoming all 
the more pronounced.
35 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest fo r  Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991), 527.
36 For a more generic discussion o f the seemingly paradoxical role that natural resources can have in 
impoverishing countries, see also “Ungenerous endowments,” The Economist, 23 December 1995, 87-89.
In particular, it is noted that, compared to human and capital resources, “The value o f natural resources is, 
indeed, clear -  provided that other things are equal. The trouble is that other things are never equal.” An 
overview o f African oil production can be found in Jonathan Bearman, “Oil: The barrel runneth over,” 
African Business, no. 211 (June 1996), 8-11. For further examples o f how oil dislocates other economies in 
West Africa, specifically Sao Tom6, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, see also “What oil can do to tiny 
states,” The Economist, 25 January 2003, 47.
37 As noted on Yergin, 696, the Nigerian government nationalized British Petroleum’s extensive holdings in 
response to allegations o f the company’s indirect sales o f oil to the apartheid government o f South Africa. 
These assets were subsequently auctioned off on the open market at even higher prices.
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In strictly economic terms, Nigeria’s potential petroleum wealth is vast. At 
present it is the fourth largest producer among the members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United 
States. In total, the country has estimated proven oil reserves of 22.5 billion barrels, with 
net oil exports for 2001 of 1.9 million barrels per day earning $19.5 billion.38 In 
particular, Nigeria’s status as a major supplier of oil to the United States gives it at least 
some insulation from international pressure, the ramifications of which are discussed in 
the next section.
In practice, however, the predominance of oil has served to stifle the growth of 
other sectors of the economy. As noted by The Economist in 1999, “Oil, or rather the 
misuse of oil money, has been the downfall of Nigeria.” With the rising price of oil, 
there was a scramble from all quarters of the national polity to get a share of the windfall 
profits, while the local currency, the naira, appreciated to such an extent that it all but 
destroyed traditional agricultural exports such as cocoa, cotton and groundnuts.39 For 
instance, between 1983 and 1993, petroleum as a share of exports rose from 96% to 98%, 
while by comparison manufacturing as a portion of GDP remained at only 8.6%.40
Moreover, access to these petroleum reserves gives the Nigerian leadership a 
cushion for corruption, as it is not directly linked to the country’s actual economic 
performance. The immense temptation to pilfer the public coffers is particularly 
insidious in that not only do such assets constitute unearned income, but their mere
38 These figures are cited in “Vital Statistics: Oil and Energy in Nigeria,” Drillbits and Tailings 7, no. 6 (31 
July 2002), available at http://www.moles.Org/ProiectUnderground/drillbits/7 06/vs.html. accessed 15 July 
2004.
39 See “Can Obasanjo save Nigeria?” The Economist, 6 March 1999,44-6, and “Boiling oil,” The 
Economist, 14 April 2001, 44.
40 These statistics are cited in “Let down again,” The Economist, 7. Furthermore, Forrest observes that 
indigenous capabilities were undermined as immense oil profits “encouraged easy access to a flood of  
imported technology that was extremely wasteful and disruptive o f local learning processes.” Forrest, 236.
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existence also serves to raise expectations among ordinary Nigerians. The unfortunate 
reality of the situation is that, on average, Nigerians are poorer now than they were before 
oil was discovered.41 Further collateral effects of this economic dislocation include weak 
or non-existent contract law, poorly regulated financial systems and the rampant bribery 
of officials.42
While oil is the most tangible of Nigeria’s resources, its human capital in the form 
of cheap, plentiful labor should not be overlooked. However, the lack of economic 
development beyond the petroleum sector translates directly into insufficient domestic 
employment opportunities. As a result, a large number of bright, articulate, well- 
educated Nigerians are encouraged to emigrate and, in some cases, turn to criminal 
activity with a high degree of success.43 Moreover, in response to criticism over low
41 During the first 14 years o f its oil boom, 1973 to 1987, per capita income in Nigeria fell 22%. 
Furthermore, during the “oil boomlet” o f 1990-1 caused by the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait, the World Bank 
estimated a windfall o f $14 billion, or a 49% increase, all but disappeared by 1992. Finally, between the 
period from 1980 to 1993, Nigeria is the only developing country in the world with a population over 100 
million to have a negative per capita growth rate. Statistics cited in Herbst, 159-62. In 1983, however, 
market pressure from a price cut in North Sea oil, which competes directly with Nigerian oil in terms of 
quality, served to undercut NNPC profits. However, the collapse of the country’s oil boom in mid-1980s 
can largely be explained by the unreported and illicit pumping o f oil, with the complicity o f government 
ministers and employees o f the NNPC. Ironically, one destination for this oil was South Africa, at the time 
under a range o f  international sanctions. To further complicate matters, the standard practice o f paying for 
oil upon delivery rather than at the time o f loading rather than unloading lent itself to various forms o f  
fraud, such as advance fees and selling the same, often non-existent, oil to multiple customers. See R. T. 
Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting and State-Sponsored Crime 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999), 141-2; and Yergin, 720. For more on the ramifications o f this 
type of activity, see also U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Maritime Fraud Pounds Nigerian Insurers,” Maritime 
Security Report, no. 1 (August 1995), 19-20. In particular, this report notes that maritime fraud costs the 
Nigerian insurance industry an estimated $50 million per year.
42 As The Economist notes, “Ultimately, it is political as well as economic failings which have handicapped 
Africa’s efforts to reform. Governments fear the protests which reform tends to provoke; and the 
paraphernalia o f state control -  rationing goods, issuing licenses, staffing state enterprises -  tends to suit 
governments that want friends and fellow tribesmen in the right places.” “A flicker o f light,” The 
Economist, 5 March 1994,24. Cited as an example o f these institution shortcomings, in 1992 
approximately $3 billion, or 10% o f annual GDP, disappeared out o f Nigerian public accounts, with half 
that amount vanishing in the first half o f 1995.
43 Williams and Savona, 19. This point is also well made in “Let down again,” The Economist, 6-7, 9. The 
following from a recent U.S. government assessment also echoes this observation. Though written with 
specific regard to Southeast Asia, parallels with West Africa also exist: “Unskilled young males in or from 
these regions — especially those who have migrated to urban areas where they have few job prospects -  are
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rates of economic growth throughout Africa, The Economist also notes that, 
“Entrepreneurs across the continent disprove the insulting proposition that Africans do 
not respond to profit motive in the same way as anyone else.”44 This dynamism will 
become even more readily apparent in the next section.
At times, Nigeria’s economic policies have further compounded the existing 
inefficiencies associated with primary dependence on a single commodity. For instance, 
in 1994 the World Bank incongruously listed Nigeria as one of only six sub-Saharan 
African countries with sound macroeconomic structures, including improved industrial 
output, exports, savings rates and per capita income. However, in January of the same 
year Abacha’s military government did away with these reforms, fixing an official 
exchange rate twice that of the free-market rate, and ordering interest rates down to 
negative real levels.45 As many of the hurdles to legitimate commerce are political, it is 
no coincidence that much of this entrepreneurial spirit is forced to find expression within 
illegal activity.
Though generally optimistic otherwise with respect to the country’s overall 
business climate, Forrest does note that, “Nigeria is a high-risk environment emanating 
from economic instability, political uncertainty and from inconsistent and unpredictable
a prime source o f recruits by drug trafficking and other criminal organizations.” U.S. Interagency Working 
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 25. More broadly speaking, as noted in Boateng, 
129, internal economic disparities have led to the movement o f labor from the relatively less developed 
interior to the coastal regions.
44 “A flicker o f light,” The Economist, 22.
45 Ibid., 21-4. Similarly, and unsurprisingly, the series o f corruption investigations that began as the 
Abacha regime replaced that o f Babangida achieved little in practice. For more on the initial hopes 
surrounding this effort, see Ocheroeme Nnanna, “Corruption unlimited,” African Business 23, no. 195 
(January 1995), 23-4.
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changes in government policies.”46 Moreover, neither periodic international pressure nor 
the country’s involvement in such supra-national organizations such as the regional 
economic bloc, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), have 
provided incentives significant enough to effect real change.47
However, as mentioned at the outset of this analysis the ongoing crisis of 
leadership presents an even more fundamental dilemma, despite the possibility that the 
actual personalities involved may be less important than the underlying structural 
deficiencies. As Nigerian Nobel Prize recipient Wole Soyinka notes, “To obtain a basic 
understanding of today’s reality of Nigerian politics, one had better learn about and come 
to grasp with the phenomenon of the spoils of power.”48 Since the government 
administers most of the assets of the country, notably oil revenue as discussed above, the 
control of political authority is the most prominent means to wealth, as well as an end 
unto itself.
In conjunction with the widespread use of official office to siphon public assets, 
known in local slang as “chopping,” corruption in Nigeria generally takes the form of a 
spoils system based on either kinship affiliation or some other functional basis for 
clientelism. The immensity of the country’s oil wealth in many ways serves to insulate 
Nigeria’s leadership from any sense that a day of reckoning may someday come since,
46 Forrest, 234. While the author is writing primarily with respect to the underlying causes o f capital flight, 
or the reluctance o f  Nigerians to invest in their own country, the same dynamics also serve to deter external 
investment.
47 At present, this is only one among a dozen competing and overlapping economic blocs on the continent. 
See “Affabet soup,” The Economist, 10 February 2001, 77. Incidentally, Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 17, also 
notes allegations o f looting by members o f the Nigerian contingent of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) resident in Liberia during the early 1990s. Ironically, this effort itself was linked to 
wider Nigerian notions o f its own “manifest destiny’” in terms o f leadership within sub-Saharan Africa.
See Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 29-30; and Tunmi Olonisakin, “Arresting the Tide o f Mercenaries:
Prospects for Regional Control,” in Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, ed. Abdel-Fatau Musah 
and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 248.50.
48 Wole Soyinka, The Open Sore o f  a Continent: A Personal Narrative o f  the Nigerian Crisis (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 62.
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despite the apparent perceptions to the contrary, these resources are in fact finite. As 
such, a looming impasse lies in the country’s sheer demographic size and constantly 
expanding number of factional relationships, which in turn must be cemented by 
increasingly greater amounts of money, eventually more than can be even theoretically 
made available.49
In this respect, both political and human geography can be seen as intertwined to 
an exceedingly high degree. This is particularly true in assessing the political dimensions 
of ethnicity and the ethnic dimensions of politics. Given the prevailing zero-sum view of 
domestic Nigerian politics, the result is that ethnic groups with numerically superiority or 
some other socio-economic advantage are able to marginalize minority ethnic groups. 
Thus, though the latter have a distinct interest in good governance in order to protect their 
collective interests, in practice this seldom amounts to more than mere wishful thinking.50
As successful politicians reward their ethnic constituencies and seek to deny 
resources to other groups, systemic instability is both reinforced and institutionalized.51 
Furthermore, in this context, ethnic competition is not just about political power, but
49 Herbst, 157-8.
50 This ethnic marginalization can be readily seen against the detrimental human impact o f the Nigerian oil 
industry. Groups such as the Ogoni and the Ijaw living in the swampy coastal oil-producing areas have 
received relatively little benefit from the wealth pumped literally out from under them. In turn, this has led 
to attacks on oil installations, damage to pipelines and the kidnapping o f oil workers by local militants. For 
their part, multinational oil companies operating in the country have resisted any suggestion that any party 
besides the Nigerian central government, via the national oil company, holds title to these assets. However, 
the primary offshore operator, Royal Dutch / Shell, has recently begun to unilaterally allocate funding to 
development projects in the region. A more extensive analysis o f this issue, focusing on the eastern portion 
o f Nigeria from 1990 to 1993, see Eghosa E. Osaghae, “The Ogoni uprising: oil politics, minority agitation 
and the future o f the Nigerian state,” African Affairs 94, no. 376 (July 1995), 325-44. For more on two 
separate episodes in which theft from damaged pipelines has led to explosions and considerable loss o f  life, 
see also “A catastrophe bound to happen,” The Economist, 24 October 1998, 44, and “The high price of 
Nigeria’s oil,” The Economist, 15 July 2000, 46.
51 As a result, “Whereas this instrumentality and strategy in politics is not peculiarly or uniquely Nigerian, 
the very form which it takes is often blatant and impedes Nigeria’s quest for political atomism.” Udogu, 
166-7.
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extends into many other spheres of the country’s public and private sectors.52 
Unfortunately, in both the African context and beyond, Nigeria is by no means alone in 
these respects.
As E. Ike Udogu notes, “In sum, conflict is a significant dimension of ethnicity, 
and this is where ideology becomes problematic in endeavors toward the successful 
governance of most African polities.” Many of these dynamics can be seen throughout 
the continent. In particular, the legacy and the burden of Africa’s often-arbitrary colonial 
boundaries, rarely coinciding with pre-existing ethnic ones, provide an inherent stimulus 
toward ethnic competition.54 Despite these endemic animosities, however, there remain a 
number of vested interests involved in maintenance of these political boundaries.55
52 For instance, ethnic tensions also play out within the country’s military, traditionally the de facto if  not 
the actual power brokers within the country. For a more comprehensive analysis incorporating the 
Nigerian experience with this phenomenon, see Pradeep P. Barua, “Ethnic conflict in the military of 
developing nations: a comparative analysis o f  India and Nigeria,” Armed Forces and Society 19, no. 1 (Fall 
1992), 123-37. There have also been numerous instances when the military has been used to settle ethnic 
scores, as in the communal violence between the Tiv and the Jukun, in which the forces sent to keep the 
peace ended up killing a reported 136 Tiv civilians. See “Military terror tactics,” The Economist, 3 
November 2001, 54. Moreover, an ethnic quota system also dominates access to higher education, as 
discussed in “No easy answers,” The Economist, 10 September 1994, 47-8; and Herbst, 154.
53 Udogu, 162. Moreover, writing in 1998, Abiodun Alao and Funmi Olonisakin, “Post Cold War Africa: 
Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and Security,” in Oyebade and Alao, 136, note that, “Nigeria seems to be one of 
the countries where ethnic differences is most likely to be the dominant issue till the end o f the this century 
and well into the next.” Supporting this conjecture, an overview o f several recent instances o f  communal 
violence in Nigeria can be found in “Reaching for your machete,” The Economist, 31 July 1999, 36. For a 
broader analysis o f this phenomenon, see also Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Managing multiple minority problems 
in a divided society: the Nigerian experience,” Journal o f  Modern African Studies 36, no. 1 (March 1998), 
1-24. A more focused case study o f the traditional conflict between the Tivs and the Jukuns in the central 
Nigerian state o f  Benue can be found in Karl Maier, “Eternal enmities,” Africa Report 37, no. 3 (May-June
1992), 17-8.
54 For instance, noted in Beoteng, 109, “The partition o f West Africa into distinct territorial units ruled by 
different colonial powers had the effect o f bringing several different tribal groups together for the first time 
under a single external political authority. But since the new political boundaries had been drown without 
any serious reference to the wishes or interests o f  the local populations the resulting political units turned 
out to be no more than mere geographic expressions totally unrelated to the ethnic and socio-economic 
realities o f the region. A similar characterization o f political boundaries can be made for much o f the rest 
of the continent as well.
55 Foremost among these parties has been the Organization o f African Unity (OAU), which has upheld the 
inviolability o f  colonial borders since its inception in May 1963, as well as sitting heads o f state in the 
region and the various international bodies dedicated to economic aid and development. The first, and to 
date only, precedent for changing colonial boundaries in Africa is the independence o f Eritrea from 
Ethiopia in 1993. The organization, rendered largely irrelevant by its failure to condemn even the most
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In many respects, the legacy of attempted secession of the Biafra region 
highlights these ongoing ethnic cleavages within the country, particularly between north 
and south, which shape the country’s human geography. This unsuccessful endeavor, 
centering on the southern and eastern Ibo-majority areas, lasted from May 1967 to 
January 1970 and launched the country into a major civil war. It was considerably 
prolonged by external support for the secession, though the lasting effects are reflected 
primarily in the context of domestic inter-ethnic relations.56 Its underlying dynamics can 
be seen as a struggle on the part of the Ibo to free themselves from Hausa-Fulani Muslim 
domination from the north.
However, in their failure the Ibo also felt immensely betrayed by the lack of 
support by the Yoruba, the third major demographic group in the country, expected to 
lend their demographic weight in light of perceived common interests.57 This in turn lent 
yet another dimension to the existing tripartite tensions among the majority groups.58 
Pondering the Biafran secession attempt and subsequent civil war, Nigerian intellectuals
egregious behavior on the part o f its members, has recently been superceded by the African Union, which 
has yet to be tested in this respect. See “New Name, Similar Struggles For Group o f African Nations,”
New York Times, 5 February 2003, A8. With specific reference to Nigeria’s borders, see Herbst, 151-72.
In particular, the author contends that the underlying optimism that any given country can develop 
economically within its existing boundaries is irrational, as demonstrated by the burgeoning number of 
failed and failing states. In light o f the issues discussed in previous chapters, his assertion that, while 
economics and particularly the flow o f capital has evolved dramatically in recent years, “The ultimate 
framework for business -  the nation-state -  has, however, almost everywhere remained unchanged.” 
However, Herbst does make a distinction between his views and those put forth in Kaplan, “The Coming 
Anarchy,” passim, in that it is necessary to assess developing countries on a case-by-case basis, rather than 
simply make generalizations.
56 For more on the various forms o f external support received by Biafra, as well as the shady activities o f  
the middlemen involved in circumventing the subsequent U.N. embargo on arms to the secessionists, see 
Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers, 153-6.
57 The underlying rationale for the Ibos’ expectation o f Yoruba support rests primarily on fears o f northern 
Hausa-Fulani dominance and the need to balance this situation. While the salience o f religious differences 
will be addressed at greater length blow, more generically there are longstanding dichotomies that exist 
throughout West Africa between inhabitants o f the coastal areas and those o f the interior. On the one hand, 
the former tend to be more politically sophisticated and economically developed, while those of the interior 
are for the most part more conservative and often suspicious o f their counterparts. Boateng, 118-9, 122-5.
58 See Alao and Olonisakin, 136-7. For more details o f the genesis, evolution and outcome o f this conflict, 
see also Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 63-9.
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such as Soyinka were able to ask the pointed question as to whether or not mere 
geographic integrity, rather than the nation itself, had been saved.59
The lingering effects of these divisions is that successive governments have had to 
engage in a balancing act in order to maintain even a modicum of nationwide authority. 
As Herbst notes:
Governments have always had to mollify fears in southern Nigeria of the Hausa / 
Fulani political domination while at the same time attempting to win the 
confidence of the peoples of the relatively more underdeveloped North through 
the deliberate allocation of industry, infrastructure, and commercial assets.
Indeed, the peoples of the South, especially in the oil-producing areas, openly 
protest the “enrichment” of the North via the state at the expense of the South and 
demand, in turn, to be compensated.60
However, further exacerbating the cleavages among the Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba,
there is also the issue of religion.
Broadly speaking, moving from north to south, the far north can be described as
overwhelmingly Muslim, the central band running from east to west as mainly Muslim,
and the far south as mainly Christian. Tensions among these groups is most concretely
manifest in the periodic attempts to apply Islamic sharia law within those states
controlled by Muslim majorities. Moreover, episodic communal violence with religious
overtones can also be observed on a semi-recurrent basis.61
Putting all of these issues into proper perspective vis-a-vis the focus of this study,
the transnational smuggling of oil is particularly germane in that it illustrates aspects of
59 This question is pondered at length in Soyinka, 28-30. In particular, the author notes the lack of debate 
on the subject o f Nigeria’s territorial integrity, attributing support for the status quo more to the interests of 
those in power than to a genuine feeling o f cohesiveness on the part o f the nation’s citizenry.
60 Herbst, 157-8. See also “Let down again,” The Economist, 5, 10-2, which further emphasizes the role of 
strong kinship ties in facilitating this phenomenon.
61 In 1966, the massacre o f thousands of Ibo Christians in the city o f Kano was a precipitating factor in the 
Biaffan secession attempt. See Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 130-3; “Islamist push,” The Economist, 6 
November 1999, 48-9; and “When the law becomes a sword,” The Economist, 8 July 2000, 47. See also 
“Let down again,” The Economist, 12-3.
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all the aforementioned dimensions of geography. To begin with, in terms of the 
necessary profit motive, there is a direct link between this activity and national monetary, 
exchange rate, and oil pricing policies, in that the resultant cross-border price differentials 
make it an extremely attractive and lucrative proposition given adequate political 
connections.62
In practice, the common border with Benin offers a case in point. Specifically, 
the use of “secret” trails to avoid customs checks, various cross-border canals and other 
water routes, and illicit markets and warehouses all support this activity, with officials on 
both sides paid to turn a blind eye. As OGD noted in 2000, “Within this context it is 
almost impossible to distinguish between the ‘illegal’ smuggling of legal goods and the 
illegal trafficking of illegal goods, such as narcotics and possibly arms.”63
As such, it is hardly surprising that there exists a chronic domestic shortage of 
gasoline, despite a national refining capacity able to meet domestic demand twice over, 
though this has been allowed to languish. To make up the shortfall, fuel is often imported 
at emergency prices, an activity that nets millions for those with the proper official 
protection from arrest and prosecution.64 However, despite its economic and social costs,
62 An excellent analysis o f this phenomenon can be found in Wang, passim. Moreover, in the early 1980s 
under the Buhari regime, the offences o f the smuggling and illegal stockpiling o f  oil were made capital 
crimes. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 172. Presumably, this only applied to the lower echelon o f those 
involved in this activity and unlucky enough to be apprehended.
63 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 213. Incidentally, this distinction also underlines the typology 
of smuggled goods put forth in Appendix A.
64 See “Abacha’s wobbly throne,” the Economist, 30 May 1998, 45-6. In particular, daylong lines at gas 
stations have served to inflame public emotions at the grass-roots level. This problem persists into the 
current Obasanjo administration, which claimed to have spent over $1 billion to import fuel in 2000. 
However, “much o f this was promptly smuggled abroad, to Benin, Niger or Cameroon,” or sold inside 
Nigeria on the domestic black market. See also “Fuelling trouble,” The Economist, 24 March 2001, 56.
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efforts to rescind the existing gasoline subsidy have generally met with strikes and other 
forms of public protest.65
In summary, the following passage succinctly underlines many of the issues noted 
throughout this section: “In view of the prevalent political and socio-economic situation, 
a burgeoning unemployed, underemployed and youthful population, the relatively porous 
borders and corruption of the security network, the country is ripe and burdened with 
drug abuse, drug trafficking and related crimes.”66 By way of transition, the growth of 
domestic Nigerian drug use, shifting the country from a straightforward trafficking role to 
one that includes significant consumption, does not auger well for the nation’s future.67
Furthermore, as a fitting segue into the next section, in the context of 
transnational refugees Nigeria’s capacity to generate massive outward population flows is 
generally ignored in the literature, despite its extremely high potential. In particular, such 
movement is generally linked to civil conflict, high levels of economic mismanagement, 
unfulfilled expectations, endemic underemployment and ongoing ethnic and religious 
disputes. The resultant augmentation of the already considerable West African diaspora 
in turn offers expanded opportunities for Nigerian TCOs to increase their global reach.
Having outlined the parameters that enable criminal activity and corruption to 
flourish in Nigeria, the next section moves on to wider issues of heroin smuggling on the 
part of Nigeria TCOs at the transnational level of analysis. In particular, this involves a 
focus on drugs in transit from source to destination in an area of operations encompassing
65 As o f 1994, this had happened twice at the national level. “A flicker o f light,” The Economist, 22.
66 U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile -  Political and Economic Situation,” 4.
67 Explanations for this include a push by traffickers to develop the local market, and the growth o f the 
practice o f paying couriers in drugs. See Sam Kiley, “Booming trade in cut-price drugs adds to Nigeria's 
woes,” Times (UK), 29 June 1998; and Hugh Dellios, “Once Just a Supplier, Nigeria Develops Heroin 
Woes,” Chicago Tribune, 29 July 1998, A l, 4.
68 See Toyin Falola, “Nigeria in the global context o f refugees,” Journal o f  Asian and African Studies 32, 
no. 1-2 (June 1997), 6-7.
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arguably the largest geographic area among all extant criminal organizations. By 
managing a substantial portion of the “legs” for an extensive set of smuggling vectors 
linking major production regions to key markets, these organizations are pivotal to 
enabling the global drug trafficking enterprise.
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Fig. 22. Eastern hemisphere drug and arms trafficking routes69
Smuggling Vectors and Nigerian TCOs: O ff the Beaten Path?
Having addressed the range of features that make Nigeria itself an attractive 
sphere of operations for illicit enterprises, it is worth reiterating from the outset that, 
strictly in terms of geography, Nigerian involvement in drug trafficking is in some ways
69 Map source: Heritage Foundation, Issues ’98: The Candidate’s Briefing Book (Washington, DC: 
Heritage Foundation, 1997), “Chapter 19, Terrorism and Crime: Containing the Threat,” Map 19.1, 
available at http://heritage.org/research/features/ISSUES/98. accessed 15 July 2004.
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70an anomaly. Nonetheless, it does exist, as the map above illustrates. For instance,
outlining the scope of these activities, one U.S. government report noted in 1999 that:
Nigeria remains the hub of African narcotics trafficking. Nigerian poly-crime 
organizations operate extensive global trafficking networks, control the sub- 
Saharan drug markets, and account for a large part of the heroin imported into the 
U.S. They also transport South American cocaine to Europe, Asia and Africa, 
especially South Africa, and export marijuana, the only narcotic grown in Nigeria, 
to Europe and West Africa.71
However, outside of cannabis, the country is neither a major producer of drugs nor even
of precursor chemicals, and Nigerian TCOs have risen to prominence almost solely as a
distribution center for the output of faraway regions, primarily both Asian heroin and
Latin American cocaine.72
By the late 1990s, between forty and sixty percent of the world’s heroin were
thought to transit the country itself, though Nigerian TCOs appear to have shifted to the
70 For a theoretical discussion the role o f geography in determining competitive advantage, see Steven E. 
Crane and Patrick J. Welch, “The problem o f geographic market definition: geographic proximity vs. 
economic significance,” Atlantic Economic Journal 19, no. 2 (June 1991), 12-20. In particular, the authors 
develop the ways in which a hypothetical geographic market can be made up o f a combination o f non­
contiguous areas.
71 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 1. For a somewhat dissenting view o f the scope 
o f Nigerian drug smuggling, which puts this activity at a level below that o f their Asian or Latin American 
counterparts, see OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 209-10. However, this report does note the 
country’s international stigmatization as a drug trafficking center due to the protection o f this trade by 
successive military regimes and its citizen’s involvement in small-scale smuggling. Moreover, the use of 
non-Nigerian couriers is also mentioned as well, though “all told, 1998 and 1999 have not witnessed a 
significant reduction o f drug-related activity by nationals o f the Giant of Africa.”
72 With respect to marijuana production, U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 89, notes that, “Substantial 
quantities o f low-potency cannabis are cultivated in Nigeria by subsistence farmers in several areas, with 
the greatest concentration in the central and northern parts o f the country, as well as in the Niger River 
delta in the southeast. In general, these crops are used as a source o f barter or as currency in illicit cross- 
border transactions for food or consumer products. For the most part, eradication efforts on the part o f  the 
Nigerian government have focused on the destruction o f individual marijuana fields and discussions o f crop 
substitution programs.” Cultivated in all 36 o f its states, Nigerian marijuana and its derivative resins are 
primarily consumed domestically, with the excess exported to neighboring West African nations and 
Europe. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 3. See also Milan Vesely, “Africa -  
Highway to Drugs Hell?” African Business, April 2000, 11, which cites Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal 
and the Ivory Coast as major African producers o f cannabis. In all o f these cases, including Nigeria, “vast 
tracts o f forest concealing plantations o f marijuana” make eradication efforts especially problematic.
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use of alternate routes in recent years.73 With Nigeria acting as a safe haven of sorts, as 
well as a center for criminal support services such as money laundering, such criminal 
organizations have thus been able to expand their reach globally.74 While the success of 
these groups is inarguable, on the surface a certain spatial illogic remains that must be 
examined further.
Peter Reuter echoes this sentiment, even as he highlights the demonstrable
transnational reach of these organizations:
Nigeria is a nation that seems to have little potential role in the international drug 
trade. It is isolated from any of the principal producer or consumer countries and 
lacks a significant base of traditional domestic production or consumption. 
Nonetheless, Nigerian traffickers have come to play a significant role in the 
shipping of heroin between Southwest Asia and the US; recently these traffickers 
have even entered the cocaine business, which is still more remote from their 
home country.75
After thus acknowledging that Nigeria is in many respects off the beaten path of the 
global drug trade, however, the author continues by cataloguing the complex of factors 
that have stimulated this trend. Some, such as longstanding official corruption and 
moderately good commercial links to the rest of the world, have been addressed above.
73 These figures were cited in 1998 by both Sam Kiley, “Booming trade in cut-price drugs adds to Nigeria's 
woes,” Times (London), 29 June 1998; and Hugh Dellios, “Once Just a Supplier, Nigeria Develops Heroin 
Woes,” Chicago Tribune, 29 July 1998, A l, 4.
74 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,” 96-7. See also Booth, Opium, 232-3; 
and U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 36, which notes, 
“Nigerian criminal syndicates centered in Lagos, many o f which have global networks, operate with virtual 
impunity in an environment o f pervasive corruption.” With a wider perspective on this issue, Williams and 
Savona, 10-2, discuss the concept o f “national sanctuaries,” countries where TCOs can operate largely 
unhindered and with a high degree o f latitude, if  not outright official involvement, which would apply in 
this instance. Furthermore, parallels with countries that sponsor or harbor terrorism, such as the Taliban 
regime’s support for al-Qa’eda when in power in Afghanistan, are obvious.
75 Reuter, 3. However, for a slightly dissenting point o f view which appears to put the geographic spread of  
Nigerian TCOs into a more historical context, note the following: “Powerful and sophisticated criminal 
syndicates based in Nigeria have extensive networks that reach into Western Hemisphere, Europe, Russia 
and the NIS [newly independent states], Southeast and Southwest, Australia, and Africa. With Nigeria an 
historical trading crossroads both in Africa and along maritime routes between East and West, the 
international criminal operations o f Nigerian syndicates are the legacy of a history o f moving capital and 
commodities on a global scale.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, 
Ch. Ill, 36. For more on the historical context o f West Africa as a transnational trading hub, see also 
Beoteng, 105-7.
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Others, such as a large overseas population and the highly entrepreneurial Nigerian ethos 
are discussed below.
In this case, economic linkages, rather than geographic proximity, also help to 
explain access dynamics with respect to smuggling vectors. For instance, as Friman 
notes, “the Nigerian ties to drug source countries in Southeast Asia appears to have been 
facilitated by patterns of licit trade. Specifically, Nigeria’s imports of and buying 
missions for rice and textiles from Thailand have provided a broader stream of economic 
transactions linking the two countries and have created opportunities for establishing and 
masking illicit trafficking.”76
More generally, Morrison points out that, “As global infrastructure and 
transportation systems improve, the need for drug transit points to be located on a direct 
route between drug producing and consuming countries is no longer compelling, as the 
rise of Nigeria as a key transshipment point has shown.”77 With terms of transshipment 
and specifically in reference to Nigeria’s role in the global heroin trade, Friman also 
observes the declining importance of geographic distance as a result of technological 
advances in transportation and communication.78
Taken together, these conditions certainly help to account for the fact that 
Nigerian TCOs have managed to exert a distinct presence across a far-flung geographical 
area. However, this in turn begs the question of whether or not, in an increasingly 
interdependent world economy, the issue of physical location is still paramount. The 
contention of this analysis is that, by virtue of its methods and the spatial distribution of
76 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 71.
77 Morrison, 2.
78 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 69.
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its operatives, these organizations TCOs have been able in many ways to both adapt to 
and, in some cases, reroute global heroin trafficking patterns.
In the previous case studies, both of which happened to center on drug cultivation 
areas, the relevant smuggling vectors were characterized as spokes on wheel radiating 
outward. In this case, the key to the success of Nigerian TCOs in transnational heroin 
transit has been the ability of these groups to maintain control of the links between the 
primary producing regions on the one hand, and the major consuming markets on the 
other. As the U.S. Department of State noted in early 2000, “Neither growers nor street-
70level retailers, the African criminal groups are the middlemen of the drug trade.”
Therefore, having begun the chapter with a consideration of Nigeria proper, this 
section examines various aspects of Nigerian TCOs’ role in facilitating the logistical 
process underlying the global trade in terms of access, risk and connectivity. Thus, the 
discussion encompasses the set of transnational smuggling vectors that move under the 
auspices of these groups, regardless of their starting point or final destination. However, 
before addressing the issue of routes, a discussion of the evolution of these groups and 
their practices is in order.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Nigerian involvement in drug trafficking was on a 
relatively low scale, and focused primarily on cannabis and its derivatives.80 The 
contention has even been made that “organized crime in Nigeria and other African 
countries was unheard of until the early 1970s.” This is based on the view that the 
introduction of a monetary economy, chronic political instability, rapid urbanization,
79 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” Fiscal Year 2001 International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington, DC: Department 
o f State, April 2000), 1.
80 See U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile -  Illicit Drug Trafficking,” (New York: ODCCP, 22 June 
2002), 1.
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widespread poverty and underdevelopment, and the growth of international trade led 
directly to the organization of criminal activity on the continent.81 However, this tends to 
overlook the well-developed underlying social networks that are the necessary 
precondition for such an evolution.
The expansion of Nigerian TCOs into the global heroin trade has been traced to 
the early 1980’s, when a clique of Nigerian naval officers undergoing training in India 
decided to begin smuggling Southwest Asian heroin to Europe and, eventually, the 
United States.82 Other analysts have been less specific, tracing the genesis of West 
African participation in the transnational heroin trade to Nigerians studying and working
• *  O '!abroad during the 1970s. The common denominator among these accounts is the early 
and concerted involvement of the elite levels of Nigerian society in fostering this 
phenomenon.
Throughout the 1980s, Nigerian TCOs continued to expand their roles, primarily 
by establishing links with Southeast Asian opium producers and transporting Golden 
Triangle heroin to both the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, the collapse of Nigeria’s oil 
boom in the mid-1980s in the face of competitive market pressures, economic 
mismanagement and the illegal siphoning off of petroleum, as discussed above, was also 
pivotal in solidifying the gains of its indigenous trafficking organizations.84
81 For instance, see Chepesiuk, 169.
82 See Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 172. More generally, the emergence o f the Indian 
sub-continent as a major source o f heroin has also been correlated to the integration o f Nigeria into 
transnational drug smuggling networks. U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile -  Illicit Drug 
Trafficking,” 1. See also Rob Marsh, With Criminal Intent: The Changing Face o f  Crime in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, South Africa: Ampersand Press, 1999), 106-7.
83 U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile -  Illicit Drug Trafficking,” 2.
84 Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 473.
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This steadily growing involvement finally began to come to light primarily via a 
number of mass media reports dating from the early 1990s.85 However, in the mid- 
1990s, it was still noted that, “the Nigerians are not in the same league as the Colombian, 
Lebanese or Thai gangs that ship drugs wholesale in containers and specialist aircraft and 
are rarely caught. Nigerian smugglers deal in smaller quantities and are much more 
vulnerable.”86 As will be discussed below, this latter observation should not necessarily 
be construed as a weakness.
As the decade progressed, Nigerian criminal groups involved in the trafficking of 
both heroin and cocaine continued to evolve. They adopted more complicated and 
complex methods of operation than ever before, including more direct access to 
production sources in Asia and expanding activities in South America. Perhaps most 
importantly, Nigeria’s provision of drug couriers has become an integral link in the
an
worldwide distribution of narcotics.
In terms of composition, there is a distinct need within the literature to move 
beyond blanket assertions that Nigerians are heavily involved in the global drug trade. 
While this in fact appears to be a truism, Nigeria is an astonishingly diverse country in 
terms of ethnicity, language and religion, as outlined throughout the previous section. 
Thus, there is a distinct need for more research to be done regarding both the membership 
and network affiliations of these organizations.
85 See, for instance, Danielle Pletka, “Heroin Inc.: the Nigerian connection,” Insight on the News 7, no. 39 
(September 1991), 22-4; and Joshua Hammer, “The Nigerian connection,” Newsweek, 7 October 1991,43.
86 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1.
87 As an example, note the following: “As recently as 1985, African criminal organizations were 
inconsequential in the international drug trade. Now they are major players, moving a substantial amount 
of the world’s heroin and cocaine.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 
1.
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As discussed in Chapter II, TCOs are most often delineated using national 
umbrella labels such as “Italian,” “Colombian” or “Russian,” even though other regional, 
ethnic or linguistic organizational dynamics are generally also present. However, 
highlighting the uncertainty surrounding this issue with respect to West African TCOs, 
Lupshka noted in 1996 that, “It is likely that other groups, like Nigerians, are also bonded 
by tribal, regional, religious, or family-clan ties, although this has not yet been developed 
in any research about them.”88
Nonetheless, there are some general observations that can be made regarding the 
structure of Nigerian and other West African criminal organizations. To begin with, as 
noted in The Economist, “Despite the dangers, there is no lack of recruits, particularly 
from the traditional coastal trading communities. Family- or village-based gangs are 
impenetrable to outsiders, speaking dialects that defy interrogators and phone-taps. Their
O Q
loyalty to each other is absolute.” However, as these groups continue to evolve, they no 
longer necessarily limit themselves strictly by ethnic affiliation.90
Moreover, while many Nigerian criminal groups operating overseas appear to be 
both small and autonomous, many others belong to larger criminal syndicates based in 
Nigeria. This diversity can be at least partially explained by the enormous profit 
potential of drug smuggling, which on the one hand creates an intensely competitive 
environment, but at the same time allows nearly every group involved to accrue lucrative
91gams.
88 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 22. As o f this writing, this observation still appears to hold 
true.
89 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1-2.
90 U.S. Congress, House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime,” 103. According to this source, 
these organizations have come to recognize that international law enforcement targets Nigerian nationals, 
and adjusted accordingly as discussed below.
91 Gastrow, 75.
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Out of necessity, the smaller groups frequently pool resources and tap into highly 
fluid networks in countries around the world to facilitate their criminal operations. 
However, the larger Lagos-based organizations are able to maintain compartmentalized 
cells of operatives wherever they are needed. As one U.S. analysis notes, “Worldwide, 
there are hundreds of Nigerian criminal cells located primarily in major metropolitan 
centers in North America, Europe, and Asia. Recent estimates suggest that more than 
500 Nigerian crime cells are operating in at least 80 countries.”93
This geographic spread of Nigerian TCOs has been facilitated to a high degree by 
immigration from Nigeria, as well as the greater West African region.94 In general, most 
criminal networks face significant hurdles expanding beyond their national and 
ethnonational borders. However, Nigerian TCOs represent an excellent example of the 
following: “For many organized criminal groups, their international activities were more 
regional than global. For those with a more worldwide presence, their operations were 
mostly confined to countries with a large ethnic expatriate population.”95 In particular, 
drugs shipped by Nigerians may be retailed by the same ubiquitous West African trading 
networks that peddle handicrafts and jewelry on street comers in major cities all over the 
world.96
92 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 38.
93 Ibid, Ch. I, 3. This report also observes that Nigerian criminal groups “have long had members or cells in 
foreign countries and international connections to obtain, distribute or market contraband.”
94 For instance, see Cooper, 58.
95 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 3. Elsewhere, the same 
report also notes that, “Nigerian criminals take advantage o f large West African ethnic communities in 
these cities to establish the infrastructure needed to support a wide range o f criminal activity.” Ibid, Ch. Ill, 
38.
96 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1. Though allegedly more involved with unlicensed 
peddling and sales o f counterfeit goods than drug trafficking, the transnational Mouride street-trading 
network represents an interesting parallel with some Nigerian TCO activity, particularly with respect to 
common West African origins and uneasy relationships vis-a-vis law enforcement authorities. This Islamic 
group, founded in Senegal at the turn o f the last century, not only extends from New York to Paris and 
Tokyo, but also continues to grow via conversion. Furthermore, it has been estimated that approximately
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Vis-a-vis the competition, Nigerian TCOs exhibit a markedly greater willingness 
to take higher risks in return for a lower marginal profit, using various practices that serve 
to undercut the competition. Traditionally, these groups have specialized in using 
numerous and relatively expendable mules to smuggle in small qualities. This practice 
simultaneously makes their operations both safer at the strategic level and riskier at the 
tactical level, since at least a certain proportion is bound to get through customs despite 
the loss of a certain percentage.
In terms of smuggling vectors, the use of more complex itineraries, multiple 
couriers and fraudulent travel documents are also become increasingly sophisticated and 
serve to conceal any direct link with the source country. In this context, the use of more 
than one passport by individual mules has also been noted. For instance, in travelling to 
and from Asian or Latin American source countries via West Africa, the courier may start 
with one passport as far as Abidan or Lagos in Nigeria, Brazzaville in the Congo, Lome 
in Togo, or Cotonou in Benin, and then proceed on with a second passport. On the return
07journey, the first passport is used upon reentry into the region.
Moreover, in planning their operations, these organizations make a careful study 
of customs and security procedures at relevant border control checkpoints, and adapt to 
law enforcement measures against them.98 For instance, according to the USCS there are 
a number of signs that an international traveler may be a drug courier. These include 
routing irregularities, suspicious amounts of luggage in relation to purported duration of 
stay and short stops in known transit countries. From the smugglers’ perspective, the
$100 million is transferred from New York to Senegal every three months by way o f affiliated informal 
banking arrangements. See “On the streets o f  New York,” The Economist, 19 June 1999,27. See also 
MacGafihey and Bazenguissa, 15-6; and OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 20-1.
97 See U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile -  Illicit Drug Trafficking,” 1.
98 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 39.
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methods of diverting risk to counter various types of security screening procedures 
includes the use of decoys to distract customs agents while the real mules move safely 
through the checkpoint, as well as multiple couriers on a single conveyance."
With respect to the latter, one such technique is known as “shotgunning,” or 
arranging for numerous couriers travel on the same flight in an attempt to overwhelm 
customs officials. Its use virtually guarantees that at least some of the shipment will get 
through in the confusion at a busy border entry.100 Utilizing these types of methods tends 
to increase the amount of contraband that is confiscated at the checkpoint, and each 
customs administration along the route in question could potentially account for an 
impressive number and volume of seizures. On the other hand, the actual losses to the 
trafficker in both heroin and mules is a small price to pay in comparison to the huge 
profits generated, and are generally written off as merely the costs of doing business.101
The ONDCP refers to the physical transport of heroin by individual couriers using 
international conveyances as the “favorite method of Nigerian traffickers.”102 As 
discussed in Chapter III, this phenomenon is generically known as body carrying. This 
may involve drugs secreted in either luggage or actually on the person of the mule, who 
may wear a corset or some other type of specialized garment in which the contraband can 
be concealed.
"Chepesiuk, 171-2.
100 Specifically, this method has been identified with the “Vice Lords,” a U.S.-based Nigerian cartel, and its 
use has been documented at Britain’s Heathrow Airport. Vesely, 9.
101 This observation is made by Lane, 70-1, with reference to heroin originating in Southeast Asia and 
carried via Africa to Europe, with eventual transshipment to the U.S. The author also notes the essential 
irony that both customs officials and heroin traffickers were both quite pleased with this outcome. See also 
“Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1. Moreover, with respect to this activity, “Most sources 
agree that only a fraction o f the couriers are actually detected and apprehended. When they are arrested, 
the bearers usually choose not to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement. Instead, they plead guilty, serve 
their time, and are subsequently deported to Nigeria. This lack o f cooperation makes it difficult for U.S. 
law enforcement to identify and pursue the head o f the drug trafficking operations, who remain safely in 
Nigeria.” U.S. Congress, House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime,” 96.
102 See U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 1.
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However, such concealment methods also include heroin carried internally within 
the body cavity, colloquially known as body packing via either swallowing or stuffing, as 
noted previously. Some swallowers may ingest up to 150 egg-sized condoms filled with 
heroin, though one kilogram tends to be a much more reasonable average. Moreover, this 
practice is can be extremely dangerous to the health of the courier, and numerous deaths 
have been attributed to defective condoms bursting within the stomachs of these 
carriers.103
In addition to an acceptance of higher calculated risks, another essential 
characteristic of Nigerian TCOs is their adaptability. As fast as law enforcement 
procedures are set up to stop illicit shipments, new channels are opened up. For instance, 
as one U.S. government assessment notes, “Recently, Nigerian traffickers have relied less 
on individual concealment methods and more on increasingly sophisticated concealment 
methods and difficult to detect air, sea and land bulk shipments and express mail 
services.”104 Moreover, these groups also exhibit a willingness to cooperate, negotiate, 
form alliances and make numerous types of business arrangements with a wide range of 
other criminal organizations, further helping to explain their success.105
As noted at the opening of this section, the links that Nigerian TCOs have been 
able to establish over the years with respect to the major heroin producing areas of the 
world are pivot to explaining their sustained and growing presence. For instance, one 
U.S. government assessment observes that:
103 Vesely, 8. See also Marsh, 109-10. For more on the observable physical characteristics o f body 
packers, see also Chepesiuk, 170-1.
104 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 2.
105 See Raymond E. Kendall, “Responding to Transnational Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 
3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 272.
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Producing no heroin of their own, Nigerian traffickers have well-established 
networks in Southeast and Southwest Asian countries to acquire the drug. The 
steady and virtually uninterrupted flow of Nigerian-controlled heroin from these 
source regions is facilitated by criminal cells in transit countries along the way .
..  They tend to avoid sending drug couriers on direct flights from drug-producing 
and key transit countries to market countries, relying instead on a widely diverse 
number of routes transiting airports through Asia, Africa, and Latin America.106
Specifically, these groups buy heroin wholesale throughout both the Golden Crescent and
the Golden Triangle, where there are significant Nigerian and West African populations
to facilitate such transactions.
With respect to the Golden Crescent, Nigerian couriers have a longstanding 
operational presence in Pakistan, while there is also an evolving relationship between 
West African TCOs and Afghan trafficking groups based in New Delhi.107 Paralleling 
this situation in terms of access to the Golden Triangle, such networks have been detected 
in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, generally using international airports as 
transit hubs for drug couriers or relying on various types of postal services to ship their 
product.108 Published intelligence resources have also indicated that Nigerian and West 
African heroin traffickers travel from their bases of operation in Bangkok to Pakistan in 
order to acquire heroin for $2,000 to $4,000 per kilogram, far below the $10,000 to 
$12,000 per kilogram price in Thailand for product of comparable purity.109
As such, from the point of purchase onward, these groups are able to control 
nearly all aspects of the relevant transnational smuggling vectors for their heroin, in some 
cases all the way up to street-level distribution.110 The typical movement of heroin from 
Asian source countries thus occurs in stages. For instance, one courier may pick up a
106 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 39.
107 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 55.
108 Ibid., 52-3, 59.
109 See U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Drug Intelligence Brief: Southwest Asian Heroin -  Selected Data.”
110 Chepesiuk, 170.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
380
shipment in Bangkok, Thailand, and fly it to a transit county such as India, Indonesia or 
Egypt. From there, it is handed over to a second courier, who brings it into another 
transit country, where it may then be parceled out and brought into the United States by 
family members visiting relatives or returning college students.111
Paralleling their involvement with the global heroin trade, links to the cocaine 
producing area of Latin America have also been actively developed by Nigerian TCOs. 
As early as 1995, these groups had reportedly reached deep into the Brazilian interior, 
near the border with Bolivia, allowing for access to the world’s major coca cultivating 
region as discussed in the previous chapter.112 Nigerian criminal organizations have also 
been able to draw on contacts with Brazil’s African community and, by extension, the 
common Portuguese language and heritage with Lusaphone Africa, to bring cocaine into 
South Africa via both Angola and Mozambique.113 In particular, Angolan and 
Mozambican expatriates resident in Brazil are crucial to facilitate such shipments.114
Drug smuggling vectors moving from disparate source regions into sub-Saharan 
Africa encounter a combination of porous international borders, corruptible police and 
security forces, and numerous established smuggling routes moving not only drugs but 
also weapons and other types of contraband. Taken together, these factors make the
111 Vesely, 9.
112 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1.
113 Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 176-7; and, more recently, U.S. Department o f State, 
INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Angola,” which notes specifically that, “Nigerian 
traffickers control the smuggling o f cocaine from Brazil through Angola to South Africa.” Nigerian TCOs 
are also prominent in shipping cocaine from Argentina to South Africa as well, often via either Angola or 
Namibia. As noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 
39, “Using techniques and concealment methods similar to those used smuggle heroin from Asia, Nigerian 
criminal syndicates dominate transatlantic cocaine shipments between Brazil and Africa, from where the 
drug is transshipped to markets in South Africa and Europe.”
114 For more on the exploitation o f ethnic ties between Brazil and Africa in this manner, see also Velez de 
Berliner and Lado, 253-4. In particular, the authors note the estimated 11% o f the country’s populations 
that is o f  African descent, and who maintain contacts across the Atlantic via both family and trade 
connections.
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continent an inviting operational environment for transnational criminals, drug 
traffickers, and terrorists.
Moreover, numerous African cities with extensive commercial and financial ties, 
as well as maritime and air transportation links, to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are 
increasingly becoming hubs for a wide range of illegal activity. This connectivity is 
being particularly exploited by Nigerian TCOs.115 Overall, as Simon Bayham observes, 
Africa is and will remain for the foreseeable future “the weakest link in the international 
war against narcotics operations.”116
However, in terms of U.S. foreign aid to help address these issues, most of the 
limited funds earmarked for Africa have focused on Nigeria and South Africa, despite a 
realization of the fact that countries “as disparate as Malawi, Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast 
have become transit routes.”117 There has even been speculation that a regional drug 
triangle linking West Africa, centered on Nigeria, to both East Africa, primarily Kenya 
and the Sudan, and South Africa itself.118 While the connectivity among these three areas 
may be more or less speculative at this point, the potential for this type of interregional 
smuggling interaction certainly exists.
To begin with East Africa, given its maritime access to the Indian Ocean, both 
Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent opium production can easily reach that side of the
115 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 35. This view is also 
echoed in U.S. Department of State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 1, which notes that, 
“Major African cities are increasingly the destination for drug shipments as well as being transshipment 
hubs.”
116 Bayham, 429. More recently, as noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 187, with respect to 
the drug trade, “Africa is confirming its role as a production area, a transit territory and a consumer 
market.”
117 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 1. It should be noted that, as of 
this writing, South Africa is not considered as a major drug trafficking country under the U.S. certification 
framework.
118 C. J. D. Venter, “Drug Abuse and Drug Smuggling in South Africa,” in Rotberg and Mills, 185. See 
also Bayham, 426. Of interest by being often omitted in such analyses, Central Africa is also not immune 
to this type o f  activity, as noted in MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 77-8.
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continent by sea. Significant amounts of heroin have also been smuggled through various 
coastal towns in the region from India.119 Major East African cities, such as Nairobi, 
Mombassa and Addis Ababa, are becoming significant transit points for heroin heading 
for the U.S. from Asia, in particular utilizing commercial air connections.120 In recent 
years, Uganda has also arrested a number of Nigerians and its own citizens on charges of 
drug trafficking, to the extent that the two countries signed a bilateral agreement to
i -y i
cooperate on this issue in December 1998.
Similarly, as noted in INCSR 2001, “Kenya's sea and air transportation 
infrastructure, and the network of commercial and family ties that link some Kenyans to 
Southwest Asia, make Kenya an important transit country for Southwest Asian 
heroin.”122 In particular, the country’s Lamu archipelago along the northern coastline 
bordering Somalia contains thousands of small islands and estuaries provide countless
119 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 218-20, also notes the favorable geographic position of 
Mauritius in this respect, situated in the southern Indian Ocean between East Africa, the Indian 
subcontinent and Southeast Asia. During the 1980s, it became a hub linking in particular Nairobi, Bombay 
and Bangkok by virtue o f  its dense network o f air routes, sophisticated telecommunications infrastructure 
and popularity as a tourist destination, in addition to its status as an off-shore banking center and free port. 
However, a significant rise in heroin use has also accompanied this involvement in the drug trade.
120 Much o f this activity appears to originate in or at least transit the Indian subcontinent. For instance, 
“Nigerian traffickers are present in India, particularly in Delhi. In some instances, Nigerian-controlled 
couriers transit through India en route to international destinations. This is apparently an effort to avoid law 
enforcement authorities at the destination airport, as passengers arriving from major drug-producing or 
transit countries are subject to greater scrutiny. Pakistani officials continue to arrest couriers, who are 
ticketed to India, at airports in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad. In other cases, West African traffickers 
reside in India and primarily sell heroin and hashish in-country to other Africans and Indians.” U.S. DOJ, 
DEA, “India Country Brief.”
121 OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 211. During the signing ceremony, and apparently in an 
effort to downplay the issue, Maman Daura, Nigeria’s high commissioner in Uganda, saw fit to point out 
that not all those arrested with a Nigerian passport are necessarily Nigerian citizens. However, as discussed 
above, given the suspicions fairly or unfairly attached to that nationality such false documentation would 
hardly be the best choice for anyone wishing to maintain a low profile.
122 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Kenya.” This source also 
notes that, “Heroin normally transits Kenya by air, carried by individual couriers. These couriers were once 
primarily West Africans. More recently, however, couriers are more commonly South Asian (Indian, 
Pakistani) or East African (Tanzanian, Ugandan). Once in Kenya, heroin is typically delivered to agents o f  
West African crime syndicates, mainly Nigerian.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
383
smuggling opportunities. A standard practice is to drop the contraband offshore, where 
fishermen retrieve it on the incoming tides.
Furthermore, Somali warlords report that the routing of heroin through their 
territory has become their major source of income.123 The situation in Tanzania also 
parallels that in neighboring Kenya in many ways. Moreover, primarily due to its 
favorable location, porous borders and numerous road, rail, sea and air points of entry, 
Afghan heroin entering Tanzania from Pakistan is being smuggled to the U.S. by 
Nigerian traffickers.124
With respect to West Africa, and as discussed in the previous section, Nigeria 
serves as a center of gravity for a wide range of criminal activity as well as a natural hub 
for the command and control of drug trafficking operations. While the country itself no 
longer appears to have the same volume of drug smuggling vectors moving directly 
through its territory, Nigerian TCOs have both expanded their operations further into 
other nations and contracted out certain other functions. However, as one regional 
assessment notes, “Nigeria is the key to crime control efforts in West Africa.”125
Overall, the response of the Nigerian government to the drug-related activities of 
these TCOs has been decidedly mixed, in keeping with the domestic trends addressed in 
the previous section.126 According to Isidore S. Obot, a persistent feature of Nigerian
123 Vesely, 8-9. Further south, a similar situation appears to be emerging in Mozambique, as noted in 
“Booming, if  a little dirty,” The Economist, 5 October 2002,43; and, more extensively, Antonio Paulo 
Namburete, “Organized crime in Mozambique and its impact on the regional and international context,” 
Institute fo r Strategic Studies, May 1999, 26-36.
124 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Tanzania.” This report also 
notes that, “There are also strong indications o f a drugs-arms connection in Tanzania linked with the arms 
demand in the Great Lakes Region (Democratic Republic o f  the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.).”
125 U.S. Department o f  State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 2.
126 For instance, note the following: “Past Nigerian regimes have typically tried to cast the drug trafficking 
and financial frauds committed by Nigerian criminal syndicates as victimless crimes that are driven by 
demand in Western countries . . .  Nevertheless, some Nigerian elites, including in the military, have come
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
384
drug control mechanisms has been the emphasis on the reduction of supply, with the 
imposition of harsh though inconsistent punishment. Consequently, initiatives aimed at 
demand reduction have generally been neglected. Furthermore, these statutes were most 
often formulated under military regimes with an overriding concern for law and order. 
One reason for this is that, to a great extent, these efforts have been largely in response to 
international pressure.127
For instance, beginning in the early 1980s the Buhari regime inaugurated a 
nominal crackdown on drug trafficking. This area of criminal activity was one of several 
designated as capital offences in 1984. To further illustrate its dedication to the effort, 
the Nigerian government executed three young men in Lagos in April 1984, while several
I
more were consigned to death row when the decree was overturned soon afterward. 
Significantly, few high-level or politically connected criminal figures were ever arrested 
during this period.
However, the most salient development within this issue area came in 1989, when 
the Nigerian Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) was set up. Established using 
the U.S. DEA as a model, the NDLEA soon became a byword for corruption.129 For
to recognize that pervasive crime and corruption in Nigeria have crippled the economy, contributed to 
social and political tensions, and undermined relations with major historical trading partners, including the 
United States and Western European countries.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime 
Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 36.
127 Isidore S. Obot, “Ethical and legal issues in the control o f drug abuse and drug trafficking: the Nigerian 
case,” Social Science & Medicine 35, no. 3-4 (August 1992), 481-93.
128 Specifically, drug offences were addressed under Special Tribunal Decree, no. 20. The other capital 
crimes so designated included tampering with oil pipelines, electrical or telephone lines, and the 
unauthorized import or export o f  oil or mineral ores, reflect the priorities o f the regime. Osaghae, Crippled 
Giant, 179.
129 According to OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 212, NDLEA officers are paid approximately 
$30 per month, lower than any other government workers in Nigeria. Moreover, to avoid corruption, these 
officers are ordered to relocate to different cities four times a year, but are not reimbursed for moving 
expenses. Finally, given the proportion o f alleged drug offenders released by the courts and the supply of 
cheap assassins, the issue o f revenge killings is also prevalent. As a result, “many drug officers are 
completely discouraged and have started extorting money at roadblocks and airports.”
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instance, suspects “escaped” from NDLEA custody on a regular basis, while much of the 
drug tonnage the agency seized found its way back into the black market. Furthermore, 
rumors persisted that its leading officials were taking a percentage of the profits.
In response to U.S. pressure, the agency was put under the leadership of Major- 
General Musa Bamaiyi in May 1994, who promptly fired 350 employees. Furthermore, 
at the time he privately admitted that much of the agency was “irredeemable.”130 Among 
a host of other shortcomings during this period, Nigeria also failed to fund its own 
narcotics control strategy in 1995.131 By 1998, more than a thousand NDLEA staff had 
been fired, including fifty-five that were reportedly awaiting prosecution.132 Bamaiyi 
was replaced in turn by Ogbona Onovo in December 1998.
In terms of Nigeria’s overall relationship with the United States, the strategic and 
economic importance of the country must be constantly weighed against it overall laxity 
in efforts to control the transnational drug trade. In general, as The Economist notes, 
“Nigeria’s oil wealth makes its rulers invulnerable to almost any sanctions except an oil 
embargo.”133 As discussed previously, the country’s leadership seems content not only to
130 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 2. Furthermore, within the issue area o f money 
laundering, though the agency has been given extensive powers to examine bank accounts, Nigerian bank 
records are not computerized. Therefore, looking for patterns indicating illicit activity is exceedingly 
difficult, and further complicated by banking regulations that tend to obscure the sources o f deposits. See 
also U.S. Department o f  State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 1, which in addition to underling the above 
observations, further notes the failure o f the Nigerian government to extradite 24 outstanding suspects to 
the U.S., despite a reaffirmation o f the bilateral basis for such action.
131 See U.S. House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime,” 104.
132 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 2. See also Chepesiuk, 174; and OGD, World 
Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 210-11. The latter does note that, despite a reputation for incorruptibility, all 
of the agency’s equipment was procured by a single supplier, an Ibo businessman, with Bamaiyi receiving 
10 percent o f the contracts signed by him. Despite this, several Western governments asked that he be kept 
in office, apparently since this activity was not drug-related.
133 “Abacha’s wobbly throne,” The Economist, 45-6.
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ignore international criticism but also to tolerate extremely high levels of corruption, 
often as its beneficiaries.134
U.S. law enforcement authorities point out that, with profit margins running into 
the many thousands of percent, corruption among foreign officials is the single biggest 
problem in addressing drug smuggling through Africa. This issue is particularly crucial 
as it relates to Nigerian government officials, as when members of the military and police 
have allowed smugglers to gain access to A-2 visas, conferring diplomatic immunity as 
they move through customs.135 Moreover, it is also exceedingly difficult to plan joint 
counter-measures without having them compromised by the involvement of high-level 
functionaries as necessitated by protocol.136
Beginning in 1993, Nigeria held the dubious distinction of being the only 
strategically significant country annually decertified by the United States solely on the 
grounds of its involvement with drug trafficking rather than production. Specifically, 
direct participation in the drug trade by members of Abacha’s cabinet as both smugglers 
and consumers helped lead to this decision.137 This action on the part of the Clinton 
administration was made despite intense lobbying from major U.S. firms.
In particular, oil companies with interests in Nigeria argued that commercial 
interests should take precedence over the drug issue, or at a minimum that cooperation in 
counter-narcotics efforts not be considered the overriding criterion. The fears were that
134 “International trade,” The Economist, 26 August 1995, 36.
135 Chepesiuk, 174. The author also notes the lax Nigerian banking regulations allow for the easy recycling 
o f illicit profits.
136 Vesely, 10. Moreover, Booth, Opium, 323, also quotes an unnamed U.S. congressman as saying that, 
“We gave some sniffer dogs the Nigerian customs, but it’s a poisoned chalice. Dogs cannot be corrupted. 
They are a permanent danger for any customs authority any time a minister’s wife walks near them.”
137 In one instance, Abacha’s head o f security, Major Hamza Al-Mustapha, and his wife allegedly 
coordinated a Persian Gulf network and used diplomatic pouches to smuggle drugs. At the same time, 
competitors were also subject to arrest and imprisonment. OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 210, 
citing as its source o f information an unnamed U.S. Embassy employee.
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the drag trafficking label would undermine investor confidence in legitimate business
ventures in the country.138 As discussed in Chapter III, Nigeria received full certification
for 2000, more in response to professed good faith on the part of the Obasanjo regime
1than any real progress in this issue area.
In general, the Nigerian government’s efforts at drag enforcement with respect to 
border control have been decidedly mixed as well. One method used by the authorities 
was to reduce drag trafficking activity through their airports was to stop direct flights 
between Nigeria and known source countries.140 The NDLEA has also had some success 
in airports by targeting individual courier activity, albeit through sometimes heavy- 
handed techniques.141 However, it has also been contended that the exit visa system 
instituted by the Abacha regime, ostensibly to control the drag trade, was chiefly a tool to 
more effectively monitor domestic opposition.142
138 Falco, 18-9. For example o f such lobbying within the oil industry, see Kimberly Music, “Panel backs 
ending drug report cards for foreign countries,” The Oil Daily 89, no. 47 (9 May 1997), 4. Moreover, 
according to OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 212, while the United States is though to have solid 
information on numerous high-level Nigerian officials, the preference is to use this information behind the 
scenes in order to pressure the government into adopting policies favorable to U.S. interests.
139 Chepesiuk, 174. Justification for this decision can be found in U.S. Department o f State, “2000 
Narcotics Certification Determinations.” Furthermore, U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, 
“Africa and the Middle East -  Nigeria,” also observes that the Obasanjo government has achieved mixed 
results as its apparent good intention face an uphill battle o f ingrained attitudes and established interests.
As evidence o f this, the report points out that the current administration also supports the controversial 
1990 NDLEA Act Number 33. This statute says that Nigerians convicted o f drug offenses abroad will be 
arrested upon their deportation back to Nigeria, and, if  convicted, be liable for a minimum o f 5 years 
additional imprisonment for “harming the reputation o f Nigeria.” However, the most salient instance of 
Nigerian cooperation within this issue area, from the U.S. standpoint, was its agreement to transfer custody 
o f four fugitives to the U.S for trial on a range o f drug-related charges in November 2000.
140 Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 4.
141 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 2. In one particular case during 1998, the 
NDLEA broke up a smuggling ring that had been concealing heroin in the wheelchairs o f the Nigerian 
Special Olympics participants as they transited Lagos airport. However, as noted in U.S. Department o f  
State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Nigeria,” in response to better security in Nigerian 
airports, “Smugglers have been forced to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria's five major 
seaports or across its porous land borders.”
142 See Falola, 20-1.
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Throughout the rest of West Africa, the impact of Nigerian criminal activity has 
also been substantial, spilling over across international borders into neighboring 
countries. As E. A. Beoteng notes, the region is the most highly segmented in Africa, the 
direct result of the direct competition for trade and territorial control that took place 
among the European colonial powers between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries.143 
Moreover, the successful example of Nigerian TCOs has also tended to encourage 
imitation throughout West Africa, notably in Ghana, Benin and Sierra Leone.144 
Similarly, in the maritime context, bulk shipments of heroin hidden in cargo containers 
transit through Lagos, and then re-exported via any of the numerous available seaports of 
neighboring West African countries.145
With specific reference to these neighbors, in addition to being an alternate transit 
hub for Nigerian TCOs, Ghana serves as an important source of mules, particularly since 
Nigerian citizens have become internationally stigmatized as being involved in the drug 
trade as noted above.146 Similarly, in Senegal, Nigerians have been characterized as “the 




144 Williams and Savona, 21. Nigerian traffickers’ use o f Ghana, Benin and Senegal as transit points is also 
noted in “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1. For more on Sierra Leone’s porous border 
with Liberia, allowing a considerable amount o f both arms and gem smuggling in addition to a two-way 
flow of refugees, see “The forgotten conflict,” The Economist, 9 November 2002, 50.
145 Chepesiuk, 170.
146 Booth, Opium, 323. Moreover, as noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the 
Middle East -  Ghana,” “Ghana is a transit point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin being smuggled 
to Europe and the U.S., and South American cocaine being smuggled to Europe. Increasing amounts of 
heroin are destined for the U.S. Some o f the cocaine might also be smuggled to South Africa. Trafficking 
occurs at Accra's Kotoka International Airport as well as at the ports of Tema and Sekondi. Overland 
trafficking occurs at the land borders with Togo (Aflao) and Cote d'Ivoire (Elubo). As Nigeria improves its 
interdiction efforts, Nigerian traffickers are strengthening their presence in Ghana.”
147 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  Senegal.” This report 
also notes that, “Professional drug networks, many o f which are operated by foreigners (e.g., Nigerians), 
are well established in the marijuana trade.”
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As discussed in the previous section with respect to oil smuggling, Benin’s 
proximity to Nigeria and its relatively open economy inevitably also make it attractive to 
those wishing to dispose of ill-gotten gains from narcotics trafficking.148 Moreover, the 
country has been characterized as both a “corridor country” and a “warehouse-state,” due 
to its role linking Nigerian to Togo, another known smuggling hub, and an economy 
based almost entirely on re-exports, a specialization tailor-made for illegal trade.149 
Finally, “Nigerian nationals, residing in Cameroon, traffic heroin to Europe and to some 
extent also to the United States.”150
However, it is Southern Africa that perhaps offers the most potential for Nigerian 
TCOs to expand their activities, and to date these groups have made every effort to 
aggressively exploit the rich trafficking opportunities of the region. Adding to the 
already inherent complexity of this activity are the interrelated logistics for a number of 
black market goods. As C. J. D. Venter writes, “Because of well-established smuggling 
networks in the southern African region, the same routes are often used for such drugs as 
Mandrax, cannabis, heroin and LSD as for weapons, cars, rhino horn, ivory and gems.”151
148 In particular, “Benin is neither a major financial center nor a major money laundering country, but 
Beninese authorities believe that their country is being used by traffickers to launder drug profits. The 
primary methods for laundering appear to be purchasing lawful assets such as real estate or vehicles, or by 
using legal businesses as front operations.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money 
Laundering,” 49.
149 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 212-4. As elsewhere, corruption among high-level 
government officials in Benin significantly helps to enable this activity. Furthermore, “A desire to draw 
the maximum amount o f profit from Nigeria’s oil, Niger’s uranium, and Togo’s phosphates has for the past 
two decades led the authorities to allow ‘the development of transit and re-export activities within a 
framework o f smuggling.’” With respect to Togo, as noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, 
“Africa and the Middle East -  Togo,” Togo's relatively porous borders permit traffickers, mostly African 
and including many Nigerian nationals, relatively free access to the country. This ease o f access has made 
Togo a transshipment point in the regional and sub-regional trade in narcotics, especially for heroin coming 
from Southeast and Southwest Asia, destined for Nigeria, and from there to Europe and the U.S.”
150 Ibid., “Africa and the Middle East -  Cameroon.”
151Venter, 185. Bayham, 427, also makes a similar point with a specific reference to Nigerian access to 
cocaine. Incidentally, Mandrax is a tranquilizer manufactured in India that has developed a significant user 
base in the region, as noted briefly in Chapter III.
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At the supra-national level, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, has attempted to 
formulate its own regional strategy to stem the flow of illicit drugs through the region. 
Due to the unavailability of reliable statistics, however, it is difficult to accurately assess 
the problem, though trends over the past several years indicate an alarming growth in 
both trafficking and consumption. Moreover, concerns related to expanding drug use in 
correlation with the spread of the HIV virus throughout the region also give impetus to 
these efforts.152
However, paralleling Nigeria’s role in West Africa, South Africa is the pivotal 
country in the context of smuggling in Southern Africa. This is largely a function of its 
economic weight within region, its role as a maritime transit point from Indian to Atlantic 
Oceans, its good flight connections to Europe and America and its relatively 
sophisticated banking network. Furthermore, in general the feeling among smugglers
152 “SADC plans to launch anti-drug strategy early ‘98,” AIDS Weekly Plus, 22 September 1997, 16. As of 
this writing, this initiative does not appear to have made any significant progress.
153 “Drug skirmishes,” The Economist, 16 July 1994, 38. This article also notes that, in the 1980s Zambia 
became enmeshed in the drug trade, particularly in terms o f its access not only to the South African market 
but also its borders adjoining seven other countries. Furthermore, direct flights from the capital, Lusaka, to 
both Europe and India provide extra-regional connectivity. See also Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in 
Southern Africa,” 176-7; Booth, Opium, 323-4; and U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa 
and the Middle East -  South Africa,” which also notes the considerable advantages that South Africa’s 
infrastructure offers to smugglers. Even prior to these more recent developments, however, apartheid-era 
South Africa’s ability to exert considerable economic leverage against intransigence on part o f its 
neighbors was facilitated by an odd quirk o f geography. A number o f its adversaries were both landlocked 
and dependent on the export o f raw materials, especially minerals, to keep their economies going. Thus, 
the use o f both the South African military and various proxy forces to interdict alternate transport routes to 
seaports was pivotal. The figures for the transport sector are the most startling, as witnessed by Lesotho 
and Botswana’s 100%, Zimbabwe’s 80% and Zambia and Malawi’s 40% dependence on wholly South 
African-controlled transport routes and facilities. These figures come from Patrick O’Meara, “South 
Africa’s Regional Goals,” in Apartheid Unravels, ed. R. Hunt Davis, Jr. (Gainesville, FL: University of 
Florida Press, 1991), 223-4.
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appears to be that goods originating in South Africa receive relatively less scrutiny than 
those coming from Nigerian or other West African ports.
Since the end of apartheid rule, major cutbacks in military spending have led to 
considerably more porous borders, demonstrated by the fact that, as of 2000, only four 
out of 350 registered airports reported any form of police presence. However, another 
cause commonly cited in the growth criminal activity in South African is the rapid 
increase in numbers of illegal immigrants, “especially Nigerians,” many on the pretext of 
securing refugee status.154 According to South Africa's Institute for Security Studies, of 
some 100,000 estimated Nigerian residents of South Africa, only 700 are legally 
permitted residents.155
Moreover, drug use is on the rise throughout Southern Africa, and in particular 
there is a thriving market for both cocaine and heroin among rich, white South Africans, 
as well as a growing preference for Mandrax from India. In fact, South Africa has 
become the largest consumer of heroin on the African continent, as well as the leading 
market for hallucinogenic drugs.156 There has also been a significant increase in the 
number of Southern Africans arrested for involvement in the drug trade outside the 
region. While not yet considered by the U.S. as a major drug trafficking nation, these 
trends indicate an increasing involvement with this issue on a number of levels.
154 While exact figures do not appear to be readily available, the number o f Nigerians seeking refugee status 
is estimated to run into the thousands. Furthermore, under South African law each applicant is entitled to a 
formal adjudication, and in the interim given full rights to work and study in the country. However, until 
the middle of 1999 fewer than 10 Nigerians had been found to be genuine political refugees. “SA is ‘top 
drug smuggling base’,” African News Service, 21 February 2000, 1008049u7130. See also Mark Shaw, 
“State Responses to Organized Crime in South Africa,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 1 (Summer 
1997), 1-19. In addition the presence Nigerian TCOs, the author also notes the impact o f both Russian and 
Chinese criminal organizations operating in South Africa.
155 These figures are cited in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  
South Africa.”
156 Vesely, 9-10. This trend is also discussed in OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 204-5, which 
notes in particular the rise o f  heroin use in the Johannesberg area and in Cape Town.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
392
In terms of transit, Nigerian TCOs were the first organized criminals to exploit 
South Africa’s diplomatic normalization following the institution of majority rule in
1 cn
1994. By 1995, it was estimated that there were 136 drug networks were operating in
1 co
the country. In 1999, the British intelligence service, MI5, singled out South Africa as 
the most important conduit for South American cocaine into Western Europe. Since 
then, transshipment cells have continued to develop in South Africa to facilitate 
movement of both heroin and cocaine to other parts of the world, and most likely to 
distribute drugs domestically as well.159 All in all, “Nigerian and South African criminal 
organizations have matured and become transnational concerns that exploit whatever 
weakness they find or, with their growing sums of money, create.” 160
With respect to smuggling vectors entering Europe under the guidance of 
Nigerian TCOs, the DEA noted in 1998 that, “Nigeria-based trafficking organizations 
were responsible for a growing amount of heroin smuggled into Europe using
157 See Gastrow, 61-2, which notes that even as early as the mid-1980s, South African law enforcement 
officials saw Nigerian criminals as the first foreign criminals to become active in the country on a 
noticeable scale, though during the apartheid era other internal and external security issues obviously took 
precedence. Largely confined to the greater Johannesburg metropolitan area, these groups relied heavily on 
transnational networks and took great pains to avoid the sorts o f petty crime that would bring them undue 
attention. These activities formed a solid basis for future expansion as political conditions evolved. See 
also OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 200-1.
158 Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 176-7. While many were Nigerian, some were Indian 
groups specializing in heroin and Mandrax and drawing on the sizable and well-established Indian 
expatriate community. See also Marsh, 104.
159 Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 174. With respect to cocaine, an emerging trafficking 
route appears to link both Nigeria and South Africa with Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Traffickers reportedly 
travel to Harare, Zimbabwe, via either Ghana or Swaziland, obtain a visa for South Africa, and proceed by 
land to South Africa and then on to Latin America. U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile -  Illicit Drug 
Trafficking,” 2. See also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  
Swaziland,” which also notes the expansion o f Nigerian TCOs into Swaziland as a conduit for smuggling 
cocaine into South Africa.
160 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 1. This view is echoed in U.S. 
Intergency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 52, which observes that, 
“Nigerian traffickers are finding South African air and seaports to be attractive gateways for transshipping 
both cocaine and heroin into the Western European market. South Africa’s growing role in the 
international drug trade has increased its domestic addiction problem, especially for cocaine, which 
Nigerian traffickers have made widely available at low prices.” Furthermore, beyond the context o f drug 
issues, Nigerians in South Africa have also been discovered engaging in types o f “419” fraud, as discussed 
previously. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East -  South Africa.”
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commercial air connections.”161 More specifically, within the wider European law 
enforcement community both the United Kingdom and Italy have officially expressed 
concerned about Nigerian criminal groups.162
Within the latter country, Nigerian TCOs have been known to cooperate with the 
Naples-based Camorra in both drug trafficking and prostitution, and are well concealed 
among the country’s 15,000 Nigerian immigrants.163 Couriers under the control of West 
African criminal groups have also been detected transiting the Athens international 
airport carrying both heroin and cocaine, as well as through the Aegean islands from 
Turkey.164 Similar activity has been documented in Russia as well, particularly with 
regard to exploiting international air links with the rest of Europe.165
Finally, in the past there has been a tendency on the part of U.S. law enforcement 
officials to underestimate Nigerian drug trafficking activity, despite estimates that as 
much as 50% of the heroin that enters the country is smuggled under their auspices.166 
However, even as early as August 1993, the United States suspended direct commercial 
flights to and from Nigeria, largely in respond to the volume of couriers coming in to
161 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC, (1998), 57. This report also notes that in the past Nigerians have occasionally 
been involved in trading heroin for cocaine.
162 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 4.
163 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f  Drugs (2000), 88. A significant volume o f cocaine smuggling into Italy 
via commercial air channels is also carried out by Nigerian couriers, primarily members o f the Ibo ethnic 
group, both in luggage and on or within their bodies. Ibid, 82.
164 This is noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia -  Greece.”
165 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 59.
166 Chepesiuk, 167-9. However, the author also quotes an unnamed DEA agent as saying, “When you talk 
to law enforcement people and you mention Nigerians, that’s almost synonymous with heroin. Nigerians 
have developed a worldwide reputation.” This sentiment is echoed in “Can Obasanjo save Nigeria?” The 
Economist, 45, where is it noted that, “Drug smuggling, money laundering and all sorts o f  frauds have 
made Nigeria synonymous with international crime. American drug officials speak almost in awe of the 
inventiveness and audacity o f Nigerian crime syndicates.” See also Mark Jones, “Nigerian crime networks 
in the United States,” International Journal o f  Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 37, no. 1 
(Spring 1993), 59-73.
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New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. Consequently, traffickers adapted by utilizing 
routes through neighboring West African countries.167
By 1995, it was reported that Nigerians were transporting roughly 40% of the 
heroin seized in the United States.168 With respect to the methods discussed above, many 
of these can be seen in practice as drugs enter the country under the auspices of Nigerian 
TCOs, such as the use of immigrants, both legal and illegal, as expendable couriers.169 
This phenomenon is spurred on by the illusion prevalent in Nigerian society that migrants 
to the West in general, and the United States in particular, that success and fast money are
1 70easily obtained there.
As of late 1996, Nigerian traffickers had begun using the company Express Mail 
Services to import drugs into the United States. During 1997, at least ten separate such 
consignments of Southeast Asian heroin were seized, many of which had been routed 
through Germany and concealed both inside a wide range of seemingly innocuous items 
and within the packaging itself. In general, vis-a-vis the use of couriers, the advantages 
of these methods include relative anonymity, predictable dates of delivery, and a decrease 
of costs and risks.171 The DEA also noted in 1998 that during the previous year most 
multi-gram and multi-kilogram seizures of Southeast Asian heroin in the U.S. were of 
drugs controlled by Nigerian-based traffickers using primarily couriers and commercial 
delivery services.172
167 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 46.
168 “Nigerian trade, internal trade,” The Economist, 1.
169 For instance, it is noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment,
Ch. II, 7, that, “Ethnically-based Nigerian criminal organizations “’’employ illegal aliens smuggled into the 
country [U.S.] to undertake higher-risk criminal activities.” As noted previously, other prominent trends 
include the use o f various forms o f body carrying and travel on international airlines.
170 Falola, 15-6.
171 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 47.
172 Ibid., 45.
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The following case helps to illustrate the geographic scope of a single Nigerian 
drug trafficking network. In October 1996, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Force operation code-named “Global Sea,” a U.S. initiative supported by officials in 
Thailand, France and Great Britain, arrested members of a Nigerian heroin smuggling 
and distribution network in Chicago, Boston, New York, Detroit, Thailand and Pakistan. 
Previously, a number of other individuals allegedly affiliated with this group had been 
arrested in Texas, New Mexico, Thailand, Switzerland, Mexico and the Netherlands. 
Incidentally, the leadership of this group was made up predominantly of Nigerian
173women.
However, in addition to smuggling drugs into the United States, Nigerian groups 
are also increasingly involved with distribution. In particular, heroin is often sold on 
street comers in suburbs containing large concentrations of West Africans, with roughly 
90% of the supply being of Southeast Asian origin.174 As Toyin Falola notes, “Nigerians 
in the United States, whether successful or not, experience complications with their hosts, 
in part because of aggressive survival strategies that may involve criminality.”175
173 See U.S DOJ, “U.S. Law Enforcement Dismantles International Heroin Smuggling Ring Run 
Predominantly By Women,” Press Release # 503 (Washington, DC: Department o f Justice, 11 October 
1996), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/opa/pr/1996/Oct96/503crm.htm. accessed 15 July 2004; and 
“Nigerian heroin-smuggling ring is broken up,” New York Times, 12 October 1996, 8-9. This particular 
operation originated with a case in Chicago in August 1995, and as o f the date o f this press release had 
seized approximately 55.5 kilograms o f heroin, with an estimated wholesale value o f between $150,000 
and $200,000 and a retail value o f more than $26 million. In keeping with the types o f trafficking behavior 
noted above, couriers allegedly flew to Thailand to pick up the heroin, where controllers met them to 
ensure they reached their destination. Generally proceeding by air to Europe and then Guatemala, before 
moving on through Mexico and across the U.S. border. The main conduit within U.S. territory stretched 
from Texas to Chicago, where the heroin was parceled out into 100-gram quantities. The cash receipts 
were then tunneled back to Southeast Asia to begin the cycle once again. See also Vesely, 11. For more 
on the interaction between drug and gender issues, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 79-83.
174 Vesely, 9. Furthermore, the author also notes that, in order to cope with the astronomical mark-ups and 
insatiable demand, as discussed above some traffickers resort to the use o f  express mail delivery just to 
keep up with business.
175 Falola, 15-6. Moreover, as Thomas Kneir notes, Nigerian criminal organizations are “seldom, if  ever, 
engaged in drug trafficking to the exclusion o f other crime.” This would include a wide range o f  financial
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In addition to their links to both Southeast and Southwest Asia, the distribution 
networks operated by Nigerian criminal organizations also tend to be much more loosely 
organized, and thus much more difficult to penetrate despite being still very sophisticated 
and adaptable. These groups have also established links with inner-city gangs and both 
Chinese and Jamaican criminal organizations with respect to distributing Southeast and 
Southwest Asian heroin. In addition to these heroin-related activities, Nigerian TCOs 
have reportedly been expanding their Latin American cocaine pipeline to service markets 
that the Colombians are not fully exploiting.176
As of 1997, Nigerian and affiliated West African crime organizations had 
reportedly taken over 70% of the Chicago heroin market.177 In 1998, the DEA noted that 
Chicago was the only major U.S. city where Southeast Asian heroin predominated, 
reflecting the strong Nigerian presence within this market.178 Furthermore, these groups 
were well enough established by 2000 that a U.S.-based, ethnic Nigerian gang called the 
Blackstone Rangers reportedly set up its own training school in Chicago to teach couriers 
of all nationalities to avoid detection by customs and border officials.179 Similar groups 
have also been operating as distributors throughout New York, Baltimore, Washington, 
D.C., Atlanta, Dallas, Houston and Milwaukee.180
crimes including fraud, money laundering, and document alteration and counterfeiting, as well as 
smuggling o f both illegal immigrant and other types o f contraband. U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
International Relations, “Combating International African Crime,” Statement by Thomas J. Kneir, Deputy 
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau o f Investigation, 15 July 1998, 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa50884.000/hfa5Q884 O.HTM. accessed 15 
July 2004.
176 Chepesiuk, 168.
177 “Streamlined for success,” The Economist, 11 October 1997, 29.
178 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 47.
179 Vesely, 9.
180 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1; and U.S. Federal Bureau o f Investigation, Organized 
Crime Section, Asian/African Criminal Enterprise Unit, “African Criminal Enterprises” (Washington, DC: 
FBI, n.d.), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/aace/afficancrim.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
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The demonstrable ability of Nigerian and other West African TCOs to operate 
within the constraints of the U.S. market, which despite its relatively high degree of 
access also involves a proportionate level of inherent risk. Keeping in mind that the 
value of a drug tends to rise as it approaches its final points of sale, the impact of massive 
profit margins result in a balance between access and risk whereby the latter is largely 
mitigated. As such, these manifestations are entirely in accord with observable operating 
patterns found along any number of Nigerian-controlled smuggling vectors.
Nigerian Heroin Smuggling Vectors: An Assessment
As noted at the outset, without being a major drug-producing nation itself, Nigeria 
has emerged not only as an important heroin trafficking hub but also as a support center 
and safe haven with respect to a wide range of illegal activity. This evolution has taken 
place almost in spite of rather than because of the country’s physical location. With 
respect to access and risk, the former being so high while the latter is so low has made 
Nigeria attractive enough in both relative and absolute terms that most hurdles to 
connectivity have been overcome in cases where Nigeria itself is a node on a given 
smuggling vector. Even in cases where Nigerian territory is not actually utilized, 
however, the country’s combination of high access and low risk also serves to facilitate 
various other essential TCO functions, primarily relating to command and control.
In parallel, the external capabilities of Nigerian TCOs have expanded beyond 
Nigeria to the extent that they now provide the “legs’ for a significant volume of 
observable transnational heroin smuggling vectors. As noted previously, in contrast to 
the previous cases focusing on Afghanistan and Colombia, the issue of drug production is
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largely moot, and the focus will remain on issues relating to transit. However, setting the 
stage for such an analysis, the nexus of domestic factors within Nigeria that allow 
widespread criminal enterprises to operate with minimal risk has been discussed, though 
aspects must be reiterated.
To begin with, in addition to drug smuggling, Nigerian involvement in various 
related phenomena including but not limited to financial fraud, piracy, and both public 
and private sector corruption on a massive scale has become demonstrably apparent and 
increasingly pronounced in recent decades. Moreover, even when these activities do not 
actually occur within Nigerian territory, access to the favorable operating environment 
provided by the country is an important enabling element in the transnational context.
Furthermore, though a number of these facilitating factors predate or are related to 
Nigeria’s period of colonial rule as part of the British Empire, others largely stem from or 
have been exacerbated by economic mismanagement or abuses of political power since 
the country’s independence. In several instances, the legacies of the former have been 
used as the excuse for the latter. Regardless of the assignment of blame, however, the 
fact remains that Nigeria’s problems, combined with its regional strategic and 
demographic weight within both West Africa and with respect to the entire continent, 
makes the nation’s endemic failure to effectively meet these challenges a matter of global 
interest.
The question is thus whether the conditions found in Nigeria can be considered as 
causal to, a derivative of, or emerging concurrent with the crime and corruption that is 
empirically evident within the country. To answer this, a brief review of the more salient 
aspects of Nigeria’s physical, economic, political and human geography is in order. This
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include, but are not limited to, the impact of oil profits, the issue of corruption, the British 
colonial legacy and the various ethnic tensions within the country, all of which are 
interrelated to varying degrees. At this juncture, it is also worth noting that there are 
generally three relevant dimensions to each of these factors, namely its intrinsic impact, 
its spillover effect into other issue areas, and the ways in which this cumulative impact is 
managed.
For instance, in this analysis the discovery of oil was introduced initially in the 
context of physical geography. However, the impact of this event and the resultant 
profits has served to dislocate the Nigerian economic, political and social structure in 
fundamentally predictable yet still tragic ways. Specifically, the dominance of the 
petroleum sector has led to a stifling nearly all other aspects of the country’s economic 
development, and in turn given political elites and their predominantly ethnically-based 
constituencies a significant goal for their more acquisitive inclinations.
Economically, in conjunction with the oflten-detrimental effects of oil revenues 
and high degree of illicit trading activity, public sector corruption also crosses a number 
of issue areas, most fundamentally with respect to the high levels of these patterns of 
behavior found throughout Nigeria in both relative and absolute terms. While both those 
offering and accepting bribes should certainly be held accountable, corruption is a 
longstanding national tradition that was largely overlooked under British colonial rule 
and has continued to flourish since independence. Nearly all of the generic conditions 
that tend to facilitate corruption can be found in Nigeria, including but not limited to 
restrictions on or obstacles to legitimate economic activity, the presence of significant 
natural resource endowments, and strong kinship ties linked to ethnic factionalization.
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Similarly, the political impact of the British colonial legacy also continues to 
resonate across Nigeria, both as a focus of rhetorical ire and as an excuse for the overall 
absence of good governance since independence. With respect to the latter, in 
conjunction with the inheritance of inadequate governing mechanisms from the colonial 
administration, a sustained failure of leadership across the course over many decades is 
abundantly clear. For instance, the aforementioned issue of corruption set against the 
backdrop of oligarchic rule has led Nigeria to become one of the foremost examples of 
the predatory “vampire” state that has become all too common across the continent. The 
country’s near-perpetual transition to democracy, punctuated by periods of military rule, 
has only exacerbated these tendencies and their underlying rationalizations.
Linked even more directly to the legacy of British colonial rule are the parameters 
of Nigeria’s human geography. Leaving aside for the moment the wider issue of artificial 
borders, the country was initially governed as three separate regions roughly correlated to 
the three dominant ethnic groups. However, it was later ruled under a more centralized 
federal framework, and it was this system that was adopted upon Nigeria’s independence. 
Since that time, ethnic identities and tensions have become inextricably connected to an 
intense competition for access to national assets, and oil wealth in particular, by way of a 
highly developed system of political patronage. These dynamics, including the 
marginalization of smaller tribal groups, continue to provide an inherent level of 
instability.
To return to the issue of why crime and corruption are able to flourish in Nigeria, 
at the apex of the hierarchy of challenges facing the country is, most simply put, a failure 
of leadership. As such, it is not necessarily oil wealth per se is not the problem, but
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rather the ongoing inability to manage these assets to the benefit of the citizenry and 
avoid the temptations of personal gain. Similarly, while there are no easy solutions 
where corruption has taken root, the country’s poor record of punishing high-level 
corruption has had a significant demonstration effect across the body politic. With 
respect to the institutional inheritance from the British colonial administration and the 
issue of zero-sum ethnic competition, as Nigeria approaches a half-century of 
independence the plausibility of generic excuses wears thinner and thinner.
While this failure of leadership cannot be properly considered as a causal factor, it 
is perhaps the single most important enabling element that has allowed other and often 
preexisting conditions to evolve into a highly favorable operational environment for 
smugglers as well as other types of criminal actors. In terms of access, risk and 
connectivity, the global success of Nigerian TCOs demonstrates how this type of 
smugglers’ landscape at the national level effectively mitigates risk to such a low level 
that access becomes less difficult to maintain, especially for those with the proper 
political leverage. In conjunction with the country’s porous borders and entrepreneurial 
traditions, the resultant connectivity has in turn enabled these discrete regional smuggling 
actors to have a seemingly disproportionate impact on wider global black markets.
In this context, the demonstrable and expanding capability of Nigerian TCOs to 
control drug supply chains from production area to point of sale lies not only in their 
ability to solidify this national base of support for their command and control functions, 
but also to extend their reach to form a seamless transnational logistical continuum. As 
such, with respect to transit this assessment represents a departure from the previous case 
studies in that since it is not a major drug producer, consideration of Nigeria proper
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figures into only one discrete set of smuggling vectors in which Nigerian TCOs are 
involved.
In turn, the effectiveness of smuggling activity conducted under the auspices of 
Nigerian TCOs is predicated upon ongoing access to relevant source areas, transit 
countries, and major markets, facilitated in large measure by the spatial distribution of 
various Nigerian and West African expatriate networks. While most ethnically-based 
TCOs experience significant obstacles in expanding beyond their national or regional 
borders, in general Nigerian TCOs appear to have experienced relatively fewer such 
constraints in developing a worldwide presence.
In doing so, these groups have been able to take advantage of a number of 
developments associated with globalization. This includes, but is not limited to, the 
growing ease of transportation, more efficient methods of international shipping, better 
technology and communications, and the fact that transshipment countries no longer need 
to be along a straight line between supply and demand. As such, in this instance 
economic linkages serve to trump mere geographical proximity.
Moreover, in order to maintain this type of access, a number of structural and 
behavioral attributes exhibited by Nigerian TCOs in their management of risk can also be 
directly linked to their competitive advantages and subsequent successes, as noted 
previously. For the most part, these characteristics relate primarily to the adaptability of 
such networks, particularly with respect to both routes and methods. In the context of the 
latter, the use of expendable couriers dealing with smaller quantities has been a hallmark, 
but this is changing as Nigerian TCOs become increasingly sophisticated. In conjunction
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with a greater relative willingness to accept higher risks in return for a lower marginal 
profit, this flexibility has been essential to their evolutionary processes.
As such, over the past several decades Nigerian TCOs have been able to extend 
their reach into a number of primary source regions and countries. In particular, the 
genesis of their connectivity with both the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent 
heroin production areas dates back decades, and in many cases can be traced back to the 
expansion of commercial or official ties into the transshipment of illicit commodities. 
Thus, longstanding links to local organizations have facilitated the purchase of heroin at 
wholesale prices, which Nigerian TCOs can in turn accrue their own profits by 
controlling nearly all subsequent aspects of the logistical process. Incidentally, a parallel 
situation can also be found in Latin America with respect to cocaine.
In terms of transit, although not the only salient region in this context sub-Saharan 
Africa can be seen as having a relatively high degree of connectivity for a number of 
reasons. Objectively, a combination of porous international borders, corruptible police 
and security forces, and established smuggling routes with respect to a wide range of 
contraband can be found throughout the region. In the more specific context of heroin, 
the continent is relatively accessible from both the Golden Triangle and the Golden 
Crescent, particularly by water and by air. Finally, and more subjectively, the significant 
presence of Nigerian TCOs in nearly every African country makes smuggling vectors 
across this region highly attractive from the perspective of command and control.
Exhibiting these attributes to an even higher degree than the rest of the continent, 
Nigeria itself as well as the rest of West Africa serve logically enough as a natural center 
of gravity for Nigerian TCOs. Not only is access maximized and risk minimized, but
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moderately good commercial maritime and aviation links to major markets create 
additional incentives as well. Moreover, the sporadic attempts on the part of the Nigerian 
government to address this problem, generally in response to various forms of external 
leverage, for the most part have resulted in such activity merely shifting across regional 
borders to the territory of Nigeria’s neighbors. Similarly, South Africa’s logistical and 
financial infrastructure also makes it a very attractive alternative, as does the growing 
domestic market for drugs.
In addition to servicing a significant portion of the demand for drugs in the 
relevant transit countries, Nigerian TCOs also maintain an active operational stance in 
most major markets as well, in particular with respect to Europe and North America. 
While an increasingly diverse range of couriers aboard international aircraft carrying 
relatively small amounts of drugs is still the norm, larger shipments using maritime forms 
of conveyance are becoming increasingly common.
Cooperation with more longstanding and often ethnically-based criminal 
organizations can also be seen, though Nigerian and West African distribution networks 
are certainly not unknown. In general, however, having achieved access to these 
markets, the relatively higher risk found in operating within these environments have not 
deterred Nigerian TCOs, but rather encouraged them to exhibit the same types of 
adaptive behavior that made them successful in the first place.
As this chapter has demonstrated, the global reach of Nigerian TCOs is truly 
impressive, particularly given the operational reliance on relatively low-tech yet 
nonetheless effective smuggling techniques. Moreover, in spatial terms the existence of 
extensive expatriate communities through which influence can be extended into
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numerous other countries, as well as access to a safe haven in the form of Nigeria itself, 
have served to facilitate the growth of these smuggling actors. In an attempt to bring this 
study full-circle, the final chapter not only draws conclusions by way of comparisons and 
contrasts among the case studies examined herein, but also to point the way toward future 
applications of the underlying geographical methodology.




Throughout the course of this study, an effort has been made to meaningfully 
engage a subject with an admittedly high degree of complexity, namely transnational 
smuggling route selection. By way of conclusion, a review of this analysis must 
encompass a number of interrelated topics, beginning with an appreciation of this pivotal 
issue as having a longstanding, ongoing and growing relevance. This is not only true 
with respect to smuggling in its own right, but also in terms of both supporting, and in 
return being supported by, a wide range of related criminal activity, with terrorism being 
the most salient within the context of the prevailing international security paradigm.
As such, given the impact of black market activity as a component of the global 
economy, a fuller understanding of the transnational dynamics that enable the underlying 
illicit cross-border logistical processes is increasingly crucial. With respect to the 
literature within the field of international security, this issue can be firmly established 
with respect to the interlocking contexts of the “end of the nation-state” debate, the 
friction between various types of transnational networks and geographically 
circumscribed nation-states, and the impact of globalization and its related 
manifestations.
To model the decision-making parameters that drive transnational smuggling 
route selection, the relevant operational landscape was conceptualized as a function of 
geography, particularly with respect to the impact of various economic, political, and 
human factors, from the smugglers’ perspective. Underpinning this approach at a holistic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
407
level, a number of initial assumptions were made that serve to more meaningfully 
circumscribe the research question.
Specifically, this included positing the existence of a fundamental link between 
geography and both licit and illicit economic activity, as well as certain shared dynamics 
that transcend any specific type of smuggled good and thus allow for a delineation of 
common and contrasting features of both expected and observed logistical patterns 
among diverse illicit commodities. To further qualify this analysis, there was an overt 
focus on rational actors dealing in tangible commodities, though neither condition may 
necessarily apply in the real world. Finally, ceteris paribus, smuggling activity has been 
characterized in spatial terms as following the path of least resistance, largely as a result 
of various spatial factors that serve to “push” or “pull” such activity by making it more or 
less attractive within or across a given area.
To more concretely assess this phenomenon, analysis was predicated on a basic 
model involving three interconnected decision-making domains of access, risk and 
connectivity. More specifically, access denotes the ability to control a smuggled < 
commodity throughout the logistical process, while risk stands for the set of factors that 
serve to impede access, most often imposed upon smuggling actors by nation-states.
From the smugglers’ perspective, within the limitations of their respective capabilities 
such actors use these criteria to seek the most attractive routes for a given commodity, 
namely those that maximize access, minimize risk, and optimize connectivity.
In terms of methodology, the inherent difficulties involved in the study of black 
markets were addressed at length in Chapter IV, with a particular emphasis on data gaps 
relating to the unknown and the inaccessible. As such, the intent behind a geographic
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approach to the issue of transnational smuggling was driven in large measure by the need 
to develop an approach that could most effectively leverage extant sources of 
information. The resultant basic model can be seen as a template for mapping out the 
more discrete spatial manifestations of this phenomenon.
As this template was consciously designed to be an open-ended architecture, its 
most compelling feature is its extensibility, specifically in terms of space, time and 
commodity. By being scalable to the relevant level of geographic analysis, flexible 
enough to encompass a diverse and often opaque set of data in the form of data points, 
observations, trends and events as they become available over time, and capable of 
meaningfully addressing nearly all identifiable types of illicit commodities and their 
related issue areas as outlined in Appendix A, this basic model can be seen as both usable 
and reusable to a high degree.
As such, the various aspects of and interactions among the decision-making 
domains of access, risk and connectivity was developed first in its generic form without 
reference to a specific commodity, and then applied to the global trade in heroin, which 
served as a benchmark commodity to illustrate the utility of this approach. Moreover, 
while realizing that smuggling actors can be depicted along a spectrum of organizational 
sophistication, with respect to this phenomenon the focus of this study was on TCOs, 
which not only represent of the upper end of this spectrum, but also are particularly 
noteworthy both within this issue area and for the complexity of their interaction with 
nation-states.
In terms of the relevant geographic levels of analysis in analyzing transnational 
smuggling activity, access and risk were conceptualized as operating reciprocally at the
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national level, with both in turn shaping and being shaped by connectivity at the 
transnational level. It should be noted, however, that the nature of the research question 
itself served to set these spatial delineations, and in theory the model could just as easily 
address the movement of illicit drugs up and down the eastern seaboard of the United 
States.
However, having set these specific geographic parameters, it became necessary to 
consider the respective national and transnational factors under which smuggling is most 
effectively able to flourish, given the underlying imperatives of supply and demand. For 
instance, at the national level, the impact of terrain that impedes the imposition of central 
government or law enforcement, traditions that foster smuggling activity, and various 
types of ongoing domestic turmoil can be most readily seen in balancing access and risk, 
with more favorable smugglers’ landscapes exhibiting higher levels of access and lower 
levels of risk, and consequently higher levels of connectivity.
As the very concept of connectivity is illustrative of the actual modes of 
conveyance and methods of concealment used to physically move illicit commodities 
across borders, at the transnational level of analysis issues relating to globalization, 
porous border control and the lack of effective cooperation between nation-states become 
relatively more important. At this juncture, the analytical convention of the smuggling 
vector was introduced as well to assist in assessing this activity.
However, to begin by revisiting the relevance of heroin as a suitable benchmark 
commodity, among the attributes that make it well suited to this role are that it is globally 
traded, of high value by weight, has a ubiquitous market presence worldwide but 
relatively discrete and moderately circumscribed primary source areas, functions beyond
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
410
its own supply and demand parameters as collateral in numerous types of other illicit 
transactions, and is subject to a longstanding and well-developed prohibition regime 
based on a broad international consensus.
Following an overview of opium and its derivatives, the evolution of international 
drug control and the related black markets for precursor chemicals and money 
laundering, the parameters of global heroin supply and demand that shape the spatial 
dimensions of the trade were discussed. In particular, the major opium cultivation areas 
of Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia and Latin America, as well as the key markets of 
Western Europe and North America were addressed in the context of the transnational 
movement of heroin, as are a number of other regional drug trafficking trends. The 
various approaches to the issue taken by specific national actors in terms of strategies 
designed to target either supply or demand were also outlined, as was the primacy of U.S. 
leadership within this issue area.
Generally speaking, recent decades have seen the evolution of increasingly 
diversified smuggling patterns with respect to illicit drugs, as well as a broadening of this 
phenomenon’s impact. More specifically, the lines between producer and consumer 
nations, as well as among supply- and demand- reduction strategies, continue to blur for 
both heroin and cocaine, though the latter does tend to be more highly circumscribed in 
terms of production within the Western hemisphere. While this analysis for the most part 
has been explicitly predicated upon supply-side considerations, to include the issue of 
transshipment, this phenomenon could not exist in the absence of the underlying demand 
for these substances, and as such a more holistic understanding of the issue must temper 
criticism, however warranted, of countries associated with illicit drug supply.
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The selection of Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria as case studies served to 
further illustrate specific aspects of the global heroin trade and to represent its more 
diverse regional manifestations. Using the basic model as a point of departure, an 
assessment of the relevant empirical data combining the conventions and parameters 
developed to address this issue was then conducted with respect to the transnational 
manifestations of this phenomenon. Similarly, other related methodological techniques 
were also discussed, specifically with respect to modified applications of geographic 
information systems and political risk analysis.
Each case study began by framing the national-level context of smuggling, and 
examined the physical, economic, political and human geographic factors that shape 
heroin smuggling within the country in question by focusing on the themes of terrain, 
tradition and domestic turmoil in their historical perspective. From there, the various sets 
of smuggling vectors proceeding outward from or across the focal nation-state via various 
modes of conveyance through intermediate transit nodes to their respective final 
destinations were considered. Finally, an assessment of this activity by applying the 
three interrelated decision-making domains, augmented by various other models, metrics 
and conventions, was conducted.
As the pivotal country within the Golden Crescent region with respect to this 
issue area, Afghanistan was in many ways a natural selection for such an analytical focus. 
Along with Burma, it is one of the two largest opium cultivators worldwide, while by 
virtue of its recent history the country has also become associated with both Islamic 
fundamentalism and terrorism. With respect to the entrenchment of the drug trade, in 
particular a state of protracted civil conflict dating from the Soviet invasion of 1979, as
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well as enduring warlordism and ethnic tensions, have significantly heightened both 
opium production and trafficking emanating outward from the country into the wider 
region.
Lacking maritime access and significant airport facilities, the primacy of land 
routes out of Afghanistan through Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian states is both 
logical and readily observable, as are various sets of smuggling vectors continuing 
outward, especially via Turkey, Eastern Europe and Africa. However, although Western 
Europe constitutes the major end-user market for Afghan heroin, growing demand in 
other regions can also be seen. Overall, the relevant transnational trading activity is 
characterized as a high degree of complexity in terms of intermediary relationships with 
respect to goods in transit.
For its part, in addition to successfully adapting established cocaine smuggling 
routes and methods to the movement of heroin, Colombia has also become a primary 
source country with respect to the U.S. market. Domestically, the nation’s ongoing civil 
strife, and in particular pressure on the central government from both guerrilla 
movements and drug trafficking activity, has become salient enough to make 
“Colombianization” a byword for parallel situations in other countries.
Overall, Colombian TCOs exhibit a high degree of control within the region with 
respect to illicit drug supply chains originating in Latin American, most saliently by 
exerting considerable leverage over their various partners. By focusing on North 
America as the major market, these organizations have been able to maintain primacy 
across land routes directly through Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and Central America, and
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often from there into Mexico, maritime access to both the Caribbean basin and the Pacific 
Ocean, and control various air routes via both commercial and private conveyances.
Finally, over time Nigeria has evolved into a known heroin transit hub without 
being a center of production, demonstrating that factors other than mere proximity can be 
decisive. This development has been significantly facilitated by the fertile ground 
provided by the country’s demonstrable corruption and ineffective political institutions, 
with in turn can largely be traced to an influx of massive oil wealth, the legacy of colonial 
rule, and a spoils system that exploits the endemic ethno-religious tensions throughout 
the nation.
Moreover, not only does Nigeria proper serve as both a safe haven and a 
command center for transnational criminal activity, by linking major drug supply and 
demand regions Nigerian TCOs can be seen as providing a significant portion of the 
“legs” for the global heroin trade. As such, Nigeria and the wider West African region 
cannot be considered as being off the beaten path of the worldwide and increasingly 
borderless drug trade. Their capabilities in this respect can for the most part be attributed 
to their strategic and spatial competitive advantages, with the later largely stemming from 
the widespread West African diaspora and resultant presence within the relevant markets.
Despite a number of regional variations, certain distinct commonalities emerge 
from a comparison of these three cases. Specifically, the impact of terrain has had a 
distinct impact on observable sets of smuggling vectors as they cross international 
borders and continue on toward their final destinations. Similarities among the various 
groups involved in transnational smuggling are also readily apparent, many of which can 
in many instances be traced back historically to longstanding traditions of smuggling.
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Finally, perhaps the most salient parallels between Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria 
can be seen in their legacies of domestic political, economic and social turmoil, which in 
turn have allowed for various types of criminal activity to become entrenched.
In absence of Cold War as a global security paradigm, the rising profile of 
transnational security issues, to include not only organized crime but also terrorism and 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, seems well positioned to fill this vacuum. 
However, for the foreseeable future there will be no viable contenders to the primacy of 
the nation-state on the international stage. That being said, nation-states still need to 
come to terms with threats that transcend their borders, with a particular onus on those 
countries where such threats either originate or are otherwise allowed to flourish.
As such, in the future other national actors within the international system may be 
compelled to intervene either unilaterally or multilaterally, despite the constraints 
imposed by accepted concepts of sovereignty. Thus, in the future nation-states that are 
chronically and demonstrably unable or unwilling to effectively manage their borders 
may increasingly find their sovereignty compromised by unilateral or multilateral 
external action. For instance, beyond the specific issue area of the illicit drug trade, the 
potential transnational spread of weapons of mass destruction was one of the primary 
justifications for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003.
Moreover, of the three cases examined in this study, the U.S.-led invasion of 
Afghanistan and the subsequent ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001 constitute 
another of the more extreme examples of this trend. In Colombia, the issue of the 
extradition of drug smugglers to the U.S. remains contentious, though arguably this 
leverage was decisive in propping up the central government during its internal struggle
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with the Medellin cartel. Finally, in the recent past Nigeria has had the dubious 
distinction of being the only non-drug producing nation to be decertified by the U.S. due 
to its ongoing failure to meaningfully address its role in the global transit of narcotics.
As noted previously, Afghanistan and Colombia have also had experience with 
decertification by various U.S. administrations.
However, while the United States remains the indispensable superpower, no 
single nation is capable of meaningfully countering either the global drug trade or the 
wider range of pressing transnational security issues alone. To begin to meet the 
challenges posed by this type of threat, nation-states must first recognize the complex 
interaction between smuggling actors and nation-states at the systemic level, particularly 
in the context of public sector corruption, good governance, border control, failed and 
failing states, “interspaces” within the international system, and the evolving role of 
customs entities worldwide, and then concentrate on transnational criminal networks 
rather than being narrowly focused on arresting and prosecuting individuals.
The demonstrable scope of transnational security issues should theoretically 
provide the grounds for a deepening for international cooperation by rational national 
actors based on concrete mutual interests. However, the key to this type of substantive 
interaction of course lies in the willingness of decision-makers to both meaningfully 
engage and devote resources to the problem. As an obvious prerequisite for effective 
action, before the relative projected feasibility of any specific measure can be discussed, 
a deeper appreciation of the spatial manifestations of the smugglers’ landscape is in 
order.
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Being successful in this endeavor in turn means that nation-states must develop 
more flexible and robust legal and investigative expertise and assets, and with respect to 
profit-motivated non-state actors in particular to even more fundamentally “recognize 
that organized crime is a business, and business and enterprise models are a useful way to 
conceptualize it.”181 With respect to access, while elements of the nexus of identifiable 
enabling factors have been allowed to take root to varying degrees in nation-states all 
over the world, and as such the issue in turn needs to be engaged meaningfully at both the 
local and the international level.
Given the conceptualization of risk from the perspective of the smuggling actor, 
in terms of vulnerability versus likelihood, or susceptibility to losses versus the 
consequences of those losses, certain measures can be taken to raise the deterrence 
threshold within a specific geographic area beyond what is considered economically 
feasible by the relevant smuggling actors. Toward that end, there are several broad 
conclusions that can be made regarding the parameters for optimizing success within this 
issue area, many rather simple in theory yet complicated in practice. As the USCS noted 
in 1997, “The combination of technology, changes in detection methods, and 
international and domestic cooperation holds the greatest potential for improvements in 
the disruption of smuggling organizations.”182
Finally, in terms of connectivity, the potential and actual modes of transnational 
smuggling by land, water and air must also be taken into account, as must be the roles of 
other non-state actors such as multinational corporations. Efforts to impede criminal 
connectivity include, but are not limited to, effective international and interagency
181 Lupska, 38.
182 U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 16.
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communication and coordination; timely and actionable intelligence sharing covering 
both the broad picture and local threat assessments, especially those driven by human 
intelligence; and the implementation of industry “best practices” at all transportation 
facilities by offering the private sector incentives if necessary.
This last issue should also encompass the deployment of innovative as well as 
proven countermeasures, particularly those relating to new and emerging technologies, 
but must be tempered by an awareness of the unintended consequences of robust 
interdiction and inspection efforts. This includes, but is not limited to, the economic 
impact stemming from intrusive inspection regimes and the migration of the flow of 
contraband to alternative modes of transit in search of relatively more attractive paths of 
least resistance.
In order to come full circle and return to the primary goal of this study, the 
attempt to first formulate and then validate an approach that can effectively frame the 
varied manifestations of smuggling in geographic terms lies as the crux of this study. As 
noted above, the open-ended architecture of the basic model is highly extensible in terms 
of space, time and commodity. Thus, in framing an agenda for future research, there are 
several distinct areas to which this generic template can be applied and extended.
Spatially, the level of analysis can be adjusted in accordance to the parameters 
necessitated by the focus of interest, be it local, regional, national or international. 
Furthermore, as only three case studies were presented for a single commodity, there is 
ample scope for further work to be done even within the parameters put forth in the 
course of this study, since every nation-state can be seen to a greater or lesser degree as 
challenged by transnational smuggling. Temporally, as more compete information
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becomes available the decision-making domains of access, risk and connectivity can be 
updated accordingly.
Given greater granularity in terms of such data, the whole structure of basic model 
could be extended considerably. Furthermore, any discernible gaps between expected 
and observed sets of smuggling vectors for a given commodity in the context of a given 
space and time could point the way to further modifications and perhaps a subsequent 
transition to more predictive modes of analysis. The methodologies discussed in Chapter 
IV, particularly relating to political risk analysis and geographic information systems, 
may also be further exploited. With respect to the latter, it is hoped that more emphasis 
will be placed on the collection of geospatially-correlated data pertaining to the relevant 
issue areas, and that such data will be both openly accessible and leveraged to its fullest.
Finally, in addition to expansion in terms of space, time and data, there are 
countless applications of this approach that can be made in the arguably even more 
straightforward extension necessary to encompass other types of illicit commodities. In 
fact, the observable range of smuggled commodities delineated at greater length in 
Appendix A offers a serviceable point of departure for framing such a research agenda. 
Overall, this analytical framework has been presented to illustrate the geographic 
dynamics of an extremely pressing global challenge, in conjunction with the associated 
models, conventions and case studies. With the aggregation of these constituent 
elements, it is hoped that the utility, flexibility and robustness of geographic analysis has 
been demonstrated with respect to the relevant issue areas.
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APPENDIX A 






Endangered Animals and Animal Parts (3) 




Sensitive and Strategic Items (6) 
Weapons and Military Equipment (7) 
Illegal Immigration (8)
Art, Antiquities and Cultural Artifacts (9)
Duty-Avoidance, 
Diversion & Differential 
Pricing
Cigarettes and Alcohol (10) 
Gasoline and Other Fuels (11) 
Gemstones (12)
Gold and Other Metals (13) 
Miscellaneous Commodities (14)
The table above represents an attempt to sort the various types of contraband 
smuggled internationally for profit. In the first category are those commodities that by 
their nature are either prohibited under international agreement or otherwise highly 
controlled. In the second, goods that are not necessarily illegal by their nature, but rather 
become contraband by virtue of where they originate from, are destined for, or who 
controls their movement. Finally, items in the last category may not be illegal at all, but 
may be commonly smuggled primarily to circumvent import and export controls and thus 
maximize profits. However, as these categories are not mutually exclusive, some overlap 
can be found among them, as will be discussed below.
Furthermore, this typology is limited to tangible commodities. While falling 
beyond the bounds of this study, however, the illegal international movement of non­
tangible assets remains an important issue. In particular, this would include such 
categories as classified information, trade secrets, password and other coding 
information, proprietary encryption algorithms, wire transfers of laundered money, and
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child pornography in digital formats. However, despite this distinction, the basic
smuggling model of access, risk and connectivity can, at least in theory, be adapted to
meet these analytical challenges as well.
(1) As discussed in Chapter IV, the two primary categories of illicit drugs are the 
natural and the synthetic. Among the former, there are three types that are 
cultivated on a large scale for profit. These are the opiates, from which such 
compounds as morphine and heroin are derived; the cannaboids, such as 
marijuana and hashish; and the coca derivatives. Other types of natural drugs 
include hallucinogens such as the fungal-based lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 
the psilocybin mushroom, the bufotenine found in secretions from the cane toad, 
and peyote buttons, found among the roots of the namesake cacti. The latter 
figures prominently in certain Native American religious practices, as discussed 
in “A field full of buttons,” The Economist, 3 April 1999, 27.
Furthermore, more regionally based drugs also have a moderately circumscribed 
popularity, such as mambog and kratom in Southeast Asia, the latter derived from 
the Mitragyna speciosa shrub, and the qat, or khat, leaf containing the stimulant 
cathinone and traditionally chewed by Muslims throughout East Africa. An 
excellent account of both the economic and social aspects of the qat trade can be 
found in Kevin Rushby, Eating the Flowers o f Paradise: A Journey through the 
Drug Fields o f Ethiopia and Yemen (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). See 
also Jonathan Stevens, “Krazy Khat,” Somalia’s Deadly Drug War,” New 
Republic, 23 November 1992, 17-8; OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 
189-92 focusing on Kenya; and “Qat Trade in Africa,” Case 427, Trade 
Environment Database (TED), American University, available at 
http://www.american.edu/proiects/mandala/TED/qat.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
By contrast, synthetic drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), various 
barbiturates and “club drugs” such as Ecstasy, as well as a wide range of 
prescription medicines, form the other major class of controlled substances. 
Incidentally, the UNDCP’s taxonomy lists prescription drug used illicitly as a 
separate category. For more on the abuse of prescription drugs in the U.S., see 
“Give them their pills, the fuddled masses,” The Economist, 23-4.
Finally, it should be noted that in several Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia 
and Sudan, alcoholic beverages are also illegal. Moreover, historically a number 
of commodities now not considered as drugs per se have in the past fallen under 
this heading. For instance, see Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World 
That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to Present 
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 77-108; in addition to opium and coca, 
coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco and sugar are discussed from this perspective.
(2) An insightful analysis of this phenomenon can be found in Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington, DC: CSIS
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Task Force Report, Global Organized Crime Project, 1996), particularly 9-18. 
However, actually tracking the illicit movement of fissile materials is 
understandably problematic. A chronology of recent detected international 
nuclear smuggling events involving nuclear materials (1993-6) is available as an 
appendix to U.S. Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, Testimony of 
John Deutch, CIA Director, 20 March 1996, available at 
http://www.fas.Org/irp/congress/l996 hr/s960320c.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
For more on this crucial issue, which has developed a significantly higher profile 
since 9/11, see also “The plutonium racket,” The Economist, 20 August 1994, 39- 
40; U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, 
Ch. 1 ,13; and, for a European perspective on this issue, Frank Gregory, 
“Transnational Crime Law Enforcement Cooperation: Problems and Processes 
Between East and West in Europe,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no.4 
(Winter 1995), 126-8.
(3) Within this issue area, the leading international regime is the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), originally established in 
1973. However, as with most international agreements there are broadly 
divergent views regarding fairness of application. A good example of the failure 
of national governments to reach true consensus is the anti-whaling issue area, 
with perennial objections voiced by both Norway and Japan. In each of these 
cases, national sovereignty and cultural, in this case dietary, traditions most often 
form the basis of opposition. See Calvin Sims, “Japan, Feasting on Whale, Sniffs 
at ‘Culinary Imperialism’ of U.S.” New York Times (web edition), 10 August 
2000 .
A related area of disagreement arises between balancing protection of resources 
with sustainable development. An example of this is found in efforts to liquidate 
existing elephant ivory stockpiles, which is often categorically opposed even 
when the proceeds are earmarked to fund conservation efforts. See “Sustainable 
arguments,” The Economist (web edition), 21 June 1997, and “Excitement at 
CITES,” The Economist (web edition), 15 April 2000.
Furthermore, certain types of animal parts in particular, such as rhino horn, tiger 
bone and grizzly bear gall bladder, are highly prized as ingredients in traditional 
Chinese herbal medicines and remain an important stimulant of demand. See 
“Why rhinos recommend Viagra,” The Economist, 30 May 1998, 76; and Marsh, 
133-5.
Other product derived from endangered species may be used in the production of 
consumer items, especially in the fashion industry. Finally, there is the collateral 
trade in the smuggling of exotic live animals, most often for eventual use as pets. 
The increasing profitability of servicing the pent-up demand for such goods is 
apparent from the level of overall poaching activity, as well as a growing interest 
in this area on the part of more organized criminal groups.
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For more on this issue, see Michael D. Lemonick, “Animal Genocide, Mob 
Style,” Time, 14 November 1994, 77-8; “Kill the butterfly,” The Economist, 8 
April 1995, 28-9; Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 78-9; and, 
more recently, “Pet owners hear the call of the wild,” International Herald 
Tribune, 14 February 2002, 8; and “Out of the blue,” The Economist, 2 November 
2002, 77-8. Shaw, 6-7, also notes the involvement of apartheid-era South African 
military intelligence networks in this trade as a means of both gathering 
information and raising money for additional projects.
(4) This category covers a wide range of intellectual property violations across a wide 
range of commodities, include such items as fake Gucci bags or Rolex watches, as 
well as pirated copies of movies and music. While diligence with respect to 
enforcement varies from country to county, in theory these goods are de facto 
contraband at the global level. In theory, this area is governed under international 
copyright law.
For more on the scope of this issue, see U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 20-2; and “Imitating property is 
theft,” The Economist, 17 May 2003, 52-4. A more recent association between 
this type of activity and terrorist financing can be found in David Johnston, 
“Terrorist groups dealing in counterfeit goods, Interpol head says,” International 
Herald Tribune, 17 July 2003, 4. For more on efforts to control such activity, see 
Jeffrey Sparshott, “Faking out the fakers,” Washington Times, 23 June 2003, C l7, 
20; and with specific reference to this phenomena’s manifestations in Vietnam, 
“Faking it,” The Economist, 15 February 2003, 40.
(5) This category refers primarily to official sanctions imposed at either the national 
or international level. As such, there may exist a degree of overlap with other 
types of prohibited goods. An excellent overview of sanctions and their 
circumvention can be found in Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers. Moreover, one of 
the most salient historical examples can be found in the case of apartheid-era 
South Africa, while the situation in Iraq, ongoing as of this writing, offers yet 
another.
To make this issue even more complicated, smuggling actors generally do their 
utmost to disguise the point of origin for their goods that have a legitimate 
alternate source. As such, enforcement is particularly difficult in the case of 
fungible commodities. For instance, overlapping with (11) below is Iraqi or, in 
the case of the United States, Libyan and Iranian oil. For a snapshot of the 
shortcomings of the sanctions regime in Iraq, see Vivienne Walt, “Iraqis making 
the most of porous sanctions,” USA Today, 1 November 2002, 15-6A; and with 
respect to Iran, “18 U.S. businesses searched as part of inquiry into arms sales to 
Iran,” International Herald Tribune, 11 July 2003, 5.
Another example is so-called “conflict” diamonds, which as of this writing is the 
subject of various international efforts aimed at curbing this source of funding for
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guerrilla movements, particularly focusing on sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly 
enough, there is a parallel with the more long-standing issue of illicit diamond 
buying (IDB), which the DeBeers cartel has been trying to curtail for the greater 
part of a century. For a historical view of this long-standing phenomenon, see 
Stefan Kanfer, The Last Empire: DeBeers, Diamonds and the World (New York: 
Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1993). More recent permutations of this issue are 
discussed in Matthew Hart, Diamond: The History o f a Cold-Blooded Love Affair 
(New York: Plume Books, 2001), 191-3.
Within the mining industry, more recent international and regional efforts have 
been focused on seemingly intractable internal conflict in Sierra Leone, Angola 
and the Congo, with various plans revolving around the development of an 
international-recognized process to certify a given gemstone’s point of origin.
See Blaine Hardin, “The West Hopes to Curtail Diamond Trading, but Without 
the Money and Troops.” New York Times (web edition), 2 August 
2000;“Diamond king,” The Economist (web edition), 29 January 00; and 
“Diamond leaders in pact to ban ‘conflict gems’ funding African wars,”
CNN.com, 18 July 2000; and “A crook’s best friend,” The Economist, 4 January
2003, 50.
(6) For an overview of this phenomenon, see R. T. Naylor, “The Rise of the Modem 
Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply-side Control,” Transnational 
Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 209-36. However, this 
category shades into the one immediately following, in addition to an obvious 
overlap with (2) above, but the intent here is to differentiate between high-end, 
sophisticated weaponry and more common types of arms. For instance, in 
addition to the control of arms and other weapons-related transactions, the export 
of some types of dual-use civilian-military items may also fall under this heading. 
Moreover, a similar case can be made for the various technologies deemed of 
strategic importance, such as supercomputer, missile and satellite systems.
An example of an item that could easily be placed under either heading is the 
U.S.-produced ground-to-air, shoulder-fired Stinger missile, lavishly distributed 
throughout Pakistan for use in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. These 
have become common throughout the region ever since, to the extent that the CIA 
unsuccessfully tried to initiate a buy-back program in the early 1990s. By 1995, 
the estimated $65 million spent had served primarily to drive up the price tag for 
these units.
For more on this issue, see Natalie J. Goldring, “Links between domestic laws and 
international light weapons control,” presented at Project on Light Weapons - 
Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons, Washington, DC, 11-12 
December 1997; and, William D. Hartung, “Reports -  Weapons at War,” World 
Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, May 1995, available at 
http ://www. worldpolicv. org/proiects/arms/reports/wawrep.html. accessed 15 July
2004, with a particular emphasis on Section II.
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(7) Among all categories of smuggled weapons and military equipment, small arms 
are logically enough the most ubiquitous. The extent of this trade is detailed in 
“Hey, anybody want a gun?” The Economist, 16 May 1998, 47-8. In particular, 
this article makes note of the various versions of the Kalashinkov rifle, both long- 
lasting and easy to reproduce (with a total of only 16 working parts), but puts 
forth the interesting suggestion that it “may be more realistic to restrict the 
ammunition that is so cheap it is unattractive to smugglers.”
See also Phil Williams, “Drugs and guns,” Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists 55, 
no. 1 (January 1999), in which the author also makes the salient point that “for 
organized crime, armaments are both commodities and tools of the trade.” This 
view is also echoed in R. T. Naylor, “Loose cannons: Covert commerce and 
underground finance in the modem arms black market,” Crime, Law and Social 
Change, 22 (1995), 1-57. Unofficial ties between the military-industrial complex 
and organized criminal elements in Russia have been well documented, with 
weapons comprising a key commodity for transfer. See Handelman, 207-14; and 
Graham H. Turbeville, Jr., “Organized Crime and the Russian Armed Forces,” 
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 64-73.
For a holistic overview of the issue of weapons moving through the international 
system, to include developments since the end of the Cold War, as well as the 
roles of air and sea routes, see also U.S. Interagency Working Group, 
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 13-5; and Bryan Wood and Johan 
Peleman, “The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents,” 
NISATResearch Report 99.3 (November 1999), available at 
http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/default.htm. accessed 15 July 2004, 
with an emphasis on Ch. 1, 5-7.
(8) Though illegal immigration is subject to a wide range of motivating factors, most 
of these may be categorized as either economic or political. Furthermore, 
international criminal groups appear to be increasingly engaged in this trade, with 
an emphasis on ensuring migrants pay for the service. As noted in U.S. 
Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 8, 
“Besides being a profitable criminal business, smuggling illegal immigrants is 
less risky than trafficking in other illicit contraband, such as drugs.” For a 
excellent overview of this issue with respect to illegal economic migrants from 
Mexico crossing into the U.S. circa the mid-1980s, see Conover, passim.
However, a number of trends can be seen developing, including the growth of the 
dangerous practice of smuggling human beings in containerized cargo, an 
increase in the systematic use of false documents and the overall surge in volume 
of activity. At least part of this increase has been attributed, either directly or 
indirectly, to a shift on the part of smuggling actors away from drugs, seen as 
carrying higher risks with similar profits. While press coverage of the numerous 
recent cases abounds, overviews of this issue area can be found in Kerry, 133-49; 
and “World faces deluge of human trafficking,” CNN.com, 31 August 2000. For
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more recent discussions of this phenomenon, see also “Desperate cargo,” The 
Economist, 2 March 2002, 44; and “A cargo of exploitable souls,” The Economist, 
1 June 2002, 30-1.
Furthermore, this activity is also highly correlated with efforts to ensure sufficient 
“workers,” often coerced, to support various venues associated with the sex trade. 
For an overview of the latter issue, see Amy O’Neill Richard, “International 
Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of 
Slavery and Organized Crime,” DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program 
monograph, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, November 1999, available 
at http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/women/trafficking.pdf. accessed 15 July 
2004; Sarah Shannon, “Prostitution and the Mafia: The Involvement of Organized 
Crime in the Global Sex Trade,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 4 (Winter
1997), 119-43; and “In the Shadows,” The Economist (web edition), 26 August 
2000 .
Finally, a related issue involves the illegal trade in human organs. For a 
comprehensive international overview, see Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “ The Global 
Traffic in Human Organs,” Current Anthropology 4, no. 2 (April 2000), 191-251. 
An analysis of a single case study, which also serves to highlight differences in 
national legal approaches to the issue, can be found in “India Kidney Trade,”
Case 240, Trade Environment Database (TED), American University, available at 
http://www.american.edu/TED/kidnev.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
(9) This area of smuggling is intimately involved not only with stolen goods but also, 
increasingly, the legal status of such items in terms of provenance and residual 
ownership. Even objects acquired in good faith have been the focus of 
repossession efforts on the grounds that they are national treasures or illegally 
obtained at an earlier period, depending on interpretations of often-conflicting 
national laws, See “Caveat emptor,” The Economist (web edition), 18 September 
1999; and “Unplundering art,” The Economist, 20 December 1997, 126-8.
An important aspect of this black market is the blurring of lines between legality 
and illegality in terms of both commodity and actors. See Lauren L. Bemick,
“Art and Antiquities Theft,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (Summer
1998), 91-116, which also includes discussion of the use of these items as both 
collateral for drug transactions and to launder money. For instance, a growing 
exporter of smuggled art in recent years has been Russia, with trafficking in stolen 
religious artwork being especially prominent, as noted in Handelman, 182-9.
However, a number of other countries with rich archeological heritages have also 
been subject to this phenomenon. One recent example has been the wholesale 
looting of museums in Iraq in the wake of the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein 
and the resultant power vacuum and breakdown of law and order. See “Heavy 
history, light fingers,” The Economist (3 May 2003), 79; and “The Disappearing 
Treasure of Iraq,” Washington Post (23 April 2003), C l, C8-9.
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(10) Both of these commodities are among the more commonly smuggled goods, by 
virtue of relatively high import duties and stable demand. Exploitation of cross- 
border prices may be found in many parts of the world; recently, Britain in 
particular has been an attractive target. See “The Belgium job,” The Economist, 8 
May 1999, 58-9, which focuses on both alcohol and tobacco bootlegging; and 
“Smuggling -  tobacco galore,” The Economist (web edition), 18 March 2000, 
which notes that, “Tobacco smuggling is the Britain’s fastest growing category of 
crime,” due primarily to low risks and high profits.
For another recent example, further underlining the linkage between criminal 
activity and terrorism, a Charlotte, North Carolina-base cigarette smuggling ring 
was recently broken. This group was allegedly raising money for the Islamic 
guerrilla group Hezbollah by exploiting interstate tax differences between North 
Carolina and Michigan, rather than operating internationally. “U.S. authorities 
bust cigarette-smuggling ring linked to Hezbollah,” CNN.com, 21 July 2000.
(11) For instance, Handelman, 243-4, discusses the use of Baltic routes by Russian oil 
and petroleum shippers seeking to avoid export duties. An extensive case study 
of this phenomenon in the 1980s can also be found in Block, 307-39. According 
to the author, those involved included “traditional organized criminals from the 
New York metropolitan region, organized criminals newly migrated to the U.S. 
particularly from Eastern Europe, criminal entrepreneurs from the Benelux 
nations, various energy-industry executives in the U.S. and Europe and 
institutions and individuals involved in quite massive money-laundering 
operations.”
Finally, two further examples of this phenomenon have been previously discussed 
in the context of this study. Specifically, both the case studies focusing on 
Colombia and Nigeria address this issue in terms of its relevance to a more 
holistic view of regional smuggling. As such, the exploitation of cross-border 
pricing differentials with respect to fuel between Colombia and Ecuador is noted 
in Chapter VI, while a similar situation Nigeria and its West African neighbors, is 
examined in the first section of Chapter VII.
(12) Gemstones, both cut and uncut, comprise a particularly lucrative and highly 
fungible form of highly portable wealth, and are often used as collateral in a wide 
range of illegal transactions. Preferences appear to vary according to local market 
conditions and availability. As discussed in (5) above, diamonds are a commonly 
smuggled commodity whose trade is often strictly regulated without generally 
falling into a restricted category.
For a regional analysis of the situation in Africa prior to the drive for international 
sanctions on “conflict diamonds,” see Francois Misser, “Smuggler’s rout,”
African Business, no. 200 (June 1995), 27-8; and “Dirty dealings,” African 
Business, no. 211 (June 1996), 16-9. The latter article in particular notes the 
disparity between statistics reported to the Diamond High Council on deliveries
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and those of individual countries’ production. For more on this issue from the 
South African perspective, see also Marsh, 71-7.
However, more recently tanzanite has also become more prominent in illegal 
transactions. For instance, traders and various other middlemen dealing with 
tanzanite have been linked with al-Qa’eda smuggling networks. This gemstone, 
found only in one 13-square kilometer area of Tanzania, has seen a considerable 
rise in demand over the past several years. As the uncut stones move toward 
finishing centers such as Jaipur, India, where they are cut and polished, they 
allegedly pass through the hands of Muslim extremists, particularly in Kenya and 
the United Arab Emirates. See Robert Block and Daniel Pearl, “Rampant 
Smuggling of Blue Gem Helps Bin Laden Loyalists,” Wall Street Journal, 19 
November 2001, A l, A9.
Moreover, even beyond diamonds and tanzanite, the trade in various other types 
of precious stones can also be observed fulfilling a similar function throughout the 
world. For more on the smuggling of gemstones focused on specific regions, see 
also Lisa Gubemick, “You Die For Sure,” Forbes, 26 October 1987, 94-6, which 
deals with Burmese rubies; and “Gem wars,” The Economist, 21 July 1990, 40-1, 
which examines the illegal trade in emeralds from Colombia.
(13) Gold has a long history of involvement in smuggling. An overview of this 
activity can be found in Timothy Green, The New World o f Gold, rev. ed. (New 
York: Walker and Company, 1984), 186-97. For a more focused national 
perspective, see also “High taxes spur gold smuggling in South Korea,” American 
Metals Market 103, no. 182 (21 September 1995), 9. For an analysis of this 
phenomenon closer to a major source, see Marsh, 66-7.
The stimulus for illicit trade in this case may be linked directly to heavy taxes on 
imported gold, including a customs duty, a value-added charge and an additional 
education tax. Avoiding these costs in turn generates the smuggler’s profit. The 
utility of gold in laundering large sums of criminally derived funds is also 
discussed in U.S. Department of State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,”
4. Chapter V of this study also notes the traditional prevalence of gold smuggling 
throughout the Persian Gulf.
Further examples of large-scale metals smuggling, particularly on the part of 
Russian organized crime, include aluminum, copper, titanium, and even scrap 
metal. For instance, during the early 1990s, Estonia rose to become the sixth 
largest exporter of non-ferrous metals, despite the fact that not a single ton of 
metal was being produced in its factories. See Handelman, 243-7; and Fialka, 77- 
86 .
(14) While a discussion of all of the various types of commodities under this heading 
are too numerous and varies to examine in extensive detail, generally speaking 
any good that is either highly taxed or otherwise strictly regulated may be targeted
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for smuggling efforts. As a result, diversion of commodities from either the open 
market or state-controlled channels often occurs. In the latter case, this 
phenomenon is highly correlated with public-sector corruption. Moreover, close 
proximity to a cross-border area where a given good is available at either a much 
higher or lower price will encourage smuggling in the direction that will maximize 
profit.
An excellent example of this can be found in the large-scale smuggling of oil 
from Nigeria, as discussed in Chapter VII and noted above. Another case can be 
found in Tanzania, specifically with respect to avoiding the officially-set buying 
price for cloves through the state-owned monopoly, the Zanzibar State Trading 
Company, which has in turn led to increased smuggling of the spice between the 
clove-growing islands and the Tanzanian coast. See “Zanzibar’s Bid to Curb 
Clove Smuggling,” African News Service, 18 January 2001. For another East 
African example, see also “Sugar Shortage Due to Smuggling,” African News 
Service, 5 September 2000.
Other popular markets that are serviced by smugglers include those for high-value 
goods such as designer clothing or computer components, as well as easily 
disposable goods such as foodstuffs and household items not readily available 
elsewhere. Moreover, the growing international demand for stolen vehicles has 
led to wide-ranging networks to meet these market preferences, as noted in U.S. 
Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 19.
Though difficult to estimate, it may be argued that in some regions of the world, 
black market consumer goods account for an even larger portion of illegal 
economies than more traditional smuggled commodities. For instance, for a 
regional assessment see Stephen Ellis and Janet MacGaffey, “Research on Sub- 
Saharan Africa’s Unrecorded International Trade: Some Methodological and 
Conceptual Problems,” African Studies Review 39, no. 2 (September 1996), 19- 
42.

















HEROIN -  A TIMELINE
Morphine first synthesized 
First Opium War 
Second Opium War
Heroin first synthesized in Germany by the Bayer Company, though by 
some accounts it was discovered as early as 1874 by a British chemist
U.S. government convenes Philippines Opium Commission, closing down 
the opium trading monopoly set up by Spanish colonial authorities and 
banning opium dens
International Opium Commission held in Shanghai, China, the first 
international conference to discuss the issue of the illegal drug trade
Hague Opium Convention formulated, with follow-up meetings in 1913 
and 1914; largely mooted by advent of First World War
Harrison Narcotics Act passed in the United States, restricting the trade in 
opiates, as well as a number of other categories of drugs, by requiring a 
doctor’s prescription for their distribution
League of Nations sets up Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium 
and Other Dangerous Drugs
Two conferences, collectively know as the International Opium 
Conference, held in Geneva, Switzerland
Geneva Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic 
Drugs held, following an abortive attempt to convene two years earlier
Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs
Paris Protocol, under U.N. auspices, providing for new drugs to be 
included under international control measures
U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, seeking to incorporate all nine 
international drug agreements formulated since 1921












U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, followed by a related 
protocol the next year
First U.S. “war on drugs’ commences during the Nixon administration, a 
cause taken up in earnest later beginning with the Reagan administration
U.S. legislatively mandates annual certification of other country’s drug 
control efforts by amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances
G-7 established the Financial Action Task Force in an attempt to control 
money laundering, since expanded to include twenty-six members
G-7 establishes Chemical Action Task Force in an attempt to control 
access to precursor chemicals used in drug processing
Clinton administration issues Executive Order 12978, allowing U.S. 
federal authorities to either freeze or block all assets held in the U.S. by 
known foreign nationals engaged in international narcotics trafficking
Multilateral Chemical Reporting Initiative proposed under U.S. auspices
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, adopted by U.N. General Assembly in Resolution 54/109
In addition to other consequences, events of September 11 herald a radical 
reassessment of security issues relating to the control of international 
borders




This model is derived from a Cocaine Activity Model developed by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and encompasses a parallel structure in terms of stages and 
sub-stages. As such, within this generic model each stage represents a series of events 
that may occur during the production, processing, transshipment, distribution and 
consumption of heroin (diaceyltmorphine or diamorphine).
Opium P oddv Stage
01 -  Grow Opium Poppy
0 1 .1 -  Clear Land (often slash & bum)
01.2 -  Purchase / Acquire Seeds
01.3 -  Plant Seeds
01.4 -  Cultivate (weeding, etc.; +/- 3 months to maturity)
Opium Gum Stage
02  -  Harvest & Store Opium Gum
02.1 -  Harvest Opium Gum (once flower petals have fallen)
02.1.2 -  Shallowly Cut (‘score’) Bulb
02.1.2 -  Scrape Off Sap (‘gum’)
02.1.3 — Collect Opium Gum for Drying (several days)
02.1.4 -  Repeat Scoring of Bulbs (3-5 times or until no more produced)
02.2 -  Prepare for Subsequent Cultivation
02.2.1 -  Cut Bulbs from Stem
02.2.2 -  Dry Bulbs
02.2.3 -  Collect Seeds from Bulbs (for use in next year’s planting)
02.3 -  Prepare Opium Gum for Storage
02.3.1 -  Collect Opium Gum for Drying (several days)
02.3.2 -  Press Opium Gum into Bricks
02.3.3 -  Wrap Opium Gum for Storage
02.4 -  Deliver Opium Gum to Storage Site
02.4.1 -  Establish Route Security
02.4.2 -  Move Opium Gum to Storage Site
02.5 -  Store Opium Gum (if properly stored, it has a relatively long shelf life)
02.5.1 -  Establish Site Security
Morphine Stage
03 -  Refine Opium Gum into Morphine (alternatively, use of opium ‘straw,’ or stalks &
bulbs; more common in licit production of opiates)
03.1 -  Prepare Processing Site
03.1.1 -  Establish Site Security
03.1.2 -  Acquire Necessary Equipment / Supplies
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03.3 -  Set Up Equipment
03.2 — Purchase / Collect Opium Gum from Storage
03.2.1 -  Negotiate Purchase / Coordinate Collection
03.3 -  Deliver Opium Gum to Processing Site
3.3.1 -  Establish Route Security
3.3.2 -  Move Opium Gum to Processing Site
03.4 -  Process Opium Gum into Morphine (ratio of approx. 10:1)
03.4.1 -  Dissolve Opium Gum in Boiling Water
03.4.2 -  Filter Liquid (burlap sacks commonly used)
03.4.3 -  Collect & Discard Precipitate (organic waste)
03.4.4 -  Reheat Liquid
03.4.5 -  Add Concentrated Ammonia
03.4.6 -  Collect Precipitate (morphine)
03.4.7 -  Dry Morphine
03.4.8 -  Press Morphine into Bricks
03.4.9 -  Wrap Morphine for Storage
03.5 -  Deliver Morphine to Storage Site
03.5.1 -  Establish Route Security
03.5.2 -  Move Morphine to Storage Site
03.6 -  Store Morphine
03.6.1 -  Establish Site Security
Heroin Stage 
04  -  Refine Morphine into Heroin
04.1 -  Prepare Processing Site
04.1.1 -  Establish Site Security
04.1.2 -  Acquire Necessary Equipment / Supplies
04.1.3 -  Set Up Equipment
04.2 -  Procure Precursor Chemicals (acetic anhydride is most common)
04.2.1 -  Move Precursor Chemicals to Site
04.3 -  Deliver Morphine to Processing Site
04.3.1 -  Collect Morphine from Storage Site
04.3.2 -  Establish Route Security
04.3.3 -  Move Morphine to Processing Site
04.4 -  Process Morphine into Heroin (chemically binding acetic anhydride to 
morphine molecule to produce CnHi7N0 (C2H302)2)
04.4.1 -  Add Equal Quantities of Morphine and Acetic Anhydride
04.4.2 -  Heat Mixture (six hours at 85°C recommended)
04.4.3 -  Add Water & Chloroform (to precipitate impurities)
04.4.3 — Collect & Discard Precipitate
04.4.4 -  Drain Solution
04.4.5 -  Add Sodium Carbonate (to precipitate heroin)
04.4.6 -  Filter Heroin Out of Solution (with activated charcoal)
04.4.7 -  Add Alcohol (to purify heroin)
04.4.8 -  Gently Heat to Evaporate Alcohol
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04.4.9 -  Collect Heroin (most commonly as a white or brown powder, 
though less refined ‘black tar’ heroin also found)
04.5 -  Deliver Heroin to Storage Site
04.5.1 -  Establish Route Security
04.5.2 -  Move Heroin to Storage Site
04.6 -  Store Heroin
04.6.1 -  Establish Site Security
04.7 -  Transship Heroin
04.7.1 -  Establish Route Security
04.7.2 -  Move Heroin via Logistical Channels
04.7.3 -  Repeat Transshipment as Necessary (including multiple 
iterations across national borders if applicable)
Distribution / Consumption Stage 
05 -  Repackage Heroin and Deliver to End User
05.1 -  Clear Customs into Target Country
05.2 -  Deliver Heroin to Storage Site
05.2.1 -  Establish Route Security
05.2.2 -  Mover Heroin to Storage Site
05.2 -  Store Heroin
05.2.1 -  Establish Site Security
05.3 -  Dilute (‘cut’) Heroin
05.3.1 -  Procure Dilutants (preferably some form of non-lethal powder)
05.3.2 -  Add to Heroin (purity will decrease, bulk will increase)
05.4 -  Repackage Heroin (into progressively smaller parcels)
05.5 -  Introduce Wholesale Heroin into Retail Marketing Channels
05.5.1 -  Establish Route Security
05.5.2 - Allot Wholesale Heroin to Retailers
05.6 -  Retail Heroin to Consumers
05.7 -  Consume Heroin (inject / inhale)
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